

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORD AND MEANING

SOME INDIAN APPROACHES WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF BHARTRHARI

BY

GAURINATH SASTRI, M.A., D.LITT.,
Principal, Sanskrit College, Calcutta.



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Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, No. V

Published under the auspices of the
Government of West Bengal

STUDIES No. 2

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORD AND MEANING

SANSKRIT COLLEGE
CALCUTTA
1959

Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series

BOARD OF EDITORS:

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PROFESSOR DURGAMOHAN BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., Kāvya-Sāṅkhya-
Purāṇatīrtha

PROFESSOR ANANTAKUMAR BHATTACHARYYA, Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha

DR GAURINATH SASTRI, M.A., D.Litt., *Secretary and General Editor*

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Published by
The Principal, Sanskrit College,
1 Bankim Chatterjee Street, Calcutta-6

©

Price : Rs. ~~20.00~~

22/81-

Printed by
S. N. Guha Ray at Sree Saraswaty Press Limited,
32 Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road, Calcutta-9

TO THE HALLOWED
MEMORY OF MY
REVERED GURUJI
MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA
HARANCHANDRA ŚĀSTRĪ

PREFACE

The present work, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, is the second in the Studies Series.

The writer feels it his solemn duty to recall to-day the names of two illustrious teachers at whose feet he had the rare privilege of studying some of the cardinal texts on the subject: the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Phanibhusan Tarkavāgiśa and the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Haranchandra Śāstrī. The latter, in particular, initiated him into the traditions of Sanskrit scholarship in Pāṇinian Philosophy which have been handed down to this day from the time of the great Nāgeśabhaṭṭa. The impetus to the writing of this book came from Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj, M.A., D.LITT., whose affectionate encouragement and abiding interest in the progress of the work have placed the author under a deep debt of gratitude. The author also acknowledges his profound indebtedness to Professor Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., PH.D., Director, Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra, under whose able and inspiring guidance the work was written.

The writer takes this opportunity of expressing his sincere gratitude to his much-esteemed colleague, Professor Taraknath Sen, M.A., of Presidency College, Calcutta, for having seen the work through. It is Professor Sen's assistance and encouragement that have made it possible for the writer to bring out the book in the present form. He is also indebted to Professors Govindagopal Mukherji, M.A., D.PHIL., Sāṅkhyatīrtha, Sisirkumar Mitra, M.A., LL.B., D.PHIL., and Gopikamohan Bhattacharyya, M.A., Nyāyatīrtha, for reading the proofs and taking a keen interest in the publication.

The author is also thankful to Sri Jibapriya Guha of the Sree Saraswaty Press, Ltd., for the kind interest he has taken in the printing of this book.

Sanskrit College, Calcutta
May, 1959.

GAURINATH SASTRI.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- ABI Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
 AK Amarakoṣa (Nirnayasagar Press, 1929)
 AVM Abhidhāvyūttimāṭṛkā (ed. by M.R. Telang, 1916)
 BH Bhāmati, supercommentary on Brahmasūtra (Nirnayasagar Press, 1917)
 BP Bodhapañcadaśikā
 BR Br̥hatī (Madras University Sanskrit Series)
 BS Brahmasiddhi (Madras Government Oriental Manuscript Series)
 CD Vākyapadiya (ed. by Charudeva Śāstrī, 1934)
 DL Dhvanyāloka (The Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1940)
 GP Gopālikā, commentary on SS (Madras University Sanskrit Series)
 GRM Gaṇaratnamahodadhi (ed. by J. Eggeling)
 HR Helārāja's commentary on VP (Benares Sanskrit Series)
 KD Kāvyaadarśa (ed. by P. Tarkavāgīśa, Calcutta)
 KP Kāvyaaprakāśa (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, 1929)
 KPU Kāvyaaprakāśa-uddiyota, commentary on KP
 KU Kāthopaniṣad
 MB Mahābhāṣya (Nirnayasagar Press, 1917)
 MBP Mahābhāṣyapradīpa, commentary on MB
 MBPU Mahābhāṣyapradīpa-uddiyota, commentary on MBP
 MG Mṛgendrāgama (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies)
 MM Mahārthamañjarī (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series)
 MU Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad
 NBH Nyāyasūtra-bhāṣya (ed. by Phanibhusan Tarkavāgīśa, Calcutta)
 NK Nyāyakusumāñjali (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)
 NKN Nyāyakaṇikā, commentary on VV (ed. by R. Śāstrī, Benares 1907)
 NKP Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakāśa, Vardhamāna's commentary on NK (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)
 NM Nyāyamañjarī (Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1936)
 NPR Nayanaprasādīnī, commentary on TP (Nirnayasagar Press, 1915)
 NR Nyāyaratnamālā (Gaekwad Oriental Series)
 NRN Nāyakarātna, commentary on NR (Gaekwad Oriental Series)
 NRT Nyāyaratnākara, commentary on ŚV (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)
 PC Pañcikā, commentary on BR (Madras University Sanskrit Series)

- PH Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya (The Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies)
- PN Pramāṇanayatattvāvalokālaṅkāra (ed. by Motilal, Poona)
- PR Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP (Benares Sanskrit Series)
- PS Pāṇinisūtra
- PT Parātrimśikā (The Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies)
- PTN Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa (Medical Hall Press, Benares)
- PWSBS Prince of Wales Saraswati Bhavan Studies
- RG Rasagaṅgādhara (Nirnayasagar Press, 1939)
- RP Rkprātiśākhya
- ŚB Śabarabhāṣya (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, 1929)
- ŚBH Śārīrabhāṣya, commentary on Brahmasūtra (Nirnayasagar Press, 1917)
- SBH Saubhāgyabhāṣkāra, commentary on Lalitāsahasranāma (ed. by W. L. Śāstri Pancikar, Bombay, 1927)
- ŚD Śivadṛṣṭi (The Kashmir Series of Texts & Studies)
- SD Sāhityadarpaṇa (ed. by C. Smṛtibhūṣaṇa, Calcutta, 1303 B.S.)
- SDS Sarvadarśanasamgraha (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, 1928)
- ŚK Śabdakaustubha (Asiatic Society of Bengal)
- ŚŚ Samkṣepaśārīraka (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series)
- SS Sphoṭasiddhi (Madras University Sanskrit Series)
- STS Ṣaṭtrimśattattvasandoha (The Kashmir Series of Texts & Studies)
- ŚV Ślokaṽrttika (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)
- TB Tattvabodhinī, commentary on Siddhāntakaumudī (Nirnayasagar Press, 1908)
- TL Tantrāloka (The Kashmir Series of Texts & Studies)
- TP Tattvapradīpikā (Nirnayasagar Press, 1915)
- TR Tantrarahasya (Gaekwad Oriental Series)
- TS Tattvasamgraha (Gaekwad Oriental Series)
- TSM Taittirīyasaṁhitā
- TSP Tattvasamgrahapañjikā (Gaekwad Oriental Series)
- TV Tantravārttika, commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtra (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series)
- UC Uttaraṛāmacarita (ed. by M.R. Kale, 1901)
- Vār Kātyāyana's Vārttika on PS
- VB Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra (Rajasthan Sanskrit College Granthamālā)
- VP Vākyapadīya (Benares Sanskrit Series)
- VR Varivasyārahasya (ed. by S. S. Śāstri, Tanjore, 1934)
- VS Vaiśeṣikasūtra

- VSLM Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā (Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Series)
VV Vidhiviveka (ed. by R. Śāstrī, Benares, 1907)
YH Yoginīhṛdaya (The Prince of Wales Saraswati Bhavan
Texts)
YS Yogasūtra

INTRODUCTION

INDIAN grammarians produced not only a most scientific system on etymology and semantics but also a remarkable philosophy of word and meaning. The *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali (middle of the 2nd century B.C.) contains quite a number of passages in which the discerning mind notices the germs of philosophical speculations and which may very well serve as the background of a regular system of philosophy. Patañjali, however, is by no means the first to incorporate matter of this nature in a grammatical work. In fact, we have it on his authority that there was an ancient treatise named *Samgraha*, in which might be found philosophical dissertations on the nature of word: whether word is an eternal or ephemeral entity.¹ Kaiyaṭa in his *Pradīpa*, a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, describes *Samgraha* as an important work,² and Nāgeśa in his super-commentary, the *Uddyota*, refers to it as a work written by Vyāḍi in one hundred thousand verses.³ In his commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartr̥hari Puṇyarāja, whose date is yet uncertain, not only mentions *Samgraha* as a work containing a hundred thousand verses,⁴ but actually quotes three verses from the lost treatise.⁵ Bhartr̥hari in his *Vākyapadīya* gives us an account

¹(i) *Samgraha* etat prādhānyena parikṣitam nityo vā syāt kāryo ve 'ti (MB, I. p. 54).

(ii) *Samgraha* tāvat kāryapratidvandvibhāvan manyāmahe nityaparyāyavācino grahaṇam iti (Op. cit., p. 56).

(iii) Śobhanā khalu Dākṣāyaṇasya saṁgrahasya kṛtiḥ. Śobhanā khalu Dākṣāyaṇena saṁgrahasya kṛtiḥ (MB, II. p. 528).

(iv) Kiratim carkarītāntam pacatī 'ty atra yo nayet /

Prāptijñam tam aham manye prārabdhas tena saṁgrahaḥ (MB, on PS, VII. iv. 92).

²Granthaviśeṣe (MBP, I. p. 55).

³Samgraho Vyāḍikṛto lakṣaślokaśamkhyo grantha iti prasiddhiḥ (MBPU, p. I. 55).

⁴Iha purā Pāṇiniye 'smin vyākaraṇe Vyāḍyuparacitam granthalakṣaparimāṇam saṁgrahābhidhānam nibandhanam āsit (PR, p. 283).

⁵(i) Tad uktam saṁgrahaḥ :

Na hi kiñcit padaṁ nāma rūpeṇa niyataṁ kvacit /
Padānām artharūpaṁ ca vākyārthād eva jāyate (PR, p. 14)

(ii) Saṁgrahaḥ 'py uktam :

Śabdārthayor asambhede vyavahāre pṛthakkriyā /
Yataś śabdārthayos tattvam ekaṁ tat samavasthitam / /
Sambandhasya na kartā 'sti śabdānām lokavedayoḥ /
Śabdair eva hi śabdānām sambandhas syāt kṛtaḥ katham. (PR, p. 14)

of how the work came to be neglected and the source of grammatical study was dried up.⁶

It was Bhartr̥hari, author of the *Vākyapadīya*, who was the first grammarian to take upon himself the task of evolving a school of philosophy which is known by the name of Verbal Monism, *Śabdādvaita* or *Śabdabrahmavāda*. Monism in Indian thought is said to have found expression in three ways—the *Brahmādvaita* or *Bhāvādvaita* of the Vedāntist, the *Vijñānādvaita* of the Buddhist, and the *Śabdādvaita* of the grammarian. The term *Śabdabrahman* is no new coinage of Bhartr̥hari's, for there are texts in the Upaniṣads where we are told that there are two *Brahmans*, *Para* and *Apara*, and while the *Parabrahman* means the Higher Brahman, i.e., the Transcendental Absolute, the *Aparabrahman* means the Lower Brahman or the *Śabdabrahman*, the realization of which leads one to the attainment of the other.⁷ But we must be careful not to identify the *Śabdabrahman* of the grammarian with the *Śabdabrahman* of the Upaniṣads, for according to Bhartr̥hari *Śabdabrahman* is identical with the Transcendent Reality.

The present work starts with an attempt to describe the Transcendental Reality of the grammarian, which, though a unitary principle in essence, is yet inseparably associated with *Śaktis* or Powers which lie therein, and of which the most important is the *Kālaśakti* or the Time Power. It is on the eve of creation that these Powers are sundered from the *Śabdabrahman*, as it were, and the cosmic process runs in two directions, viz, that of word (*śabda*) and that of meaning (*artha*). In the first four chapters of the book I have discussed the nature of the *Śabdabrahman* and of *Kālaśakti* and other Powers and have not only examined the cosmic process as presented by the grammarian-philosopher but compared it with parallel schemes in other systems of philosophy as well. From this I have proceeded to the study of the empiric realities on the *śabda* side, letters, words and sentences, and I have shown that the grammarian understands *sphoṭa*, the

⁶VP, II. 484-90.

⁷Dve brahmaṇī veditavye śabdabrahma param ca yat /

Śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ param brahmā 'dhigacchati (MU, vi. 22).

indivisible word, as *śabda qua* denoter. In this part of the book I have fully utilized the *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍanamiśra, and shown that the grammarian's idea of the indivisible word is not the innovation of a doctrinaire but a faithful exposition of the verdict of common sense. I have examined in detail the views of the rival schools of philosophers in this context, those of Kumārila and the Naiyāyika in particular. I have next attempted to present the *artha* side of the cosmic evolution. In this part of the book I have first taken up the study of the meaning of words and, in that connexion, fully examined the view-points of Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana who hold the universal and the individual respectively as the meaning of a word. In the last chapter, which spreads over as many as five sections, I have discussed in detail the problem of the import of sentences. In this connexion I have thought it useful not only to present the grammarian's theory of *pratibhā* (i.e. the import of propositions as an instance of intuition, pure and simple) but also to enter into a critical presentation and evaluation of the rival theories of Prabhākara, Kumārila, the Naiyāyika (the older and the later schools), and the monistic Vedāntist. I have tried to make the treatment in this part of the book as systematic and comprehensive as possible, and I believe it is the first attempt of its kind.

To the subject-matter of this book I have devoted nearly a quarter of a century's study and thinking. My studies have left me convinced that the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari must be regarded as an outstanding figure in the history of Indian thought. He is the author of an astoundingly original system of thought which, to the best of my knowledge, has no parallel. His philosophy is unique and singular; practically he represents a school by himself. There are three commentators, Puṇyarāja, Helārāja and Phullarāja, whose commentaries are devoted to the elucidation of the different parts of his work; but they are not of much help to a proper evaluation of Bhartṛhari's philosophy. Barring Maṇḍanamiśra, reputed to be a contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya, the great apostle of Monistic Vedānta, and Vācaspatimiśra,

the philosophy of Bhartṛhari has no supporter and sympathetic exponent and elaborator. But Bhartṛhari is a host in himself. The wonderful logical cogency of his arguments and his masterly marshalling of data compelled recognition and criticism. He seems to have been a most criticised philosopher. So far as our knowledge goes, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti seem to have been the earliest critics of his philosophy. No writer on philosophy, no matter whatever school he represented, could ignore Bhartṛhari. The Mīmāṃsist, the Naiyāyika, the Buddhist, the Jaina, the Vedāntist, and the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* known as *Vyāsa* have elaborately criticised Bhartṛhari's fundamental philosophical theory. In consequence Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* was the most extensively read work in the medieval period which represents the most fruitful epoch of Indian thought. If this be the standard of popularity, the work of Bhartṛhari has had a singularly good fortune which can be compared with that of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* and Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika*.

The fame of the work was due both to the originality of the thesis it maintained and to its difficulty and abstruseness. It is a pity that in spite of its fame the work of Bhartṛhari did not become the fountain-head of a school. To all intents and purposes, he alone represents his school. Dharmakīrti, Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and Śaṅkarācārya became founders of different schools. A continuous succession of brilliant writers developed the central thesis of the original promulgators and the result has been that we have well-rounded systems which have at their back centuries of evolution. But Bhartṛhari, in spite of his originality and compelling logic, was not followed up by an unbroken succession of expositors. So there are snags and surds in his philosophy which have not been straightened out by a galaxy of first-rate commentators. There is a long gap between Bhartṛhari and his commentators, Puṇyarāja, Helārāja and Phullarāja. Maṇḍanamīśra, who supported Bhartṛhari in his *Sphoṭasiddhi*, and Vācaspati-mīśra, whose *Tattvabindu* is a masterly defence of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, were separated from our author by about two and three centuries respec-

tively. It is no wonder that Bhartṛhari's work became almost obsolete in the eleventh century and afterwards. So the tradition of Bhartṛhari's philosophy is entirely lost from the eleventh century A.D. onwards. The writers of the Navya-nyāya school have almost ignored him, though stray quotations of a purely grammatical interest are found scattered in their writings. There is a very strong presumption for thinking that these quotations are rather derived from second-hand sources. Bhaṭṭojidikṣita and his followers have laid Bhartṛhari's work under contribution, but there is no evidence of any systematic cultivation on their part of Bhartṛhari's *Vākya-pādīya* in its entirety.

In this context of blank oblivion of tradition the attempt of a modern student to understand and interpret the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, embodied in a single work, the *Vākya-pādīya*, is sure to give the impression of audacity. It is an uphill task. Years of devoted study of the original work under the tutelage of some eminent professors of Indian Philosophy, and of the classics of the different schools of thought which have undertaken a criticism of the system, have enabled and emboldened me to embark upon this difficult task.

The uniqueness of Bhartṛhari's philosophy lies in the fact that it refuses to be affiliated to orthodox idealism or materialism. As a matter of historical fact Bhartṛhari's philosophy has been interpreted differently by different writers. The Vedāntists have sought to represent Bhartṛhari as an exponent of idealistic monism. Again, Bhartṛhari's *Śabda-brahman*, the Ultimate Reality, has been interpreted as an evolutionary principle. The cryptic nature of Bhartṛhari's *ipse dixit* has been responsible for these diverse and conflicting interpretations. We are acquainted with the position of the idealists who make Thought, in one way or other, the fountain and prius of the world of reality, subjective and objective. We are also familiar with the materialist's position which deduces thought and matter from an insentient principle. But to assert that the word is the source of the cosmos is a novel proposition. Bhartṛhari promulgates this theory

with a wealth of elaboration which has provoked admiration and resentment alike. I have endeavoured to present this highly abstruse philosophy to the modern mind in the language and technique of modern thought, with what success it is for others to judge. Mine is a pioneer exposition of the subject in a modern language, and an inquisitive student who will go to the sources will be in a position to adjudge the light I have been able to throw on the tangled problems it involves. I have chosen my own manner of presentation but nowhere have I been guilty of infidelity to the original. The difficulty of the subject and the abstruseness of the arguments both for and against the fundamental thesis are beyond dispute. I have not refrained from giving the whole picture whose logical interest alone should have an appeal to the human intellect at all times and places. I do not claim that the difficulties have been ironed out by my exposition, because they do not pertain alone to the language or the manner in which they have been delivered in the original sources. The difficulties are objective, inherent in the very nature of the subject. I shall consider my labours justified if they succeed in rousing the interest of a modern student of philosophy. Of course, admission to Bhartṛhari's world has to be paid for in the shape of intensive study and close and hard thinking.

The subject of the last two chapters of the book—the import of words and propositions—cannot but have an attraction for a student of logic. The rich speculations of Indian philosophers in these matters are bound to have a perennial interest. The various theories I have dealt with in the last two chapters have not been discussed and evaluated in any modern language by any other writer. The academic world of the present day has thus had no opportunity to acquire a reliable knowledge of these valuable theories which are more or less known only by their names. The present work, I hope, would fill a gap that needed closing. The treatment of the grammarian's view of the import of propositions as an instance of pure and simple intuition proved the stiffest part of my task. The study of some of the Indian philo-

sophical classics and also of the writings of some European philosophers, particularly of Croce, has enabled me to present this abstruse theory in an intelligible perspective.

It is not possible to solve the problem of the date of Bhartṛhari. There is no definite information as to whether he is the same person as the author of the three *Śatakas*. The title of his work, *Vākyapadīya*, is cited as an illustration of a grammatical rule in the *Kāśikā* of Vāmana-Jayāditya, a work composed before the visit of I-tsing to India.⁸ There is a general belief among scholars that I-tsing refers to Bhartṛhari when he writes that a grammarian-philosopher died in 651 A.D. Bhartṛhari has again been sought to be identified with Bhaṭṭi, the great grammarian-poet who composed the *Rāvaṇavadha*. All that we can safely observe on this point is that Bhartṛhari seems to be an ancient grammarian-philosopher who represents a very old tradition associated with a distinct school of Āgama.

A commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* has been ascribed to Bhartṛhari. Though available in fragments now, this work provided a great impetus to later writers contributing to the system of Pāṇini. Vardhamāna Sūri in his *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* refers to Bhartṛhari as the author of the *Vākyapadīya*, the *Prakīrṇaka* and a commentary on three sections of the *Mahābhāṣya*. This would seem to imply that at the time of Vardhamāna Bhartṛhari's commentary on only three sections of the *Mahābhāṣya* was in existence.⁹

Now, whether the *Prakīrṇaka* is a separate work as maintained by Vardhamāna or a part of the *Vākyapadīya* itself may present an interesting study. It appears from Bhartṛhari's own statement that the *Vākyapadīya* contains three sections. We cannot, however, definitely assert on Bhartṛhari's authority whether the *Prakīrṇaka* is the third section of his work.¹⁰ The *Vākyapadīya*, as the name implies, is expected to discuss the nature of sentence and word. In fact, the first

⁸ *Kāśikā* on PS, IV. iii. 88

⁹ Bhartṛharir Vākyapadīya-Prakīrṇakayoḥ kartā Mahābhāṣyatripādyā vyākhyātā ca (GRM, p. 2).

¹⁰ Vartmanām atra keṣāñcid vastumātram udāhṛtam /
Kāṇḍe tṛtīye nyakṣeṇa bhaviṣyati vicāraṇā (VP, II. 491).

two chapters are primarily concerned with the treatment of sentence and word. And in the *Prakīrṇaka*—another significant title—one finds a discussion on quite a variety of topics, such as substance, quality, universal, activity, agenthood and the like. It is not, therefore, without any justification that Vardhamāna is inclined to recognize the *Prakīrṇaka* as a separate work. But whether the *Prakīrṇaka* is a continuation of the *Vākyapadīya* as its third chapter or is a separate work, it certainly contains valuable information about Bhartṛhari's philosophical outlook.

As regards the other point, namely that the commentary of Bhartṛhari on only three sections of the *Mahābhāṣya* was available at the time of Vardhamāna, it may be said that Vardhamāna wrote his work in the first half of the twelfth century A.D. But Kaiyaṭa mentions at the beginning of his *Pradīpa* that it was possible for him to write his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* because he had the privilege of being acquainted with Bhartṛhari's work. This would lead one to surmise that Kaiyaṭa had access to the whole of Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* while Vardhamāna knew only a part of it.

Whatever may be the merits or demerits of my work, I may expect from scholars who may honour my work with their perusal a sympathetic recognition of the intellectual honesty of this attempt to rediscover and reconstruct an abstruse system of thought which fell into desuetude even in the land of its birth long long ago. I may claim with some justification that this old philosophy has not a mere anti-quarian sanction but is supported by convincing logic. In view of the widespread interest in contemporary Western philosophy in the Philosophy of Meaning, Bhartṛhari's philosophy should rouse the interest of modern students of philosophy and give the necessary fillip to the study of the perennial problem of word and meaning from different angles of vision. The approach need not be unilateral but should be multilateral. In conclusion, let me add that I do not make any extravagant claim of recognition as an

original discoverer. My claim is rather modest, based upon an honest and persistent endeavour to understand and interpret an extremely difficult system of thought. I have not shirked the difficulties nor chosen the line of least resistance. I now put the results of my studies before the bar of the academic world.

CHAPTER ONE

THE SUPREME REALITY

The Supreme Reality in the philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar has been called the Eternal Verbum¹ (*Śabdatattva* or *Śabdabrahman*)² or the Supreme Word, which is a highly subtle³ and metempirical principle which transcends all that comes within the ken of human experience⁴ and all that possesses a pragmatic significance⁵: even moral and religious values are not predicable of it.⁶ The Eternal Verbum lies beyond time and space,⁷ it is non-relational and featureless, and eludes all descriptions by means of positive and negative predicates.⁸ The question of identifying it with any one of the recognized categories of human experience should not and, in fact, does not arise at all. Human reason with its limitations

¹It is very difficult to find in the English language an expression which would convey the full connotation of the term, *Śabdabrahman*, in the philosophical literature of Sanskrit Grammar. In the absence of any other suitable expression we suggest the term, 'Eternal Verbum' or 'Supreme Word'. It should be remembered that when the grammarian describes the Supreme Reality as the Supreme Word he does neither think of any articulate word-form which is regarded as an evolution of the transcendent principle nor mean 'sound' which is viewed as the medium of manifestation of the transcendent principle on the empirical plane. Hence, when the Upaniṣads describe the Absolute as transcending word (*aśabdāṁ asparśāṁ arūpāṁ avyayam...* KU, III. 15), the grammarian feels little difficulty in explaining the text from his own standpoint inasmuch as the expression *śabda* (word) in the text stands for the empirical concept (*dhvani* or *nāda*, which is perceived by the auditory organ) which is transcended by what he calls the Supreme Word.

²It is called *Śabdatattva* (Word-essence) as it assumes all verbal forms (*sarvaśabdārūpatayā*) and objects signified by all verbal forms (*sarvaśabdopagrāhyatayā*). And it is called *Śabdabrahman* because it is not determined or limited but ubiquitous. It comprehends and gathers up all the diverse phenomena within its orbit and it is their prius—a truth which can be deduced from the fact that it runs through, as the underlying principle, all that occurs. The continuity of the Verbum in the phenomenal world proves that the latter is its transformation or appearance—that the world with its multifarious varieties derives its genesis from the former (...*rūpābhimatānām api vikārāṇām prakṛtyanvayād vyāpakam ca* : PR, p. 1).

³*Sūksmām arthenā 'pravibhaktatattvām, ekām vācam abhiṣyandamānām* (Loc. cit.); also : *Yām sūksmām...vācam...* (PR, p. 3); also : ...*apū...śabdabrahma...* (Op. cit., p. 18).

⁴...*pratyastamitasarvavikārolekhām...* (Op. cit., p. 8).

⁵...*lokavyavahārātītam...* (Op. cit., p. 56).

⁶...*vyavahārānupātibhir dharmādharmais sarvāvasthāsv anāśitam ca...* (Op. cit., p. 1).

⁷*Vaikṛtaṁ samatikrāntā mūrtivyāpāradaśanam* (VP, I. 19).

⁸*Vyatito bhedasaṁsargau, bhāvābhāvau kramākramau / Satyānṛte ca...* (CD, p. 1).

fails to comprehend it and, as such, is incompetent to deliver an accurate definition of the same.⁹ And even what the Scriptures say about it contains only a shadow of the hidden truth; for they furnish us at the most with an account of an approach to its comprehension.¹⁰ This explains why different thinkers and different Scriptures give us mutually divergent statements about the Supreme Reality.¹¹ Direct realization of the Eternal Verbum alone, following in the wake of the attainment of discriminating knowledge which dispels the gloom of nescience, can give the right insight into it, and one who is blessed with the vision of the Eternal Verbum is alone acquainted with its true nature.¹²

It is worthy of notice that though the grammarian regards the Eternal Verbum as the transcendent principle devoid of all attributes,¹³ he still mentions some of its characteristics, but when he does so he makes his position neither ambiguous nor absurd. It is true that conceptual designations are usually denied of the Supreme Reality, still they are necessary aids and stimulants to the human intellect and prepare the ground for the subsequent realization. It is, therefore, legitimate that the Scriptures define the Absolute in positive terms. So even the Vedānta, which conceives the Supreme Reality as devoid of all qualities and distinctions, has to formulate the attributes of being, consciousness and bliss as constitutive of its essence¹⁴.

⁹...paramagambhīrasya jagatkāraṇasya tarkānavagāhyatvam (ŚBH, p. 452).

¹⁰Upāyāś śikṣyamāṇānām bālānām upalālanāḥ / Asatye vartmani sthitvā tatas satyaṁ samīhate (VP, II. 240); also : Sāstrārthaprakriyā kevalam abudhānām vyutpādanāya. Ato na śāstrāṇi tattvaṁ vaktuṁ pārayanti, (PR, p. 178). Cp. also : Tam etam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanor itaretarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikā vaidikāś ca pravṛttāś, sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhipratiṣedhamokṣaparāṇi (ŚBH, p. 40); also : Na hi śāstram idantayā viśayabhūtaṁ brahma pratipipādayiṣati (Op. cit., p. 124).

¹¹Tarkāgamānumānena bahudhā parikalpitaḥ (CD, p. 6).

¹²...pravivekāt prakāśate (Op. cit., p. 7).

¹³...sarvadharmaparikalpanātītam... (PR, p. 2).

¹⁴The distinction between essential characteristics (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*) and accidental characteristics (*taṣṭhalakṣaṇa*) has been discussed in the Vedānta. Thus, while the attributes of being, consciousness and bliss are held to be the essential characteristics of the *Brahman*, those of creatorship and others are maintained to be its accidental characteristics. The grammarian has not a word to say about this distinction. The attributes enumerated by him represent the Eternal Verbum in its immanent aspect which is other than the transcendent aspect in which the Supreme Reality is beyond all descriptions and predications.

It is a fact that human language and human thought are alike inherently incapable of giving full knowledge of a real even on the empirical plane. But in spite of its limitations human language is a useful instrument in the hands of thinkers because, though it may fail to express the reality in full and give only a pale and blurred vision, it is an index and pointer to the truth. It is this secondary capacity of language which rescues it from the status of downright nonsense and helps the inquisitive spirit in its advance towards the ultimate truth.¹⁵ Hence, though the best and highest conceptual designation of the Absolute is always imperfect, still the necessity for a definition is usually felt. And the grammarian gives us quite a number of attributes which may be regarded as the essence of the Eternal Verbum. Such attributes include among others those of being, consciousness, independence and the like.

What the grammarian means by saying that the Eternal Verbum is being (or existence) in essence¹⁶ is that it exists for all time and beyond time as well.¹⁷ The Eternal Verbum is real, having authentic being.¹⁸ It has neither birth nor death.¹⁹ It is never possible to discover its origin and it lasts even after the dissolution of the universe.²⁰ It does not change and does not cease to be even when all that is associated with it ceases to exist, since it does not depend on anything else to preserve it in being.²¹ The Eternal Verbum is thus the ultimate principle of being (or existence).

The Eternal Verbum is also of the nature of conscious-

¹⁵Sarvam eva hi vākyam ne 'dantayā vastubhedam bodhayitum arhati. Na hi 'kṣukṣiraguḍādinām madhuraśasabhedas śakya ākhyātum. Evam anyatrā 'pi sarvatra draṣṭavyam. Tena pramāṇāntarasiddhe laukika evā 'rthe yadā gatiḥ idrīśi śābdasya, tadā kai 'va kathā pratyagātmany alaukike. Adūraviprakaṣeṇa tu kathāñcit pratipādanam ihā 'pi samānam (BH, pp. 124-25).

¹⁶...tasmāc ca sattāmātrāt pratibhākyāc chabdāt... (PR, p. 8).

✓¹⁷The Eternal Verbum, as the grammarian holds, is identical in essence with *Kālaśakti* (Time-force or Zeitgeist), which is its eternal and innate Power. Therefore, the Eternal Verbum has a twofold aspect—as transcendent beyond time in which it is above all predication in thought and language and as immanent in time in which it is the subject and predicate of all judgments.

¹⁸Iha dvau śābdātmānau kāryo nityas ca (PR, p. 50)

¹⁹Anādinidhanam brahma... (VP, I. 1); also :...tad brahmā 'mṛtam aśnute. (Op. cit., I. 133).

²⁰...sarvavikārapratyastamayē vartamānāt... (PR, p. 2).

²¹...śābdātattvam yad akṣaram (VP, I. 1); also : sarvamūrtinām aparīṇāmā prakṛtiḥ

ness.²² The Vedāntist asserts the Supreme Reality to be pure consciousness, meaning thereby that it is the transcendental light that reveals its own self and others as well. Likewise, the grammarian describes the Eternal Verbum as a supremely self-luminous principle which reveals its own self²³ and the world of objects.²⁴ He further states that the Eternal Verbum is the purest of all lights that dispels the gloom of nescience.²⁵ There are ancient Vedic texts which speak of three kinds of light. The first of these is represented by the different physical lights, the fire, the lightning, the sun, the moon, and myriads of other luminaries which we find in the firmament. The second is the inner light of the mind which through the medium of sense-organs reveals different objects to us. The third and the best light is the Eternal Verbum itself, the light of all lights.²⁶ It is only when the transcendent light of the Eternal Verbum shines in its undimmed splendour that it becomes possible for the other two kinds of light described above to manifest themselves and the different objects of the world. Just as in the case of a red-hot bar of iron or a flaming log of wood what actually burns is fire and neither the bar nor the log, so also in the case of the inner light of the mind and the different physical lights what alone reveals is the Eternal Verbum and none else. If such a moment or state of things could ever be conceived when the light of the Eternal Verbum ceases to shed its lustre, the other two would at once cease to shine by themselves with the inevitable consequence

(PR, p. 50); also : sai 'śā vāg anapāyinī (Op. cit., p. 57); also : ...paśyantyā rūpam anapabhraṁśam (Op. cit., p. 56).

✓²²...vāgrūpatvam eva citikriyārūpam (Op. cit., 48); also : ...bodhasvabhāvaṁ śabdārthamayam nirvibhāgaṁ śabdatattvam ... (Op. cit., p. 81).

✓²³Svarūpajyotir evā 'ntas sai 'śā vāg anapāyinī (Op. cit., p. 57).

²⁴Ātmarūpaṁ yathā jñāne jñeyarūpaṁ ca dr̥śyate / Artharūpaṁ tathā śabde svarūpaṁ ca prakāśate (VP, I. 50); also : Yathā jñāne jñeyam ghaṭādirūpaṁ atītam anāgataṁ vartamānaṁ ca gr̥hyate jñānasvarūpaṁ ca svaprakāśatvāt, tāvac chabdo 'py abhidheyatantras tadrūpopagrāhī svarūpaṁ api pratyavabhāsayati (PR, p. 22).

²⁵Yat tat puṇyatamaṁ jyotiḥ... (VP, I. 12); also : Yad agnir eva 'va tamasi jyotiś śuddham pravartate (Op. cit., I. 18); also : Evaṁ hy āha—Vedābhyāsāt param āntaram śuklam ajaram jyotir asmin evā 'pāre tamasi pite vivartata iti (PR, p. 3).

²⁶Trīṇi jyotirṇi trayāḥ prakāśā yo 'yam jātavedā yaś ca puruṣeṣv āntaraḥ prakāśo yaś ca prakāśayoḥ prakāśayitā śabdākhyāḥ prakāśas tatrai 'tat sarvam upanibaddham ... (PR, p. 7).

that the universe would be thrown into a state of blinding darkness.²⁷

That the Eternal Verbum can be regarded as the Supreme Light that manifests different objects may be clearly understood with reference to our everyday experience. It is an undeniable fact that whatever passes current in our thought is determined by an articulate verbal form.²⁸ A brute fact, though existent in its right, is as good as non-existent if it does not find access to our thought. A reality which is not associated with an articulate verbal form cannot be the content of our thought and is regarded as a fiction. On the other hand, a fiction such as a hare's horn or a square-circle when conjured up by a verbal expression, appears to have existence and becomes amenable to logical predication.²⁹ Thus when the existence of an object is denied by our perceptual cognition or inferential knowledge, the mere use of an articulate verbal form appears to confer an existential status upon it and makes it a fit object of communication. An object which is purely intellectual and has nothing to correspond to in the outside world of reality appears to be present before us with all the bold and vivid touch of reality as soon as we have articulate word-forms to reveal the same. Thus when our perception tells us that a rabbit has no horns and the sky yields no flowers, we cannot even then deny that linguistic forms, such as 'rabbit's horn', 'sky-flower' and others, do represent certain objects to our mind to which reference is often made in serious discourse. It is again a matter of inferential knowledge that nothing of a real circle of flaming fire can be produced by the quick movement of a torch in a circular manner. But it cannot be denied that when some one utters the word 'fire-circle' (*alātacakra*), it reveals to our

²⁷Vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī / Na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī (VP, I. 125). Cp. also : Idam andhaṁ tamaḥ kṛtsnaṁ jāyeta bhuvana-trayam / Yadi śabdābhayaṁ jyotiḥ āsaṁsāraṁ na dīpyate (KD, I. 4).

²⁸Tasmād arthavidhās sarvāś śabdāmātrās suniścitāḥ (VP, I. 120); also : Samvijnātāpadanibandhano hi sarvo 'rthāś śabdena nirūpyamāṇo vyavahāram avatarati (PR, p. 45).

²⁹Sad api vyavahāreṇa 'nupagrhītam asatā tulyam. Atyantāsac ca loke śaśaviṣṇādi prāptāvirbhāvatirobhāvaṁ ca gandharvanagarādi vācā samutthāpyamānaṁ mukhyasattāyuktam iva teṣu teṣu kāryeṣu pratyavabhāśate (PR, p. 46).

mind an object like a circle of fire though no such thing ever exists.

Further, the importance of articulate expressions in the matter of revealing objects can never be overestimated. Even the illiterate cowherd distinguishes an animal, which he tends, from another by means of articulate verbal forms.³⁰ Objects made of the same substance are distinguished from one another with the help of articulate word-forms alone.³¹ The difference between highly technical musical notes and tunes is set forth by verbal descriptions and the student of music apprehends them in the light of these descriptions. Mere intuition unaided by such descriptions is incapable of seizing the fine shades of difference.³² Whatever progress we might have achieved in the different spheres of intellectual pursuits, is transmitted to us through words.³³ The entire intersocial usage or communication ultimately rests on articulate verbal forms. And not only our external consciousness which is reflected through intersocial usage but also our internal consciousness by which we mean our cognitive and hedonic experience, becomes hardly intelligible if they be dissociated from corresponding linguistic forms.³⁴ Even our elementary feelings and ideas cannot be communicated without the help of words and so the lack of knowledge of language would reduce even a human being to the level of insentient objects.³⁵

We have endeavoured to set forth the position strenuously maintained by the grammarian that there cannot be even an elementary experience which is not associated with a linguistic expression. In other words, every possible cognition is determinate, the determining factor being an articu-

³⁰Gopālādayo 'pi hi nibandhanapadāni prakalpya gavādiviśeṣaviśayaṃ vyavahāram ihante (PR, p. 45).

³¹Abhiniṣpannavastūnām samānākārāṇām vibhāgo 'pi vākkṛta eva....(Op. cit., p. 48).

³²Ṣaḍjādibhedas śabdena vyākhyāto rūpyate yataḥ (VP, I. 120).

³³Sā sarvavidyā śilpānām kalānām co 'pabandhanī / Tadvaśād abhiniṣpattau sarvaṃ vastu vibhajyate (Op. cit., I. 126).

³⁴Sukhaduḥkhasamvinmātrarūpā 'ntassamjñā 'pi yāvad vāgrūpatānuvṛttis tāvad eva bhavati. Bahissamjñā lokavyavahāras, so 'pi vāgadadhina eva..... Na hi vākcaitanya-nāviṣṭā samjñā 'sti (PR, p. 48).

³⁵Arthakriyāsu vāk sarvā (n) samihayati dehinaḥ / Tadutkrāntau visamjño 'yaṃ dṛśyate kāṣṭhakuḍyavat (VP, I. 128).

late verbal form.³⁶ A cognition which is not linked to an articulate word-form, cannot manifest itself, even if its possibility be conceded for argument's sake, and is on that account hardly distinguishable from a cognition which has not arisen at all.³⁷ Even infants communicate their awareness of an object through the medium of some articulate expressions, however vague, indefinite and general such expressions might be.³⁸ It has been, of course, argued by critics that the knowledge of infants is not associated with linguistic forms and consequently the thesis of the grammarian that every cognition is linked to some articulate verbal form ought to be rejected. But the grammarian maintains that impressions of linguistic expressions continue in infants from their previous births and these impressions are revived as soon as they cognize objects in their present lives. This hypothesis, however paradoxical it may sound, is not without the support of reason. That the newborn babe knows from the time of birth how to move its tongue and send the breath up so as to strike against the different sources of articulation, is a fact which demands serious consideration. We know that the child was not taught to do so earlier in this life. That the aforesaid activities of the child are similar to the effects of speech-habits does not admit of doubt. The hypothesis that they are the outcome of speech-habits is legitimate and the conclusion can hardly be resisted that the child's activities in question are made possible by its implicit knowledge of verbal forms, though not in their gross development, which are inherited from previous lives, along with many other impressions.³⁹

To resume our discussion, it has been made abundantly

³⁶Na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaś śabdānugamād ṛte / Anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāṣate (VP, I. 124).

³⁷Vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī / Na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī (Op. cit., I. 125).

³⁸Itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā / Yām pūrvāhitasamśkāro bālo pi pratipadyate (Op. cit., I. 122).

³⁹Ādyaḥ karaṇavinyāsaḥ prāṇasyo 'rdhvaṁ samīraṇam / Sthānānām abhigḥatāś ca na vinā śabdabhāvanām (Op. cit., I. 123).

Also: Prathamotpannasya bālasyā 'dyam indriyavinyāsādi upadeśābhāve 'pi jñānasādhyam jāyamānaṁ dṛśyate. Tasmād anādir jñānabījaśabdaparigrahā śabdabhāvanā pratipurūṣam avasthite 'ti mantavyam. Arthasmarāṇasyā 'pi śabdollekhenai 'va darśanāt. (PR, p. 46).

clear that articulate linguistic forms reveal, like light, the different objects of the world. It only remains to be said that they are but evolutions of the Eternal Verbum on the empirical plane. If that is proved, we can explain how the Eternal Verbum, conceived by the grammarian as a transcendent principle, can function as the light of all lights and as the source of all knowledge.

It is an interesting point to discuss whether the grammarian like the Vedāntist declares that the Supreme Reality in his system is of the nature of bliss. It has been very cogently established by the Vedāntist dialecticians that a spiritual entity must partake of the nature of bliss; otherwise, its spiritual character cannot be advocated.⁴⁰ We must admit, however, that there is no definite statement in the writings of Bhartṛhari that would unmistakably warrant the conclusion that he is conscious of the logical necessity of admitting the identity of consciousness with bliss. But when the grammarian-philosopher goes on to declare that the science of grammar is the doorway to emancipation he undoubtedly attaches to it a far greater importance than we are apt to assign.⁴¹ According to the traditional view, a reverent study of grammar is an infallible source of spiritual illumination which culminates in securing the freedom of the soul.⁴² And surely such a state of illumination cannot but be blissful. For unless the goal is of the nature of bliss there is no reason why people should strive to reach it. The moment it is described as something other than bliss it ceases to be the end of human existence. Puṇyarāja cites a passage, presumably an ancient text, in which the Eternal Verbum is conceived as a principle free from all shackles of bondage and worshipped by all those who strive after emancipation.⁴³ If freedom

⁴⁰Ānandatve jñānatā jñānatāyām ānandatvaṁ vidyate nirviśaṅkam / Saty apy evam nā 'tīrēkāvākāśaḥ pūrṇe tattve jñānasaukhyopapatteḥ (SŚ, I. 187).

⁴¹Tad dvāraṁ apavargasya.....(VP, I. 14).

⁴²Āsannaṁ brahmaṇas tasya tapasām uttamaṁ tapaḥ / Prathamam chandasām aṅgaṁ prāhur vyākaraṇaṁ budhāḥ (Op. cit., I. 11).

Also : Idam ādyaṁ padasthānaṁ siddhisopānaparvaṇām / Iyaṁ sā mokṣyamāṇānām ajihmā rājapaddhatiḥ (Op. cit., I. 16).

⁴³So 'tyantamukto mokṣāya mumukṣubhir upāsyate (CD, p. 7); also : Te mṛtyum ativartante ye vai vācam upāśate (PR, p. 49).

is the concomitant of freedom from pain and freedom from pain is the same as infinite bliss, as the Vedānta maintains, we have every reason to interpret it as unalloyed joy and bliss.

It may be further pointed out in this connexion that Helārāja appears to suggest that the Absolute of the grammarian is of the nature of pure bliss. Helārāja in introducing his commentary on the third section of the *Vākyapadīya* gives a highly poetic description of *Pratibhā*. Helārāja states that: *Pratibhā*⁴⁴ is of the nature of light (or, consciousness) and joy and when it dawns upon us the luminous Self shines in the mind in its supreme glory and strikes the mind as a novel revelation. It is then that we experience a delight, as if from a taste of nectar, which is not born of the senses and never knows fading. It needs to be mentioned here that Puṇyarāja has identified *Pratibhā* with *Paśyantī*⁴⁵ and if, *Paśyantī* is only another name for the Eternal Verbum (*Śabdabrahman*) or the Ultimate Reality,⁴⁶ the conclusion becomes irresistible that the Eternal Verbum which is thus identified with *Pratibhā* is also of the nature of infinite bliss. If, again, the Eternal Verbum is not identified with *Paśyantī* but conceived as *Parā Vāk*, it may be still maintained that when *Paśyantī* and *Parā Vāk* are looked upon as two aspects of the same Reality and when again *Paśyantī* is described as blissful in nature, *Parā Vāk* also cannot but be of the nature of pure and infinite bliss.

But, as has been already mentioned, the text of the *Vākyapadīya* does not lend any positive support to the suggestion that Bhartṛhari identifies his Absolute with bliss. It also appears from a perusal of Puṇyarāja's commentary that the Absolute in the system of grammar is not bliss—it is being and it is consciousness. Let us pursue the point in detail: Bhartṛhari tells us that the Ultimate Reality is reached

⁴⁴Yasmin sanmukhatām prayāti ruciraṃ ko 'py antar ujjṛmbhate / Nediyaṃ mahimā manasy abhinavaḥ puriṣaḥ prakāśātmanaḥ / Tṛptiṃ yat paramām tanoti viṣayāsvādāṃ vinā śāśvatīm / Dhāmānandasudhāmayorjitavapus tat prātibhāṃ samstumaḥ (HR, p. 1).

⁴⁵....vāgvikārāṇām prakṛtiṃ paśyantyākhyāṃ pratibhāṃ.... (PR, p. 8).

⁴⁶It is worthy of notice that Bhartṛhari does not mention *Parā Vāk* anywhere in his work and he refers to the Transcendent Principle by the term, *Paśyantī*. Later grammarians, probably working under the influence of the Āgamic literature, describe *Parā* as the Absolute in their system of philosophy.

through a process which he calls communion through word (*śabdayoga*). According to the grammarian it is the knowledge of purification of words (*śabdasaṃskāra*) which may be described as the attainment of the Supreme Soul.⁴⁷ Now what is meant by purification of words and how is it effected? Purification of words means discarding unchaste words, by which the grammarian means *apabhraṃśa* forms, and adherence to chaste words. Puṇyarāja tells us that strict adherence to chaste forms gradually results in the emergence of a special kind of merit leading to permanent spiritual advancement. Use of chaste words enables us to be initiated into a form of determinate communion, the determinant being in the nature of word. Such communion ultimately reveals the Absolute, the principle of being, which is the matrix of all changes and origin of the phenomenal world. Puṇyarāja adds that with this revelation the devotee attains the *summum bonum* of human existence.⁴⁸

It is to be noted here that the ultimate state in the career of a devotee when he is blessed with the vision of the Absolute is described by Puṇyarāja as the attainment of *kṣema*. This reminds us of Vātsyāyana describing, in his commentary on the *Nyāyasūtras*, emancipation (*apavarga*) as attainment of *kṣema*.⁴⁹ It is well known to all students of Nyāya philosophy that the Supreme Reality in that system is not of the nature of bliss. Indeed, the term *kṣema* is commonly used in the sense of 'welfare' or 'good' (*kalyāṇa*)⁵⁰ and not happiness or bliss (*ānanda*). Hence, the Eternal Verbum appears to be, in the opinion of Puṇyarāja, the chief good in a man's life—it is not identified with bliss. The position seems to be akin to

⁴⁷Tasmād yaś śabdasaṃskāras sā siddhiḥ paramātmanah / Tasya pravṛttitattvajñāsa tad brahmāmṛtam ānute (VP, I. 133).

⁴⁸Vyavasthitasādhubhāve hi śabdatattve saṃskriyamāṇe 'pabhraṃśāpagamād āvirbhūte dharmaviśeṣe niyato 'bhyudayaḥ. Tadabhyāsāc ca śabdapūrvakam yogaṃ adhi-gamya pratibhātattvaprabhāvām bhāvavikāraprakṛtisattām sādhyasādhanaśakti-yuktām samyag avabudhya niyataṃ kṣemam āpnoti 'ty arthaḥ (PR, p. 51); also: Śabdasvarūpatattvajñāḥ kramasaṃhāreṇa yogaṃ labhate sādhiprayogāc cā 'bhivyakta-dharmaviśeṣo mahāntaṃ śabdātmānam abhisambhavaṃ kaivalyaṃ prāpnoti (Op. cit., p. 8).

⁴⁹Abhayam ajaram amṛtyupadam brahma kṣemaprāptir iti (NBH, on NS, I. i. 22).

⁵⁰AK, p. 52.

that of the Sāṅkhya according to which the Supreme Reality is consciousness but not bliss. The Sāṅkhya states that bliss or happiness is an effect of *sattva*, one of the triple qualities (*guṇa*) and as such cannot be identified with *Puruṣa* which transcends it. A section of Vedāntists also holds that in the Vedic texts where the Absolute is apparently described as bliss, the underlying purport is that it is 'free from pain'. Consciousness and existence are identical, because consciousness which is not existent, will be a fiction. Again, existence cannot but be identical with consciousness, because if it be different it can at most be a content of consciousness. And a content cannot be conceived as absolutely different from consciousness as that will annul the difference between a content and what is not a content. The content is a known fact and what is unknown is not a content. But what makes a thing unknown? It is only that which remains apart and aloof from consciousness and unrelated to it which can be characterized as unknown. If the content, that is known, is different from consciousness in the sense in which an unknown object is different, then the distinction between the known and the unknown is obliterated. So the relation of content to consciousness is not difference; nor can it be identity, as that would make the content and the contained identical, which means the death of the content. The felt difference and non-difference entailed by the relation would make the content stand in a relation logically indefinable. And what is logically indefinite and indeterminate is only an appearance, because reality is bound to be definite in character in pursuance of the laws of thought which are but another way of statement of the laws of reality. It must, therefore, be admitted on pain of absurdity that existence and consciousness are but one indivisible entity, which is not capable of being expressed by a whole word owing to the limitations of human language and perhaps of conceptual thought.

But this logical necessity does not hold good in the case of bliss. There is nothing repugnant in the conception that an entity is not blissful in character. The proof of blissful nature of the self is furnished by the empirical evidence of self-love.

The Vedāntist concludes that the self must be blissful from the empirical fact that a man loves his self over and above everything else. But the fact of self-love can be justified and explained by positing that it is free from pain. We cannot love pain and we are prone to hate it. But if there be no pain there is no occasion for hate and absence of hate is construed in positive terms as love. So bliss is nothing but freedom from pain and this means negation of pain. Negation of pain may be characterized as an attribute of the self; but this does not make the admission of dualism inevitable, since negation is not an entity. It is non-entity which is conjured up by conceptual habits of thinking and being thus ontologically a hypostatized fiction does not affect the unity of being. So the denial of bliss as a character of the Ultimate Reality does not make monism indefensible or unintelligible.⁵¹

We have discussed in the foregoing paragraphs whether, like Śaṅkara and his followers, the grammarian-philosopher asserts the blissful character of his Absolute. We have seen that Helārāja appears to suggest that the Ultimate Reality is of the nature of bliss while Puṇyarāja does not appear to think that the same can be identified with bliss. In the absence of any more definite statement from Bharṭṛhari himself we prefer to leave the question open.

One more important characteristic of the Eternal Verbum is its unrestricted independence (*svātantrya*). This independence or freedom is represented by what the grammarian calls *Kālaśakti*,⁵² the most important of many other Powers known as *Kālās* that are exclusive of one another and lie embedded in the Eternal Verbum as identical with it.⁵³ The reason why the *Kālaśakti* is held to be the chief of all Powers is that it is represented as holding sway over them and they

⁵¹Anye manyante—dvididho dharmāḥ—bhāvarūpa abhāvarūpaś ce 'ti; tatrā 'bhāvarūpā nā 'dvaitam vighnanti, yathā—"Ekam amṛtam aṣṭam" iti;.....(BS, p. 4); also: Tasmād vijñānātmano brahmaṇo duḥkhābhāvopādhir evā 'nandaśabdah,.....(Loc. cit.).

✓ ⁵²Avyāhatāḥ kalā yasya kālaśaktim upāśritāḥ (VP, I. 3).

✓ ⁵³Śabdatattve brahmaṇy ekatvāvirodhinyas samuccitā ātmabhūtās śaktayas santi mitho bhinnāḥ.....(PR, p. 2); also: Na khalu jātivyaktivad anyās śaktayo brahmaṇo vidyante tattat (tat ?) prakāśavat (Loc. cit.); also: Te cā 'sya pratipādyapratipādakatva-śakti nityam ātmabhūte pṛthag iva pratyavabhāsete (Op. cit., p. 24).

operate according to its dictation.⁵⁴ The different *Kalās* may be looked upon as so many potencies which account for the various characters of the Eternal Verbum such as its omniformness, omnipresence, omniscience and the like.⁵⁵ ✓

✓ It is to be remembered that the *Kālaśakti* of the grammarian is not the same as *kāla* in the system of the Vaiśeṣika which is an independent and supersensible substance. The *Kālaśakti* of the grammarian is a Power of the Eternal Verbum by virtue of which the latter is described as the Powerful. It should be noted, however, that though the Eternal Verbum and *Kālaśakti* stand in the relation of a substance and an attribute, yet they are essentially identical and not different from each other. In fact the two may be regarded as two moments or aspects of one and the same Reality. The difference between the Eternal Verbum and *Kālaśakti* and, for the matter of that, all *Kalās*, is a mere appearance, an intellectual fiction, without a foundation in reality.⁵⁶ ✓

✓ From what has been said above it may not be an improbable deduction that the position of the grammarian-philosopher is not strictly monistic. *Kālaśakti* in the system of the grammarian appears to be different from *avidyā*, the power of the Absolute, in the system of Śaṅkara.⁵⁷ The latter states in

✓⁵⁴Kālākhyena svātantryeṇa sarvāḥ paratantrā janmādimayyāś śaktayas tatsamāviṣṭāḥ kālaśaktivṛttim anupatanti.... Sarveṣāṃ hi vikārāṇāṃ kāraṇāntareṣu satsv api apekṣāvaśāt pratibandhajanmanām abhyanujñayā sahakārikāraṇaṃ kālaḥ (PR, cit., p. 3).

⁵⁵Vāg evā 'rthaṃ paśyati vāg bravīti vāg evā 'rthaṃ sannihitaṃ tanoti / Vācai 'va viśvaṃ bahurūpaṃ nibaddhaṃ tad etad ekaṃ pravibhajyo 'pabhuṅkte (Op. cit., p. 44).

✓⁵⁶Apṛthakte 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktveṇa 'va vartate (VP, I. 2); also: Śaktibhyo brahmaṇo 'pṛthakte 'pi āropitaḥ pṛthaktvābhāsa ity arthaḥ Tadavad eva ca kālpaniko bhedavyavahāra iti bhāvaḥ (PR, p. 3).

✓⁵⁷It is interesting to note that Puṇyārāja seems to identify *Kālaśakti* with *avidyā* as in the system of Śaṅkara. It is extremely difficult to ascertain the status of *Kālaśakti* and also of *Avidyā* (or *Avidyāśakti*) in the system of the grammarian and whether they are identical or different. And whether they are identical or different, it is also very difficult to determine how far it would be reasonable to identify *Kālaśakti* with *avidyā* in the Monistic Vedānta. Helārāja appears to suggest that the grammarian acknowledges both *kālaśakti* and *avidyāśakti* and that they have different functions. Thus while *kālaśakti* holds the phenomena in temporal succession, *avidyāśakti* shuts out the vision of the Absolute and projects the phenomena: Tatrai 'va kramābhāsanāṃ kālākhyasvātantryaśaktikṛtam eva (HR, p. 136); Aprakāśas tu tamo 'vidyā (Op. cit., p. 89); Sarvasmin paridṛśyamānā-bhedajāte svabhāvāt sāmānyasamāveśād ekasvabhāve brahmanāyā citreṣu vikalpeṣu bhāvavādinānātvenā 'nādinīyatiśaktinīyamite 'yam avidyāvaśād vyavasthā nānārūpā dṛśyate (Op. cit., p. 130); Krame 'pi brahmaṇā bhedābhāsanam avidyākṛtam (Op.

unambiguous terms that the power of the Absolute is false, that is, neither real (*sat*) nor unreal (*asat*). But the grammarian does not say that *Kālaśakti* is false. It is only the difference between the Eternal Verbum and *Kālaśakti* which is declared to be superimposed. And when this seeming difference is removed with the dawning of discriminating knowledge at the time of emancipation, *Kālaśakti* does not disappear like *avidyā* in the philosophy of Śaṅkara. The reason is obvious. Discriminating knowledge can dispel the gloom of ignorance but it cannot repudiate *Kālaśakti* which is an eternal principle.) In the circumstances it is not wholly unreasonable to conclude that the grammarian does not advocate unqualified monism in his philosophy. Before we set out to discuss the question in detail we should declare at the outset that the grammarian is as much a champion of monism

cit., p. 136). But Helārāja maintains in positive terms that both the powers are false—in fact, he believes that all powers are false (.....anirvācyā hi bhedābhedābhyām sarvāśaktayaḥ: Op. cit., p. 172).

But what is the view of Puṇyarāja on the subject? In the commentary on the opening verse of the *Vākyapadiya*, he speaks of *avidyā* as a power of the Absolute which gives rise to the phenomenal order of plurality. It is indubitably certain that this phenomenal plurality has no independent status of its own apart from the Absolute in and from which it emerges into being. It is asserted that the Absolute is one, undivided essence but comes to assume manifold forms by reason of a multiplicity of powers which are not only inherent in the Absolute but also spoken to be non-disparate. The disparity is only an appearance. In the third verse the plurality of powers is definitely asserted to be bound up with and derived from *Kālaśakti*. Again, in the fourth verse, the multifarious manifestation of the Absolute as enjoyer, enjoyment and object of enjoyment—in other words, as subject, object and cognition—is asserted to be due to *Kālaśakti*. Thus *Kālaśakti* is virtually observed to be the primal and original power. And *avidyā* also is asserted to be the power of the *Brahman* which makes plurality possible. The taciturnity of Puṇyarāja regarding the status of these two powers makes it difficult to ascertain whether the two are identical or different. Unless definite texts are available we prefer to maintain a non-committal attitude. It will not be safe to assert like Śaṅkara that *avidyā* is the primal power and *Kālaśakti* and other powers are rather derivatives. The latter position has got the merit of philosophical simplicity and clarity no doubt, but to interpret the position of one school, however analogous and allied, with the technique of another school is not a safe procedure. It cannot be ignored that Śaṅkara, who came after Bhartṛhari and with whose philosophy his acquaintance was quite adequate, did not think that they were adherents of the same line of thought. This is apparent from Śaṅkara's adverse criticism of Bhartṛhari's conception of *Sphoṭa*. This is a most vital difference and it is quite possible that there may be other points of divergence between the two masters of idealistic philosophy. To sum up, in the absence of definite statements confirming the identity or difference of the two powers, *Kāla* and *Avidyā*, we leave the question open. Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Gopināth Kavirāj, however, thinks that they are different and distinct when he writes: "Of these *Avidyā*, viz. the power not only of veiling the Essence

as Śaṅkara is,⁵⁸ though it is undeniable that there are important points of difference between them. (The grammarian does not uphold the cause of dualism when he says that both the Eternal Verbum and *Kālaśakti* are eternal truths. He does not also champion the cause of pluralism when he conceives the Eternal Verbum to consist of an infinite plurality of Powers known as *Kalās*.⁵⁹ We have definitely said above that the Eternal Verbum and *Kālaśakti* and *Kalās* are all essentially identical and thus the Supreme Reality is, in the system of the grammarian, one unqualified and undifferentiated unity of existence. But it should be remembered that though the grammarian's position is not anything but that of a monist, yet it is not identical with that of Śaṅkara.) The great Vedāntist does not uphold the view that the Supreme Reality in his system has an infinite plurality of powers. He does not countenance such a conception of a plurality in the Absolute Unity inasmuch as the identity of unity and plurality is not logically conceivable in his judgment. (Thus the Eternal Verbum is an alogical or, rather, a supra-logical principle. It would be unfair to the grammarian if we conceive his position to be a qualified monism. For he emphatically denies the ontological difference of Powers.) The pluralism

but of exhibiting the Many, and Kāla, viz. the power of projecting the eternal Kalās of Śabda Brahman in succession, may be regarded as the chief." (ABI, Vol. V., p. 12).

✓ But whether the two are identical or different, both Puṇyarāja and Helārāja are of the opinion that they are not reals but fictions. The text of the *Vākyapadīya*, however, does not appear to support the views of the commentators. Bhartṛhari does not say that *Kālaśakti* is false. It seems quite plain that all the powers of the Eternal Verbum are real, and when we say this we have in our mind the case of *Kālaśakti* and also of *Avidyāśakti* if the latter is believed to be different from the former. ✓

The paucity of adequate information about Bhartṛhari's conception of the powers of the Absolute is responsible for the formulation of different interpretations of his system of philosophy. In fact, we cannot explain the position of the school of thought that seeks to interpret Bhartṛhari's philosophy in the light of the doctrine of material transformation (*pariṇāma*) unless the powers of the Absolute are held to be reals. What we gather from the most cryptic statement of Bhartṛhari is that the Eternal Verbum is essentially a unity which assumes multiplicity due to its powers which are not different from it.

⁵⁸Ekam eva yad āmnātam.....(VP, I. 2); also :...tat sarvaṃ prakṛtyekatvād ekam ity āmnātaṃ "Ekam evā 'dvitīyam" "Praṇava evai 'kas tredhā 'bhivyajyate" ityādiśrutibhiḥ (PR, p. 2); also : Yad ekam prakriyābhedaḥ bahudhā pravibhajyate / Pareṇa jyotiṣai 'katvaṃ chittvā granthīn prapadyate (Op. cit., p. 51).

⁵⁹...ekatvāvirodhinyas samuccitā ātmabhūtāś śaktyas santi mitho bhinnās tadbhedāropeṇa bhinnam prthagrupam ity arthaḥ (Op. cit., p. 2).

of the Powers is not a metaphysical pluralism; it is conjured into existence by the necessity of the laws of logical interpretation. So metaphysically the Eternal Verbum is strictly a monistic principle and the pluralism is only a logical construction serving as the prius of the phenomenal plurality.⁶⁰

That the grammarian is a strict adherent of monistic idealism will also be apparent from his description of the way and nature of final liberation. Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, asserts that the real self of the individual is to be found in the Eternal Word-Principle—the Absolute Consciousness and the empirical self is but a shadowy reflection of this Principle.⁶¹ The Eternal Principle has been poetically described as the Great Bull (*Vṛṣabha*),⁶² existing in all individuals as a self-identical principle, uniform, unchanging and steadfast spiritual light, and yet, as associated with various powers, it is the prius and source of the phenomenal world of plurality, subjective and objective alike. The empirical self which is the logical and epistemological subject on this side of transcendental realization, attains enlightenment after undergoing a course of spiritual discipline which dissolves the bond of egoity and limitation. This enlightenment consists in the realization of identity of the individuated self with the Absolute and this realization leads to the merger of the individuated soul with the latter. The discipline which leads to this consummation consists in meditation upon the essence of Word (*Vāk*)—the Eternal Verbum disentangled from impurities. The grammatical errors are symptomatic of spiritual backslidings and the purge of solecism eventuates in the emergence of a spiritual competency and moral power. The repeated course of meditation upon this pure form conducts the spiritual aspirant to a stage in which the intuition of the Supreme Reality dawns upon him. This gives him the full vision of the Ultimate Truth with the Powers, which are the generative cause of the world-order. This vision ends in the

⁶⁰Avyahatāḥ kalā yasya kālāśaktim upāśritāḥ / Janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāva-bhedaḥ yonayaḥ (VP, I. 3).

⁶¹...ādya vyavahārikaḥ puruṣasya vāgātmanāḥ pratibimbopagrāhī (PR, p. 50);

⁶²Vṛṣabho varṣaṇātMahān dēvaś śabdaḥ (MB, I. pp. 37-38); also: Prāhur mahāntam ṛṣabham yena sāyujyam iṣyate (VP, I. 132).

union of the self with the Absolute—which is the *summum bonum*. (The *modus operandi* of the process of meditation and its culmination in the vision of the Truth and final union with it is graphically described in an ancient text quoted by Puṇyārāja : “The aspirant reaches the essence of Speech—the Pure Verbum, which lies beyond the vital plane, by withdrawing his mind from external objects and fixing it upon his internal nature. This entails the dissolution of temporal sequence of thought-activity. The purification of the Verbum (i.e., the eternal light of consciousness which ever shines within the subject) results from this and the aspirant enters into it after having severed all his ties with the material objective plane. This leads him to the attainment of the internal light and freed from all bonds and limitations he becomes identical with the Supreme Light—the Eternal Word-Principle—the undying and undecaying Spirit, called *Śabdabrahman* or the Word-Absolute.”⁶⁴) Evidently such a conception of the individual soul as being merged in the World Soul, of the unification of the individual consciousness with the Supreme Consciousness, the Ultimate Reality, is capable of only one interpretation, viz, that the individual has essential identity with the Absolute beyond which and besides which nothing exists. And this is monism *in excelsis*.

It may be mentioned in this connexion that the teachers of the *Pratyabhijñā* school of Kashmir seem to have been followers of Bhartṛhari's philosophical view. Thus Abhinavagupta writes to say that Power (*Śakti*) is identical in essence with the Powerful (*Śaktimat*) and that they are not different from each other. Just as the efficiency for burning is not different from fire itself so *Vimarśaśakti* and *Paramaśiva* (the Highest Absolute) are one and identical in essence.⁶⁵ (It may be

⁶⁴Prāṇavṛttim atikrānte vācas tattve vyavasthitaḥ /
Kramasamhārayogena samhr̥tyā 'tmānam ātmani //
Vācas samskāram ādhāya vācas sthāne niveśya ca /
Vibhajya bandhanāny asyāḥ kṛtvā tām chinnabandhanām //
Jyotir āntaram āśādy cchinnagranthiparigraham (ḥ ?) /
Pareṇa jyotiṣai 'katvaṁ chittvā granthīn prapadyate (PR, p. 51).
⁶⁵Śaktiś ca śaktimadrūpād vyatirekaṁ na vāñchati.
Tādātmyam anayor nityaṁ vahnidāhikayor iva (BP, 3).

further pointed out that *Vimarśaśakti* is described as the Power of autonomy and self-mastery (*Svātantryaśakti*) which comprehends the various other Powers which are subordinate to it.⁶⁶ Thus, in the first instance, the relation between *Paramaśiva* and *Vimarśa* in the Pratyabhijñā school corresponds to that between *Śabdabrahman* and *Kālaśakti* in the philosophy of the grammarian. Secondly, the nature of *Vimarśa* as the Supreme Power of *Paramaśiva* runs parallel to that of *Kālaśakti*, the Supreme Power of the Eternal Verbum. Thirdly, the conception of all Powers (*Śaktis*) as subordinate to *Vimarśa* bears close analogy to that of various *Kalās* which are controlled by *Kālaśakti*. Finally, it is interesting to note that the grammarian has used the term '*mala*' several times in his work. This term has not been used in Vedānta literature and sparingly used in Sāṅkhya and Yoga literature. But it has gathered a special meaning in the Āgama literature of the Śaivas. Bhartṛhari affirms that grammar heals impurities pertaining to words or speech (*vāṇmala*).⁶⁷ Again, he says that physical, verbal and intellectual impurities (*mala*) should be removed with the help of the sciences of medicine, grammar and philosophy respectively.⁶⁸ Further, Puṇyarāja cites an ancient text which describes how *Paśyantī* is always mixed up with foreign impurities (*mala*) but like the last digit of the lunar disc, it is never completely blacked out.⁶⁹ On these grounds we are inclined to suggest that the doctrine of *ābhāsa* (reflexion), as sponsored by Kashmirian philosophers, may have been inspired by the philosophy of Bhartṛhari and his school. The contact between the two schools of thought appears to be most intimate.

It may be noted in passing that by describing the Eternal Verbum as identical in essence with *Kālaśakti* which both Puṇyarāja and Helārāja explain as *Svātantryaśakti*, the gram-

⁶⁶...svātantryam eva kevalam viśvotpattisamharaṇādaḥ mūrdhābhiṣiktaṁ tattad-anantaśaktinīcayānām kroḍhikāritvāt... (Com. on STS, 1).

⁶⁷...vāṇmalānām cikitsitam (VP, I. 14).

⁶⁸Kāyavāgbuddhiviśayā ye malās samavasthitāḥ /
Cikitsālakṣaṇādhyātmaśāstrais teṣāṁ viśuddhayaḥ (VP, I. 144).

⁶⁹Sai 'śā saṅkīryamāṇā 'pi nityam āgantukair malaiḥ /
Antyā kale 'va somasya nā 'tyantam abhibhūyate (PR, p. 57).

marian wants us to understand that the character of unrestricted agenthood forms the essence or nature of the Supreme Reality in his system. Unlike Śaṅkara he views the Supreme Reality not as a mere locus or a passive background for the play of Power (*Śakti*) but as Power itself. Freedom to act is only natural to the Eternal Verbum.) In the system of Śaṅkara, however, the conception of the Absolute can only be explained by reference to *māyā*. With Śaṅkara the Absolute is no better than an actionless substratum on which plays *māyā* which is attached to it in a most mysterious way. *Māyā* is neither identical with nor distinct from the Absolute. The activity is of *māyā* in relation to which the Absolute may be viewed as the passive background. *Māyā* is not the essence of the Absolute in the system of Śaṅkara and is consequently regarded as a false adjunct. With the grammarian, on the other hand, *Kālaśakti* is identical with the Eternal Verbum and forms its very essence, which means that it is real.

Another characteristic of the Eternal Verbum which is intimately associated with its character of unrestricted independence is its omnipotence.⁷⁰ The Eternal Verbum is omnipotent as it knows no impediment when it chooses to work.⁷¹ But it should be borne in mind that for all practical purposes its unlimited power for work seems to be confined within the circumscribed field of the worldly self.⁷² The omnipotence of the Eternal Verbum has been set forth through a very happy illustration. As at the end of summer the rainy season collects masses of dark clouds which send down volumes of water on the earth, so the Eternal Verbum by means of *Kālaśakti* makes it possible for the so-called causal powers to produce objects of various descriptions.⁷³ Thus this character of omnipotence of the Eternal Verbum enables us to comprehend its character as an agent by virtue of which it arranges for the evolution of the phenomenal world. The Eternal Verbum acts as the living dynamic force behind all

⁷⁰...sarveśvaras sarvaśaktiḥ... (PR, p. 51).

⁷¹...sarvatrā 'pratihata-kāryaśaktiḥ... (Op. cit., p. 50).

⁷²...parigṛhītabhogakṣetrādvadhiḥ ... (Loc. cit.).

⁷³Prakṛtitvam api prāptān vikārān ākaroti saḥ /

Ṛtudhāme 'va grīṣmānte mahato meghasaṃplavān (CD, p. 7).

our limitless experiences. It stands as the regulating principle guiding and shaping the destinies of all beings for all times⁷⁴ and is looked upon in the last resort as the spring of all actions.⁷⁵ But the Eternal Verbum is not only the agent of production and preservation but also the agent of destruction. Like a cloud producing crops with seasonal showers of rain the Eternal Verbum brings into existence the multitudinous phenomena of the world, and like fire burning to ashes every substance that comes into contact with it, it exercises its devastating influence on every thing and turns an oasis into a desert.⁷⁶

The omnipotence of the Eternal Verbum as explained in the foregoing paragraph clearly indicates that it is the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the phenomenal world. But the grammarian like the Vedāntist conceives the Eternal Verbum as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the phenomenal world.⁷⁷ And if the Eternal Verbum is described as the material cause it becomes quite intelligible why it is characterized as omniform and omnipresent. According to the grammarian the Eternal Verbum is the unchanging matrix of manifold changes.⁷⁸ It is the one seed that sprouts into the big and growing tree of the phenomenal world.⁷⁹ It is the centre from which radiates and to which is withdrawn the infinite variety of objects⁸⁰ that are experienced, the beings that experience, the means of experience and the process of experience itself. But this is not all. The Eternal Verbum also underlies as its innermost and true self not only every ex-

⁷⁴Antaryāmi sa bhūtānām...(CD, p. 7), also: Antaryāmi...śabdabrahma...(PR, p. 18).

⁷⁵...āśrayas sarvakarmaṇām...(Op. cit., p. 50).

⁷⁶...parjanyavad agnivac ca prasavocchedaśaktiyuktaḥ...(Op. cit., p. 51).

⁷⁷Idānīm śabdasyai 'va jaganmūlatvaṁ prapañcayati :

Śabdeṣv evā 'śritā śaktir viśvasyā 'sya nibandhanī /

Yannetraḥ pratibhātmā 'yaṁ bhedarūpaḥ pratiyate (VP, I. 119).

Also : Sarvā apy arthajātayas sūksmarūpeṇa śabdādhiṣṭhānāḥ. Tāḥ kilā 'tmābhiv-
vyaktim adhiṣṭhānapariṇāmena pratilabhamānā vācyavācakabhāvarūpeṇa bhedena
pratiyate (PR, p. 44).

⁷⁸...apariṇāmā prakṛtiḥ...(Op. cit., p. 50).

⁷⁹Ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ce 'yam anekadhā. /

Bhoktṛbhoktavayarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ (VP, I. 4).

⁸⁰Brahme 'daṁ śabdanirmāṇaṁ śabdaśaktinibandhanam /

Vivṛtaṁ śabdamātrābhyaś tās eva pravṛtiyate (PR, p. 2).

Also : Yad etan maṇḍalaṁ bhāsvad dhāma citrasya rādhasaḥ /

Tadbhāvam abhisambhūya vidyāyāṁ pratilīyate (Op. cit., p. 46).

perienicing being but also every manifestation in the universe. It is present in every object and is perceived here, there and everywhere. As the Absolute, the material cause of the phenomenal world, according to the Vedāntist, or *Prakṛti*, the material cause of the universe according to the teachers of Sāṅkhya, is perceived in every appearance (*vivarta*) or in every mode (*pariṇāma*), so the Eternal Verbum, the material cause of the world, according to the grammarian, is found to persist in every manifestation.⁸¹

It may not be out of place to discuss here why the evolution of the universe from the Eternal Verbum as conceived by Bhartr̥hari cannot be definitely identified with any one of the well-known theories on causation. What is the nature of the relation that subsists between the Eternal Verbum and the products that come out of it ? It seems as though the grammarian is not interested in setting forth a pronounced opinion on the subject. He only affirms that the Eternal Verbum is the material cause of the universe inasmuch as every object is determined by a verbal form. An object which is determined by a word cannot be confused with another object which in its turn is determined by another verbal expression. An object is moulded, as it were, by the verbal expression signifying it. This establishes a most intimate relationship between word and object which the grammarian describes as causation by which he means that the world of objects has got the Eternal Verbum as its material cause.

But is the object determined by a word different from the word itself or are they identical in nature ? The grammarian refers to both the alternatives but leaves the question open.⁸² Puṇyarāja, however, has sought to analyze the two views but has refrained from identifying the view of Bhartr̥hari on the subject. Puṇyarāja says that in the opinion of a school of thinkers all change or transformation is identical with the cause. All effects are but manifestations of the cause which

⁸¹Vibhajya bahudhā 'tmānaṁ sa chandasyaḥ prajāpatiḥ /
Chandomayibhir mātṛābhir bahudhai 'va viveśa tam (PR, p. 45).

⁸²Svamātrā paramātrā vā śrutyā prakramyate yathā /
Tathai 'va rūḍhatām eti tayā hy artho vidhīyate (VP, I. 130).

gives rise to them and they should be treated as non-distinct from it.⁸³ According to others, all changes are purely intellectual constructs but they are supposed to be invested with externality. Their plurality is in truth only an appearance and they are not limited by space and form.⁸⁴ According to a third view, changes are actually the transformations of One Conscious Principle.⁸⁵ According to Puṇyarāja these are the three-fold interpretations of the view that holds the cause and the effect to be identical. As for the view holding the cause and the effect to be different entities Puṇyarāja refers to a two-fold interpretation. That the cause and the effect are different may be illustrated by means of either the sesamum and the oil pressed out of it or the fire and a spark springing from it.⁸⁶ Likewise, the Eternal Verbum and the objective world evolved out of it are different from each other.

But whether the cause and the effect are identical or different is a subject which Bhartṛhari does not discuss. He only affirms the Eternal Verbum as the material cause of the phenomenal world. It is this reticence on his part which makes it possible for the latter-day philosophers of different systems of Indian thought to interpret his system in various ways. Thus, for instance, Maṇḍanamiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa have recorded different interpretations of Bhartṛhari's position on the causal relation between the Absolute and the objective world. Thanks to his reticence and non-committal attitude superimposition (*pratyāsa* or *adhyāsa*), self-alienation (*vivarta*) and real transformation (*pariṇāma*) are suggested as equally plausible explanations of Bhartṛhari's outlook on the causal relation between the Absolute and the objective world.⁸⁷

⁸³Sarvo hi vikāra ātmanātre 'ti keṣāñcid darśanam (PR, p. 49).

⁸⁴Sa ca pratipuruṣam antassanniviṣṭo bāhya iva pratyavabhāṣate, vastutas tasyai 'katvād amūrtatvād arūpatvāc ca vyavahāramātram idam antar bahir ity apareṣāṃ matam (Loc. cit.).

⁸⁵Ekasya cititattvasyā 'yam pariṇāma ityādi...(Loc. cit.).

⁸⁶Caitanyam bhūtayoni tilakṣodarasavat pravibhajyata ity ekeṣāṃ matam. Anyeṣāṃ tu darśanam yathā mahato 'gner visphuliṅgās sūkṣmā vāyor abhrasamghātaś candrakāntād vibhāginīyas toyadhārāḥ pṛthivyā vā sāvārohaprasavā nyagrodhā ity evamādi paramātrāvādinām darśanam (Loc. cit.).

⁸⁷...ekasya śabdātmanah pratyāsāt pariṇāmād vivartād ve 'ti (VV, p. 287); also see NM, II. p. 102.

To resume, though the Eternal Verbum is the underlying principle in every object and in every being, it does not undergo any change—it remains one and uniform all through. It never admits of division or bifurcation and is not subject to any limitation. But as the one sea, calm and serene, expresses itself in the forms of myriads of waves due to the rise of a tempest, so the Eternal Verbum, which is essentially a unitary principle, assumes a plurality of forms in the shape of so many beings and objects through the influence of *Avidyā*.⁸⁸ Each being and each object cannot but reveal the one that runs through them. The clear and colourless sky is believed to be a vault of variegated hues by those men and women whose eyes are affected with a disease.⁸⁹ Likewise, it is *Avidyā* which clouds the vision of the unenlightened and it is under its spell that they fail to understand the real nature of the Eternal Verbum which is one and unchanging.⁹⁰ With the emergence of correct and discriminating knowledge the veil of *Avidyā* will, of course, be removed and the vision of the Eternal Verbum will bless us all.

The unitary and unchanging character of the Eternal Verbum, as explained above, enables us to understand its character of permanence or eternality. Whatever is one and unchanging is permanent as well.⁹¹ And when we say that the Supreme Reality in the system of Bhartṛhari is a permanent or eternal principle, we should add that this permanence is not permanence as continuity of flow (*pravāha-nityatā*) as maintained by the Buddhist but absolute permanence (*pāramārthika-nityatā*).

Yet one more characteristic of the Eternal Verbum is its omniscience. It has been said above that the Eternal Verbum assumes the form of the individual soul in every animate and inanimate object and as such it watches all our conduct. It is

⁸⁸Tasyai 'kam api caitanyaṁ bahudhā pravibhajyate /
Aṅgārāṅkitam utpāte vārirāśer ivo 'dakam (CD, p. 7).

⁸⁹Yathā viśuddham ākāśaṁ timiropapluto janaḥ /
Saṅkīrṇam iva mātṛabhiś citrābhir abhimanyate (Op. cit., p. 8).

⁹⁰Tathe 'dam amṛtaṁ brahma nirvikāram avidyayā /
Kaluṣatvam ivā 'pannaṁ bhedarūpaṁ vivartate (Loc. cit.).

⁹¹Iha dvau śabdātmānau—kāryo nityaś ca (PR, p. 50).

present everywhere and nothing can therefore escape its notice. It is always aware of what we do, when we do it and how we do it. Whatever happens, happens within the ken of its ever wakeful experience.⁹²

To sum up :

1. The Ultimate Reality is the Absolute Consciousness, and consciousness and word being identical, it is the Absolute Word. In the system of Bhartṛhari consciousness and word are interchangeable terms. This makes for his difference from the Vedānta, though both of them are at one with regard to the unitary character of the Absolute.

2. But with regard to the unitary character of the Absolute there is also a fundamental difference. In Śaṅkara's Vedānta the unity is absolute and unqualified and the plurality of powers is a mere appearance which has no ultimacy. In Bhartṛhari's philosophy the plurality of Powers has no independent being apart from the Absolute Word and each member of the plurality partakes of the character of the Word as the Powers are inherent in and identical with the Absolute.

These seem to be the salient features of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, which emerge from a critical examination of the author's own language. The commentators, however, have read Śaṅkara's ideas into the text. They define the relation between the *Brahman* and the powers as *anirvācya*, that is to say, logically indefinable as identity or non-identity, as real or not real.⁹³ But we have not been able to light upon a single word in the text of Bhartṛhari that can lend the remotest countenance to such an interpretation. Bhartṛhari has not declared that the Powers of the Absolute are not real. On the contrary he is unmistakably positive that the Powers of the Eternal Verbum are eternally real and eternally present in the relation of identity.

3. The process of evolution which proceeds from the Absolute and occurs in it does not involve a change of being in the Absolute. The Absolute though identical with the plurality does not forfeit its simple unity at any stage.

⁹²Vāg evā 'rthaṁ paśyati...(PR, p. 44).

⁹³...tattvānyatvābhyāṁ sattvāsattvābhyāṁ cā 'nirvācya śaktirūpā...(Op. cit., p. 3.); also : ...anirvācya eva bhedaḥbhedaḥ sarvāś śaktayaḥ (HR, p. 172).

4. Bhartṛhari's Absolute seems to be a dynamic principle. It produces the universe out of itself. It appears to be the material and the efficient cause of all that exists. Although Śaṅkara would call the Absolute the material and efficient cause in one, the concept of causality is not applicable to it in absolute reality. If the metaphysical position of Śaṅkara was to be expressed in exact terminology, the *Brahman* would be said to appear as the cause and not to be the cause in absolute reality of the world. The position adumbrated here follows, of course, from the conception of the Absolute as endowed with multiple Powers which are as real as the Absolute.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SUPREME POWER

We have seen in the last chapter that the Eternal Verbum and its Powers are identical in essence¹ and the difference between them is only a figment of the imagination.² In the transcendental plane even this distinction is not felt and the plurality of Powers does not annul the unity of the Eternal Verbum.³ But when we come down to the empirical plane of the phenomenal world, we find the Powers of the Eternal Verbum sundered from it, and when they are at work, they become the sources of the objective world in its manifold phases.⁴ It is remarkable that the Eternal Verbum understood as the integer of the different Powers that lie embedded in it prior to the projection of the phenomenal world, is asserted to be the material cause out of which the phenomenal world evolves. The objective world is thus represented by the grammarian as the manifestation of the different Powers of the Eternal Verbum. Any object, therefore, (say, for instance, a jar) is capable of being explained in terms of a number of Powers which include among others its capacity for fetching water.⁵ It is, therefore, quite appropriate that Bhartṛhari conceives such categories as time (*kāla*) and space (*dik*), activity (*kriyā*) and instrumentality (*sādhana* or *kāraka*) as so many Powers and nothing more.⁶ The grammarian-

¹Sarvaśaktyātmabhūtatvam ekasyai 've 'ti nirṇayaḥ (VP, III. i. 22).

²Ekam eva yad āmnātaṁ bhinnam śaktivyapāśrayāt /

Apṛthakte 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthakte 'va vartate (Op. cit., I. 2).

Also: Śaktibhyo brahmaṇo 'pṛthakte 'py āropitaḥ pṛthaktvābhāsaḥ (PR, p. 2).

³Tan nityam śabdavācyaṁ tac chabdatattvam na bhidyate (VP, III. ii. 11).

Also: Paramārthe tu nai 'katvam pṛthaktvād bhinnalakṣaṇam /

Pṛthaktvaikatvarūpeṇa tattvam eva prakāśate (Op. cit., vii. 39).

Also: Pṛthaktvād bhinnalakṣaṇam pṛthaktvavyatiriktaṁ nai 'katvam asti, pṛthaktvaikatvarūpeṇa hi tattvam eva prakāśate (HR, p. 200).

⁴Śaktimātrāsamūhasya viśvasyā 'nekadharmaṇaḥ /

Sarvadā sarvathābhāvāt kvacit kiñcid vivakṣyate (VP, III. vii. 2).

⁵Ghaṭādayo bhāvā viśvaśabdavācyaś te ca tattadudakaharaṇādikāryasādhikānām śaktinām samūharūpaḥ. Ata eva tāś śaktayas tatra mātrābhāgā iti śaktisamāhāramātram ghaṭādayaḥ (HR, p. 174).

⁶Śaktirūpe padārthānām atyantam anavasthitaḥ /

philosopher is, of course, careful enough to state that all such Powers as constitute an entity or an object are not understood simultaneously; for, in that case, they would be so mixed up with one another that it would be well-nigh impossible to understand them separately and thus it would be difficult to understand and identify any particular object. An object is understood in terms of a particular Power only which the speaker intends to convey. This sets aside the apprehension of a confusion of Powers resulting in a confusion of identity.⁷

It is interesting to note that Bhartṛhari puts greater emphasis particularly on two Powers of the Eternal Verbum—Time and Space⁸ besides *Avidyā*. Like consciousness itself we cannot disown the two Powers—Time and Space, which are universally and necessarily apprehended as the inevitable background of all knowledge. The notions of priority and posteriority are integral to all our everyday activities and they can only be explained with reference to time and space. And if we analyze the order of creation of the universe, we shall notice that there are two parallel lines of time and space running through it. Of these two Powers, again, the grammarian regards Time-force as the more fundamental, for he asserts that it governs and controls all other Powers which are subordinate to it.⁹

The Eternal Verbum, which runs through all evolutes and lasts throughout the duration and after the dissolution of the universe, and which remains serene and unruffled in spite of any cosmic upheaval and is of the nature of pure consciousness, is asserted to be the highest universal (*mahāsattā*).¹⁰ It is the

Dik sādhanam kriyā kāla iti vastavabhidhāyinaḥ (VP, III. v. 1).

Also: Nityāṣ ṣaṭ śaktayo 'nyeṣām... (Op. cit., III. vii. 35).

⁷Tenā 'nekaśakter api padārthasya saty eva tathā sthāne 'pi kācic chaktiḥ kvacid udbhūtā vivakṣyata iti ghaṭam paśya ghaṭeno 'dakam ānaya ghaṭe udakam nidhehi 'tyādikarmakaraṇādibhāvo niyamenō 'papadyata iti na kārakasāṅkaryaprasaṅgaḥ (HR, p. 175).

⁸Caitanyavat sthitā loke dikkālaparikalpanā /

Prakṛtiṁ prāṇinām tām hi ko 'nyathā sthāpayiṣyati (VP, III. vi. 18).

⁹Kālākhyena svāntaryeṇa sarvāḥ paratantrā janmādimayyaś śaktayas tatsamāviṣṭāḥ kālāśaktivṛttim anupatanti... (PR, p. 2).

¹⁰...antyā parā prakṛtis satyā sarvavikāraṇhuyāyini praśāntakalloḷā cidekaghanaḥ brahme 'ty āgamavidah... . Citsāmānyasya sarvatrā 'nugamād eva mahāsattārūpam abhāvāpratiyogi... (HR, p. 29).

universal meaning of all words—the lower universals are but transformations of this highest universal which runs through them as the underlying principle. We have stated above that the objective world is the projection of the Powers of the Eternal Verbum and it remains to examine what is at the root of the projection of the Powers of the Eternal Verbum. Certainly it is *Avidyā* which shuts out the vision of the unity which the Absolute is and initiates the multiform transformations which the Absolute undergoes.¹¹ Though *Avidyā* is as much a unitary principle as the Supreme Reality, still it exhibits the plurality of phenomena inside its own being and thus comes to be perceived as multiform. But the question that arises in this connexion is this: what is there that prevents the Supreme Reality from undergoing different shades of transformation simultaneously?¹² We are told that the Supreme Reality is not affected by any notion of sequence. The question has been anticipated by Bhartṛhari and he posits *Kālaśakti*, which, like all other Powers, remains ingrained in the very being of the Eternal Verbum, as identical with it so long as the evolution of the universe does not take place. As soon as the process of creation or evolution starts and the Eternal Verbum which has been described as the highest universal (*mahāsattā*) appears as different forms of being (*sattā*) in the shape of particular universals, the latter are manifested in a particular order due to the influence of *Kālaśakti*.¹³ It is this *Kālaśakti* which prevents the different transformations of the Eternal Verbum from occurring simultaneously and thereby conflicting with one another. *Kālaśakti* is regarded as that Power of the Eternal Verbum which determines every activity in the empirical plane—it governs the order of phenomena appearing or disappearing as a result of each activity. Thus the Eternal Verbum which is conceived as a unitary principle which is

¹¹Tathe 'dam amṛtaṁ brahma nirvikāram avidyayā /

Kaluṣatvam ivā 'pannam bhedarūpaṁ vivartate (CD, p. 8).

¹²Yadi tarhi svaśaktimāhātmyāj janmādirūpatayā sattai 'vā 'vabhāsate katham na yugapad avabhāsaḥ. Krameṇa 'ti katham (HR, p. 32).

¹³Ātmabhūtaḥ kramo 'py asyā yatre 'dam kāladarśanam /

Paurvāparyādirūpeṇa pravibhaktam iva sthitam (VP, III. i. 37).

Also: Kramākhyā hi kālaśaktir brahmaṇo janmavatsu padārtheṣu janmādikriyādvārakam eva paurvāparyeṇā 'vabhāsoṣāgamavidhāyini (HR, p. 32).

sequence-less,¹⁴ becomes capable of projecting the phenomenal sequence of priority and posteriority. It is true that time functions in the plane of phenomenal existence only and has no bearing on the Supreme Reality¹⁵; but it is also true that when the Eternal Verbum evolves into the different Powers immanent in it, the sequential order of evolution can be explained by reference to *Kālaśakti*. All Powers of the Eternal Verbum are but the immanent potentialities which when activated create the universe.¹⁶ And it is *Kālaśakti* which exercises a control on these Powers by presenting them in a particular order of sequence. And because all other Powers of the Eternal Verbum are thus asserted to be subordinate to *Kālaśakti*, the latter has been described as the Power of autonomy and self-mastery.

It may be noted here that the Eternal Verbum and *Kālaśakti* can be viewed as the two moments or aspects of one and the same Reality. We are told that *Kālaśakti*, which is conceived to be the Supreme inherent Power of the Eternal Verbum, is identical in essence with it. The Powerful and the Power are declared to be one and the same principle, though it must be admitted that when *Kālaśakti* is described as the Power the implication cannot but be that it is subservient to the Powerful, a point which is in common with the Vedānta where *avidyā* is regarded as acting in dependence upon the Absolute. It needs to be pointed out, however, that despite this point of contact there is a vital point of difference between the two systems for the reason that whereas in the Vedānta the identity between the Absolute and *avidyā* is never upheld as ultimate, the same is sought to be established between the Eternal Verbum and *Kālaśakti* in the system of the grammarian.¹⁷

We have already noticed that *Kālaśakti* or the Supreme

¹⁴Vikalparūpaṁ bhajate tattvam evā 'vikalpitam/

Na cā 'tra kālabhedo 'sti kālabhedaś ca grhyate (VP, III. ii. 8).

Also: Evam akālakalitam api tattvam anādinidhanam kālākhyasvatantṛaśaktivini-
veṣitapratibandhābhyanujñāvaśāj janmādhāvavikārābhidhīyamānapaurvāpyam
cakāsti (HR, p. 90).

¹⁵Nityānām hi sthitau sahakāriṇyāḥ kālaśakter vyāpāro na vidyate (PR, p. 67).

¹⁶Ātmīyā eva śaktayo yogyatākhyās sattāyās tathāvidhās santi yābhir viśvaprapaṇcam
racayati (HR, p. 34).

¹⁷...idānīm dharmadharminor avyātirekam bhāvikam āśritya...(Op. cit., p. 362).

Power, which is at one with the Eternal Verbum on the transcendental plane, functions in a twofold way on the empirical plane. In the first place, *Kālaśakti* exercises a supreme control over the activities of all other Powers known as *Kālās*. Secondly, *Kālaśakti* presents the various phenomena of the world in temporal succession. Thus it is stated by the grammarian that the Eternal Verbum is called *Kāla* or *Kālaśakti* when it manifests the different worldly objects as if on the rim of a wheel.¹⁸ *Kālaśakti* which is thus an expression of the Eternal Verbum is essentially active—it rotates and revolves and in course of its rotations and revolutions which we know by the names of the different seasons of the year, various objects or effects are thrown out of the womb of their respective causes.¹⁹ This projection of effects is the creation of the world-order. It is for this reason that the grammarian compares *Kālaśakti* to the wire-puller (*sūtradhāra*) in a puppet-play, as being solely in charge of running the entire show of the world-order.²⁰ Causes cannot operate unless *Kālaśakti* infuses into them a life-giving force. The idea has been expressed by the grammarian with the help of a fine illustration. Strings are tied to the feet of smaller birds with which fowlers catch bigger ones. Now smaller birds with their feet thus tied with strings can fly over a limited space; for they cannot go beyond the lengths of strings. Sometimes they choose to fly up and again they hop on the ground but all their movements are confined within a circumference having the length of the particular string for its radius. Like strings controlling the movements of birds as described above, *Kālaśakti* controls the causes of different phenomena.²¹ And this control of *Kālaśakti* is not operative simply with regard to the event of creation but also with reference to those of preservation and

¹⁸Jalayantrabhramāveśasadrśibhiḥ pravṛttibhiḥ /

Sa kālaḥ kalayan sarvāḥ kālākhyāṁ labhate vibhuḥ (VP, III. ix. 14).

¹⁹Hemantādikālabhedāpannena kālena sādhanāśaktayaḥ pratibaddhās tā eva vasantādikabhāvam anuprāptās sa eva 'nujānāti sṛjati kālayati... (HR, p. 347).

²⁰Tam asya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṁ pracakṣate /

Pratibandhābhyānujñābhyāṁ tena viśvaṁ vibhajate (VP, III. ix. 4).

²¹Pratibaddhās ca yās tena citrā viśvasya vṛttayaḥ /

Tās sa eva 'nujānāti yathā tantuś śakuntinaḥ (Op. cit., ix. 15).

destruction.²² It follows, therefore, that the universe comes into existence, continues to exist and ceases to do so only in obedience to the dictates of *Kālaśakti*. Unless *Kālaśakti* extends its helping hand the so-called different causal powers cannot give rise to different effects. Even when effects are produced, both the causal powers and effects absolutely depend on *Kālaśakti* to preserve them in being. And it is only when *Kālaśakti* so chooses that they should die, that they cease to exist. It is for this reason that *Kālaśakti* is looked upon as the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) or the causal agent (*prayojaka-kartṛ*) of the phenomenal world in its manifold phases of creation, preservation and dissolution.²³ *Kālaśakti* thus viewed is supreme in itself and without its governing influence the world would have been reduced to a state of chaos.²⁴ The influence of *Kālaśakti* has been illustrated by Bhartṛhari in a graphic fashion. Just as the current of a stream carries with it grass, leaves and creepers that lie on its banks and again sends them back to the shores, so does *Kālaśakti* behaving in various ways project different objects and bring about their limitless transformations;²⁵ or as the life-breath remaining within us in the different joints of our limbs controls all our physical movements, so does *Kālaśakti* permeate the constitution of different objects and make them appear or disappear according as it sets them in motion or inhibits them.²⁶ It is,

²²Sthitasyā 'nugrahas tais tair dharmais saṁsargibhis tataḥ /

Pratibandhas tirobhāvaḥ prahāṇam iti cā 'tmanaḥ (VP, III. ix. 11).

Also : ...anugraho vṛddhilakṣaṇo bhāvātmanaś ca pratibandhas svakāryasāmarthyam tirobhāvo 'darśanaṁ prahāṇaṁ vinaśyatte 'tyādayas sarva eva vikārāḥ kālādhiṇo niyatasamayavāt (HR, p. 345).

²³Utpattau ca sthitau cā 'pi vināśe cā 'pi tadvatām /

Nimittaṁ kalam evā 'hur vibhaktenā 'tmanā sthitam (VP, III. ix. 3).

Also : Vasantādikāle sakalaśaktinām pravṛttidarśanāt tāsām prayojako hetur nimit-takāraṇaṁ kāla unnīyate (HR, p. 345).

²⁴Yadi na pratibadhnīyāt pratibaddham ca no 'tsrjet /

Avasthā vyatikīryeran paurvāparyavinākr̥tāḥ (VP, III. ix. 5).

²⁵Tṛṇaparṇalatādini yathā sroto 'nukarṣati /

Pravartayati kālo 'pi mātṛā mātṛavatām tathā (Op. cit., ix. 41).

²⁶Āviśyai 'vā 'nusandhatte yathā gatimatām gatiḥ /

Vāyus tathai 'va kālātmā vidhatte kramarūpatām (Op. cit., ix. 42).

Also : Yathā prāṇākyo vāyus śarīriṇām antar avayavasandhiṣv avasthito gamanāgamanādiceṣṭās sādhayati tathā kālātmā 'pi bhāvānām ātmānam anupraviśya pratibandhābhyānujñābhyām nimajjanonmajjane kurvan kramaṁ paurvāparyalakṣaṇaṁ prakalpayati (HR, p. 357).

therefore, not an exaggeration to say that *Kālaśakti* regulates the movements of the sun, the rise and fall of stars, and the appearance and the disappearance of the gross elements before and after the creation of different objects and their dissolution respectively.²⁷ Looked at from this points of view, therefore, *Kālaśakti* which is so supremely powerful has been rightly regarded as the soul of the universe.²⁸

It has been observed before that causal powers operate in strict obedience to the dictates of *Kālaśakti*. These dictates have been held to represent the two aspects of *Kālaśakti*, known as *Krama* and *Jarā*. Thus when *Kālaśakti* permits causal powers to produce effects and to determine their lives, it is revealed in its aspect of *Krama*.²⁹ But when *Kālaśakti* withholds the permission as a result of which effects cease to exist, its aspect *Jarā* is manifested.³⁰ *Kālaśakti* as *Krama* infuses potency into the causes which work in such a way that they produce different effects. It also determines the periods for which such effects would last.³¹ But as soon as *Kālaśakti* appears in its aspect of *Jarā*, its other aspect, that is, *Krama*, seems to get paralyzed. It is, therefore, found that all objects gradually show signs of decay as soon as they fall in the grip of *Jarā*. All powers of life and growth are set at rest when this aspect of *Kālaśakti* manifests itself. Loss of intelligence and withering of vital forces are clear indications of the approach of *Jarā*.³² The auxiliary forces which help the different objects in behaving in different ways and also contribute to their preservation, appear to vanish with the

²⁷Ayanaprabhāgaś ca gatiś ca jyotiṣām dhruvā /

Nivṛttiprabhavaś ca 'va bhūtānām tannibandhanāḥ (VP, III. ix. 43).

²⁸Kāla eva ca viśvātmā....(Op. cit., ix. 12); also : ...sarvopari kālo viśvātme 'ty ucyate (HR, p. 357).

²⁹... sarvatra kramākyā kālaśaktis savyāpāre 'ty abhyanujñe 'yam (Op. cit., p. 349).

³⁰Idānīm pratibandhalakṣaṇām kālavṛttīm vyācaṣṭe (Op. cit., p. 350).

³¹Tad evaṁ kramabhāvi anekakāryakartṛtvaṁ tatsahakāripṛāptau sthītilakṣaṇam upapadyate, tathā ca sthītiparyantā 'bhyanujñopapattiḥ (Loc. cit.).

³²Jarākyā kālaśaktir yā śaktyantaravirodhinī /

Sā śaktiḥ pratibandhnāti jāyante ca virodhinaḥ (VP, III. ix. 24).

Also : Jiryate bhāvo 'naye 'ti jarākyā kālaśaktiḥ prāṇyapṛāṇisādhāraṇy evā 'nādir yauvanādisaktyantarapratidvandvinī kāryavyaktinām kālāntaraparipākāvadhṛtārthakriyāsu sāmārthyam vighnayati tatas ca sāmārthyavirodhino 'vasthāviśeṣaḥ, prāṇyapṛāṇiṣu prajñāmāndyaśoṣādayo yataḥ pradhvaṁsaḥ pratyāsanna iti lakṣyate (HR, p. 350).

advent of *Jarā*.³³ It needs to be remembered in this connexion that both the aspects of *Kālaśakti*, the one by which the causal forces are brought into play and the other by which they are withheld, have been held to be eternal ;³⁴ for, we notice that as on the one hand there is a continuous appearance and growth of phenomena, so on the other there is a ceaseless disappearance and withering away of objects one after another.³⁵

It is with reference to the two aspects of *Kālaśakti*, that is to say, *Krama* and *Jarā*, which are vitally connected with the emergence and cessation of phenomena in succession, that it appears to be associated with the qualities of succession or sequence.³⁶ The question of sequence, of course, relates primarily to action and next to phenomena appearing and disappearing as a consequence thereof. And as *Kālaśakti* governs all actions and present them in succession, it is only natural to expect that the attributes of sequence or succession would come to be ideally associated with *Kālaśakti*.³⁷ In reality, however, these attributes are never integral to *Kālaśakti*. It may be mentioned in this connexion that what is true of succession or sequence is also true of co-existence.³⁸ There is co-existence of actions or of objects produced by them. When we talk of co-existence as relating to *Kālaśakti* we do not give out the real truth; we superimpose the properties of actions or objects on *Kālaśakti* which in reality does not possess them.

³³Prayojakās tu ye bhāvā sthitibhāgasya hetavaḥ /

Tirobhavanti te sarve yata ātmā prahīyate (VP, III. ix. 25).

Also: Yaiḥ pravartitās svakārye bhāvās saṁsargibhis saḥakāribhis sthityarśasya hetavaḥ te sarve 'sya jarasā 'dhiṣṭhitasyai 'kalalpanā iva sahoṣitā api nivartante teṣu niṣṭteṣu kṛtakaraṇīyasyā 'sya bhāvasya svarūpaṁ cyavate (HR, p. 351).

³⁴Pratibandhābhyanujñābhyāṁ vṛttir yā tasya śāsvatī /

Tayā vibhajyamāno 'sau bhajate kramarūpatām (VP, III. ix. 30).

³⁵...bhāveṣu satataparīṇāmiṣu hi kiñcit prajāyate kiñcid apakṣīyata iti niyatam etat (HR, p. 352).

³⁶...tathā ca kāryaniveśitaḥ kramaḥ kāle samāropyate na tv asau tatra bhāvika ity arthaḥ (Loc. cit.).

³⁷Samśargiṇāṁ tu yo bhedo viśeṣās tasya te matāḥ /

Sambhinnas tair avasthānaṁ kālo bhedāya kalpate (Op. cit., ix. 8).

³⁸Evam yaugapadyam api kramavikramavirodhī dharmāḥ kāryagataḥ kāle samāropyate (HR, p. 353).

It should be pointed out here that not only are the attributes of sequence and co-existence superimposed on *Kālaśakti* but the notion of plurality is transferred to it as well.³⁹ Bhartṛhari states in clear terms that it is not at all unusual that *Kālaśakti* which controls all movements and actions (*vyāpāra*) is often identified with them. Movements and actions are manifold but *Kālaśakti* is one and uniform. But as *Kālaśakti* determines all actions as weight determines concrete substances and as it runs on uninterruptedly through all stages of actions, it is only natural that the ordinary cognizer is led to presume an identity between the two.⁴⁰ But the more intelligent and discerning mind never mistakes *Kālaśakti* for action. Manifoldness is thus never natural to *Kālaśakti*, it is superimposed on it under a false impression. Every action is different from another, and as *Kālaśakti* is the determining factor of each and every action, it seems as though *Kālaśakti* were different in each case. And such different forms of *Kālaśakti* are popularly called by various names such as day, night, week, fortnight, month, season, year, etc.⁴¹ Really speaking, however, all these descriptions of *Kālaśakti* contain no more value in themselves than serving our practical purposes. *Kālaśakti* is essentially a unitary principle which is uniform all through.⁴²

Just like the designation of *Kālaśakti* in terms of different seasons, the distinction of *Kālaśakti* into auspicious and ominous is also superimposed on it. *Kālaśakti* is described as auspicious when the majority of people lead their lives in rigid obedience to the injunctions of sacred books and laws. And in case there is a violation of religious, social and moral laws in society, people would say that *Kālaśakti* is ominous. Thus the description of *Kālaśakti* as auspicious and ominous is explained with reference to the conduct of people.

³⁹...ekatve 'pi vibhāvite nānātvam upādhibhedanihitam...(HR, p. 344).

⁴⁰Diṣṭiprasthasuvarṇādi mūrtabhedāya kalpate /
Kriyābhedāya kālas tu saṁkhyā sarvasya bhedikā (VP, III. ix. 2).

⁴¹...teṣāṁ / bhedopāhitātmātiśayo 'sāv ahorātrapakṣamāsartusamvatsarayugaman-
vantarādivyavasthām āśādayati (HR, p. 344).

⁴²Tasyā 'tmā bahudhā bhinnā bhedair dharmāntarāśrayaiḥ /
Na hi bhinnam abhinnam vā vastu kiñcana vidyate (VP, III. ix. 6).

And this clearly suggests that the aforesaid description of *Kālaśakti* cannot be natural to but is superimposed on it.⁴³

Arguing on the same line as before, it has been held that the description of *Kālaśakti* or *Kāla* as long or brief should also be explained with reference to actions happening under its governing influence. The length of a path is constant but it appears to be long to those travellers who cannot walk fast while it seems to be short to those who can walk quickly. Likewise, *Kālaśakti*, which is constant and changeless, appears to be of greater or shorter duration according as the series of actions brought about by it is long drawn out or cut short. Thus it is the series of actions that varies but *Kālaśakti* remains uniform all through.⁴⁴

Proceeding as before, it may be pointed out that the ideas of commencement, continuity and completion which are generally associated with *Kāla* or *Kālaśakti* are all superimposed on it. What is described as the commencement of *Kāla* is nothing but the congregation of different causes or conditions up to the point of the production of effects. Similarly, a proper co-ordination of causes or conditions maintaining the life of an effect is described as the continuity of *Kāla*. Likewise, the fulfilment of the mission of any effect is held to be the completion of *Kāla*. Thus the commencement, continuity and completion of *Kāla* are to be understood with reference to different effects inasmuch as it is the life of an effect that starts, continues and finally comes to a close. *Kālaśakti* or *Kāla* is primarily free from any idea of change—

⁴³Kartṛbhedāt tadartheṣu pracayāpacayau gataḥ /

Samatvaṁ viśamatvaṁ vā sa ekaḥ pratipadyate (VP, III. ix. 31).

Also: Iha yadā 'nuṣṭhātāraś śrutismṛtinibandhanam ācāram anuṣṭhanti tadā prakarṣam āśādayan kālas sama evai 'kaḥ kṛtādir vyapadiśyate śubhasamācārādhi-kāribāhulyādibhir ity arthaḥ...., yadā tu kartāro viśṛṅkhalā yathāvat samācāram ullaṅghayanti tasmād ācārāpakarṣād apacayaprāpteh kaliprabhṛtir viśamaḥ kālo 'bhidhīyate...(HR, p. 353).

⁴⁴Dūrāntikavyavasthānam adhvādhikaraṇam yathā /

Cirakṣipravvyavasthānam kālādhikaraṇam tathā (VP, III. ix. 47).

Also: Dūro 'yam adhvā nikaṭo 'yam iti kartṛgatibhedenā 'dhvani vyavasthā, na tu mārgabhedo 'tra kaścit, ya eva hi mandagatīnām dūras sa eva caturaceṣṭānām āsanno 'dhvā, evam eva sthāyiny api kāle pracitasantānakriyopādhiś ciram iti vyavasthānam, apacitasantānakriyopādhiḥ kṣipram iti (HR, p. 359).

it is the effects changing under its control which reflect their changeful nature in *Kālaśakti*.⁴⁵

It has been stated above that *Kālaśakti* is essentially a unitary principle, uniform and unchanging. And it has been pointed out that whatever empirical description or designation is given to it should be explained as pertaining to either the different actions happening under its influence or the different effects produced at its dictation. Two questions, however, may be discussed in this connexion. First, how is it that a unitary principle comes to assume different designations under different conditions? Secondly, why is it necessary to view a unitary principle as appearing different at different stages? In answer to the first question it has been said that the same agent is variously styled with reference to the variety of actions performed by him. Thus a man who chisels wood is called a carpenter while the same person is called a blacksmith when he works on iron. Hence the difference in designation depends on the difference in the nature of actions.⁴⁶ Likewise, *Kālaśakti*, which is one and uniform, assumes different names in respect of different events organized and arranged under its powerful influence. Thus *Kālaśakti* is called the vernal season when the trees of the woodland shine magnificently with green foliage and budding flowers; the same *Kālaśakti* again appears as the winter season when leaves wither and trees look bare and desolate.⁴⁷ In answer to the second question Bhartṛhari says that *Kālaśakti* is indeed a uniform and unchanging principle but he asks us to remember at the same time that this description takes

⁴⁵ Ārambhaś ca kriyā cai 'va niṣṭhā ce 'ty abhidhiyate /

Dharmāntarāṇām adhyāśabhedāt sadasadātmanām (VP, III. ix. 33).

⁴⁶ Kriyābhedād yathai 'kasmin takṣādyākhyā pravartate /

Kriyābhedāt tathai 'kasminn ṛtvādyākhyā vartapajāyate (Op. cit., ix. 38)

Also : Takṣaṇād ayovikaraṇāt kriyāviśeṣād upakalpītā takṣāyaskārādīsamjñā yathai 'kasyai 'va kartur vartate tathā viśiṣṭapuṣpādiprasavalakṣaṇakriyābhedād ekasyā 'pi kālasya vasantādīsamākhyā bhedena jāyate (HR, p. 353).

⁴⁷ Rutair mṛgaśākuntānām sthāvarāṇām ca vṛttibhiḥ /

Chāyādi-pariṇāmaś ca ṛtudhāmā nirūpyate (VP, III. ix. 45).

Also : ...kālākhyā hi svātantryaśaktir brahmaṇo vasantādibhedena pravibhaktā cakāṣṭi, tayā cā 'sau niyartatubhedapuṁskokilakūjitanavanavakīśalayayogena sūryādīsaṅcāraviśeṣopalakṣyamāṇacchāyātapādibhedena tarulatāprasūnaviśeṣeṇa cā 'vadhāryate (HR, p. 358).

into consideration the transcendent character of *Kālaśakti* only. But how can we explain our everyday experience with a transcendent concept ? Thus when we do not soar in the higher spiritual plane which lies above our empirical sphere, we cannot but conceive *Kālaśakti*, the transcendent concept, as represented by different aspects corresponding to and explaining the varieties of our worldly experience.⁴⁸ Thus when an action ceases, *Kālaśakti* is described as *past*; when it is about to happen, it is said to be *future*, and when it continues to flow on as a current, it is called *present*. Thus the distinctions into past, future and present naturally pertain to actions while they are superimposed on *Kālaśakti*.⁴⁹ What we experience in our everyday life is the variety of phenomena which are produced by or revealed through different actions. And as *Kālaśakti* is believed to be a changeless principle, we should admit for all practical purposes the existence of a plurality of powers or aspects, all belonging to *Kālaśakti*, which function in such a way that different effects arise, last for some time and finally disappear. Helārāja wants us to remember that the assumption of the three powers or aspects explaining the birth, life and death of various phenomena is far more reasonable than admitting *Kālaśakti* itself as a plural concept.⁵⁰

It may in the fitness of things be recalled here that *Kālaśakti* has been said to be represented by two aspects, viz, *Krama* and *Jarā*. Is it not, therefore, self-contradictory to hold that *Kālaśakti* is represented by three aspects ? It may be pointed out by way of answering this question that out of the three powers or aspects described above, the two powers or aspects, viz, past and future, veil all phenomena while the third, viz, present, reveals them to us. If we concentrate on the point of affinity between the two powers, past and future, the obvious suggestion will be that there is hardly any necessity for recognizing three different powers or aspects; for in

✓⁴⁸Tasyā 'bhinnasya kālasya vyavahāre kriyākṛtāḥ /

Bhedā iva trayasiddhā yān loka nā 'tīvartate (VP, III. ix. 48).

⁴⁹...kriyāvyuparame bhūtas, sambhāvitāyām kriyāyām bhaviṣyan, kṣaṇapravāha-rūpeṇa vartamānarūpāyām tasyām mukhya evā 'yam (HR, p. 350).

⁵⁰...śaktibhedāt kāryabhedopapattau kālabhedakalpanā nirnimittā (Loc. cit.).

that case the two powers or aspects will answer the manifestation and the disappearance of worldly phenomena.⁵¹

It should be noted, however, that those who view *Kālaśakti* as having three powers or aspects have their own way of looking at things and possibly they do not make purely dogmatic statements. It cannot but be admitted that though there is some affinity between the two powers or aspects, past and future, there is a vital point of difference between the two. Thus the power which is yet to come into play, we mean *Kālaśakti* in its future aspect, does not obstruct the course of the power representing *Kālaśakti* in its present aspect. But this latter power is completely paralyzed under the influence of the power that represents the past aspect of *Kālaśakti*.⁵² The present power of *Kālaśakti* which brings into existence the various phenomena of the world is not opposed by its future power. The latter opposes the former so long as the former does not make itself felt. But when conditions for the play of the present power ripen, the future power ceases to oppose it; on the contrary, it helps those conditions in giving rise to one phenomenon or another.⁵³ Further, there cannot be any relation of hostility between the two powers, present and future, inasmuch as what will appear as present at one moment or another is called future. But the same cannot be held with reference to the relation between the present and past powers of *Kālaśakti*. The past invariably contradicts the present. What has once been engulfed by the past can never come back to life and live in the present.⁵⁴ Judged in this way, the difference in the nature of the future and the past power in relation to the present power becomes clearly discernible.⁵⁵

⁵¹Dvābhyāṁ kila sa śaktibhyāṁ bhāvānāṁ varaṇātmakaḥ /
Śaktis tu vartamānākhyā bhāvarūpaprakāśinī (VP, III. ix. 50).

⁵²Anāgatā janmaśakteś śaktir apratibandhikā /
Atitākhyā tu yā śaktis tayā janma nirudhyate (Op. cit., ix. 50).

⁵³...samarthahetusampāte tu vartamānaśakter udayānukūlyam anāgataśaktir bhajate ... (HR, p. 361).

⁵⁴...atitaśakyā tu janmaśaktir vartamānākhyā nirudhyata eva, na hi mṛtasya punarjanme 'ti nā 'tite 'dhvani patitam āvirbhavati vastu (Loc. cit.).

⁵⁵It may be mentioned in this connexion that there is a section of thinkers who would believe that what has entered into the jaws of the past can again come back to life. Thus

It should be observed in passing that as the future and past powers of *Kālaśakti* veil different phenomena so that they do not come within the ken of our cognition, they may be linked to the principle of *tamas* as described in the Sāṅkhya or the Vedānta philosophy. And in the same way the present power of *Kālaśakti* which reveals various objects to us may be associated with the principle of *sattva*. Further, what is common to all these three powers is activity, pure and simple, which is described as the principle of *rajas*, the principle which lies at the root of all change. *Kālaśakti* thus viewed as the principle of *rajas* should be regarded as an evolute of *Prakṛti* or primordial matter.⁵⁶

It needs to be added here that we have previously said that the two aspects of *Kālaśakti*, viz, *Krama* and *Jarā*, are eternal. And it should be noted as well that those who acknowledge three powers or aspects of *Kālaśakti*, viz, past, present and future, entertain the opinion that these powers or aspects are eternal also. Now if the two or three aspects of *Kālaśakti* are said to be eternal, it must be admitted that they are co-existent as well. In that case the presumption may be that as the two or three aspects are different in their nature and as they are co-existent, they might frustrate one another owing to their inherent antagonism. The grammarian with his penetrative insight was able to anticipate such an anomalous position, and he steers clear of the difficulty by pointing out that though *Kālaśakti* does not essentially contain or convey any notion of sequence, yet we must

it is maintained that what has been relegated to the domain of the past lies in the primal cause in a subtle form only to be awakened at the time of a new creation. It may be further observed that the above view has been criticized by another school of thinkers in whose opinion whatever is said to be reborn at any subsequent moment is not exactly that which existed previously but only a faithful image thereof. According to this view, therefore, the difference between past and future holds good in the same way as Bhartṛhari has tried to establish (Vide HR, p. 362).

⁵⁶Tamaḥprakāśavat tv ete trayo 'dhvāno vyavasthitāḥ (VP, III. ix. 52).

Also : Dvau tu tatra tamorūpāv ekasyā 'nekavat sthitiḥ (Op. cit., ix. 53).

Also : Atitānāgatāv adhvānau bhāvāvaraṇahetutvāt tamassvabhāvau, varaṇam hi tamodharmo "Guru varaṇakam eva tama" ity uktam, vartamāno 'dhvā prakāśatulyas sattvasadrśas "Sattvaṁ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam" iti, rajas tu pravṛttisāmānyaṁ kālasvarūpaṁ sarvatra anvayi pratibandhābhyanujñābhyāṁ pravartamānaṁ pre-
raṇārūpaṁ rajaḥ kālātmakam eva...(HR, p. 361).

admit an idea of logical succession in it only to account for the order of the world. Thus it is an undeniable truth that the different aspects of *Kālaśakti* are co-existent, but it is none the less true that there is a logical sequence among them. What the grammarian really means by making such apparently conflicting statements is that the appearance and disappearance of a phenomenon depends on the relative supremacy of one aspect or power over the other or others. So when the veiling power commands supremacy over the revealing power, an object disappears; when the revealing power is more potent, an object appears. Hence it becomes quite intelligible why a logical sequence among the different aspects or powers of *Kālaśakti* is recognized, their co-existence notwithstanding.⁵⁷ Helārāja refers to a parallel case to unfold and strengthen the position of the grammarian. He observes that it is known to all students of the Sāṅkhya philosophy that the three attributes recognized in that system are held to be co-existent and yet there arises no conflict among them in giving rise to a phenomenon, in preserving it or in making for its destruction. They seem to have entered a mutual agreement, and whichever among them prevails over the other two is found to yield the corresponding result. Thus the Sāṅkhya system admits that though the three attributes are co-existent, yet there is a sequence due to the preponderance of one or the other over the rest, but for which the diversity of the phenomena in the changing world would be unaccountable.⁵⁸

In drawing this section to a close we must not forget to mention that Bhartṛhari has recorded a number of theories of Time besides the one which he himself upholds. Thus in the first place he refers to the view of the Vaiśeṣika according to which *kāla* is an eternal and ubiquitous substance that determines different objects through their various move-

⁵⁷Tamaḥprakāśavat tv ete trayo 'dhvāno vyavasthitāḥ /

Akramās teṣu bhāvānāṁ kramas samupalabhyate (VP, III. ix. 52).

⁵⁸Tad yathā trayas sattvarajastamolakṣaṇā guṇā nityatvād yugapadavasthānā api aṅgāṅgibhāvopagameṇa yathāyathāṁ svavṛttiyullāse vicitrāpariṇāmān bhāvān uparacayanti...(HR, p. 361).

ments.⁵⁹ Secondly, he seems to allude to the view of the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* who believes in the independent existence of time—a position which is different from that of the Buddhist according to whom there is no existence of time apart from and independent of the acts or facts. In the opinion of the Buddhist there is no difference between an act and a fact and the time-factor is not anything different from such facts. Hence it is that they describe facts as moments (*kṣaṇa*). The author of the *Yogabhāṣya*, on the other hand, conceives time as endowed with an existence of its own. He, however, does not admit that time has any length of duration. *A fortiori* he refuses to believe in the existence of one eternal time. The real time is only a moment—the minimal unit of time. Eternal time or time having a length of duration is only an intellectual construction (*buddhinirmāṇa*).⁶⁰ Lastly, Bhartṛhari alludes in one breath to three more theories. The language in which, however, he speaks of them is indeed most cryptic, and we have largely to depend upon his commentator for the elucidation of its significance. The views on time vary according as it is regarded as power, self and a divinity. The first is due to nescience and ceases to be on the emergence of knowledge.⁶¹ What is the significance of the proposition—Time is power? Power of what? Helārāja supplies the ellipsis and explains it as the *power of the cause*. The Mīmāṃsist in contradiction to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school believes in the separate existence of causal energy or power. A cause becomes effective only when its causal energy is not obstructed; when the latter is hampered, the cause fails to produce the effect. So causal energy is distinguished from the cause, although the two are not separable when present. But the Mīmāṃsist, though an ardent advocate of causal energy as distinct and different from the cause, does not hold time to be a causal energy. It is impossible in the present state of our knowledge to affiliate this doctrine that identifies time with

⁵⁹Vyāpāravyatirekeṇa kālam eke pracakṣate /

Nityam ekaṁ vibhuṁ dravyaṁ parimāṇaṁ kriyāvatām (VP, III. ix. 1).

⁶⁰Kṣaṇatatkramayos saṁyamād vivekajaṁ jñānam (YS, III. 52).

⁶¹Śaktyātmadevatāpakṣair bhinnam kālasya darśanam /

Prathamam tad avidyāyām yad vidyāyām na vidyate (VP, III. ix. 62).

causal energy to any recognized school of philosophy. It is a historical problem and we reserve it for the student of the history of Indian philosophy to tackle.

Time is causal power. How ? To take a concrete example, the seed is the cause of the sprout, but only by virtue of the power it possesses for acting as the cause. This causal energy has a double function—a positive and a negative one. By means of the former the cause produces its immediate effect, say, the sprout, and the negative activity is evidenced by the prevention of the materialization of later products, e.g., the stem, the leaves and the like. The causal power helps the realization of the immediate effect and frustrates the materialization of the later growths. The emergence of the dual activity of causal energy functions as time inasmuch as it is realized as time-order. Causal energy minus time-order is inconceivable and has no meaning and purpose. This is the line of argument by which some thinkers arrive at the conclusion that time is nothing but causal energy.⁶²

Helārāja takes exception to the position adumbrated above on the following ground. Effects are entities which occur when their causes are present and not otherwise. This is the very meaning and implication of the law of causation. And as the occurrence of cause and effect is determined by determinate time-order, time must be held to be a necessary condition of such occurrence and as such different from both cause and effect. Effects are produced in a graduated scale according to the order of the emergence of their relevant causes. And as time is nothing but the order of sequence, time *qua* sequence should be held to be the determination (*upādhi*) of the entities concerned. It seems, therefore, legitimate to hold that time should be regarded as the determination of the principle which is responsible for the emergence of the plurality of phenomena.⁶³

⁶²Tatra Bhartṛharer abhiprāyavyākhyātāras tu kāraṇaśaktir eva kāla iti vyācakṣate, tathā hi bījaśaktir āṅkuropajananam abhyānujānāti kāṇḍaprasavaṁ pratibadhnāti kāryakaraṇāt. Evam āṅkurādisaktāv api yathottaram anantarakāryajananād vyavahitakāryapratibandhāc ca kālatvaṁ boddhavyam (HR, p. 365).

⁶³Etac cā 'yuktam iva lakṣyate. Niyatakāraṇā hi bhāvās svakāraṇasannidhāne bhavanti nā 'nyathe 'ti kāraṇasāmarthyam eve 'dam. Tatra tu niyatakālatvāt sahakāri

The second theory that time is self, comes in at this stage. This refers to the autonomous consciousness, which functions as the individual self. If the phenomenal world has its ultimate seat in the individual self, the order in which the former manifests itself should also be traced to the same source. The Ultimate Reality is an indivisible unitary principle, called *Paśyantī*, the free cognizing word or consciousness. But the individual under the spell of ignorance (*avidyā*), the first manifestation of which is the time-order, sees a multiplicity in place of the unity. It is natural to infer that the principle, which possesses the capacity of manifesting the plurality of phenomena, should also possess the capacity of manifesting the temporal order in which the world-order manifests itself. Accordingly time as a concomitant of the primal ignorance under which the individual labours, is equated with the individual subject in which it finds its residence and ground. Time is first viewed as the capacity of the individual, and then, by a justifiable extension of meaning, is identified with it.⁶⁴

The third theory, which regards time as a divinity, differs from the second only in affiliating the time-force to the *Absolute Brahman* instead of the individual subject. Though the time-force manifests its activity in the individualized consciousness, it should not on that account be regarded as the determination of the latter. The self, individualized or otherwise, is nothing in reality but the Absolute Consciousness. Hence, like *avidyā*, of which it is a concomitant, time should be regarded as having its source in the Absolute. Time *qua* power of the *Brahman* is symbolized as a divinity which engulfs the whole creation. This is, however, a popular representation of a metaphysical truth. According to the commentator the third theory is the theory of Bhartṛhari. Both the

kālas tadanya eva yuktaḥ, kāraṇaparamparayā bhāvānām utpadyamānānām ca kramadarśanāt kramākhyā kālaśaktir bhāvopādhirūpā 'vagantavyā. Tataś ca ya eva bhāvabhedābhāsane prabhus sa eva tu tadanuyāyikramābhabhāsane' pi...(HR, pp. 365-66).

⁶⁴Ātmā puruṣo jīva eva kālas tasyai 'va kramābhabhāsāt. Sa hi yathātattvam arthān pratyetum asamarthas svābhāsakālānusāreṇa tatra kramam adhyavasyati tataś ca tataḥ kālabhedaprakṛptes sa evo 'pacāreṇa kālākhyām pratipadyate. Sa eva ca kālaśakter avidyāśaktisahacāriṇyāḥ phalabhūmis tadadṛṣṭādīvaśenai 'va bhāveṣu pratibandhābhyanyujne (Op. cit., p. 366).

second and the third theories regard time as a manifestation of ignorance which disappears together with time when knowledge of the Ultimate Truth dawns upon the individual.⁶⁵

To sum up : The first of the last three theories mentioned by Bhartṛhari regards time as an objective principle, although being a power of the cause it is only an adjective to it and has no independent status. In any event it is a fact over which the individual has no control and which owes no allegiance to the latter. The second of these theories reduces time to a subjective determination, while the third rescues it from subjectivity by making it a concomitant of cosmic ignorance which finds a *locus standi* in the *Absolute Brahman*. But this difference results in momentous metaphysical consequences. Time as the determination of the individual will numerically vary with the number of the individual subjects which is infinite; as the determination of the Absolute, time will be a unitary principle independent of the individual. It is worthy of note that according to all these three theories time is a determination and not a self-subsistent principle as the Vaiśeṣika and Newton maintain. It may not be irrelevant to observe that the second theory anticipates that of Kant, who regards time as the form of perception, as the manner or mode in which the individual perceives objects. Time, according to Kant, has no objectivity; it is a determination of the subject. That is also the position in the theory referred to. In philosophy originality does not mean being singular. This coincidence should be a pointer to the danger of historical bias, which is apt to commit the fallacy : *Post hoc, ergo, Propter hoc*. We should rather be encouraged to think that the human mind is essentially identical in its ways of thought—a conclusion which is borne out by the identity of results attained from identical data irrespective of race, time and place.

⁶⁵ Anye tu vighrahavatīm mahāprabhāvām devatām kālātvena pratipadyante. Atrā 'pi cidrūpasya brahmaṇas śaktir devatai 'va sakalajagadgrāsaghasmare 'ty etadānugūṇyam eve 'ti. Idam evā 'tra siddhāntarūpaṁ darśanam. Ata evai 'tat kāladarśanam avidyāyām saṁsārahetubhūtāyām prathamam, bhedāvabhāsamayo hi saṁsāro bhedaś ca deśakālābhyām, tatra ca kālabhedo jagatsrṣṭer ādyaḥ. Akramā hi paśyanti-rūpā saṁvit prāṇavṛttim upārūḍhā kālātmanā parigrhitakrame 'va cakāsti (HR, p. 366).

CHAPTER THREE

FUNCTIONING OF POWERS (*KALĀS*)

We have seen that in the transcendental plane the Eternal Verbum and *Kālaśakti* should be viewed as an uncompromising unity, that is, as one and the same principle, which differentiates itself into two aspects on the eve of creation. We have also seen that besides this *Kālaśakti* which is described as the Eternal Power of the Eternal Verbum, there lie in that plane innumerable other Powers, all belonging to the Eternal Verbum but mutually exclusive, and yet each of them identical with the Eternal Verbum in the same way as *Kālaśakti* is. It has been shown that the plurality of the Powers does not affect or contradict the unitary character of the Eternal Verbum in spite of the fact that they are held to be eternal and identical in essence with the Eternal Verbum. It should be carefully noted that at the pre-cosmic stage the Powers remain indistinguishable from the Eternal Verbum. The active projection of the Powers out of the womb of the Absolute takes place immediately on the eve of the inauguration of the cosmic movement which ushers stage by stage the phenomenal world into existence. And this projection happens under the influence of *Kālaśakti*, the supremely independent Power of the Eternal Verbum. The movement of the multiple Powers under the influence of *Kālaśakti* on the transcendental plane—if it might be called a movement at all—is an ineffable act. And their subsequent movement on the lower plane under the same influence which initiates the cosmic process is a punctual movement in a multilinear series. It follows from the above that the Eternal Verbum as *Kālaśakti* is the efficient cause of the world-process while the Eternal Verbum *qua* the multiple *Kalās* is the material cause of the phenomenal world.

It will be our endeavour to study what exactly is meant by the grammarian when he asserts that the Eternal Verbum is the material cause of the phenomenal world. Does the grammarian mean that the Eternal Verbum transforms itself

into the phenomenal world or does he suggest that the Eternal Verbum is the changeless background to the stupendous panorama of the phenomenal world ? Before we proceed further it is desirable to discuss briefly the different doctrines in the different philosophical systems dealing with the material cause of the world. There are five well-known doctrines in Indian philosophy which deal with the problem mentioned above, viz :

1. the doctrine of creation or construction (*ārambha*)
2. the doctrine of combination (*saṁghāta*)
3. the doctrine of real change or evolution (*pariṇāma*)
4. the doctrine of appearance or self-alienation (*vivarta*)
5. the doctrine of reflexion (*ābhāsa*)

According to the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika different effects are produced from component particles, called atoms (*paramāṇus*), which are regarded as indivisible units and thus marking the limit of division. If these component particles were held to be divisible into parts, all effects from them would be the products of an equally endless number of component parts, and in that case it would be absolutely impossible for us to account for the differences in the dimensions of different effects. The changes in the volumes of different bodies are explained by the addition and withdrawal of the atoms constituting them. So in the opinion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school atoms are believed to be the material cause of all effects. It should be remembered, however, that though the effects born of component atoms are perishable, the latter are conceived as eternal entities. Atoms abide for ever while the structures of different shapes and sizes built with them last for some time only to be destroyed again. When a number of atoms combine together they produce a gross object, and when they disintegrate the result is the destruction of that object. The processes of combination and disintegration run on endlessly. During the time of creation atoms are in a state of vibratory motion (*parispanda*) which results in the combination of two at a time which is technically called a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) ; three such dyads form a triad (*trasareṇu*). It is maintained that a triad is the least magnitude visible to us in

the form of a mote in the sunbeam. It should be noted that a dyad is not merely the aggregate of two atoms but that it has its own individual existence apart from the parts that go to constitute it. Thus in the opinion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school parts should be distinguished from wholes and *vice versa*. Wholes are not, therefore, fictions in this system of thought. They are as real as parts themselves. It may be added here that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school assumes four classes of atoms answering to the four classes of material objects, earth, water, fire and air.

The doctrine of *ārambha*, which has been briefly reviewed in the preceding paragraph, is accepted not only by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school but by the Bhāṭṭa school of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā system also.¹ Prabhākara and his followers also appear to accept this doctrine, for it is stated in the *Tantra-rahasya* that the categories of the Vaiśeṣika system are admitted in the school of Prabhākara.² Moreover, it is a point worthy of consideration that the atomic doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has nowhere been refuted in the writings of Prabhākara and his followers. The Jainas, too, seem to be favourably inclined to the atomic doctrine. In their system we find *pudgalas* instead of *paramāṇus*, which, however, are of one kind and not of four kinds as maintained in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It is held by the Jainas that the four classes of material objects together with movables and immovables are produced from *pudgalas*. We shall, therefore, be justified in saying that the atomic theory is also accepted by the Jainas.

According to the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas an effect is not anything more than an aggregate of a number of *paramāṇus*. It is maintained by them that *paramāṇus* are mutually exclusive and that there cannot be any physical connexion among them. In opposition to the views of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas hold that physical connexion is a fiction if it is to be

¹But while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school admits triads as non-eternal entities, the Bhāṭṭa school opines that they are eternal and ultimate. This is the view of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi also (PTN, p. 11).

²Abhyupagamasiddhāntanayena Kaṇādasiddha eva prameyavargo 'ṅgikriyate (TR, p. 20).

understood in abstraction from the objects that are said to be connected. In their opinion the close proximity among particular *paramāṇus* is described as their physical connexion. This is the fundamental conception of the Buddhist doctrine of combination (*saṃghāta*).

The doctrines of real change (*pariṇāma*) and appearance (*vivarta*) may be studied together. According to the former a cause undergoes a change and we have an effect. An effect, therefore, may be looked upon as subsisting in a subtler form in its cause. According to the latter, however, a cause does not undergo any change and yet we seem to cognize its effect. In truth there is no effect—what we cognize is after all an appearance and never a reality. Milk changing into curd illustrates the doctrine of *pariṇāma*, while a string appearing as a snake or a mother-o'-pearl appearing as a piece of silver explains the doctrine of *vivarta*. According to the latter doctrine the world which is an appearance, pure and simple, appears in the *Brahman* in the same way as a snake, which is an appearance, appears in a string. The difference in the two cases lies only in this that whereas in the latter the false appearance is sublated by a subsequent cognition, in the former it is not cancelled on this side of the realization of the *Absolute Brahman*, though both are the products of nescience. The Vedāntist accounts for this difference by the postulation of qualitatively different *avidyās*—one primordial, which persists till ultimate realization, the other as parallel states or lesser *avidyās*. This is, however, a technical and methodological difference, which does not make any difference to the ontological character of *avidyā* or its product.

The exponents of the doctrine of *pariṇāma*, however, do not believe in the unreality of the world, and they would like to point out that the false appearance of the string as a snake or that of the mother-o'-pearl as a piece of silver is not a case of transformation at all but a case of ordinary error of perception, which when corrected enables the object previously cognized as a snake or a piece of silver to be realized as a string or a mother-o'-pearl. It is contended by the exponents of the doctrine of *pariṇāma* that like curd coming out of milk

the world comes out of the Ultimate Principle and is as much real as the material cause of it. The most celebrated exponents of the doctrine of *pariṇāma* are the Sāṅkhyaites according to whom the material cause of the world is Primordial Matter (*Prakṛti*). It may be noted as well that the Yoga school of Patañjali, the Pāśupatas, the Mādhvas, the school of Nimbārka and the Vaiṣṇava school of Bengal, all accept the view that *Prakṛti* is transformed into the phenomenal world and thus subscribe to the doctrine of *pariṇāma*. Similarly, Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, the Pāñcarātra sects and others who declare that the *Brahman* changes into the material world, believe in the doctrine of *pariṇāma*. Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha, Bhāskara Rāya and others who opine that the *Brahman* as determined by *Prakṛti* is the material cause of the world, are also adherents to the doctrine of *pariṇāma*.

The most outstanding exponent of the doctrine of *vivarta* is Śaṅkara, according to whom the stupendous appearance of the phenomenal world is founded on the reality of the *Brahman*. As regards the Mādhymikas, so far as their position can be gleaned from Nāgārjuna's *Mādhymikakārikā* as expounded by Candrakīrti, both the subject and the object are hollow appearance without any background or support. We may call their theory as one of unqualified appearance (*vivarta*) unattached to any substratum. One inclines to equate the *Śūnya* with *māyā*—the logically undefinable and unjustifiable source of an equally unjustifiable appearance. The Yogācāra school which regards consciousness as formless and which assumes that the momentary consciousnesses together with the impressions of *avidyā* form the different states of the knower, the knowable and the like, seems to lend countenance to the doctrine of illusory appearance of the phenomenal world over the consciousness.

According to the Trika writers of Kashmir the universe is neither a *pariṇāma* nor a *vivarta* of the Supreme Reality. In their opinion Consciousness (*Caitanya*) is the only reality and is all-embracing and all that we experience lies within it. Thus what is popularly called external is held to be a reflexion on Consciousness as on a mirror. The universe is an

image within Consciousness. The manifestation of the universe is due to the unrestricted and spontaneous freedom of Consciousness and is a process of reflexion (*ābhāsa*). For the initiation of the said process the play of the Supreme Power, the unrestricted freedom and spontaneity of Consciousness alone, is sufficient. It needs to be pointed out that the doctrine of reflexion rejects the doctrine of *vivarta* on vital grounds. The exponent of the doctrine of reflexion does not view the world as originally a false appearance due to *avidyā*. It is as much real as an image is real. But it has no existence of its own apart from the medium in which it is manifested. Its existence is only the existence of the medium. But we know that an advocate of the doctrine of *vivarta* denies the reality of the phenomenal universe without any reservation. He holds that the universe appears as such to the ignorant subject and that it is ultimately resolved into *māyā* which is neither identical with nor distinct from the Absolute and is, therefore, regarded as unspiritual matter. But in the Trika system the universe is viewed as an expression of the Supreme Power of Consciousness and as, consequently, spiritual in essence. In the last resort the universe lapses back into the Supreme Power which is never recanted but remains even after the world has disappeared.

It would be quite an interesting study to find out which one of the five doctrines reviewed above would satisfactorily explain the metaphysical background of the cosmic system according to Bhartṛhari. Obviously, the doctrine of creation and combination have nothing to do with the philosophy of the grammarian inasmuch as the two doctrines acknowledge atoms (*paramāṇus*) as the material cause of each and every effect while Bhartṛhari has no place for them in his system.

Let us study this point in detail. Bhartṛhari has referred to three well-known theories about the nature of word.³ According to a school of thinkers, the internal air striking against the different vocal organs assumes the state of word. According to others, word is made up of physical atoms. But

³Vāyor aṇūnām jñānasya śabdatvāpattir iṣyate (VP, I. 108).

Patañjali, the author of the *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya*, is of opinion that word is nothing but internal consciousness.⁴ He suggests that internal consciousness exists in the form of subtle speech and when it becomes manifest, it takes the form of word.⁵ Needless to say, Bhartṛhari upholds the theory of Patañjali and seeks to explain its underlying implications.

The first theory stated above is a very old one and we find that ancient phoneticians speak of the internal air as the creative stuff of word.⁶ Śābarasvāmin rejects the theory on the ground that if words were air-products, we should have felt the aerial matter of word by touch.⁷ The Naiyāyikas, too, have controverted the theory by pointing out that if words were air-products, they could be cognized only through the tactile organ. The auditory organ cannot be supposed to be made of air-atoms and as such it would be perfectly incompetent to cognize words, if they were air-products. Moreover, if words or sounds be supposed to be made up of air-elements, they would be non-eternal. If words be conceived as the products of an aggregate of air-atoms, they would be imperceptible like the tactile properties inhering in the same atoms. But none of these alternatives can be entertained as a plausible theory simply because air-products are invariably perceived through tactile sensations, and certainly it would be futile to make out that words or sounds are possessed of tactile properties, a supposition for which there is no warrant in experience.⁸

The grammarian, however, does not believe that word is made up of air-particles inasmuch as word in their system is an eternal entity. It is sound (*dhvani*) which is believed to be the modification of an airy substance. The objection of the Naiyāyika that airy particles cannot be perceived without their tactile qualities, does not appear to be cogent, as there is no restriction that all the qualities of a particular substance should be cognized together. Only those properties which are

⁴Jñānasya śabdarūpatāpattir iti darśanam atra Bhāṣyakārasya (MBP, II. p. 254).

⁵Atha vā jyotirvaj jñānāni bhavanti (MB, on PS, I. iv. 29).

⁶Tathā ca Śikṣākārā āhur vāyur āpadyate śabdatām (ŚB, pp. 90-1).

⁷...na ca vāyaviyān avayavāñ śabde sataḥ pratyabhijñānimaḥ...syāc ced evaṁ sparśanena upalabhemahi (Loc. cit.).

⁸NK, II. pp. 33-4

evolved, are amenable to perception; otherwise, the non-perception of colour in hot air can not be explained. The next objection of the Naiyāyika is that sound cannot be cognized through the auditory organ if it is believed to be airy in nature, because sense-organs are competent to perceive those qualities alone which belong to substances kindred to that of which the sense-organs also are constituted. Thus the eye perceives colour because colour is an attribute of fire which is also the formative principle of the visual organ. So, if sound is believed to be a property of air, it would be incapable of being perceived by the auditory organ as the latter is not made up of air. This objection has not been anticipated by the grammarian and so we do not know the precise answer they might return to it.

The objection, however, can be refuted if we think that sound is the property of ether and that length and pitch, intensity and feebleness, are the properties of sound and not of word or *sphoṭa*, which, in the opinion of the grammarian, is revealed by it. The objection of Udayana that these properties are invariably felt to be associated with word, and that the distinctive existence of word apart from sound is not perceived, and that there is no proof for the word which the grammarian understands as *sphoṭa*, has been seriously challenged by the grammarian. The alleged non-perception cannot be regarded as a sound argument against the possibility of *sphoṭa* which, as we shall discuss in a later chapter, has been proved by abundant logic, and the empirical evidence is after all inconclusive.

Let us now discuss the theory of the atomic constitution of word referred to by Bhartṛhari. Though the commentators of Bhartṛhari have not thrown any light on this theory, we are fortunately able to trace it to the Jaina system of thought. The Jaina believes that words are material substances made up of atoms which are distinct from other material atoms in nature. These atoms have been designated as sound-atoms in order to distinguish them from the acknowledged kinds of atoms, viz, air, earth, etc. The Naiyāyika has criticized this theory on various grounds. The first objec-

tion is that words made up of an aggregate of atoms are not conceivable apart from tactile qualities. But words are never cognized to be possessed of tactile properties. The second objection is that if word were possessed of mass, it could not but be obstructed by a barrier. Thirdly, there is no experience of the parts of a word. Fourthly, being possessed of corporeal magnitude, it should be felt to come into clash with other small particles and so should displace them. But none of these possibilities is seen to be the case.

The Jaina, however, does not think these objections to be serious obstacles to his conception. Words may be conceived to be possessed of tactile qualities though these qualities may by their very nature remain unmanifested and as such may escape detection. This is quite evident from the fact that the perception of words is contingent upon the course of the wind, and so with a forward wind distant words are perceived, and when the course of the wind is in a different direction, even proximate words are intercepted from coming within the range of our auditory organs. This phenomenon is easily explicable if word or sound is supposed to be possessed of tactile properties like other material substances. The second objection, too, is unsubstantial. Because, the influx and efflux of odorous particles are seen to take place even in a closed area though these odorous molecules are acknowledged to be possessed of magnitude. If, to escape this difficulty, it is assumed that these small particles are not prevented from effecting an entry through small apertures in the barriers, the same explanation can be offered by the Jaina regarding sound. The third objection is also based upon a false analogy. Because, in such phenomena as a flash of lightning and the like, the parts are not distinctly felt. So the mere existence of parts is no guarantee for the perception of the same. Nor, again can non-perception of parts be construed as evidence of their absence. The fourth objection, too, does not seem to be convincing as the alleged consequence is not seen to take place when odorous particles effect their entrance into the nasal membrane. These particles, in spite of their magnitude, do not shake the hairs in the nostrils. If extreme lightness is

trotted out as an explanation in the case of odorous particles, the same may be accepted by the Jaina in the case of sound-molecules.⁹

The grammarian, however, refuses to accept the Jaina theory exactly on the same grounds on which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory has been rejected. The postulation of an infinite number of sound entities is in direct opposition to recognition of identity of words. The grammarian has sought to prove by philosophical investigations that word is not anything distinct from consciousness and as such it is spiritual in nature. And in view of this the atomic constitution of word is hardly acceptable to him. According to the grammarian the two theories noticed above proceed upon a misconception of the fundamental nature and function of word.

Let us now turn to the doctrines of change (*pariṇāma*) and appearance (*vivarta*) to see how far the theory on which the grammarian bases his philosophy is in agreement with either of them. It is worthy of notice that Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita in his *Śabdakaustubha* writes that Bhartṛhari, while dealing with the nature of word, has incidentally discussed the illusory creation of the objective world and kindred topics, and that this may very well be likened to the finding of a precious gem in course of a quest after an insignificant cowrie.¹⁰ Mādhavācārya, too, while introducing a review of the Sāṅkhya system in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* after he has finished his study of the grammarian's philosophy, writes to say that preference of the doctrine of *vivarta* cannot have a stable basis, if the doctrine of real change as advocated by the Sāṅkhya can maintain itself as its rival.¹¹ Evidently, therefore, the philosophical system of the grammarian, in the opinion of Mādhavācārya, is based on the doctrine of *vivarta*. It may also be inferred from the writings of Bhavabhūti, the great poet

⁹PN, IV. 9 and com. thereunder.

¹⁰Varāṭikānveṣaṇāya pravṛttaś cintāmaṇim labdhavān iti Vāsiṣṭharāmāyaṇoktā-bhāṇakanyāyena śabdavicārāya pravṛttas san prasaṅgād advaite aupaniṣade brahmaṇy api vyutpadyatām ity abhiprāyeṇa bhagavān Bhartṛharir vivartavādādikam api prasaṅgād vyudapādayat (ŚK, p. 12).

¹¹Pariṇāmavāde paripanthini jāgarūke kathanākāraṁ vivartavāda ādaraṇīyo bhavet (SDS, p. 117).

and dramatist, that the doctrine of *Śabdabrahman* is based on the doctrine of *vivarta*.¹² It may be further adduced that Prabhākara in his *Bṛhatī* and Śālikanātha in his *Pañcikā* have referred to the grammarian as an exponent of the doctrine of *vivarta*.¹³ It is again worthy of remark that Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, in course of his repudiation of the Vedānta philosophy in his commentary on the *Mṛgendrāgama*, describes Bhartṛhari as an exponent of the doctrine of *vivarta*.¹⁴

On the other hand, there is evidence to prove that as early as the time of Vācaspati, Jayantabhaṭṭa and Śāntarakṣita there were at least two different schools of the philosophy of *Śabdabrahman*, one explaining it in the light of the doctrine of real change and another basing it on the doctrine of illusory appearance. Thus we find Vācaspati observing in the *Nyāyakaṇikā* that the philosophy of *Śabdabrahman* has been interpreted by exponents of the two schools of *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* in their own ways.¹⁵ Jayantabhaṭṭa represents the grammarian's philosophy as based on the doctrine of *vivarta* but is cautious enough to point out that there might be schools of thought which would interpret it from the viewpoint of the doctrine of *pariṇāma*.¹⁶ Śāntarakṣita again informs us through his *Tattvasaṃgraha* that a twofold interpretation of the philosophy of *Śabdabrahman* may be attempted.¹⁷

¹²Atha sa bhagavān Prācetasah prathamam manuṣeṣu śabdabrahmaṇas tādṛṣam vivartam itihāsam Rāmāyaṇam praṇināya (UC, p. 54); also: Op. cit., p. 105 & p. 155.

¹³Tasmāc ehadatatattvam eve 'dam artharūpatayā vivartate (BR, p. 143); also: Tasmād vivarta evā 'śrayaṇīyas tattvavidbhir avagateḥ kāraṇam (Op. cit., p. 150); also: Ata eka evā 'yam bahudhā vikalpyā 'vagamyate loke Vede ce 'ti brahmavido manyante. Tasmād vivarta evā 'yam iti brahmavidbhir avagantavyam (Op. cit., pp. 361-2); also: Eka evā 'yam śabda bahudhā prakṛtipratyayavibhāgena vikalpya avidyamānabhedas san loke Vede ca pratīyate iti brahmavido Vedavido vaiyākaraṇā manyante (PC, p. 360).

¹⁴Vide com. on MG, pp. 74-75. 9

¹⁵Ye punar abhinnasya śabdabrahmaṇo vivartam vā pariṇāmam vā 'rtham ācakṣate ... (NKN, p. 293).

¹⁶Vivartavādo 'pi na samāñjasaḥ. Tathā hi vivarte kṣīram iva dadhirūpeṇa pariṇāmitvena vikāritayā vā kṣīrāder anityatvaprasaṅgāt...athā 'rthapratibhāsam asatyam apī 'ndrajālavād upadarśayati śabda ity ayaṁ vivartārthaḥ...athā 'rtharūpeṇa śabdaś śuktir iva rajatākāratayā 'vabhāsata iti 'yam vivartavācocyuktiḥ...atha śabdabrahmai 'va sṛjati jaganti 'ty ayaṁ vivartaprakāra ucyate... (NM, II, p. 102).

¹⁷Nāśotpādasamālīdham brahma śabdamayam param /

Yat tasya pariṇāmo 'yam bhāvagrāmaḥ pratīyate (TS, śl. 128).

Also: Athā 'vibhāgam eve 'dam brahmatattvam sadā sthitam /

Avidyopaplavāl loko vicitraṁ tv abhimanyate (Op. cit., śl. 144).

In the presence of so many conflicting evidences it is almost impossible to determine at this distant date the attitude of Bhartṛhari to either of the two doctrines. The internal evidence furnished by his writings does not help us substantially; for he has indiscriminately used both the terms *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* in connexion with the evolution of the universe from the Eternal Verbum.¹⁸ It appears to us, therefore, that Bhartṛhari was not familiar with the difference in the connotations of the two terms which is so usual in later philosophical literature. That the term *vivarta* was used to convey an import which is expressed by the term *pariṇāma* can be gathered even from the writings of Śaṅkara himself who has used the term *vivarta* to explain the Sāṅkhya view of the evolution of the universe.¹⁹ We, therefore, conjecture that the term *vivarta* came to gather its peculiar sense of formal transformation or apparent self-alienation in the writings of teachers of the Monistic Vedānta who came after Bhartṛhari, and it is, therefore, nothing unusual that Bhartṛhari's position is sought to be explained in the light of either of the two doctrines of *pariṇāma* and *vivarta*. With Bhartṛhari there is no question of any marked distinction in the connotations of the terms *pariṇāma* and *vivarta*. But in later years when the philosophical conceptions of those two terms were clearly defined, there arose a tendency among the followers of Bhartṛhari to explain the standpoint of their master with as much precision as they could. Every student of Indian philosophy is well aware that Śaṅkarācārya exercised a great influence on the minds of all those who came after him, and we are sure that there would be hardly any difference of opinion if it is asserted that the doctrine of *vivarta* meaning appearance is characteristic of the system of Śaṅkarācārya. Hence those of Bhartṛhari's followers who were deeply influenced by the philosophical speculations of Śaṅkara thought that the master's philosophical leanings were towards

¹⁸Śabdasya pariṇāmo 'yam ity āmnāyavido viduḥ /

Chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṁ vyavartata (VP, I. 121).

¹⁹Triguṇaṁ pradhānaṁ mṛdva acetanaṁ cetanāya puruṣasyā 'rthaṁ sādhayitum svabhāvenai 'va vicitreṇa vikārātmanā vivartate (ŚBH, p. 488).

the doctrine of *vivarta*. But there remained others whose conviction was deep-rooted in the doctrine of *pariṇāma*, and it is only natural that they would seek to interpret the view of Bhartṛhari in the light of the doctrine that appealed to them.

It is worthy of notice that Jayantabhaṭṭa has represented the grammarian's philosophy of *Śabdabrahman* in as many as four different ways by showing that the term *vivarta* may give us four different meanings. In the first place, the word *vivarta* means material change (*pariṇāma*), and according to this view the Eternal Verbum changes into the different objects of the world in the same way as milk changes into curd. Secondly, the term *vivarta* is supposed to convey the idea of unreal representation, and according to this view the Eternal Verbum does not have any direct reference to objective reality and what is denoted by a word is as unreal as a piece of magic shown by a magician. According to the third view the term *vivarta* is understood to imply formal transformation, which means that the Eternal Verbum assumes the forms of different objects in the same way as the mother-o'-pearl assumes the form of a piece of silver. According to the fourth view the term *vivarta* is taken to suggest the idea that the Eternal Verbum is the creative principle of the world.²⁰ From all these accounts it only appears that the philosophy of *Śabdabrahman* came to be interpreted in different ways in the course of years; but we know it for certain that during the time of Jayantabhaṭṭa the most authoritative school would explain it in the light of *vivarta* meaning formal transformation, for it is this view of *vivarta* which Jayantabhaṭṭa has selected to criticize as the view of the grammarian.²¹

Both Puṇyarāja and Helārāja appear to explain the view of Bhartṛhari from the standpoint of Absolute Monism as advocated by Śaṅkara. Puṇyarāja identifies the *Kālaśakti* of the grammarian with the *avidyā* in the system of Śaṅkara when he characterizes it as something which is neither real

²⁰NM, II. pp. 102-3.

²¹Ataś ca śabdabrahme 'dam ekam avidyopādhidarśitavicitrabhedam avidyoparame yathāvasthitarūpaṁ prakāśata iti yuktam (Op. cit., p. 100).

nor unreal and consequently false.²² He also interprets the term *vivarta* in the sense of false appearance as in dreams and says that the Absolute does not forsake its own nature while passing through evolutions.²³ We must mention here that Puṇyarāja in another context admits that the entire world of objects resides in a subtle form in the Absolute and that the former is the *pariṇāma* of the latter.²⁴ To avoid this seeming incongruence, we suggest that the term *pariṇāma* in the context should be understood in the sense of *vivarta*.

Helārāja, however, has the courage of conviction to describe in unambiguous language the view of Bhartṛhari in the light of Śaṅkara's Absolute Monism. On numerous occasions in his voluminous commentary on the *Prakīrṇa-kāṇḍa*, the third chapter of the *Vākyapadīya*, Helārāja has drawn attention to the fact that in the first chapter, which is known as the *Brahmakāṇḍa*, he has fully made out the point that Bhartṛhari is strictly monistic in his outlook, and his way of interpretation leaves no doubt in the mind that Bhartṛhari's philosophy is not any form materially different from that of Śaṅkara. Though Bhartṛhari has not a word to suggest that he recognizes *avidyā* as a power of the Eternal Verbum,²⁵ Helārāja speaks not only of *avidyā* but also of *avidyāśakti*²⁶ and describes it as nescience or darkness that covers the light of the Absolute and as the power that presents the unreal phenomenal world in its multitudinous forms before the individual soul.²⁷ This twofold function of *avidyā* is only too well-known to the student of Śaṅkara's

²²Ekasya sarvabījasya brahmaṇas tattvānyatvābhyāṁ sattvāsattvābhyāṁ cā 'nir-vācyā śaktirūpā sthitiḥ (PR, p. 3).

²³Ekasya tattvād apracyutasya bhedānukāreṇā 'satyā vibhaktānyarūpopagrāhitā vivartas svapnaviṣayapratibhāsavat (Op. cit., p. 1).

²⁴Sarvā apy arthajātayas sūkṣmarūpeṇa śabdādhiṣṭhānāḥ. Tāḥ kilā 'tmābhivyaktim adhiṣṭhānapariṇāmena pratilabhamānā vācyavācakabhāvarūpeṇa bhedenā pratiyante (Op. cit., p. 119).

²⁵Bhartṛhari speaks of *avidyā* and *vidyā* but does not clearly state whether *avidyā* is a power of the Absolute or not. Cp. Śāstreṣu prakriyābhedair avidyai 'vo 'pavarṇyate/ Anāgamavikalpā tu svayaṁ vidyo 'pavartate (VP, II. 235).

²⁶Ata evā 'vidyāśaktibrahmaṇor bhede na dvaitāpattiḥ (HR, p. 172).

²⁷Aprakāśas tu tamo 'vidyā (Op. cit., p. 89); also : Avidyāvasād vyavasthā nānārūpā drśyate (Op. cit., p. 130).

philosophy where the functions of veiling and projectivity are asserted to be possessed by *avidyā*. The difference between *kālaśakti* and *avidyā* in the system of Bhartṛhari has been explained by Helārāja in this way that whereas the former presents the phenomena in temporal succession, the latter shuts out the vision of the Ultimate Reality and exhibits the plurality of the phenomenal world.²⁸ The phenomenal world is nothing more than a mere false appearance superinduced upon the foundational reality of the Eternal Verbum by the operation of *avidyā* and *kālaśakti*. These two latter principles, though existing from eternity in close touch with the Absolute, are not co-ordinate existents—they are essentially as false as the phenomenal world which is their product. What persists in and through the countless phenomena of the world is the Truth or the Ultimate Reality which is Consciousness, the *Brahman* of the Vedāntist, to be equated with the Eternal Verbum of the grammarian.

✓ Somānandanātha in his *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* has surveyed the doctrine of Verbal Monism of the grammarian and criticized it in order to establish his own theory which, though a form of Monistic Idealism, yet accords to the phenomenal world a status of reality. According to him the grammarian regards *Paśyantī* as the Ultimate Reality in his system of philosophy beyond which there is nothing that enjoys a status superior to or higher than it.²⁹ The grammarian describes *Paśyantī* as the transcendental consciousness in which the distinction between word and import, the knower and the knowable, vanishes and the diversity of objective realities does not appear. Somānandanātha, however, does not agree with the grammarian in thinking that this is the highest transcendental state which should be looked upon as the Ultimate Reality. He points out that *Paśyantī* is regarded as the immediate prius of *madhyamā* in which temporal order and sequence (*krama*) manifests itself. In accordance with the law

✓²⁸ *Brahmaṇā bhedāvabhāsanam avidyākṛtam. Tatrai 'va kramābhāsanam kālākhyasvātantryaśaktikṛtam* (HR, p. 136).

✓²⁹ *Athā 'smākaṁ jñānaśaktir yā sadāśivarūpatā / Vaiyākaraṇasādhūnām paśyantī sā parā sthitiḥ* (ŚD, II. 1).

of homogeneity of cause and effect *Paśyantī* also should be supposed to be endowed with the latent power of embodying sequence, otherwise the sequential order in *madhyamā* would be unaccountable. This obviously negates the claim of *Paśyantī* to be ranked as the Ultimate Reality, which is, *ex hypothesi*, not compatible with the slightest trace of sequence—spatial or temporal. Whatever may be the merits of the criticism of Somānandanātha, the grammarian conceives *Paśyantī* as the indestructible Supreme Reality without a beginning and an end—it is the individual soul in each and every body—it witnesses from within and is a conscious principle possessing none of the characteristics or features of anything that is unconscious. *Paśyantī* owes its name to the fact that it surveys (✓ *drś*) the entire universe in all its phases. It cannot be comprehended by any one instrument of cognition, it eludes the limitations of time and space, it transcends all that is sequential. It is formless and ubiquitous, the *sum-mum bonum* and *ens realissimum*. The evolution of the world-order, psychical or physical, is possible because of the infinite number of powers inherent in it. The *madhyamā* is the next evolute of *Paśyantī*. It is an intellectual principle comparable to the *buddhitattva* of the Sāṅkhya, which subsequently manifests itself as the vocal speech forms (*vaikhari*)—the ideas objectified and externalized. Still later, it undergoes transformations in the shape of different objects of the universe due to the operation of nescience and at that stage it becomes cognizable by our sense-organs. Somānandanātha definitely says that in the opinion of the grammarian the transformations of *Paśyantī* into the objects of the world are all illusory and not real transformations.³⁰ It is, therefore, interesting to note that a celebrated teacher of Śaivāgama like Somānandanātha, who is held in high esteem by Abhinavagupta and others and whose authority is beyond question, does not interpret the doctrine of Bhartṛhari in the light of the teachings of his own school. According to Utpaladeva, the author of the gloss on the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* and worthy disciple of Somānandanātha, Bhartṛhari

³⁰Tathā rūpānurūpatvāt prasūteś śivarūpataḥ /

Satyatvāc ca na tulyatvam ato 'smāt praviramyatām (ŚD, II. 79).

is a champion of Verbal Monism according to which the universe is an illusory appearance. He represents Bhartṛhari as upholding the view that the world-process proceeds as a result of the operation of *avidyā*, which is neither real nor unreal (*anirvācyā*) and hence does not present an opposing reality.³¹

Somānandanātha flourished in the latter part of the 9th century A.D. Utpaladeva who, came immediately after Somānandanātha, his teacher, was in all probability well acquainted with the doctrine of *vivarta* as advocated by Śaṅkara. It is not, therefore, in the least surprising that Utpaladeva and his teacher, too, would elucidate the grammarian's philosophy in the manner of Śaṅkara's idealism which was current at that time. If this suggestion of acquaintance with the monistic Vedānta is rejected and we accept the view that Somānandanātha and Utpaladeva gave us a most accurate information about Bhartṛhari's philosophical outlook, we may suggest that the monism of Bhartṛhari is the precursor of Śaṅkara's monism. The evolution of the plurality of the phenomenal world is an appearance, which has the same power of affecting the individual with pluralistic belief as could be possessed by a real principle. Both Puṇyarāja and Helārāja, as we have already seen, also interpret the powers of the Absolute as logically indeterminable and hence metaphysically unreal. The tradition among the exponents of Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta also supports the view that Bhartṛhari championed monism and discarded plurality as the spurious creation of *māyā*, an illusory principle, which logically speaking is unreal and so ought not to appear.³² But the appearance is there—an unquestionable and undeniable presence, which deludes those who are in the grip of ignorance. With the dawn of enlightenment it will vanish leaving no trace behind.

³¹Yasmāt tair Vaiyākaraṇaiḥ...paśyantīrūpaṁ śabdatattvam akṣaram anādyantaṁ brahma viśvārthabhāvena vivartate tad asatyarūpaṁ ātmany upagacchati (com. under ŚD, II. 11).

³²...Dhātusamikṣāyām brahmavitprakāṇḍair Bhartṛharibhir abhihitaṁ "Śuddha-tattvaṁ prapañcasya na hetur anivṛtitaḥ / Jñānajñeyādirūpasya māyai 'va janani tata" iti (NP, p. 60).

But we should not fail to point out that however much the later stalwarts might have tried to read Bhartṛhari's philosophical outlook in the light of their own favourite doctrines, it is extremely difficult to explain from their points of view some of the fundamental features of the grammarian's philosophy. Thus if the philosophy of Bhartṛhari is interpreted in the light of the doctrine of *vivarta* as sponsored by Śaṅkara, the status accorded to *Kālaśakti* or, for the matter of that, to all other Powers (*Kalās*) cannot be explained with fidelity to Bhartṛhari. That the *Kālaśakti* is ultimately real and has the same ontological status as the Eternal Verbum does not seem to admit of doubt. But Śaṅkara would never accept the ultimate reality of any power (*śakti*) co-existing with the Absolute. Śaṅkara also speaks of the powers of the Absolute, but these powers are not possessed of a co-ordinate reality with the Absolute. Of course, according to Bhartṛhari, the Eternal Verbum itself is the *Kālaśakti* and the affirmation of this Power does not imply dualism.³³ But Śaṅkara would not admit the possibility of the relation of identity except as a metaphorical expression. Śaṅkara's *avidyā* has only a phenomenal reality and phenomenal reality is only a euphemism for metaphysical unreality. If Bhartṛhari's position is sought to be equated with that of Śaṅkara, the Powers must be declared to be false. Incidentally, it may be said that in his zeal to explain the philosophy of the grammarian in the light of *vivarta* as conceived in Śaṅkara's monism, Helārāja has actually referred to a verse in which it is stated that all powers are false.³⁴ But it might be purely dogmatic to assert this proposition with regard to Bhartṛhari's philosophy when the identity of *Kālaśakti* and the *Kalās* with the Eternal Verbum has been so plainly maintained in the system of Bhartṛhari. Later writers fell unquestionably under the influence of Śaṅkara's philosophy, in the light of which they tried to solve the apparent logical antinomies which seem to be embedded in the assertion that the *Śaktis* (Powers) are manifold, that

³³Ekam eva yad āmnātam...(VP, I. 2).

³⁴Tathā 'ktaḥ : Śaktināṁ vasturūpatve tattvānyatvavicāraṇā / Yujyate kalpitānāṁ tu yuktādvayavikalpitā (HR, p. 102).

they lie in the Eternal Verbum which is purely a unitary principle, and that their plurality does not contradict the unitary character of the Eternal Verbum. If we are correct in our reading of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, the seeming contradiction is due to the assumption of difference between the Eternal Verbum and the Powers, which Bhartṛhari repudiates in unmistakable terms. So the antinomy is only a creation of the logical mind. The antinomy does not exist because the Eternal Verbum and the Powers are not only not opposed to one another but not different at all. They are identical in essence. In fact the conception of the two is only the outcome of our logical activity. But why does Bhartṛhari describe the Absolute as *Śakti* ? Do the two words mean the same thing ? If so, he does not make his position any the clearer. The answer that suggests itself to our mind is that though they are one and the same thing, the *Brahman* comes to be conceived as *Śakti* when the logical mind seeks to relate it and the world-order. The world is a false appearance no doubt. But why should there be an appearance at all ? If you explain it as due to the operation of *avidyā*, the question will arise as to where the *avidyā* lies. If it has its seat in the Eternal Verbum, it follows that the Eternal Verbum is competent to provide an asylum for *avidyā* in its being. So the very conception of *avidyā* is impossible without the conception of the competency of the Eternal Verbum to shelter it. Competency is nothing but power. And how would you answer the question : Is the competency of the Eternal Verbum under consideration different or not from the Eternal Verbum ? The only satisfactory answer is that it is not different. This is the truth about the *Kālaśakti* of the Eternal Verbum. You may deny the *Kālaśakti* or any particular *Śakti* (*Kalā*); but you cannot deny the competence of the Absolute to be the substratum of the appearance. So if the Absolute has being, it must have power (*śakti*). Thus power and being are identical. The logical difficulty raised by Śaṅkara would be declared by Bhartṛhari to be non-existent so far as the being of the Absolute is concerned.

If, however, it is held that the philosophy of Bhartṛhari

may be explained in the light of the doctrine of real change (*pariṇāma*), it may be pointed out that there are insuperable difficulties in the way. At the outset we should be careful enough to enquire whether Bhartṛhari's philosophy is sought to be explained in the light of the doctrine of *pariṇāma* as advocated in the Sāṅkhya system. If our answer is in the affirmative, it needs to be said that Bhartṛhari does not believe in real change which is the central position in the Sāṅkhya system. The world, according to Bhartṛhari, is not so much an evolution as an appearance which presents itself to an individual who has not realized the truth. The Sāṅkhya system upholds the cause of dualism while Bhartṛhari is out and out a monist. So far as the world-process is concerned, Bhartṛhari's position seems to be analogous to that of Śaṅkara, though the two philosophers may not be in agreement with regard to the nature of the Ultimate Reality.

Let us draw this chapter to a close by venturing a bold suggestion that Bhartṛhari's philosophy may be explained in the light of the doctrine of reflexion (*ābhāsa*) as sponsored by the Trika writers of Kashmir. We can cite a passage from the *Vākyapadīya* where Bhartṛhari seems to entertain the view that the difference between the Eternal Verbum and the world is only a fiction conjured into existence by the operation of the Power lying in the Eternal Verbum—Bhartṛhari does not clearly assert that the world also is an illusion.³⁵ If the reality of the world is conceded by Bhartṛhari and if again the identity of the world with the Eternal Verbum is also maintained by him, we may be justified in hinting that Bhartṛhari is the precursor of the doctrine of reflexion held by Trika writers. Further, the nature and character of the Eternal Verbum, the *Kālaśakti* and the multiple *Kalās* and their mutual relationship find a parallel in the concepts of *Parameśvara*, *Vimarśa*, and the different *Śaktis* of the Trika system. The Trika system again is strictly monistic and concedes the reality of the world which is one with *Parameśvara*, the difference between the two appearing only to the ignorant.

³⁵Śabdeṣv evā 'śritā śaktir viśvasyā 'sya nibandhanī /

Yannetrah pratibhātmā 'yaṁ bhedarūpo vivartate (VP, I. 119).

It may not be out of place to mention in this connexion that the high esteem and admiration in which Bhartṛhari is held by all Trika writers also suggest the possibility that the Trika system of Indian philosophy owes an enormous debt to the writings of Bhartṛhari.

CHAPTER FOUR

CORRESPONDENCE OF FORM AND MATTER

The world-process which evolves out of the Eternal Verbum runs into the two lines of form and matter—of word and import.¹ Puṇyarāja cites an ancient text which informs us that according to one school of thinkers form and matter are identical in essence, both constituting the two aspects of the Supreme Reality, while according to another school form and matter are clearly distinguishable from the very beginning.² We know it on the authority of Puṇyarāja that the former school is represented by Vyāḍi, the most celebrated ancient author of that monumental work on Sanskrit grammar, the *Samgraha*, which is now lost to us. According to Vyāḍi, the differentiation between form and matter is recognized for purely practical purposes, the Ultimate Reality being essentially a unitary principle, a perfectly homogeneous entity which does not admit of any division.³ The second school referred to above has not been shown to be associated with the name of any great teacher in particular, but it is undoubtedly dualistic in spirit. We feel no hesitation in asserting that Bhartṛhari who is a redoubtable monist cannot belong to this second school of thought. In the opinion of Bhartṛhari name and meaning lose their individualities on the transcendental plane, and it is only when the cosmic movement starts that their difference becomes discernible. Puṇyarāja quotes a Vedic text to show that the manifestation of matter is preceded by that of form, and this clearly implies that the two manifestations are not simultaneous.⁴ It is name that becomes matter and the latter relapses into the former. Accordingly,

¹Ekasyai 'vā 'tmano bhedaś śabdārthāu aprthaksthītau (VP, II. 31).

Also : Abhinnāt saṁhṛtakramāc chabdatattvād varṇapadavākyaalakṣaṇaṁ prāptāyā vāco 'bhidheyatvenā 'rthavibhāgapagrāhaṁ nityenā 'rthasambandhena prāptāyā vācaḥ ... (PR, p. 7).

²Eke tad ekam avibhaktaṁ vibhejūḥ / Prāg evā 'nye bhedarūpaṁ vadanti (Loc. cit.).

³Samgraha 'py uktam : Śabdārthayor asambhede vyavahāre prthakkriyā / Yataś śabdārthayos tattvam ekaṁ tat samavasthītam (PR, p. 14).

⁴Nāme 'daṁ rūpatvena vṛttarūpaṁ / Rūpaṁ ce 'daṁ nāmabhāvena tasthe (Op. cit., p. 7).

the relation between form and matter is asserted to be one subsisting between a cause and its effect.⁵ This causal relationship may also be looked upon as one of the manifestor and the manifested or that of the denoter and the denoted.⁶ It is a matter of everyday knowledge that a particular name reveals a particular entity to us ; an entity which has no name to manifest it cannot become the content of our knowledge. This is how the relation of the manifestor and the manifested between a name and a meaning is explained. This relation is also described as one of the denoter and the denoted. It is a name which is called a denoter, while the meaning signified by it is called its denotation . It may be a pertinent question to ask in this connexion that when the denoter and the denoted or the manifestor and the manifested are found to be two different entities, each having its own individuality, how can the grammarian maintain that name and meaning are one in essence? The grammarian answers this question by saying that the Ultimate Reality commands an unlimited and unrestricted power of its own and this power enables it to appear in diverse ways—as cause and effect, as denoter and denoted or as manifestor and manifested, though it is absolutely certain that the Ultimate Reality is in itself one undifferentenced unity of existence. The difference between name and meaning which we experience on the empirical plane is a mere appearance, their identity being the only reality.⁷

The first manifestation of the Eternal Verbum which Bhartṛhari calls *Paśyantī* is, in the direction of name, known to be *madhyamā*, and the subsequent manifestation is asserted

⁵Kāryakāraṇabhāvena yogyabhāvena ca sthitāḥ (VP, I. 24).

Also: Yato vāg evā 'vibhāgāpannā gavādirūpeṇā 'vatiṣṭhate gavādayaś ca bāhyārtha-vibhāgāḥ punaś śrūtirūpatvena pariṇamante, ata eva śabdārthayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāva-sambandha ity eke (PR, p. 7).

⁶Indriyaviśayavac ca prakāśyaprakāśakabhāvena tadyogyatāgrahaḥ...vācākānām vācyeṣu yogyatvam (Op. cit., p. 13).

⁷Nanu śabdārthau vācyavācakāv iti prasiddham, ataḥ katham tayoḥ abhedāḥ. ... Prakāśakaprakāśyatvaṁ kāryakāraṇarūpatā / Antarmātrātmanas tasya śabdatattvasya sarvadā / Tasya hi śabdatattvasyā 'ntarasya jyotirūpasya śaktibhedād ayaṁ bheda-pratibhāso na viruddhaḥ (VP, II. 32 & PR, p. 82); also: Tasya tad evai 'kaṁ nirvibhāgaṁ paraṁ tattvam āśrityā 'yaṁ sakalalokasaṁvyavahāraś śaktibhedāt pratiyate. Kiṁ punar ayaṁ vācyavācakavibhāgamātrarūpaḥ (Loc. cit).

to be *vaikharī*.⁸ But it must be pointed out here that according to a section of grammarians the Ultimate Reality is represented by *Parā* and not *Paśyantī* which in their opinion, is the first manifestation of the Eternal Verbum (or *Parā Vāk*) while *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* are the two subsequent manifestations. Thus Puṇyarāja in course of his description of the science of grammar as the doorway to emancipation says that the aspirant after spiritual enlightenment should in the beginning leave the plane of articulate speech called *vaikharī* and reach the state of *madhyamā* in which there is no confusion of syllables. On crossing this state he visits the region of *Paśyantī* which is consciousness and existence in essence and the fountain-head of all the diverse transformations of name. As soon as he transcends this region through a course of rigorous discipline in divine communion, he is sure to be blessed with the vision of the Eternal Verbum, in which all reference to different transformations are completely absent. This is the highest spiritual plane—the *summum bonum* of all devotees.⁹

It is, however, surprising that though Puṇyarāja seems to differ from Bhartṛhari in regarding *Paśyantī* as a manifestation of the Eternal Verbum and not as the Eternal Verbum itself, he does not make any comment either by way of elucidation or dissent on the scheme of manifestation of the Eternal Verbum as conceived by Bhartṛhari. This warrants us in drawing the conclusion that there arose a difference of opinion in the school of the grammarian in later years; and while some recognized *Paśyantī* as the highest stage, others were inclined to go one stage further and assert *Parā Vāk* as the ultimate prius. That Bhartṛhari believed *Paśyantī*

⁸Vaikharyā madhyamāyās ca paśyantyās cai 'tad adbhutam /
Anekatīrthabhedāyās trayyā vācaḥ param padam (VP, I. 144).

We know it on the authority of Somānandanātha that *Paśyantī* is the Absolute of the grammarian—it is the Supreme Reality which transcends everything else. Cp. Ity āhus te param brahma yad anādi tathā 'kṣayam / Tad akṣaram śabdarūpaṁ sā paśyanti parā hi vāk (ŚD, II. 2).

⁹So 'vyatikrāṇām vāgavasthām madhyamākhyām adhigamya vāgvikārāṇām prakṛtiṁ paśyantyākhyām pratibhām upaiti tasmāc ca sattāmātrāt pratibhākhyāc chabdāt pūrvayogabhāvanābhyāsāt pratyasiamitasarvavikārolekḥm parām prakṛtiṁ pratipadyate (PR, p. 8).

to be the Eternal Verbum can be proved on the strength of convincing data. In the first place, Puṇyarāja himself in course of his elucidation of the text of Bhartṛhari on the Eternal Verbum and its manifestations writes to point out that *Paśyantī* is free from all impurities, embraces all and is transcendent.¹⁰ It can be attained only through determinate communion coming in the wake of the knowledge of chaste expressions through a consummate and systematic study of grammar.¹¹ He further quotes a text from the *Mahābhārata* to show that *Paśyantī* is the self-luminous eternal light shining within, and when the seeker of truth realizes the Ultimate Principle he is freed from all the bonds of ethical and spiritual obligations and rights and has nothing more to achieve.¹² When the realization of this principle absolves him from all ties, it follows that *Paśyantī* is the Ultimate Reality. In the second place, some of the early teachers of the Āgamic philosophy have definitely identified *Paśyantī* of the grammarian with *Parā* in their system of thought. Thus Somānandanātha, in reviewing the position of the grammarian, affirms that the Supreme Principle, which is without a beginning and an end, which is consciousness in essence and indestructible and unchangeable, is verbal in nature and is called *Paśyantī*. Utpaladeva comments that the grammarian has not conceived a stage higher than this.¹³ Kṣemendra also writes in his *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* that the Soul in the philosophy of the grammarian is called *Śabdabrahman* or *Paśyantī*.¹⁴

In the light of the assertions of the Śaiva philosophers noticed in the preceding paragraphs we may suggest that some of the teachers belonging to the school of Bhartṛhari were influenced by the teachings of the Āgamic philosophy and that Puṇyarāja was most probably one of them. Our

¹⁰...paśyantī rūpam anapabhraṁśam asaṅkīrṇaṁ lokavyavahārātītam (PR, p. 56).

¹¹Tasyā eva vāco vyākaraṇena sādhutvajñānalabhyena śabdapūrveṇa yogenā 'dhigama ity ekeṣāṁ āgamaḥ (Loc. cit.).

¹²Svarūpajyotiḥ eva 'ntas sai 'śā vāg anapāyini / Tasyāṁ dṛṣṭasvarūpāyām adhi-kāro nivartate (PR, p. 57).

¹³Teṣāṁ punas sā parāvasthā matā (Com. on ŚD, II. 1).

¹⁴Śabdabrahmamayaṁ paśyantīrūpam ātmatattvam iti Vaiyākaraṇāś śrīsadāśiva-padam adhyāsitāḥ (PH, p. 18).

hypothesis is confirmed by the consideration that Puṇyarāja mentions *Parā Vāk* as the Supreme Reality at the time of discussing the subject in his own way independently of the text of Bhartṛhari, but avoids a discussion on *Parā Vāk* when he is called upon to explain the scheme of Bhartṛhari in which we find a reference to *Paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* only. It should be noted here in passing that the exponents of the Pratyabhijñā school have nowhere identified *Parā* with *Paśyantī*. They maintain in unambiguous terms that *paśyantī* is far removed from the transcendental plane and it is impossible to conceive its identity with *Paramaśiva* which is essentially one with *Parā Vāk*.¹⁵ Though it is admitted in the Pratyabhijñā school that *Parā Vāk* persists in all the three stages of *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, still it is never asserted that any one of the lower stages could be regarded as *Parā Vāk*. The three stages are clearly marked with the labels of *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* in view of their distinctive character. So it would not stand to reason if it were held that the grammarian indiscriminately used the two terms, *Parā* and *Paśyantī*, to signify the Supreme Reality in his system. Indeed Bhartṛhari does not make use of the term *Parā*.

✓ Let us now turn to enquire into the nature of the Eternal Verbum and its different manifestations. *Vaikharī* represents that stage of the manifestation of the Eternal Verbum which is invariably apprehended by the auditory organ and is of innumerable variety. When syllables are distinctly pronounced and there is no distortion of any kind whatsoever, we have the variety of *vaikharī* which is called 'chaste word' (*sādhū-śabda*). If, however, the syllables are confused and their pronunciation is not abundantly clear, we get the variety called '*apabhraṃśa*'. Besides these two, the notes of flutes and drums furnish us with abundant specimens of *vaikharī*.¹⁶ Somānandanātha tells us that when *Paśyantī* is manifested

✓ ¹⁵Paśyantī yady api nādarūpatayā viśvam āmṛśanti kriyāśaktirūpatayā samanvitā, tathā' pi paśyantī 'ti darśanaprādhānyād upacaritajñānaśaktirūpatve 'py āśrīyamāṇe paramaśivarūpatayā atyantadūravartinī na tu paryantadaśā 'sau.. (ŚD, p. 37).

✓ ¹⁶Yasyāś śrotraviśayatvena pratiniyataṁ śrutirūpaṁ sā vaikharī śliṣṭavyaktavarṇa-samuccāraṇe prasiddhasādhubhāvā bhraṣṭasaṁskārā ca dundubhiveṇuvīṇādīśabdarūpā ce 'ty aparimitabhedā (PR, p. 56).

in the cavity of the mouth as the breath touches the different sources of articulation, it is called *vaikharī*,¹⁷ the etymological meaning of the term being 'what is produced in the mouth'.

✓ Unlike *vaikharī* which has a purely physical form and is cognized by an external sense-organ, *madhyamā* is a less gross manifestation which is apprehended by the internal sense-organ, the mind. *Madhyamā* is not entirely free from all attributes of sequence which is mentally conceived. The seat of *madhyamā* is within us—it is mental in its constitution and imperceptible by an external sense-organ. *Madhyamā* follows the course of vital breath which explains the ideas of sequence associated with it¹⁸. The name *madhyamā* is derived from the idea that it lies midway between *Paśyantī* and *vaikharī*.

✓ *Paśyantī* or the Eternal Verbum is one and indivisible into parts. Consequently, the attribute of sequence is absent in it. But the attribute of sequence which is clearly manifest in *vaikharī* is reflected, as it were, in *Paśyantī*. Likewise, though an undivided entity, *Paśyantī* seems to be endowed with several phases. Thus, in the lowest manifestation, it appears as the locus of various objects in their manifold forms; in the second, it assumes a state wherein lie all forms merged beyond recognition; and in the third, it transcends all associations with the diverse objects of the world. Hence, *Paśyantī* manifests the diverse objects individually, it manifests them collectively, and again it transcends and does not manifest them at all. On the empirical plane, words are usually classified under two heads, chaste and unchaste, according as they retain their pristine sanctity or lose it by falling off from their original forms. *Paśyantī* transcends either of these two classes. It also transcends the sphere of our internal discourses. Thus *Paśyantī* is the purest state which is completely free from every kind of mixture, homogeneous or heterogeneous. Unlike *vaikharī* and *madhyamā*, *Paśyantī* does not follow the

✓ ¹⁷Samprāptā vaktrakuḥaram kaṇṭhādīsthānabhāgaśah /
Vaikharī kathyate sai 'va bahirvāsanayā kramāt (ŚD, II. 7).

Also: Sthāneṣu vivṛte vāyau kṛtavarnaparigrahā /
Vaikharī vāk prayokṛtṇām prānavṛttinibandhanī (PR, p. 56).

✓ ¹⁸Madhyamā tv antassanniveśinī parigṛhītakrame 'va buddhimātropādānā sūkṣmā prānavṛtṭyanugatā (PR, p. 56).

movement of the vital breath, and so the question of its being influenced by the vital breath does not arise at all. Consequently it is immune from division and divested of all attributes of priority and posteriority. *Paśyantī*, as the name implies, is the Shining One, the purest of all lights which is eternal and does not wane at any time. It has been described as the immortal lunar digit which never fails to diffuse its cool and refreshing rays. Even though it comes into contact with the impurities of the world, it remains as pure as ever and therein lies its spiritual character. A vision of that undying light entitles the devotee to attain emancipation. It is said that as soon as the devotee acquaints himself with chaste forms through a rigorous and reverent study of grammar his mind becomes concentrated and he experiences a determinate communion which is considered to be the step leading to a visualization of *Paśyantī*.¹⁹

Somānandanātha in his *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* has fully and comprehensively represented the grammarian's view on the gradual manifestation of the Eternal Verbum, and it is desirable that we refer to it. *Paśyantī*, which is essentially a conscious principle, is regarded as the individual soul residing within all bodies as the enjoyer. It experiences the different objects of enjoyment from within a body which may be looked upon as the field of its enjoyment (*bhogakṣetra*).²⁰ Such experience is only circumscribed at the outset, but it gradually develops universal form; and when it experiences the entire universe, the *jīva* stage is transcended and the universal soul

¹⁹Pratisamhṛtakramā saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ (/ - ?) Paśyantī tu (?) calācalapratibaddhasamādhānā sanniviṣṭajñeyākārā pratilīnākārā nirākārā ca paricchinārthapratyavabhāsā samśrṣṭārthapratyavabhāsā ca praśāntasarvārthapratyavabhāsā ce 'ty aparimitabhedā. Tatra vyavahārikiṣu sarvāsu vāgavasthāsu (vāk) vyavasthitasādhvasādhupravibhāgā puruṣasamśkārahetuḥ paraṁ tu paśyantyā rūpam anapabhramśam asaṅkīrṇaṁ lokavyavahārātītam.....Avibhāgā tu paśyanti sarvatas samhṛtakramā / Svarūpajyotir evā 'ntas sai 'ṣā vāg anapāyini / Sai 'ṣā saṅkīryamāṇā 'pi nityam āgantukair malaiḥ / Antyā kale 'va somasya nā 'tyantam abhibhūyate / Tasyāṁ dr̥ṣṭasvarūpāyām adhikāro nivartate / Puruṣe ṣoḍaśakale tām āhur amṛtām kalām (PR, pp. 56-7). (N. B. The printed text of the com. appears to be misleading. The punctuation requires careful modification. Accordingly we have suggested some alterations.)

²⁰Sa eva cā 'tme 'ty āha :

Sa evā 'tmā sarvadehavyāpakatvena vartate /
Antaḥpaśyadavasthai 'va cidrūpatvam arūpakam (ŚD, p. 40).

manifests itself, which the grammarian describes in his own language as the manifestation of *Paśyantī*²¹. This is the *summum bonum* of human existence. This stage is reached when the veil of nescience is removed once for all. No sense-organ is powerful enough to enable us to secure a vision of the highest stage as it transcends the order of time and space and is entirely free from all distinctions into the cognizer and the cognizable.

✓ Somānandanātha tells us that the grammarian does not know of any stage higher than this. *Paśyantī* is the Supreme Reality in his system²². When *Paśyantī* feels that it would express the world of ideas and objects, there arises a wave of sequence on its calm and tranquil surface, and what has been so long lying as one and indivisible unfolds a sequence which is traceable in *madhyamā*. *Madhyamā* is described as a form of intellectual discourse which is revealed when the two breaths, *prāṇa* and *apāna*, technically called *bindu* and *nāda*, are sent up from the naval region²³. When the stage of *madhyamā* is crossed, *Paśyantī* comes up, as it were, into the cavity of the mouth through the medium of the two breaths and touches the different sources of articulation. This state is described as *vaikharī* in which the discrete letters of the alphabet find their proper expression. After the state of *vaikharī* is reached and the manifestation of the Eternal Verbum in the direction of name becomes complete, *Paśyantī* transforms itself into the various objects of the world through *avidyā*²⁴. ✓

✓ Hitherto we have discussed in detail the manifestation of the Eternal Verbum according to the grammarian, and now

²¹Sa eva paramātmā sarvajña ity āha :

Tāvat yāvat parā kāṣṭhā yāvat paśyaty anantakam (ŚD, p. 40).

✓ ²²Tadai 'vā 'vidyopaśamāt paramārtho 'sāv ity āha :

Akṣādivṛttibhir hīnaṁ deśakālādīśūnyakam /

Sarvataḥ kramasamhāramātram ākāravarjitam /

Brahmatattvaṁ parā kāṣṭhā paramārthas tad eva saḥ (Op. cit., p. 41).

²³Āste vijñānarūpatve sa śabdo 'rthavivakṣayā /

Madhyamā kathyate sai 'va bindunādamarutkramāt //

Sa eva paśyantirūpaś śabdo 'rthapratipādanecchārūpayā vivakṣayā upalakṣite manovijñānarūpatve āste. Sai 'va ca madhyamā vāk kathyate krameṇa bindunādasamjñāprānāpānavāyullāsāt "Prāṇāpānāntare nityam ekā sarvasya tiṣṭhati" iti (Op. cit., pp. 41-2).

²⁴Samprāptā vaktrakuhaṁ kaṇṭhādīsthānabhāgaśaḥ /

Vaikharī kathyate sai 'va bahirvāsanayā kramāt //

Ghaṭādirūpair vyāvṛttā gṛhyate cakṣurādinā (Loc. cit.).

we propose to refer to an almost analogous scheme as developed in the Trika system of Kashmir. In his commentary on the *Parātrīṃśikā* Abhinavagupta explains *Parā Vāk* and its manifestations. *Parā Vāk* in the Trika system of thought is only another name for *Vimarśa* which is held to be the self-revealing Power of *Paramaśiva*, the Absolute. We are told by Trika writers that *Paramaśiva* assumes the state of *Parā Vāk* for purposes of self-enjoyment—the latter is thus an expression of the desire of the Absolute to unfold itself. But though *Parā Vāk* is the Power of the Absolute, it is still identical in essence with it and is not naturally separable from it.²⁵ *Parā Vāk* is the power of volition which gradually evolves as the power of knowledge and the power of activity, and the Absolute, as vested with these powers, is called *sadāśiva* and *īśvara* respectively.²⁶ These two powers are also described as *paśyantī* and *madhyamā*. On the plane of *paśyantī* the difference between a denoter and its denotation is never cognizable—on the contrary, the two are perceived as identical with each other²⁷. *Madhyamā*, of course, presents the difference but invariably in an indistinct manner; it reveals that the denoter and the denotation lie in the same locus²⁸. The difference is fully discovered on the plane of *vaikharī*²⁹.

It is indeed very interesting to find Abhinavagupta giving us a more detailed and somewhat different account of the manifestation of *Parā Vāk* in his *magnum opus*, the *Tantrāloka*. There he says that *Parā Vāk* assumes the state of *paśyantī* when through its innate autonomous spontaneity it externalizes itself. As the order of the denoter and its denotation does not arise in that state we find no differentiation. It is the light of consciousness alone which shines with all its lustre, and

²⁵Parameśvaraḥ...satatam anugrahamayyā parārūpayā śaktyā ākrānto vastuto 'nugrahaikātmā 'va, na hi śaktiś śivād bhedam āmarśayet (PT, p. 3).

²⁶Parā bhagavati saṃvit prasaranti svarūpataḥ /

Pareccchāśaktir ity uktā bhairavasyā 'vibhedinī (Op. cit., p. 64).

Also : ...ubhayatra jñānakriyāśaktimaye rūpe sadāśiveśvarasāre (Op. cit., p. 6).

²⁷Na hi prathamajñānakāle bhedo 'trā 'sphurat, yatra vācyavācakaviśeṣayor abhedat (Op. cit., pp. 4-5).

²⁸Madhyamā punas taylor eva vācyavācakayor bhedam ādarśya sāmānādhikaraṇyena vimarśavyāpārā...(Loc. cit.).

²⁹Vaikharī tu tadubhayabhedasphuṭatāmāy eva (Loc. cit.).

consequently it is described as the cognizer or the seer (cp. √drś—to perceive). In *madhyamā*, which is purely intellectual, the differentiation between the denoter and its denotation becomes slightly manifested. It is described as an intermediate stage between indistinct and distinct manifestation. And the name *madhyamā* owes its origin to this fact. The stage of distinct manifestation of the difference between the denoter and its denotation is called *vaikharī*, which exhibits the sequence of letters and syllables. Each of the three stages, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, is further divided into three states, gross, subtle and super-subtle. Thus the gross form of *paśyantī* is represented by the prelude to a song as denoted by the technical term, *ālāpa*, in which there is no differentiation of letters and which is singularly captivating. The gross state of *madhyamā* is represented by the sound which arises when the fingers play upon a musical instrument, say, a drum (*mṛdaṅga*). The gross stage of *vaikharī* is represented by what produces the various letters. The subtle conditions of each of these manifestations are respectively represented by the desire to sing, the desire to play upon a musical instrument and the desire to speak. And the super-subtle conditions are represented by the pure knowledge which lies as the source of the aforesaid desires.³⁰

Maheśvarānanda, the author of the *Mahārthamañjarī*, who often follows in the footsteps of Abhinavagupta, differs from the latter in so far as the classification of *Vāk* is concerned. Thus he draws up in the beginning a classification of *Vāk* into *sūkṣmā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* and subsequently observes that *vaikharī* represents *Paramaśiva*'s power of action, *madhyamā* His power of knowledge and *paśyantī* His power of volition. *Sūkṣmā* is described as the unification of the three kinds of *Vāk* mentioned above with an individuality of its own. It is a matter of common knowledge that the manifestation of *vaikharī* depends on the movement of the vocal organs, and so it is quite in the fitness of things that it represents the power of action in *Paramaśiva*. *Madhyamā* is cognized by the mind alone,

³⁰TL, III. 236-48.

and it is, therefore, looked upon as the power of knowledge. *Paśyantī* is held to be the power of volition for it represents the will of the Absolute to project Himself. *Sūkṣmā* is described as the liquid in a peahen's egg in which there is a complete unification of *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* and which represents *Paramaśiva's* state of preparation for throwing the universe out of Himself³¹. Besides these four Maheśvarānanda recognizes *Parā* as well, and he says that the same enters into the very essence of *Paramaśiva* Himself.³²

It will not be out of place to note here that the scheme of the classification of *Vāk* which we find in the earlier literature of the Tripurā school of Āgamic thought runs parallel to the scheme set forth by the Trika Śaivas. The *Yoginīhrdaya* and its commentary, the *Dīpikā*, by Amṛtānandanātha, son of Puṇyānandanātha, which are regarded as authoritative literature of the Tripurā school and are held in high esteem by the Trika philosophers of Kashmir, describe *Vimarśa* as the Supreme Power of *Paramaśiva*, which, while witnessing the gradual manifestations of the latter from *paśyantī* to *vaikharī*, assumes the most unruffled and tranquil state in the form of *Ambikā* which is called *Parā Vāk*. *Parā Vāk* is thus a particular state of *Vimarśa*, which is also called *Vāmā* when She chooses to throw out the universe lying in a subtle form in *Paramaśiva*. The three stages of the manifestation of *Paramaśiva*—*paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*—represent *Paramaśiva's* powers of volition, knowledge and action respectively.³³

³¹Tatra vaikharī 'ti prasiddhā vāk tālvādikaraṇavyāpārōpārūḍhasphuraṇatayā kriyāśaktir ity adhyavasiyate. Madhyamā ca buddhivṛttimātrapravartyamānatvāj jñānaśaktiḥ. Paśyantī punar icchā bahiḥprasaraṇābhyupagamarūpatvāt tasyā yataḥ parā vāk paśyantī 'ti paśyanti vyutpattiḥ. Sūkṣmā tu śikhaṇḍyaṇḍarasānvayād ukta-vāktrayaśabalibhāvasvabhāvā pratyagdraṣṭuḥ paramēśvarasyo 'dyogalakṣaṇā vṛttir ity ākhyāyate (MM, pp. 128-9).

³²Parā vāk punas tasyai 'va paramēśvarasya svarūpam anupraviśanti parisphurati (Loc. cit.).

³³Ātmanas sphuraṇaṁ paśyed yadā sā paramā kalā /
Ambikārūpam āpannā parā vāk samudīritā //
Bijabhāvasthitaṁ viśvaṁ sphuṭikartuṁ yado 'nmukhi /
Vāmā viśvasya vamanād aṅkuśākāratāṁ gatā //
Icchāśaktis tadā se 'yaṁ paśyantīvapūṣā sthitā /
Jñānaśaktis tathā jyeṣṭhā madhyamā vāg udāhṛtā (YH, I. 36-8).
Kriyāśaktis tu raudri 'yaṁ vaikharī viśvavigrahā (Op. cit., I. 40).

✓ We have dwelt at length on the two parallel schemes of the classification of *Vāk* as propounded by Bhartṛhari and his school and by the Trika writers of Kashmir and early Tripurā writers. We have tried to show that though Bhartṛhari does not appear to recognize *Parā* as the highest principle in his system of philosophy, the grammarians who came after him have accepted it as such. Now if the grammarians admit a fourfold classification of *Vāk*, it would be quite pertinent to ask whether there is any vital point of difference between the grammarians and the Trika writers on the nature of *Vāk* and its manifestations or whether their positions are absolutely identical. According to the school of Bhartṛhari *Parā Vāk* is the Supreme Reality while in the opinion of the Trika philosophers *Parā Vāk* is the Power of *Paramaśiva* which is maintained to be the highest principle. It is, of course, true that the Trika philosophers entertain the view that *Paramaśiva* and His power known as *Vimarśa* are not different—the two are held to be identical in essence. Still, it cannot be denied that when the two are described as the Powerful and Power, they stand in the relation of the substantive and its attribute. Consequently, the latter should be looked upon as subordinate to the former. Thus *Vimarśa* or *Parā Vāk* cannot be viewed as an independent and self-subsistent principle in the same way in which it is conceived in the system of the grammarian. It must, however, be admitted that the difference in the conceptions of *Parā Vāk* in the two systems is logical rather than real, and it would not perhaps be wrong to suggest that the two schemes are rather identical than different.³⁴

³⁴The Supreme Reality is conceived in Vyākaraṇa in terms of Śabda or Vāk (cf. Anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yad akṣaram) so that to the Vaiyākaraṇa the difference between Śabda Brahman and Para Brahman is in reality a difference without distinction. To him the two represent the two aspects of the same Supreme Śabda: accordingly, the so-called Śabda Brahman is synonymous with Paśyanti and Para Brahman with Parā. But in Āgama the Parā Vāk occupies a subordinate position, being conceived as the Power of the Supreme Reality or Parama Śiva, and would thus seem to correspond to Śabda Brahman; while Parama Śiva and Para Brahman would be identical. Though there is admittedly no essential difference between paśyanti and parā in Vyākaraṇa or between Parā Vāk and Parama Śiva in Āgama, there is no denying the fact that there is some slight difference between the two systems regarding the character of Vāk, in so far as the one holds it to be independent and self-subsistent, while

It needs to be pointed out in this connexion that Bhāskara-rāya, who commands an enviable reputation as an authority on Tripurā literature in later times, has set forth an elaborate exposition of the scheme of the fourfold classification of *Vāk* in his two important works, the *Guptavatī*, a commentary on the *Saptaśatī* which is popularly known as *Mārkaṇḍeya-Caṇḍī*, and the *Saubhāgyabhāskara*, a commentary on the *Lalitāsahasranāma*. It appears that the status accorded to *Parā Vāk* or *Śabdabrahman* by him is not as paramount as what has been assigned to it by the grammarians, the Trika Śaivas and even the early Tripurā philosophers. Bhāskara-rāya describes how during the time of dissolution of the universe when the actions of different individuals are not ripe and lie in a subtle state so that they are not distinguishable from the Supreme Power, the Absolute remains in a highly condensed state, as it were. In process of time, however, these actions gradually mature and the Absolute feels the desire to unfold the changes which were hitherto withdrawn into Himself. Immediately the Supreme Power assumes the forms of the different actions that have matured. The Absolute, as determined by the Supreme Power, is called *avyakta*, which is described as the sprout growing into the tree of the universe³⁵. This *avyakta* is also called *kāraṇabindu*. The emergence of *avyakta* from the Supreme Reality has been described by Bhāskara-rāya in his commentary on the *Varivasyārahasya* with the help of an illustration taken from our daily life. The unseen destiny of the issue to be born creates the desire in the mind of the father to procreate. With the desire thus roused the father turns to his better half and he subsequently enters into her body in the form of a seminal drop. As soon as this drop enters the ovary, the wife in her turn mixes with it in the form of a drop of blood. Thus the seminal drop swells and this may be well

other makes it a power subordinate to the substance with which it is identical (ABI, V, pp. 113-14).

³⁵Pralaye sṛjyamānaprāṇīkarmaṇām aparipākadaśāyām tādṛśakarmābhinnamāyā-vacchinnaṁ brahma ghanībhūtaṁ ity ucyate. Kālavaśāt karmaṇām paripāke sati vinaśyadavasthaḥ paripākaprāgabdhāvo vicikīrṣe 'ty ucyate. Tataḥ paripākakṣaṇe mātāvṛttir utpadyate tādṛśam paripākvakarmākārapariṇatamāyāviśiṣṭaṁ brahmā 'vyaktapadavācyam (SBH, p. 99).

compared to a seed which grows into a tree. The drop thereafter develops little by little till it assumes the form of a child. Exactly on this analogy the destinies of different souls create in *Paramaśiva* the desire to throw out of Himself the world which was withdrawn into His own essence at the time of dissolution. Accordingly, He turns to His own Power and enters into Her, and it is then that *kāraṇabindu* appears.³⁶ Viewed as a unitive principle this *kāraṇabindu* represents the state of equilibrium of *Śiva* and *Śakti* in their manifold forms.³⁷ The *kāraṇabindu* which is the fountainhead of the objective world subsequently changes into *kāryabindu* which in its turn develops into *nāda*, the latter again changing into *bīja*. The *kāryabindu* is an extremely subtle principle which is essentially of the nature of consciousness. *Nāda* is less subtle and is partly consciousness and partly unconsciousness in character. *Bīja* is a gross principle and is, therefore, of the nature of unconsciousness.³⁸ So long as *kāraṇabindu* does not change as *kāryabindu* it is called by different names such as *śakti*, *piṇḍa kuṇḍalī* and others.³⁹ But as soon as the undifferentiated state of *kāraṇabindu* is disturbed there arises an extremely indistinct sound called *śabdabrahman*.⁴⁰ The sound is said to be identical with *kāraṇabindu* and as such all-pervasive like it. It is held, however, that though *śabdabrahman* is all-pervasive, still it is manifested in the region of *mūlādhāra* by the breath which is regulated by the efforts of the speaker when he desires to convey his thoughts through the medium of speech.⁴¹ *Śabdabrahman* thus manifested is called *parā vāk*.⁴² When the breath which reveals *parā vāk* comes up to the navel it manifests *paśyanti*, which is

³⁶Com. on VR, II. 68, pp. 46-7.

³⁷Sa ca bindus samaṣṭirūpeṇai 'kas sphuṭaśivaśaktisāmarasyanāmā (Loc. cit.).

³⁸Asmāc ca kāraṇabindos sakāśāt krameṇa kāryabindus tato nādas tato bījam iti trayam utpannam. Tad idam parāsūkṣmāsthūlapadair apy ucyate. Cidaṁśaś cida-cinmiśro 'cidaṁśaś ce 'ti teṣāṁ rūpāṇi (SBH, p. 99).

³⁹Adhyātman tu kāraṇabinduś śaktipiṇḍakuṇḍalyādiśabdavācyo mūlādhārasthah ... (Loc. cit.).

⁴⁰Ayam eva ca yadā kāryabindvāditrayajananonmukho bhidyate taddaśāyām avyak-taś śabdabrahmābhidheyo ravas tatro 'tpadyate (Loc. cit.).

⁴¹...sarvagato 'pi vyañjakayatnasaṁskṛtapavanavaśāt prāṇinām mūlādhāra evā 'bhivyaṇyate (Loc. cit.).

⁴²Tad idam kāraṇabindvātmakam abhivyaṇyaktam śabdabrahma svapraṭiṣṭhatayā niṣpandaṁ tad eva ca parā vāg ity ucyate (Loc. cit.).

associated with the mind in the form of *vimarśa* and is identified with *kāryabindu* which represents activity in a general way. As soon as the same breath reaches the region of the heart, *madhyamā* is revealed. The indistinctness in *paśyantī* yields place to a definiteness at this stage; for *madhyamā* is associated with the principle of intelligence and is identified with the *nāda* evolution of *kāraṇabindu* which is of the nature of clear and distinct activity. The subsequent manifestation of *śabdabrahman* is *vaikharī* which is the grossest of all evolutions and represents the principle of *bīja*. The stage of *vaikharī* is reached when the breath strikes the different places of articulation.⁴³

From a careful perusal of Bhāskara-rāya's exposition as set forth in the preceding paragraph one may suggest without any fear of contradiction that Bhāskara-rāya, who does not always follow the traditional view-points,⁴⁴ has not on this occasion, too, represented the traditions of the Tripurā school of Āgamic thought; or, to be more precise, he has chalked out a new path for himself regardless of the traditions of the school to which he belongs.⁴⁵ *Parā Vāk*, according to Bhāskara-rāya, is neither the Supreme Reality as the grammarians think nor the Supreme Power as the Trika and the early Tripurā philosophers opine; but it is identified with *śabda-brahman* which, as he himself describes, is not an eternal principle but a product (*janya-padārtha*) having both a beginning and an end. It is, however, really surprising to find Nāgeśa-bhaṭṭa, a redoubtable champion of the Pāṇinian school, describing the evolution of the world and the fourfold manifestation of *vāk* exactly in the same manner as Bhāskara-rāya has done. Nāgeśa in his *magnum opus*, the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-*

⁴³Atha tad eva nābhiparyantam āgacchatā tena pavanenā 'bhiviyaktam vimarśa-rūpeṇa manasā yuktam sāmānyaspandaprakāśarūpakāryabindumayaṁ sat paśyanti vāg ucyate. Atha tad eva śabdabrahma tenai 'va vāyunā hṛdayaparyantam abhivyaṇamānam niścayātmikayā buddhyā yuktam viśeṣaspandaprakāśarūpanādamayaṁ san madhyamā vāg ity ucyate. Atha tad eva vadanaparyantam tenai 'va vāyunā kaṇṭhādīsthāneṣv abhivyaṇamānam akārādivarṇarūpaparam śrotragrahaṇayogyaspaṣṭataraṇaprakāśarūpabijātmakam sad vaikharī vāg ucyate (SBH, p. 99).

⁴⁴Prefatory note to YH, p. 2

⁴⁵Idam ca śāktamataṁ pūrvadarśitasakalamatāpekṣayā vilakṣaṇam iti sudhiyām atirohitatayā nā 'tro 'papādanam apekṣate (PWSBS, x., p. 132).

ghumañjūsā, writes to say that *māyā* lies merged in the Supreme Godhead during the period of dissolution of the universe. When the actions of different people mature there appears a split in the Supreme Reality and *māyā* becomes dissociated from God. Through the creative impulse of God *māyā* assumes the state of *avyakta* or *kāraṇabindu* which is asserted to be a highly subtle entity comprising three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is further characterized as a state suited to creation in which the germ of action sprouts increasingly. This *kāraṇabindu* divides itself into three aspects, *kāryabindu*, *nāda* and *bīja*. At the time when *kāraṇabindu* divides itself into the three aspects there arises an indistinct sound which is called *śabdabrahman*. When this *śabdabrahman* is manifested at *mūlādhāra*⁴⁶ it is called *parā vāk*, and it is respectively called *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* according as it is revealed at the navel, the heart and the cavity of the mouth. Nāgeśa informs us that both *parā* and *paśyantī* are highly subtle stages which the ascetic comprehends through indeterminate and determinate meditations respectively. *Madhyamā* is grosser than both *parā* and *paśyantī* while *vaikharī* is the grossest of all⁴⁷.

Nāgeśa's description of *śabdabrahman*, as already noticed, runs parallel to that of Bhāskararāya. On a close analysis, however, it appears that there are slight differences between the two descriptions. Thus while Nāgeśa holds that *kāryabindu*, *nāda* and *bīja* are but the three aspects of *kāraṇabindu*, Bhāskararāya says that it is *kāraṇabindu* which changes into *kāryabindu*, the latter into *nāda* and *nāda* into *bīja*. It is worthy of notice again that Nāgeśa conceives *māyā* as an illusory principle just in the same way as it is found in the Monistic Vedānta. It is indeed a pity that in spite of his versatility and genius Nāgeśa should fail to understand and appreciate the position of Bhartṛhari and his successors and seek to interpret the grammarian's viewpoint in the light of a theory that does not assign any important status to *Vāk*. We would only wish Nāgeśa had been conscious of the paramount importance enjoyed by *Vāk* in the writings of Bhartṛhari.

⁴⁶A mystical circle situated above the generative organs

⁴⁷VSLM, pp. 171-75.

Bhartrhari views *Vāk* as the Supreme Reality subordinate to none else in the universe. It shines in full glory at all times and over all space. It knows no change and does not wax or wane in any circumstances. Strictly speaking, even Trika and early Tripurā writers have not given us such an exalted conception of *Vāk* as Bhartrhari has.

To sum up : The close relation of word and thought is the datum from which Bhartrhari and the philosophers of the Śaiva and Śākta schools have deduced momentous conclusions. In the idealistic schools thought in one form or another is the ultimate principle which gives rise to the subjective and objective orders of reality. Thought is identified with word. The Logos of the Neo-Platonic school stands for word and thought alike. But the philosophers of these Indian schools have made word the fountain-head of the cosmic order and evolution. In spite of the minor differences between the Śaiva and Śākta schools on the one hand and the school of Bhartrhari on the other, their agreement is fundamental. The Āgamas contain the germs of these speculations, and their development in the philosophical systems is the outcome of the logical understanding. It is not possible to trace the chronological relation between these schools. But Bhartrhari's work is evidently prior to those of the philosophical classics of the Śaiva and Śākta schools and it is natural that they have been influenced by the former. The different ontological schemes worked out from the concept of *śabdabrahman* and the religious disciplines based upon them or giving rise to them ought to show the modern thinker that the nexus between thought and word is too close to be brushed aside as accidental. In spite of the scholastic look and bizarre vesture that these speculations may appear to assume to a modern mind their philosophical basis ought not to be overlooked. It is with this end in view and in pursuance of the conviction that what has been of serious concern to great minds in the past should be an object of interest to earnest students of the history of human thought that we have made a rather elaborate treatment of the topic.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EMPIRIC WORLD OF REALITIES :

VARṆA, PADA AND VĀKYA

We know it on the authority of the *Taittirīyasamhitā* that language in its primitive stage was not dissolvable into parts.¹ The method of analysis, therefore, should be looked upon as a later development in the history of language. Puṇyarāja takes care to point out that both Pāṇini and Patañjali have recognized the indivisibility of a sentence, which is not any new thesis that medieval or later grammarians have introduced in their system of thought.² Thus Puṇyarāja quotes a passage from the *Māhābhāṣya* to show that Patañjali admits the reality of an indivisible sentence and considers terms to be unreal entities.³ But it must be admitted that the real credit for logically establishing the indivisibility of a sentence goes to Bhartṛhari, the redoubtable champion of the doctrine of *Śabdabrahman*.⁴ In seeking to develop the thesis that a sentence is an indivisible unit he has to unfold and examine the view of the Mīmāṃsist (or, the *padavādin*) who regards terms as ultimate elements and vehemently repudiates the view that they are unreal abstractions. At the outset Bhartṛhari examines a very well-known dictum traceable in the *Rk-*

¹Vāg vai parācy avyākṛtā (TSM, VI. iv. 7).

²Sūtrakārasya tv atīṅgrahaṇād ekam evā 'khaṇḍam vākyam arthaikatvād ākhyātābhedo 'py abhipretam iti gamyate (PR, p. 71) ; also : ...Sūtrakārābhīprāyam anusṛtyā 'khaṇḍapakṣa eva vākyavākyārthayor abhyupagamyata iti darśitam. Idānīm Bhāṣyākārābhīprāyeṇā 'pi sa evā 'bhyupagantavya ity upakramyate (Op. cit., p. 90).

³Tathā ca bhāṣyam—na lakṣaṇena padakārā anuvartyāḥ padakārair nāma lakṣaṇam anuvartavyam. Tathā, "Yathālakṣaṇam aprayukta" iti (Op. cit., p. 91).

It is pointed out that the term *padakāra* in MB on PS, VI. i. 207 shows from its very formation that a term as an element in a proposition is a fictitious product and as such it cannot be looked upon as a real entity, reality being hardly predicable of entities that are not eternal: Atra yadi padānām satyatā syāt tadā teṣām svata eva siddhatvāt padāni kurvantī 'ti padakārā ity etad asaṅgataṁ syāt... (PR, p. 91); also : Padāmnāyaś ca yady anyas saṁhitāyā nidarśakaḥ / Nityas tatra katham kāryam padam lakṣaṇadarśanāt (VP, II. 60).

⁴Yata evam Sūtrakārasya Bhāṣyakārasya cā 'khaṇḍapakṣo 'bhirucitaḥ. Tasmād vākyavādidbhis sphoṭavādidbhir abhedakalpanam āśritaṁ kālpanikaḥ padavādo 'bhyupagata ity arthaḥ (PR, p. 91).

*prātiśākhya*⁵ to show how the rival schools, the *padavādin* and the grammarian (or, the *vākyavādin*), study the nature of a sentence. The controversy between the two schools, it may be pointed out, arises in respect of the interpretation of the compound, *padaprakṛtiḥ*, occurring in the dictum.⁶ The *padavādin*, who believes in the reality of terms and looks upon a sentence as a combination of several terms, interprets the aforesaid expression in such a way that a term appears as the ultimate entity and a sentence can hardly be regarded as an indivisible unit of thought and expression.⁷ The grammarian, on the other hand, lays emphasis on the indivisibility of a sentence and strongly refutes the claim of a term to be treated as an ultimate reality.⁸ The splitting up of a sentence into a number of terms is, in his opinion, only a means that helps the beginner in his study of the nature of a sentence.⁹ In fact, the grammarian conceives terms as so many fictions, pure and simple.¹⁰

⁵Padaprakṛtis saṁhitā (RP, II. 1).

⁶Padaprakṛtibhāvaś ca vṛttibhedena varṇyate /

Padānām saṁhitā yonis saṁhitā vā padāśrayā (VP, II. 59).

It may be noted here that the form, *padaprakṛtiḥ*, may be regarded as a case of either a genitive or a possessive (*bahuvrīhi*) compound. If it is treated as a case of genitive compound, it will mean that a sentence is the ultimate reality and a term is only imagined to be its constituent. If, however, it is taken to be a case of possessive compound, a term and not a sentence will be the ultimate entity.

⁷...padadarśinaḥ padam eva satyaṁ ye manyante te hy akhaṇḍaṁ vākyam kalpitam āhuḥ (PR, p. 91).

⁸Akhaṇḍapakṣe padaprakṛtis saṁhite 'ti śaṣṭhisamāśena vyākhyāyata ity arthaḥ (Op. cit. p. 92).

⁹Tasmān manyāmahe padāny asatyāni ekam abhinnaśvabhāvaṁ vākyam. Tad abudhabodhanāya padavibhāgaḥ kalpita iti (Op. cit., p. 91).

¹⁰It may be noted in passing that it is not an unusual phenomenon that an entity, internal or external, is regarded either as indivisible or as composed of parts by different thinkers. Needless to say, when it is held to be indivisible, any reference to the same as possessing parts should be understood to mean that such parts are undoubtedly no better than fictions. In the same way, if an entity is admitted to be divisible into parts, the latter cannot but be conceived as realities. An illustration will make the point clear. A cognition which presents different objects as its content, is undoubtedly a unitary entity with an individuality of its own. It is not merely the sum-total of several individual cognitions, each presenting only one object as its content. This is how one school of thinkers would explain the knowledge of a number of objects at one and the same time. But according to a different school of thought such a knowledge is nothing but the aggregate of several individual cognitions with hardly any individuality of its own. To be explicit, in the opinion of the former school, a cognition in which different objects appear as content does not admit of being analyzed into a number of cognitions which

Before proceeding further we propose to study the several views on the nature of a sentence which Bhartṛhari has recorded in his work and which have been analyzed by Puṇyarāja in his commentary. We find that Bhartṛhari refers to no less than eight different theories.¹¹ Puṇyarāja observes that those who believe in the indivisibility of a sentence may view it in three different ways while those who admit that it is dissolvable into parts may describe it in five different ways.¹²

A sentence conceived as an indivisible unit is called *sphoṭa* in the language of the grammarian. And this *sphoṭa* is looked upon both as an internal and as an external entity.¹³ As an external entity, again, it is viewed either in the form of an individual or a universal.¹⁴ It will now become intelligible how three definitions of a sentence could be framed so as to explain *sphoṭa* as an internal entity, *sphoṭa* as an external entity in the form of an individual, and *sphoṭa* as an external entity in the form of a universal.¹⁵

In the opinion of the grammarian a sentence is complete in itself. It possesses an individuality of its own and is not merely an aggregate of a number of terms. Puṇyarāja likens

being summed up will give us the resultant cognition. If any analysis is ever resorted to, it must not be forgotten that such an analysis is meant only for a proper understanding of this type of cognition and does not contain any more value in itself. According to the other school, there is hardly any necessity for admitting a unitary cognition in view of the fact that what appears to be a unitary experience is after all so many different experiences. What holds good of an internal entity like cognition does equally so in the case of an external entity. Thus motley colour, according to some philosophers, is a class by itself and is not a combination of several colours. But others maintain that it is merely a conglomeration of a few colours and has no individuality of its own.

Cp. Yathai 'ka eva sarvārthapratyayaḥ pravibhajyate /
Drśyabhedānukāreṇa vākyārthānugamas tathā //
Citrasyai 'kasvarūpasya yathā bhedanidarśanaḥ /
Nīlādibhis samākhyānaṁ kriyate bhinnalakṣaṇaiḥ (VP, 11. 7-8).

¹¹Ākhyātaśabdāḥ saṁghāto jātis saṁghātavartinī /
Eko 'navayavaś śabdaḥ kramo buddhyanusaṁhṛtiḥ //
Padam ādyaṁ pṛthaksarvapaḍam sākāṅkṣam ity api /
Vākyam prati matir bhinnā bahudhā nyāyavādinām (Op. cit., II. 1-2).

¹²PR, p. 63.

¹³Sphoṭaś ca dvividho bāhya ābhyantaraś ca (Op. cit., p. 64).

¹⁴Bāhyo 'pi jātiviyaktibhedena dvividhaḥ (Loc. cit.).

¹⁵Tatra jātīlakṣaṇasya jātis saṁghātavartinī 'ti. Vyaktīlakṣaṇasyai 'ko 'navayavaś śabda iti. Ābhyantaraś tu buddhyanusaṁhṛtir ity aneno 'ddeśaḥ (Loc. cit.).

it to a delicious drink in which different ingredients merge their individual tastes to give rise to a peculiar flavour. Or, it resembles the liquid in a peahen's egg where different colours mingle to produce a variegated hue.¹⁶ In fine, it is a class by itself like the man-lion which, though resembling partly a man and partly a lion, is neither a man nor a lion but something definitely different from either. A sentence likewise seems to be a combination of several terms which may, for practical convenience, be viewed as its constituents, but the truth is that it is an indivisible unit. As has been pointed out before, the division of a sentence into terms is absolutely an artificial device which is resorted to for the sole purpose of enabling the beginner to understand the indivisibility of a sentence which he fails to comprehend in the early stages of his study.¹⁷ It is a well-known maxim in the Monistic Vedānta that untruth leads us on to truth—a study of terms which are no better than fictions similarly reaches us to the plane of a sentence where we are blessed with the vision of its indivisibility.¹⁸

The grammarian maintains that a sentence is indivisible, because the opposite theory of division would result in infinite regress or in the acceptance of atomism. If a sentence is divisible into terms and terms into syllables and syllables into letters, there is no *a priori* reason for stopping short at this stage. Were the division to be carried further and further, a term should be infinitely divisible. But this means *regressus ad infinitum* which should be regarded as the *reductio ad absurdum* of this theory. If, on the other hand, we were to stop either at letters or at subtler parts of the same, we would have to admit that the ultimate real is indivisible. Why not then regard the sentence as an indivisible unit? Further, there is the absurdity of the atomic theory. An atom is *ex hypothesi*

¹⁶Vākyavākyaṛthayor akhaṇḍatvaṁ pānakarasamyūrāṇḍarasacitrarūpanarasimhagavayacitrajñānavat samānam eve 'ty ucyate (PR, p. 71).

¹⁷Ekasya nirvibhāgasya vākyaśya sarvataḥ paripūrṇasya vākyaāntaragataiḥ padāntarair anvākhyānaṁ tathai 'va kriyate iti (Op. cit. p. 72); also: Yathā 'khaṇḍam eva padaṁ prakṛtipratyayādibhiḥ kalpitair eva vibhajyate. Tathā vākye 'py asatyabhūtānām eva 'budhabodhanāya padānām vibhāgo draṣṭavya iti (Loc. cit.).

¹⁸Asatyē vartmani sthitvā tatas satyaṁ samihate (VP, II. 240).

indivisible and has no parts and as such its cohesion with other parts is not intelligible. A physical atom could be supposed to be united with another atom provided it had parts and combined in respect thereof; otherwise, there would be no extension in magnitude. If the conjunction of one atom with another were not partial but in respect of their entire identity, it would only mean a merger of the two and so there would be no increase in magnitude. What holds true of physical atoms must also be true of verbal atoms and thus there would be neither a syllable nor a term resulting from their combination. The indivisibility of a sentence is thus forced on us as an inevitable logical necessity.¹⁹

That the division of a sentence into terms and syllables is a mere artifice may be explained with reference to the status given to them in the science of grammar. It has been definitely asserted that the parts into which the diphthongs, 'e', 'ai', 'o' and 'au', are shown to be resolvable, are not identical with the simple vowels resembling them. Splitting up such diphthongs, therefore, is simply to help the beginner in approaching his subject of study with less difficulty. In reality, the diphthongs are all indivisible entities. Were the parts into which they are said to be divided real and significant in themselves, there would be no justification for declaring that such parts should not be confused with the simple vowels corresponding to them.²⁰ In the same way, the terms into which a sentence is shown to be divided are merely shadows of similar forms and never identical with them. So the grammarian declares that a sentence does not admit of division into terms, syllables and letters. This is in fine the view of those who regard the sentence or *sphoṭa* as an external entity with an individuality of its own.

¹⁹Padāni vākye tāny eva varṇās te ca pade yadi /
Varṇeṣu varṇabhāgānām bhedas syāt paramāṇuvāt //
Bhāgānām anupaśleṣān na varṇo na padaṁ bhavet /
Teṣām avyapadeśyatvāt kim anyad apadiśyatām (VP, II. 28-9).

²⁰Tatra vākyād apoddhṛtānām padānām kevalam itarapadasārūpyamātram dṛśyata
iti pratipādayitum āha :

Varṇāntarasarūpaṁ ca varṇabhāgeṣu dṛśyate /
Padāntarasarūpaś ca padabhāga avasthitaḥ (Op. cit., II. 11).

We next propose to explain the concept of *sphoṭa* in the capacity of a universal. It is a matter of common knowledge that the universal inheres in each of the individuals within it, and as the universal is regarded as an indivisible unit, it must necessarily be held that it resides in every individual within its orbit in its entirety. The relation subsisting between the universal and the individual is one of the revealed and the revealer. A question which is usually raised in this connexion is that if the universal is completely revealed by any one of the several individuals within its purview, is it not without any justification to hold that it is revealed by all the individuals? And if *sphoṭa* be such a universal immanent in all terms and syllables of a sentence, the question requires to be answered. It is replied that each one of the individuals contributes to the revelation of the universal immanent in them in such a way that the revelation of the universal becomes more and more clear and distinct through different individuals within it. Bhartṛhari explains this point with the help of an analogy. The universal underlying the action of walking is revealed each time a walking exercise is undertaken ; for it is held that a universal seeks its expression through the medium of each and every individual within it. But though every individual possesses the requisite capacity for manifesting the universal, still the universal is not distinctly comprehended when it is revealed through the medium of one particular individual alone. When a walking exercise is observed on several occasions, the conception of the universal underlying the activity of walking becomes abundantly clear. It is argued that as each walking movement differs from another in certain respects, it is not understandable how each movement, which is the result of some specific efforts, is capable of manifesting the same universal inhering in all such movements. Bhartṛhari anticipates this argument and offers an answer. Though it is a fact that each walking movement differs from another, it is undeniable that they agree in important points which make them similar, and so there cannot be any difficulty in different individuals revealing a universal immanent in them in the same way.

Arguing on the same line, those who acknowledge *sphoṭa* as a universal entity, maintain that each sound manifests *sphoṭa* which is of the nature of a universal. In spite of the fact that each sound possesses individual peculiarities in respect of efforts at producing it and the sources of articulation, there is affinity among all sounds inasmuch as they are all produced when the internal air strikes against the sources of articulation. This is how the grammarian explains *sphoṭa* or a sentence as an external entity of the nature of the universal.²¹

Our next endeavour would be to study the view of the grammarian describing *sphoṭa* as an internal entity. The grammarian tells us that *sphoṭa* is an internal entity, purely spiritual and assuming externality only when it is revealed by sounds.²² This internal *sphoṭa* is indivisible and partless, consciousness in essence, and, therefore, luminous. It partakes of the nature of both word and import as it is derived from and inseparably linked to *pratibhā*, being identical with it in essence²³. Internal *sphoṭa* and *pratibhā* are interchangeable expressions as they do not signify two different entities but represent the same Supreme Verbal Principle which is unquestionably unitary and indivisible²⁴. The difference between the two does not appear so long as they remain within and there is no outward projection. It is only when they come out that they appear to be two different entities linked together by the relationship of the denoter and the denoted²⁵. It is strongly asserted that the two are not essen-

²¹Yathā 'kṣepaviśeṣe 'pi karmabhedo na gṛhyate /
Āvṛttau vyajyate jātiḥ karmabhir bhramaṇādibhiḥ //
Varṇavākyapadeṣv evaṁ tulyopavyañjanā śrutiḥ /
Atyantabhede tattvasya sarūpe 'va pratiyate (VP, II. 20-21).

Also: Nityatve samudāyānām jāter vā parikalpane /

Ekasyai 'vā 'rthatām āhur vākyasyā 'vyabhicāriṇīm (Op. cit., II. 57); see also PR, thereunder.

²²Yad antas śabdatattvaṁ tu nādair ekaṁ prakāśitam /

Tad āhur apare śabdaṁ tasya vākye tathai 'katā (VP, II. 30).

²³Idānīm antar evā 'navayavaṁ bodhasvabhāvaṁ śabdārthamayam nirvibhāgam śabdatattvaṁ iti yad gītam (PR, p. 81).

²⁴...vāgvikārānām prakṛtiṁ paśyantyākhyāṁ pratibhāṁ upaiti, tasmāc ca sattā-mātrāt pratibhākyāc chabdāt... (Op. cit. p. 8); also: Ekasyai 'vātmano bhedau śab-dārthāv aprthaksthitau (VP, II. 31).

²⁵Tau ca...vastuto bahis sthitau bhedāv iva pratibhāsete iti bodhyam (PR, p. 82).

tially different entities. The Supreme Principle which they represent possesses the infinite power to present them not only as the denoter and the denoted but also as the revealer and the revealed, the enjoyer and the enjoyed and in a thousand and one different ways.²⁶ Bhartṛhari speaks eloquently about this limitless power of the Eternal Verbum which explains all our usages including what has a reference to the relationship between the denoter and the denoted.²⁷

Before we proceed to study the several definitions of the sentence as an entity divisible into parts, it is necessary to review one important point in connexion with the indivisibility of sentences as maintained in each one of the three definitions discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. It is held, as we have seen, that the sentence is a unitary principle which does not admit of any division into parts. But it is common experience that the idea of sequence is associated with the concept of a sentence. And unless a sentence is conceived as an entity divisible into parts, it is well-nigh impossible to explain any idea of sequence associated with it. The grammarian, however, holds that the ideas of sequence and division which are found to be associated with the concept of a sentence are all appearances engendered by sounds through the medium of which it is revealed. It may be noticed in passing that all those ideas that contradict the unitary character of a sentence are never natural to it but happen to be reflected therein from the medium manifesting it. Thus when we make a distinction between a sentence when it is mildly revealed and the same when it is boldly manifested, we seem to be oblivious of the fact that there is no difference in the essence of the two sentences—the seeming difference is brought about by the sounds revealing them. In the one case,

²⁶Prakāśakaprakāśyatvaṁ kāryakāraṇarūpatā /

Antarmātrātmanas tasya śabdatattvasya sarvadā (VP, II. 32).

Also : Ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ce 'yam anekadhā /

Bhokṛṭbhoktavayārūpeṇa bhogārūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ (Op. cit., I. 4).

²⁷Tasyai 'vā 'stīvanāstitvasāmarthyē samavasthite /

Akrame kramanirbhāse vyavahāranibandhane (Op. cit., II. 33).

Also : Tasya tad evai 'kaṁ nirvibhāgaṁ paraṁ tattvam āśrityā 'yam sakala-lokasamvyavahāraś śaktibhedāt pratiyate. Kiṁ punar ayaṁ vācyavācaka-mātrarūpa iti (PR, p. 82).

the sounds are soft while, in the other, they are distinct and bold.²⁸ The position of the grammarian may be elucidated with the help of an analogy. Knowledge is one and partless. Still we make a distinction between one piece of knowledge which is prolonged and another which is of shorter duration. If we enquire into the reason why it is so, it will appear that the contents of knowledge being many, the knowledge itself seems to last, as it were, for a much longer period of time than what happens when such contents are comparatively few in number.²⁹ It may be argued, however, that this illustration does not make it quite intelligible why a unitary and indivisible principle should at all appear as different and admitting of divisions. Bhartṛhari has not failed to anticipate the problem and he solves it by asserting that it is the very nature of such unitive and divisionless principles that, thanks to the peculiar power innate to them, they seem to imitate the characteristics of the medium through which they are reflected.³⁰

It has been noticed in a preceding paragraph that the sentence as a divisible entity has been defined in five different ways. In the first place, a verbal form (*ākhyāta*) is held to be a sentence in view of the fact that the same alone gives us a sense which is self-sufficient, the required agent and the relevant object being understood through implication (*ākṣepa*).³¹ Thus the verbal form 'burns' may be looked upon as a

²⁸Avyaktaḥ kramavān śabda upāśv ayam adhīyate /

Akramas tu vitatye 'va buddhir yatrā 'vatiṣṭhate (VP, II. 19).

Also : Yas tu bhedapratibhāsa so 'śāv upādhikṛta eve 'ty arthaḥ. Tatho 'pāśvuparamopāśvuyakto vyaktataraś ca vilambito vilambitataras ca druto drutataraś ce 'tyādikāḥ pratibhāsā abhivyañjakadhvanikṛtā na punas satyā iti boddhavyam (PR, p. 76).

²⁹Çiraṁ kṣipram iti jñāne kālabhedād ṛte yathā /

Bhinnakāle prakāśete sa dharmo hrasvadirghayoḥ (VP, II. 23).

³⁰Nityeṣu tu kutah pūrvam param vā paramārthataḥ /

Ekasyai 'va tu sā śaktir yad evam avabhāṣate (Op. cit. II. 22).

Also : Bhavanāsamaye 'tv etat kramasāmarthyam akramam /

Vyāvṛttabhedo yenā 'rtho bhedavān upalabhyate (Op. cit., II. 27).

Also : ...akramam 'sphoṭasvabhāvam ekaṁ vācakaṁ svapadārthabhāvanāvasare tū 'pādhivāśāt kramasāmarthyam krame sāmārthyam śaktir yasya tat kramasāmarthyam avagatam (PR, p. 80).

³¹Ākhyātaśabdo niyataṁ sādhanam yatra gamyate /

Tad apy ekaṁ samāsārtham (samāptārtham ?) vākyam ity abhidhīyate (VP, II. 327-8).

sentence, the agent, viz, the fire, and the object, viz, the house, being construed with it by implication by reason of their intimate relationship. It may be mentioned here that this view of regarding a verbal form as a proposition is of very great importance to the linguist. It may be remembered that Kātyāyana, the author of the *Vārttikas*, lays emphasis on the verbal element in the body of a proposition.³² Puṇyarāja also draws our attention to the view of the Mīmāṃsist according to whom the verbal form is the most important part of a sentence³³. Bhartṛhari also brings to our notice a theory which holds that a proposition may even consist of a substantive noun (*nāma-pada*), if it is found from the nature of its connotation to imply action, i.e., the meaning of the verb. Thus we find that the verbal element is certainly the most conspicuous part of a proposition and should, in the fitness of things, be described as its very life. As such a verbal form may very well be considered as good as a sentence or a proposition.³⁴

According to another view, the first term in a proposition may be looked upon as the proposition itself. It is held by exponents of this view that even when the first terms of two different propositions happen to be identically the same, the first term of one proposition should be regarded as different from that of the other proposition. The point is that the two terms which appear to be identical in form are not really so in view of the fact that the meanings of these two terms are different and not identical inasmuch as they are associated with the meanings of other terms which vary in different propositions. To illustrate the point, the term 'bring' in the proposition 'Bring a cow' conveys a meaning different from what is expressed by the same term in the proposition 'Bring a dog'. The initial terms of the two propositions have apparently the same form but should not, on that account, be treated as identical for the simple reason that the import signified by either varies on account of its association with the imports of

³²Ākhyātāṃ sāvyayakāra-kaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyam (Vār, 9 on PS, II. i. 1).

³³Karmapradhānaṃ kriyāpadapradhānam ity arthaḥ (PR, p. 69); also :
Vākyam tad api manyante yat padaṃ caritakriyam (VP, II. 326).

³⁴Ekatiṃ vākyam (Vār, 10 on PS, II. i. 1).

other terms in either proposition. Thus it is maintained that the meaning of the first term which is related to the meaning of other terms in a proposition is a complex and cannot be studied in isolation. In the circumstances, the first term of a proposition is held to be the proposition itself for it serves to express the meaning of the entire proposition.³⁵

According to another view, any one of the terms in a proposition is the proposition itself. Arguing exactly on the lines mentioned in the last paragraph, it may be pointed out that like the first term in a proposition every other term may be shown to stand for the sentence. As the meaning of the first term is a complex, so are the meanings of all other terms in a proposition. And as such the meaning of any particular term in a proposition being different from the meaning of a similar term in another proposition, there is every justification for viewing the two terms, though identical in structure, as different from each other, and a term thus conceived may very well be looked upon as a proposition³⁶.

✓ According to yet another view, it is an order or a sequence (*krama*) which is called a proposition.³⁷ Primarily, order or sequence is the property of time.³⁸ It is posited by the exponents of this view that each term in a proposition expresses a particular meaning only when it is perceived in some particular order³⁹. It is asserted that though terms are not required to be cognized in one specific order exclusive of another, still it is undeniable that unless they come in a certain order, the intended meaning is never expressed.⁴⁰ It is maintained that a proposition is never made up of terms alone—it is not merely the sum-total of a number of terms. It is the order of

³⁵Viśeṣāśabdāḥ keṣāñcit sāmānyapratirūpakāḥ /

Śabdāntarābhisambandhād vyajyate pratipattiḥ (VP, II. 17).

Also: Iha Devadatta gām abhyāje 'ty atra devadattapadaṁ (Devadatta ?) gām badhāne 'ty asmād viśiṣṭam eva vaktrā samudiritam bhramāt tu sakalasādhāraṇam pratibhāti. Uttarakālām gavāḍipadasambandhād viśiṣṭā pratipattir abhivyajyata iti tad eva vākyam (PR, p. 75).

³⁶Teṣāṁ tu kṛtsno vākyārthaḥ pratibhedam samāpyate (VP, II. 17).

✓³⁷Kramo vākyam ity uddiṣṭam (PR, p. 88).

✓³⁸Kramo hi dharmo kālasya (VP, II. 51).

✓³⁹Santa eva viśeṣa ye padārtheṣu vyavasthitāḥ /

Te kramād anugamyante na vākyam abhidhāyakam (Op. cit., II. 50).

✓⁴⁰Anapekṣitaviśiṣṭānupūrvikāḥ kramāḥ kramamātram (PR, p. 88).

arrangement which is the prime factor in the construction of a proposition. Hence the exponents of this view are opposed to the grammarian who holds that the proposition as *sphoṭa* is indivisible and sequenceless⁴¹.

It should be noted in this connexion that the advocates of the theory discussed in the last paragraph acknowledge the sequence of terms as the sentence expressive of sense, but the sequence of letters is not conceived by them as endowed with the denotative power.⁴² They, however, have no objection to the description of a term as a sequence of letters, but they state in unambiguous language that they regard the sequence of terms alone as the proposition for it is this sequence of terms alone which is found from experience to possess the power of conveying a meaning⁴³. It may be argued here that when both letters and terms are apprehended by the auditory organ, it stands to reason that the sequence of letters, like the sequence of terms, should be supposed to be expressive of meaning.⁴⁴ It is replied that such arguments are of no avail because of the obvious fact that what expresses a meaning is noticed to be the sequence of terms and not of letters. We know that both letters and terms are cognized by the same auditory organ but that is no reason why they should have identical functions. Our experience teaches us that it is the terms and not the letters which are capable of expressing a meaning. In the circumstances, it is no use asking why a sequence of letters should be denied the privilege and status of a denoter (*vācaka*) which is accorded to a sequence of terms.⁴⁵ It being a question of fact and not of reason, experience alone is the ultimate proof.

According to yet another view, a combination of terms

⁴¹Tasmin saty arthapratīter nā 'nyas tadvyatiriktaḥ kaścit sphoṭādis śabdo vācako 'bhyupagantuḥ yuktaḥ. Api tu krama evo 'palabhyamāno vācakaḥ (PR, p. 88).

⁴²Varṇakramaḥ padam ucyatām nāma. Vākyasaṃjñā padakrama eva yukta tathā 'rthapratītidarśanāt (Op. cit., p. 89).

⁴³Ye ca sambhavino bhedaḥ padārtheṣv avibhāvītāḥ /
Te sannidhāne vyajyante na tu varṇeṣv ayaṁ kramaḥ (VP, II. 52).

⁴⁴Tayor varṇapadayoś śabdatvaṁ śrotrendriyagrāhyatve 'pi vācakatvalakṣaṇaṁ ne 'śyate, api tu kramasyai 'va (PR, p. 89).

⁴⁵Samāne 'pi tu śabdatve dr̥ṣṭas saṃpratyayaḥ padāt /
Prativarṇaṁ tv asau nā 'sti padasyā 'rtham ato viduḥ (VP, II. 54).

is a sentence. It is held that each term by itself does not signify any meaning which is complete in itself and sufficient for the purpose of mutual communication. So it is necessary to admit that a sentence is a combination of terms and that the meaning of a sentence comprises the meanings of the individual terms together with the relation (*saṁsarga*) amongst such meanings.⁴⁶

To sum up : There are primarily two schools of thought on the nature of the proposition. Of these two, one believes in the indivisibility of the proposition while the other admits its divisibility. The former is usually called the *vākyavādin* while the latter is known as the *padavādin*. We now propose to examine the arguments advanced by the rival schools in support of their respective theories.

The *padavādin* asserts that each term in a proposition expresses a sense-unit; but there arises some additional signification when such individual sense-units are sought to be construed with one another. The import of a proposition which is evolved from a correlation of meanings is not merely the sum-total of several meanings denoted by the different terms but possesses an individuality of its own. The denotation of a term changes according as it is construed with the denotation of another term. Hence, what enters into the body of the relation (*anvaya*), which is another name for the import of a proposition, is not the individual denotations of several terms but something different from them. Strictly speaking, therefore, the original denotation of a term is required to be modified or abandoned when the syntactical relation is sought to be established. That being so, the *vākyavādin* points out the futility of the assumption that each term in a proposition is pregnant with an individual import of its own. When it transpires that the meanings of individual terms are only figments of the imagination, it follows that the individual

⁴⁶Kevalena padenā 'rtho yāvān evā 'bhidhīyate /

Vākyasthaṁ tāvato 'rthasya tad āhur abhidhāyakam //

Sambandhe sati yat tv anyad ādhikyam upajāyate /

Vākyārtham eva taṁ prāhur anekapadasaṁśrayam (VP, II. 41-2).

Also : Yathā svāvayavā varṇā vinā vācyena kenacit /

Arthavantas samuditā vākyam apy evam iṣyate (Op. cit., II. 55).

terms have no independent existence of their own, much less an individual and independent significance. If the proposition were a composite whole, it would not carry any sense, because the aggregate of nonentities or of nonsensical units cannot expect to have an improved chance. But since the significance of a sentence cannot be repudiated, the theory of composite sentence must be abandoned.⁴⁷

The *vākyavādin* advances further arguments to show that the position of the *padavādin* is hardly sound and tenable. In the first place, it is pointed out that a particular term expresses a particular import even when it happens to assume a change of form. Thus the same import of 'a king' is found to be expressed by such different forms as 'rājā', 'rājānam', 'rājñā' and the like.⁴⁸ The *vākyavādin* contends that if terms were really denotative of any import, we could hardly explain how the same import is conveyed by a term even when it undergoes a change of form. It is only in the fitness of things to expect that a particular sense is signified by a term having a fixed form. But as the *padavādin* cannot entertain such a view, the *vākyavādin* insists that terms are no better than fictions and there is no justification for the belief that they are endowed with the power of denotation.

Secondly, it is maintained by the *vākyavādin* that in certain compound words we may discover certain forms which are identical with uncompounded words, but it is a fact that the meanings of those forms differ widely from the meanings of the latter. Thus the compound 'rāja-puruṣa' appears to comprise two components, 'rāja' and 'puruṣa', which may be looked upon as two uncompounded terms. But if we enquire into the meaning of the compound and the imports of the two terms into which it is shown to be split up, we notice that

⁴⁷Sampratyaya-pramāṇatvāt padārthāstitvakalpane/

Padārthābhyuccaye tyāgād ānarthakyaṁ prasajyate (VP, II. 34).

Also: Yadi padārthasampratyayaḥ pramāṇaṁ padapadārthasattāyām ucyate tadā Devadatta gām abhyāja śuklāṁ daṇḍene 'ty asmin vākye pūrvapūrvapadārthānām uttarottarapadārthābhyuccaye svārthatyāgāt tattatpadopādānasyā 'narthakyaṁ prasajyate. Tatas cā 'narthakasyo 'ccāraṇavaiphalīyād uccāritād vā tasmāc chabdamātrāt padārthapratyayaṣyā 'nupapatteḥ kinnibandhanā vākyārthapratītiḥ syād iti yat kiñcid etat (PR, p. 83).

⁴⁸Rājaśabdena rājārtho bhinnarūpeṇa gamyate (VP, II. 34); also see PR, p. 83.

there is not the slightest trace of any similarity in them, not to speak of their identity. Thus while the compound means 'a royal servant', the uncompounded terms mean 'Shine, O man'. When terms having identical forms are thus found to be denotative of different imports, the *vākyavādin* urges that it is futile to believe that terms are denotative of sense.⁴⁹

It is further pointed out against the *padavādin* that just as he cannot assert that the import of a term is derived from that of the several letters which are believed to be its constituents, so the *vākyavādin* would contend that the import of a proposition cannot be derived from the individual terms supposed to be its component factors.⁵⁰ The *padavādin*, however, does not accept this contention to be true. He maintains that letters are not unmeaning since the meaning of the term must inhere in them, just as the meaning of the proposition inheres in the terms.⁵¹ The letters are concomitant with a term just as terms are with a proposition. We do not seem to possess the requisite skill to understand that an isolated letter or term is endowed with the power of denotation. That does not argue that letters or terms are unmeaning. Our powers of apprehension are unequal to the task. It is common experience that a subtle entity like a particle of dust eludes our perception. But when it is combined with other similar entities or associated with a particular substratum, we can perceive it.⁵² Likewise, though it is really a fact that each letter or term signifies a sense-unit, yet we fail to understand the same. The reason for this is to be traced to innate incapacity on the part of the person who is expected to understand it and who can apprehend the meaning of letters or terms only when he finds certain such letters combining to constitute a term or certain such terms combining to make

⁴⁹ Vṛttāḥ ākhyātasadrśaṁ padam anyatra yujyate (VP, II. 35).

⁵⁰ Pratīvarṇam asarṇvedyaḥ padārthapratyayo yathā /
Padeṣv evam asarṇvedyaṁ vākyārthasya nirūpaṇam (Op. cit., II. 61).

⁵¹ Vākyārthas sannivīṣate padeṣu sahaṇvṛttiṣu /
Yathā tathai 'va varṇeṣu padārthas sahaṇvṛttiṣu (Op. cit., II. 62).

⁵² Sūkṣmaṁ grāhyaṁ yathā 'nyena saṁśṛṣṭaṁ saha gṛhyate /
Varṇo 'py anyena varṇena sambaddho vācakas tathā (Op. cit., II. 63).

a proposition.⁵³ The *padavādin* concludes that to deny that a term possesses the power of denotation is to disown our normal experience. As soon as we cognize a term there arises an idea in our mind and this idea with others conveyed by other terms is expressed by the proposition which is just the combination of these terms.⁵⁴

The *vākyavādin* makes a convincing reply to the argument advanced by the *padavādin* in support of the view that terms are really denotative of sense. It is maintained by the *vākyavādin* that a proposition and its import are both indivisible units which are made to appear in answer to the practical needs of empirical understanding to assume divisions in the shape of terms and imports of terms. Both the proposition and its import possess the power to bifurcate themselves, as it were, into terms and imports of terms respectively.⁵⁵ Thus it would not be fair to think that terms or their meanings carry any real value—they are nothing but so many fictions serving or explaining some purely practical utility. The ordinary man with his limited power of understanding fails to notice this subtle point and he is usually led to form an impression that this division into terms and their imports has an abiding value. Bhartṛhari unfolds the position of the grammarian and remarks that it is as silly to find in a proposition two different entities, viz, term and proposition, as it is futile to apportion two genera like the man and the lion in a man-lion or to detect the class-character of the cow in a gayal because of similarity. It is as impossible for two independent entities like term and proposition to coincide as it is for two different class-characters in one individual. There is similarity of a man-lion with a man and a lion or of a centaur with a man and a horse. But similarity does not presuppose the coincidence of two class-characters in parts. It is a different category altogether and is not a composite

⁵³Arthavanta eva varṇaḥ pratipatrā tu pāṭavavirahād ekaikaṁ na tathā gṛhyanta itī nā 'tra teṣāṁ aparādhaḥ (PR, p. 93).

⁵⁴Padasyo 'ccāraṇād artho yathā kaścin nirūpyate /
Varṇānām api sānnidhyāt tathā so 'rthaḥ pratiyate (VP, II. 64).

⁵⁵Avibhakte 'pi vākyārthe śaktibhedād apoddhṛte /
Vākyāntaravibhāgena yathoktaṁ na virudhyate (Op. cit., II. 90).

characteristic. Neither the concept of a man nor of a lion is present in the connotation of the man-lion. Likewise, what appear as terms as the constituents of a proposition are fictions which arise from similarity of form and have no reality worth the name.⁵⁶

The *padavādin* does not evidently understand the *vākyavādin* when he resumes the discussion by pointing out that it is common experience that when we do not know the particular meaning of a term in a proposition, we make an enquiry of the same so that the meaning of the proposition is fully ascertained. Thus it is argued that so long as the meaning of the term 'cuckoo' is not known to us we cannot comprehend the import of the proposition, 'Bring a cuckoo from the forest'. In the circumstances, it is argued by the *padavādin* that it is only natural to expect that each term is denotative of a particular import.⁵⁷ The *vākyavādin*, however, meets this argument by saying that the proposition, 'Bring a cuckoo from the forest', is a unit by itself and is not on that account divisible into parts. Hence, the import of this indivisible unit is also believed to be indivisible. If this is so, he refuses to admit that the meaning of a proposition is revealed part by part. It is, therefore, quite meaningless to say that the import of a proposition is not fully and clearly understood, unless all the terms constituting it have signified their respective imports. It is maintained by the *vākyavādin* that the two propositions, 'Bring a cuckoo from the forest' and 'Bring a creeper from the forest' have nothing in common between them. It is not correct to say that they differ in respect of only one term. The two are entirely different from each other with their respective individualities. It is to be noted, therefore, that the meaning of a proposition is either cognized in full or not cognized at all. The interrogation regarding the meaning of the term 'cuckoo' indicates that the meaning of the whole proposition is not understood and not of a part

⁵⁶Gavaye narasiṁhe vā 'py ekajñānāvṛte yathā /
Bhāgaṁ jātyantarasyai 'va sadṛśaṁ pratipadyate (VP, II. 92).

⁵⁷Vijñātārthaṁ padaṁ yac ca tadarthe pratipādite /
Pikādi yad avijñātaṁ tat kim ity anuyujyate (VP, II. 74); see also PR, p. 97

of it only. The constituents of the two propositions in question, viz, 'Bring a cuckoo from the forest' and 'Bring a creeper from the forest', are not the same but similar. It is similarity which is here misunderstood for identity.⁵⁸

The *padavādin*, however, does not yield ground and he points out certain other difficulties for his opponent. It has been sanctioned in the religious texts that in case the substance with which a sacrifice is enjoined to be performed is not available, a substitute for the same might be employed. Thus it is enjoined that a particular sacrifice should be performed with grains of paddy (*vr̥hi*). In the absence of grains of paddy, there is the sanction for grains of *nīvāra* (wild paddy) as the substitute. Now it is contended by the *padavādin* that his opponent who looks upon the proposition as an indivisible unit and understands the performance of a sacrifice with grains of paddy as an indivisible unit of sense, would hardly be justified in performing the same sacrifice with grains of wild paddy in case grains of paddy are not available in view of the fact that the performance of the sacrifice with grains of paddy is different from the performance of the sacrifice with grains of wild paddy, each yielding a different result. We know that the question of a substitute is restricted to the case of a substance (*dravya*) and is not extended to that of the performance (*kriyā*), and therefore a sacrifice with one kind of article as the offering cannot be treated as equivalent to another sacrifice with some other kind of substance as oblation. To sum up, the *padavādin* holds the view that the question of using a substitute becomes understandable only when the individual imports of terms are recognized.⁵⁹ The *padavādin* is not tired of offering further instances in which it becomes necessary to acknow-

⁵⁸Tathā pikādiyogena vākye 'tyantavilakṣaṇe /

Sadr̥śasye 'va saṃjñānam asato 'rthasya manyate (VP, II. 94).

Tathai 'va bhāge sādṛśyaṃ bhāge bhedo 'vasīyate /

Bhāgābhāve 'pi vākyānāṃ atyantam bhinnadharmanām (Op. cit., II. 96).

⁵⁹Yajete 'ti yadā dravyam prāptam sāmānyalakṣaṇam /

Vr̥hiśrutya nivarteta na syāt pratidinidhis tadā (Op. cit., II. 67).

Viśiṣṭai 'va kriyā yena vākyārthaḥ parikalpyate /

Dravyābhāve pratidinidhau tasya tat syāt kriyāntaram (Op. cit., II. 73).

ledge the status of terms as separate entities from the proposition.⁶⁰

Bhartr̥hari has studied carefully all the points raised by the *padavādin*, and the manner in which he has explained away the apparent difficulties may be summed up in the following way. It is a fact that the science of grammar discusses the classification of terms and unless the classification contains any value in itself, it is not intelligible why the grammarian takes so much pains to illustrate it. But it should be remembered that the treatment of terms is considered as means to an end. Those young learners who are not equipped with the requisite power of grasping the indivisibility of the proposition, are initiated into their study through the medium of the classification of terms. Thus, the study of terms ultimately leads the less intelligent to comprehend the nature of the proposition. It is, therefore, that the grammarian attaches a pragmatic value to terms as constituents of propositions. It is the proposition alone which is endowed with a reality of its own.⁶¹ As regards the Scriptural texts sanctioning the use of substitutes for the same result, they have no bearing on the grammatical problem. The Veda declares that the two sacrifices, though numerically and qualitatively different on account of the difference of the material, have the same and similar efficiency. As regards the specification of the terms, 'vr̥hi' and 'nīvāra', it only signifies that terms have a provisional meaning, a point which is also endorsed by the grammarian. But this pragmatic value of terms does not invest them with ultimate meaning. So the contention does not bear upon the issue in dispute.

⁶⁰Iti vākyeṣu ye dharmāḥ padārthopanibandhanāḥ /
Sarve te na prakalperan padaṁ cet syād avācakam (VP, II. 89).

⁶¹Yathai 'vā 'narthakair varṇair viśiṣṭārtho 'bhidhiyate /
Padair anarthakair evaṁ viśiṣṭārtho 'bhidhiyate //
Yad antarāle jñānaṁ tu padārtheṣū 'pajāyate /
Pratipatter upāyo 'sau prakramānavadhāraṇāt (Op. cit., II. 416-17).

CHAPTER SIX

WORD—WHAT IT IS

In the previous chapter we have discussed at length the various problems and issues regarding the nature of the Ultimate Reality and also the empiric and pragmatic phenomena in which the Ultimate Reality is found to be embedded as the formative principle. We have shown how word and consciousness are inextricable from each other and how the grammarian as philosopher has deduced from this datum the identity of both. We have shown that the grammarian is a sponsor of monism and spiritual monism at that. The whole super-structure erected by Bhartṛhari stands on the foundational postulate that word in its essence is an indivisible unit and the plurality of linguistic forms and the objective phenomena which are related as denoter and denoted has only a provisional pragmatic validity. It may seem that the conclusion that word and consciousness are identical is inspired by the exigencies of religious mysticism, and that the arguments employed to validate it have been conceived *a priori* and the linguistic forms and phenomena have been so twisted as to fit into the architectonic plan in order to bolster up a mystical doctrine conceived independently and *a priori*. It is imperative that the plausibility of this impression should be examined in all its bearings in order to convince ourselves of the logical validity or otherwise of the grammarian's metaphysical stand. This can be achieved by a critical scrutiny of the nature of word as it comes within our ken in ordinary experience. We, therefore, propose to address ourselves to this task in this chapter and our approach will be purely logical.

What is a word? This question has been posed and answered by Bhartṛhari. The question relates to significant words and not unmeaning sounds. But in each significant word as experienced by us there are two elements, the element of sound which is variable and the element of logos¹

¹I use the word 'logos' as equivalent of *śphoṭa*, taking into consideration its etymological meaning. The definition of *śphoṭa* will apply to it and so prevent its confusion with the

which possesses significance and meaning of its own.² The significance of sound is vicarious in so far as its objective reference is considered. Sound only reveals logos, the real word, and its genesis is inspired by the latter in order to make it the vehicle of its manifestation in the empirical plane. The logos is asserted to be ever-present in the mind and as such cannot be apprehended by another mind unless it is conveyed by appropriate sounds. These sounds are primarily concerned with the task of revealing the word, and once that is done the word reveals the meaning automatically. Owing to our uncritical habits of understanding we do not discriminate between word and sound and so believe that the sound signifies an objective fact. Bhartṛhari asserts that this is a superstition, pure and simple, however universal it may be. He has given us ample illustrations from ordinary experience as to how word occasions sound and sound reveals word. But these illustrations can at best serve to prove that the theory may not be implausible. Regarded as proofs they must be adjudged as possessing dubious logical value unless and until it can be shown that the existence of word as distinct from the sounds has to be admitted by reason of a compelling logical necessity. Fortunately this logical basis of the doctrine has been cogently demonstrated by Maṇḍana in his *Sphoṭasiddhi*. The refreshing features of Maṇḍana's exposition are, firstly, its purely logical approach and, secondly, its rigorous analysis of the implications of the alternative hypothesis propounded by Kumārila. Kumārila was the most formidable critic of the theory of *sphoṭa*, i.e., simple unanalyzable sentence or word (i.e., *śabda*). Later writers have only expounded Kumārila's arguments and no substantial addition has been made. We shall study the problem as posed at the outset in the light of Maṇḍana's analysis and criticism.

Patañjali puts this question in the beginning of his

logos of the Neo-Platonic and medieval schools of Europe in which it has been accorded a different status. The fact that logos stands for an idea as well as a word wonderfully approximates to the concept of *sphoṭa*. The reader is requested to bear this in mind and not to confound it with the logos of medieval philosophy.

²Dvāv upādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidō viduḥ /

Eko nimittarṇ śabdānām aparo 'rthe prayujyate (VP, I. 44).

Mahābhāṣya: What is a word? To a superficial observer the question seems a superfluity. Patañjali defines word as that which has a meaning. But Kumārila puts forward serious objections against this position. In the first place, the definition is too wide, because a logical ground, say smoke, signifies fire but is not regarded as a word. Secondly, the definition is inadequate and uncomprehensive. A word is that which is perceived by the auditory organ. Now, that which is perceived by the auditory organ is only a group of letters, and, as being so perceived, each one of these should be regarded as word though they do not signify any external fact. Moreover, that which is significant, viz, a whole word, e.g., 'cow', would not in terms of this definition be a word (i.e., significant of meaning) before its meaning is known and would again become a word after the meaning is known. So this conception of word must be abandoned. Now the relation of word and meaning is capable of being ascertained from usage. People understand by word only those elements which are grasped by the sense-organ of hearing. Thus letters as constituent factors of a significant expression are also regarded as words just like the significant expression of which they are members. There is no entity beyond and behind what is directly heard, and even if it were possible it would not be a word.³

Maṇḍana regards this objection of Kumārila as an instance of frivolous sophistry. The question has been definitely raised to spot out the word-element from a complex setting. Now when we utter the word 'cow', the idea that is generated by it is a complex in which the word that is audible is mixed up with its meaning which may be the objective substance, i.e., the animal, its qualities, its movement and the class-character. Now all these elements are not word except that which signifies and stands for an objective fact. It is the act of signification that singles out the word from its associates. It is not meant that a word ceases to be a word when it fails to

³Ataś śravaṇagrahaṇatai 'va śabdalaṅkāraṇaṁ nyāyyam. Varṇā eva ce 'daṁ śabdalaṅkāraṇaṁ anupatanti 'ty abhidheyadhīhetubhāvaṁ anupayanto 'pi lokaprasiddhes ta eva śabdāḥ; tadatiricyamānaśarīraṁ tv arthavastu samupetasattvābhidhātṛbhāvaṁ api na śabda iti vyapadeśam anupatitum arhati lokaprasiddhivirahāt (SS, p. 13).

communicate a meaning to an ignoramus. Whether the meaning is understood or not, the word is capable of having significance. And because the constituent letters do not have this capacity they are not regarded as words, not at any rate from the point of view of the grammarian. So the attack of Kumārila is inspired by a spirit of levity.⁴

It is contended that the significant word is not different from the letters and the designation of these letters by the singular number as one word is only symbolic as there is no single entity behind the letters so far as our experience goes. But this is in direct contravention of the plain verdict of experience as well as of the accredited usage in authoritative works, e.g., 'We understand the meaning from the word', 'The verb signifies an act', and the like. The unsophisticated person regards a noun or a verb as one word without reference to the plurality of letters and syllables which are rather the products of speculative thought. And as for the definition that a word is what is cognized by the auditory sense-organ, it is vitiated by serious defects. The auditory organ also apprehends qualitative differences of pitch and modulation and such universals as wordhood and the like. These attributes though known through the organ of hearing are not words. Moreover, word is not known only by the auditory organ but also by the mind. So the definition proposed by Kumārila is misleading and apt to create confusion. The verdict of unsophisticated commonsense that 'cow' is a whole word which yields the meaning, ought not to be brushed aside as an uncritical appraisal. The unity of the significant word is a felt fact and no amount of quibbling can conjure it away. It is contended that the unity is only an ideal construction of letters. But this contention is not supported by logic or psychology. The letters individually are not significant. Nor can a group of letters fare better, because no group is possible as the letters uttered cannot be held together, since the previous letter ceases when the succeeding letter is heard. So there can be no assemblage which is possible between enti-

⁴Upalakṣaṇatvāc cā 'rthapratyayasya saṁvidvaikalyād anupajanayann apy arthapratyayaṁ na śabdatām jahāti yathā vimuktakuṇḍalaḥ kaṭatām (SS, pp. 18-19).

ties which co-exist. Moreover, when different letters are uttered by different persons at the same time, there is co-existence but no meaning is understood from such letters. Again, if the order is reversed the meaning does not come out from the letters. So by the application of the Joint Method it transpires that it is not letters *per se* or their combination that are significant but something different from them.⁵

Kumārila has, however, contended that the objections are absolutely unavailing because he does not suppose the letters promiscuously uttered to be significant, but when they are arranged and adjusted in a particular order. This adjustment invests the letters with the peculiar efficiency for the conveyance of meaning. So it is unwarrantable that we should postulate a metempirical entity apart from the letters.⁶ But this defence does not throw light upon the real problem. How can there be an adjustment without a combination? The combination of letters is physically impossible, because the preceding letter does not persist when the succeeding letters are uttered. The fact that the cognition of the preceding letter precedes the cognition of the succeeding letter does not give any advantage, because the two cognitions do not synchronise. An antecedent cognition which has ceased to exist and a cognition which is not yet born are on the same footing. If a defunct letter or its cognition could be of help to its successors, even unuttered letters and unborn cognitions could also be of help. So the hypothesis of adjustment is only an eyewash.⁷

The difficulty was realized by Kumārila and so he has put forward another explanation. He asserts that even different acts though occurring at different times and thus not capable of temporal or spatial concurrence are found to produce

⁵Nanu ca varṇā evā 'bhidheyādhigamanimittam svābhidheyāvabodhāvadhilabdha-paricchedāḥ padaparikalpanābhājah. Nai 'tat sāram; pratyekam apratyāyakatvāt, sāhityābhāvāt, niyatakramavartinām ayaugapadyena sambhūyakāritvānupapattē, nānāvaktṛprayuktebhyas ca pratyayādarśanāt kramaviparyaye yaugapadye ca (SS, pp. 27-28).

⁶Yāvanto yādṛśā ye ca yadarthapratipādane /

Varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyās te tathai 'vā 'vabodhakāḥ (ŚV, p. 527).

⁷Nai 'tat sāram; na hi vṛttā varṇaviśeṣopalabdhir visarjanīyam bhettum arhati, asat-tvāt; na hy ajātānanvayapradhvastayor atīśayaḥ kaścit (SS, p. 33).

qualitatively and numerically different effects. For instance, the performance of the different acts in a sacrifice, the repeated articulation of a lesson, the different acts of movement are found to produce desirable results which the reversal of the order or the simultaneous performance by different persons do not generate. A distant goal is reached by a series of motions which occur successively. Learning by heart is effected by the different successive utterances. So temporal or spatial co-occurrence or co-presence of acts is not the necessary condition. This holds good in the case of letters.⁸

This defence has a show of plausibility. But the cases are not parallel. The fact that the different rites performed in succession give rise to one desirable result is due to the fact that each preceding act leaves behind an abiding result. It is through the medium of abiding religious merits that the different Vedic rites do co-operate with one another and produce the result. As regards the case of repeated exercise of recitals, each preceding recital leaves behind a lasting memory-impression and the memorizing of the lesson is the cumulative effect of these impressions which persist and exist together. The example of a series of motions in a journey towards the goal has no analogy with the utterance of the letters. Each movement constitutes an advance in the direction of the destination and so the arrival at the destination is the result of a series of movements. If we probe the situation closely, it will be found that the different acts of movement have produced different results in the shape of covering different areas of space, and so it is not a case of joint causality. But there is no such abiding link to be found among the different letters. So the examples cited are not at all apposite to the problem.⁹

But Kumārila contends that the letters apprehended in succession also leave behind abiding impressions which

⁸Nanu ca yathā darśapūrṇamāsādayaḥ kramavanto 'pi sarībhūyakāriṇaḥ, abhyā-sās ca svādhyāyagrahaṇādiṣu, gamanakṣaṇās ca 'bhimatadeśaprāptau; yathā ca tatra kaivalye yaugapadye ca kramaviparyaye kartṛbhede ca na phalotpādaḥ, kevalādibhyaś ca viśeṣāt phalotpādas tathā varṇeṣv api kiṃ ne 'ṣyate (SS, p. 36).

⁹Ekārthakārīno ye 'pi drśyante kramavartinaḥ /

Iṣṭaṃ vipaścitam tatra kāryam sthāyupakāraṇam (SS, 5).

together with the final letter may deliver the meaning, and so the charge of non-comprehension does not hold good. Let us scrutinize this argument and see whether it succeeds in abolishing the necessity of postulating one word-entity. It cannot be denied that the different acts of the apprehension of letters do produce memory-impressions, but this does not explain how the meaning is delivered. It is the nature of memory-impression that it produces the recollection of the very object which was the object of the cognition that produced it. The perception of the cow is found to produce the recollection of the cow in and through a memory-impression. It is never the case that one thing is cognized and another thing is recollected by means of the impression left by the former. So the memory-impression of the letters can produce the recollection of the letters and not the meaning.¹⁰

The justice of this argument is not denied by the opponent. He admits that as a rule memory-impression does not lead to the cognition of a different thing. But if it is reinforced by other factors, it gives rise to a cognition with a different content. The position is this. None of the letters can deliver the meaning nor can they combine for the purpose. But the meaning is understood and there must be a cause. The advocate of *sphoṭa* posits an abiding and metempirical entity to explain the fact. This involves a two-fold assumption : (i) of the indivisible word and (ii) of its capacity for the delivery of the meaning. The Mīmāṃsist's contention that the memory-impression left by the different letters do perform this function is free from the assumption of a debatable principle. What the Mīmāṃsist assumes is that it also can yield a new cognition other than recollection of a precognized fact. The advantage of the Mīmāṃsist theory is that it does not postulate any unknown entity and also its unknown capacity. On the other hand, it posits an unwonted capacity of a known fact, viz, impression.¹¹

¹⁰Saṃskārāḥ khalu yadvasturūpaprakhyāprabhāvitāḥ /
Vijñānaśhetavas tatra tato 'rthe dhīr na kalpate (SS, cit., 6).
Also : GP, thereunder.

¹¹Tan na śabdaḥ, anekakalpanādoṣāt; tasya khalv ātmā, arthādhigamanimittabhāvaś ce 'ti dvayam upakalpayitavyam. Saṃskāraṃ tu vāsanādvitīyanāmānaṃ paṭutarasamīve-

This, however, seems like oversimplification. Memory-impression is rather a quality or capacity of the subject. It is assumed by the Mīmāṃsist that this capacity acquires another additional capacity. We cannot explain to ourselves from what special circumstances this additional capacity is derived. The adjustment of letters has been found to be an unfounded hypothesis. And so this cannot be held responsible for this additional capacity. Again, the attribution of a capacity to another capacity is like the ascription of a quality to another quality. If there be no bar to such assumptions, the number of capacities may be infinitely multiplied, each capacity being capable of other capacities.¹² Apart from the unorthodox character of the hypothesis, it is not supported by the exigencies of the situation. The impressions left by the letters are all the same even when the order is reversed. The letters and their impressions are the same irrespective of the order. It passes one's understanding how the effect produced by the same or similar causes can come to have different capacities.¹³ The cause of the impression is the letter. The letters by themselves are the self-same entities and so their impressions cannot have additional efficacy. Their adjustment has been found not to confer any additional efficacy upon the letters and so their effects cannot also be supposed to derive any additional efficacy.

The realization of these logical difficulties has led the opponent to amend his theory. Now he asserts that though the impressions may not give rise to the cognition of the meaning, they can by virtue of their cohesion generate one cognition having all the letters as its content.¹⁴ It is this cognition or the letters as its contents which directly yield the meaning. So there is no necessity for postulating an indivisible word. The felt unity is explained by the collective memory. Now it may

danasamanubhūtavastugocaraṃ sarva eva saṃgirante smaraṇaphalaprasavonniyamān-
ātmānaṃ pravādinaḥ... (SS, p. 47).

¹²Na ca sāmāthyānāṃ sāmāthyāntarayogaḥ, anavasthāpātāt (Op. cit., p. 54).

¹³Na khalu kramabhede 'pi pratyekam akṣaropalambhaprabhāvitās saṃskārāḥ
parasparam atīśerate (Op. cit., p. 56).

¹⁴Api tu tābhyas sthāyitvena pratilabdhyaugapadyābhyah pratyavamṛṣṭasakala-
varṇarūpātmā ekaḥ pratyaya udeti (Op. cit., pp. 58-9).

be supposed that the cognition of the word is rather a complex of recollections of previous letters and perception of the final letter. Alternatively it has been posited that the entire cognition is a homogeneous memory-act which has for its content all the different letters. It is one cognition in which all the letters are held together simultaneously.¹⁵ It is no objection that successive cognitions cannot give rise to a simultaneous recollection. The cognition of a plural number, say, twenty or a hundred, is a collective recollection of a number of facts successively cognized. It is this cognition or the letters present as *tout ensemble* in it that yields the knowledge of the meaning. So the affiliation of the meaning to word as asserted in such propositions as 'We apprehend the meaning from the word', is not unjustifiable.

This defence, too, does not succeed in explaining the felt unity of the word. It may be conceded that successive cognitions can give rise to one recollection of a *tout ensemble*. But this *tout ensemble* may be effected even when the letters are pronounced in varying orders. It is immaterial so far as the *tout ensemble* is concerned whether the letters are pronounced in one order or another. The cumulative recollection takes note of the letters in one sweep and there is no sequence in the act of recollection which is a self-identical cognition.¹⁶ If we are to believe in the theory of the Mīmāṃsist, the letters are eternal and ubiquitous and so there can be no temporal or spatial gap between one letter and another.¹⁷ The felt gap is due to the difference of the successive cognitions. What is recollected is the letters and not their cognitions. So the sequence of the previous cognitions cannot give rise to the appearance of sequential difference of the letters. The collective recollection of the *tout ensemble* is a single act, and as all the letters are recollected together there can be no difference due

¹⁵Sa cai 'śa pratyayas smaraṇapratyakṣarūpābhyām ubhayātmā sadasadvarṇarūpā-vabhāsy antyavarṇagocara iṣyate kaiścit. Anyais tu sakalavarṇopalabdhinibandhananikhilabhāvanābijajanmā yugapad akhilavarṇarūpaparāmarśi caramavarṇapratyakṣopala-bdhisamanantaras smaraṇaika-rūpas saṅgīryate (SS, pp. 60-61)

¹⁶Ekopalabdhau tu yaugapadyān nā 'nupūrviko viśeṣaḥ (Op. cit., 66).

¹⁷Svato varṇā nityatayā vibhutayā ca na deśanibandhanam nā 'pi kālanibandhanam parāparabhāvam anupatanti (Op. cit., 66-67).

to sequence in the cognition. What is necessary is the presence of all the letters as the total content of one recollection. Now this can be secured even when the letters are pronounced in a different order. So this attempt to explain away the unity of the felt word does not carry conviction in spite of its ingenuity.

Nor can the unity be accounted for by a reference to the common universal inherent in the different letters and syllables. The word-universal is a colourless concept and, being indifferent to the difference of the sound-individuals, is not capable of yielding any meaning. Being common to all words it cannot have an uncommon meaning, whereas the different words have different meanings. Nor can the different individual word-units, say letters, be supposed to shed their individualities and thus come to be conceived as identified with the universal. For the felt unity of the word is expressed through a plurality of letters, the differences of which are too patent to be ignored or explained away. Nor can the word be identified with the constituent letters because in that case there would only remain a plurality and not a unity. The meaning of a common name is always a universal plus the individuals synthesized by it by an extension of denotation. So there is no collective sense either in respect of the meaning or in respect of the nature of the expression. The word 'cow', for instance, taken by itself does not appear as a collection of letters. Were it so, it should have the plural number. The unity of the word can neither be explained by reference to the final letter since there is knowledge of the previous letters also. Therefore, the peculiar grammatical form in which such class-names as cow, horse, etc. are expressed, i.e., the singular number of the expression, cannot be explained by reference to the individual letters or their universal or the final letter or all the letters as constitutive of a group. All these words are felt as single self-identical entities without the slightest reference to their group character.¹⁸

¹⁸SS, pp. 73-85

Let us suppose that the final letter together with the impressions left by the preceding letters is the word and let this word deliver the meaning. As regards the charge that the impressions would produce recollection of the letters which have generated them, it is easily met by the consideration that the impression in question is not a memory-impression. It is a different entity endowed with a different capacity like the unseen result left behind by the different operations of a religious act, e.g., sacrifice. These different acts perish as soon as they are performed and the result, viz, residence in heaven, etc, does not materialize immediately after the performance. The Scripture declares that the performance of a sacrifice produces these results. This anomaly in the causal relation can be accounted for by the postulation of an abiding after-effect which persists till the materialization of the effect in another life after death. The after-effect which is left by the different letters upon the subject is analogous to such religious leaven. It is the determinate order of performance by a determinate agent as enjoined in the Scripture which is responsible for the spiritual leaven. In the present case, also, the determinate order of the letters pronounced by a determinate person is responsible for the unusual result which is entirely different from memory-impression. So the final letter leavened by the impression of the previous letters gives out the meaning.¹⁹

It has been urged that the postulation of an unseen intellectual leaven and that of an entire word-entity unaffected by the plurality of the letters pronounced are equally guilty of assumption of an unperceived fact. The postulation of an undivided word, on the other hand, has the advantage of squaring with our spontaneous intuition. But this contention is not at all fair. Well, the advocate of undivided word-entity has to admit that it is manifested by the different letters or sounds pronounced in a determinate order. As none such letter can reveal the word, it is admitted to be revealed by the letters combined with one another. It is out of the ques-

¹⁹Astu tarhi "pūrvavarṇajanitasamśkārasahito 'ntyo varṇo vācakaḥ" ity eva; mā bhūd eṣa jñānaprasavas smaraṇanimittam samśkāraḥ (SS, p. 86).

tion that each letter in succession reveals a part of the word, because the word *ex hypothesi* is a simple unanalyzable whole.²⁰ Nor can these evanescent letters be supposed to form a group, as they are pronounced in succession and cannot be perceived together. So the charge of assumption of an unusual function is equally shared by both the theories.²¹ In order to avoid this contradiction the advocate of the word-entity also will have to posit the unseen and unverifiable impression left by the individual letters.²² The opponent also posits this fact and makes it immediately responsible for the delivery of the meaning. The advocate of logos is guilty of assumption of two metempirical facts, viz, the impression as leaven and the undivided logos. Not only this. He is bound to postulate, firstly, that there is a simple word (logos); secondly, that it is different from the felt plurality of the letters; and thirdly, that the letters are not experienced as constituent elements of the word or that such experience is erroneous.²³

This is the most formidable attack on the theory of simple word; its plausibility is so obvious that no escape seems possible. But the cogency of the dialectic employed by the opponent rests on the assumption that the unseen impressions in both the cases are identical in nature and function. The unseen impression left behind by the perceived letters or sounds is nothing but the memory-impression which is admitted by all schools of thinkers as an inescapable logical necessity; otherwise, there would be no point in talking of memory. The opponent, on the other hand, posits the impression to be analogous to religious merit and makes it capable of delivering the meaning. It is an unprecedented assumption and there is not the slightest justification for it. The postulation of religious merit is necessitated by a *reductio ad absurdum*.

²⁰Yasyā 'py anavayavaś śabdātmā 'rthapratītinimittam dhvanito varṇato vā pratilabdhabhivyaktyanugrahaḥ prakāśate, tasyā 'pi nā 'napekṣitetaretarā varṇā dhvanayo vā tam avadyotayanti; tasyā 'rthasyc 'vā 'prakāśanāt; avayavaśas tv avadyotanam anāśaṅkanīyam eva... (SS, pp. 91-2).

²¹...tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ (Op. cit., p. 93).

²²Tad anenā 'pi viśiṣṭas saṁskāro 'vaśyābhyupeyas sphoṭābhivyaktisiddhaye;... (Loc. cit.).

²³Sadbhāvavyatirekau ca tathā 'vayavavarjanam /

Tavā 'dhikam bhavet tasmād yatno 'sāv arthabuddhiṣu (ŚV, p. 534).

The validity of the moral law and also of religious practices can be maintained only by this postulation. There is no such necessity in the case of the apprehension of the word and its meaning. The plurality of the letters is not denied by the advocate of logos (*sphoṭa*). They are essential conditions for the revelation of the word. It is only the simple word that has to be postulated. It will be shown later on that the simple word is not at all a postulate but a perceived fact. The opponent's avowed concern for assumption of unperceivable facts is only a make-believe. The opponent admits that the determinate order of letters is effected by as many impressions as the letters; the determinate identity of the speaker has an unseen efficacy; the sequence and the consequential combination and the rule that the number must be neither less nor more—all these different factors, though not perceived, are supposed to exercise an unperceivable influence. All this is rather illustrative of the truth that one absurdity requires an enormous number of absurdities to justify itself. The simple intuition of the common man—"I understand the meaning from the word"—and the unambiguous assertion of the authorities—"Word, its meaning and their relation are established facts for the existence of which no person can be held responsible"—are simply dismissed with scant courtesy. What is worse, the patronizing support accorded to these unsophisticated deliverances only makes the confusion worse confounded. The so-called impression which is supposed to deliver the meaning is not a word; the final letter has no meaning; the group, if possible, is not a word nor has it the capacity to convey a sense, as we have shown that the difference of order of the letters or the simultaneous utterance of the letters by different persons do not make any difference to the numerical identity of the letters.²⁴

The contention that the impression left by the letters is different from the ordinary memory-impression and analogous to religious merit, has been found to be bereft of all justification. The assumption again that each succeeding

²⁴SS, pp. 94-100.

impression left by each letter gains an additional efficacy, will transpire to be equally unjustifiable. We do not see any reason why the same or similar letter should give rise to different kinds of impressions. Different effects are produced only if the causes are different in nature or made different by attendant circumstances. Letters are recognized to be identical even in different permutations and combinations. So far as the Mīmāṃsist is concerned, the identity of letters, in spite of their occurrence in different orders, is an established conclusion. As for the Buddhist and the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school who assert that letters are nothing but sounds and perish immediately after their emergence and that, as such, each letter must be different from others, similar or dissimilar, the different efficacy cannot be asserted even in their view. The difference of the letters as maintained by these philosophers is only an ontological difference which is not empirically felt. In the matter of apprehension of meaning, the words or their constituent letters are found to be capable of yielding a meaning only when they are cognized as such. A word is only a *causa cognoscendi* and not a *causa essendi*.²⁵ So far as the Mīmāṃsist is concerned, the essential difference of letters is simply *non est*.

Nor can this additional efficacy be supposed to accrue from the association of one letter with other letters. It has been shown that there can be no association so far as the letters are concerned, simply because they are evanescent in character and as such cannot coalesce with the others. If it be supposed that the association is effected by means of the impressions left by the accompanying letters preceding it, this will not avail for the initial letter since it cannot derive any assistance from the previous letters as there are none. So the postulation of an additional efficacy has no warrant.²⁶

The final letter cannot by itself yield any meaning, nor

²⁵Yady api ca pūrvopahitātmanas saṃskārasya sthemnā tatsannidhir uttaram atīṣāyayet; prācīnasya tu nā 'parasamavadhānanibandhanah, nā 'py ātmanā bheda iti katham iva so 'rthapratyayānugūṇaṃ saṃskāraṃ ādadhīta (SS, pp. 102-3).

²⁶Ye 'pi svarūpabhedam eva varṇānāṃ pratipadam āsthiṣṭāta, teṣāṃ asau sann api no 'pakāraḥ, prajñānaparāmarśavikalasya bhedasya jñāpanāyogāt; na hi sattāmātreṇa śrutayo 'rthapratyāyanāṅgatām upayānti (Op. cit., pp. 103-4); also GP, thereunder.

even if it be supposed to be reinforced by the impressions of the preceding letters. The relation between the word and the meaning is understood as between two perceived facts. But the impressions are *ex hypothesi* unperceivable entities, and so the relation cannot be apprehended between the meaning and such impressions or even the last letter aided by such impressions. The theory of simple word, however, is immune from these difficulties. It cannot be contended that the existence of simple word is a matter of dispute and, that, as such, it must be unperceived, and so the difficulty of apprehending a relation between the meaning and the unperceived word remains as it is in the previous theories. But there is no possibility of such a problem simply because a simple word is a perceived fact.²⁷ Why, then, do you take the trouble of advancing abstruse arguments to establish its existence? No argument is necessary for the proof of a perceived fact; nobody infers the presence of an elephant from its footprints when the elephant is actually observed. True, inference ought not to be necessary to prove the existence of a simple word. But it has to be resorted to with a view to combating the erroneous impression of those who are victims of the sophistical arguments of the philosophers who refuse to acknowledge the truth in deference to their preconceived notions. The argument is employed as a corrective for those persons who are deluded but are open to correction.²⁸

We have seen that the preceding letters become defunct, so far as the awareness of them is concerned, when the final letter is perceived, and as such they cannot qualify and make it different. The mere physical presence of letters, believed to be eternal and ubiquitous by the Mīmāṃsist, has no influence upon the apprehension of word and meaning, because all the letters of the alphabet are unavoidably present everywhere. The difficulty inherent in the theory of the combination of letters is too patent to be ignored, and it must be affirmed that it did not fail to strike Kumārila also. For this reason he has

²⁷...tasyai 'ndriyakatvād ity upapādayiṣyate (SS, p. 109).

²⁸Yañ khalu kutaścid bhraṇanibandhanāt sarvavedanam apy avajānīte, tañ praty anumānam sākṣīsthānīyam upanyasyate (Op. cit., pp. 109-10).

advanced an alternative theory which seems to be immune from the charges. It is asserted that all the different letters pronounced successively give rise to an identical cognition like that of a plural number or series. But this view is open to another serious objection. The cognition, being identical, cannot have any sequence in itself nor can the different letters, present as a *tout ensemble*, have any sequential difference. And it has been affirmed by Kumārila that letters have significance only when they are felt in sequence.²⁹

Furthermore, the following consideration should clinch the argument against the advocacy of pluralistic words. It is common experience that there is no realization of the meaning unless the speaker of the word is known to be numerically identical. The numerical identity of the speaker is to be admitted as the essential condition of the knowledge of the meaning. Kumārila has observed: "The different letters are conducive to the communication of the meaning only when they are combined and uttered by a self-identical person. The sequence is a necessary corollary of the numerical identity of the speaker, since one speaker cannot utter all the letters at one time. The synchronism of the letters is not insisted upon as a condition because this is impossible for one speaker, and the synchronism is only possible if there are as many speakers as the letters. But if the number of speakers be different, the letters would not yield any sense".³⁰

Now if the identity of the speaker be a condition of the communication of the meaning, it must be known as such like the other conditions. But it is observed that the meaning is understood even when the speaker is screened by a barrier or remains invisible to the auditor. And now-a-days radio broadcasts afford an unmistakable proof of this conten-

²⁹Sakalopalambhaprabhāvitabhāvanābijajanmani caramē pratyaye syāt sahabhāvād viśeṣakatvam; tatra tu kramādibhedapratyastamayād astamitakramādibhedānām ca sāmāthyākhyāpanāt...(SS, p. 113).

³⁰Teṣāṃ tu guṇabhūtānām arthapratyāyanam prati /
Sāhityam ekakarādikramasā ca 'pi vivakṣitaḥ //
Kartṛaikatve nimitte ca krame sati niyāmakam /
Prayujjānasya yat pūrvam vṛddhebhyaḥ kramadarśanam //
Yaugapadyam tv aśakyatvān nai 'va teṣāṃ ihā 'śritam /
Kartṛbhedaś ca tatra syān na cai 'vam dṛśyate 'bhidhā (ŚV, p. 528).

tion. It is no convincing argument that the homogeneity of the tone and articulation of the letters gives the impression of the identity of the speaker. In the broadcast of a football match, where several persons are heard to shout and the different syllables and words are heard in unbroken succession and the tone and articulation are not felt to be different, there is apprehension of the meaning from the words. It is impossible in the situation to grasp the identity of the speakers. It is not necessarily the case that only indistinct sounds are heard; even broken sentences and words are distinctly apprehended by attentive auditors.³¹

Moreover, in such a situation a person has often to interpret the meaning of a sentence to an enquirer who fails to apprehend it in full. A child, for instance, may request an elderly person to explain to him the meaning of a radio talk. The interpreter repeats the words and gives out the meaning without the slightest reference to the identity of the speaker. The child also understands the meaning of the words without the slightest inkling of the personal identity of the speaker whose words are quoted and explained to him. In such a situation the question of personal identity is simply ignored or slurred over, as there is no means available for the knowledge thereof.³²

The knowledge of the personal identity of the speaker is thus found not to be the indispensable condition of the understanding of the meaning of a verbal proposition. But it is also true that the understanding of the meaning is impeded if the words are known to be uttered by different persons. The different impressions produced by the letters and syllables are, however, the same though they are uttered by different persons. Kumārila thinks that these impressions

³¹Āṅgatte tu jñāpakānupraveśān nā 'navadhāritārthapratīṣiddhau hetuḥ. Dṛśyate ca vyavahitārohitodiritebhyo varṇebhyo 'rthajñānaṁ; na ca vyavahitārohitayor akasmād ekatvajñānaṁ vaktros sambhavati; sambhavati hi svarasādṛśyo nirantaroccarāṇe vaktṛbhede 'pi kalakalaśabdaśrutau cā 'rthajñānaṁ; kas tatra vaktur ekatvanānātve vivektaṁ kṣamaḥ? Na ca dhvanimātraśravaṇaṁ tatra, varṇapadavākya-paricchedānām api keśāñcid buddhāv upārohād iti (SS, pp. 117-9).

³²Sambandhajñānasamaye jñāyate na niyogataḥ /

Tirohitavyavahitaprayuktau vaktur ekatā (Op. cit., 16).

contribute to the communication of the meaning. But they fail to yield a meaning where the speakers are different. Of course, Kumāṛila has made the identity of the speaker one of the conditions. But we have seen that this is not necessarily and universally the antecedent condition of the apprehension of the meaning. It is true that the numerical difference of speakers acts as an impediment to the apprehension of meaning, but that does not warrant the assumption of the knowledge of personal identity as its condition. What is necessary is the realization of the identity of the words or the sentence and not of the speaker. The difference of speakers operates as a bar only because it fails to convey the identity of the words. The identity of the words is thus a pointer to the existence of simple word-units : which is the position of the advocate of *sphoṭa*.³³

Let us next pass on to consider the problem how word (i.e., *sphoṭa*) is comprehended. Word, as it has been said before, is an indivisible unit. Now it is contended that the oneness pertaining to word cannot be satisfactorily explained in the event of the assumption that sound reveals word. To be explicit, it is held that separate efforts are required to produce different sounds and as the different sounds are produced in succession and not simultaneously, the comprehension of unity pertaining to word is not sufficiently intelligible. The advocate of *sphoṭa* discusses this point with reference to a concrete example. Thus in the case of the time-honoured illustration of simple word (or, to be precise, whole word), viz, *gauḥ*, each one of the three sounds, 'g', 'au' and 'h', reveals the same word, and it will be wrong to suppose that the word which finds its expression through the medium of the three sounds, different in nature from one another, is different on each occasion. The grammarian asserts that it is one and the same *sphoṭa* which is manifested by each one of the three successive sounds. He elucidates his point with apt illustrations. Each time a particular section of the Veda (*anuvāka*) or a particular verse is read, we do not seem to have

³³Anaṅge vaktur ekatve vaktṛbhede nirudbhavā /
Saṁskārādāv abhinne 'pi dhīr hetvantarasūcanī (SS, 17).

the experience that we are reading a new *anuvāka* or a new verse quite different from what we have read before; rather, with each reading the notion of distinction disappears yielding place to that of identity. Likewise, in the present case, each sound serves to illumine one and the same word, and accordingly the apprehension that the idea of the unity cannot be obtained is absolutely without any foundation.³⁴

It is true, one might say, that the real word-essence is an indivisible unit, and it is manifested by the sounds. Each sound, be it a letter or a syllable, serves to manifest this reality. It is not maintained that each sound reveals a part, because the word-essence is devoid of parts. So if it is to be manifested, it must be manifested as a whole or not at all. But if the previous sound manifests it as a whole, the succeeding sounds will be otiose appendages. The advocate of simple word answers that neither of these contingencies arises. It is admitted that each sound reveals the whole word. But there is a qualitative difference in each act of revelation. The primal revelation is indistinct and each succeeding revelation serves to make its apprehension more and more distinct. The reason for this additional efficacy of the succeeding sounds lies in the fact that each of the previous sounds leaves behind an impression on the mind, and reinforced by these impressions the mind acquires progressively greater and greater aptitude for receiving further glimpses. The process comes to an end when the last sound is uttered, which enables the mind, which has acquired the requisite sensitiveness imparted by the previous impressions left by the antecedent sounds, to comprehend the word-essence in its undimmed glory. It should be observed in this connexion that though the word-essence does not possess a qualitative or quantitative difference, the qualitative difference of the revelations as received by the mind does not involve any logical incongruity. The word-essence, which is perfect and complete and does not admit of qualitative or quantitative excess or diminution, is no doubt presented to the mind even by the first sound. But the mind,

³⁴Pratyayair anupākhyeyair grahaṇānugūṇais tathā /
Dhvaniprakāśite śabde svarūpam avadhāryate (VP, I. 85).

which is the subject's organ for intuition of word-essence, is so constituted that it requires successive rubbings and polishings in order to be able to receive the full glimpse of *sphoṭa*. Thus, if this slow and tardy process of successive cognitions each yielding light, be thought to entail a qualitative and quantitative distinction, that must be set down entirely to the account of the mental apparatus. In one word, the degrees of difference are purely subjective due to the inherent constitution of the human intellect, and they do not give warrant for postulating such differences or distinctions in the objective nature and essence of word-essence.³⁵

We have seen how Kumārila has tried to make out that the conditions of the revelation of word-essence do serve as the conditions of the communication of meaning. But this attempt has been found to be fruitless unless and until the memory-impression be supposed to function as a mysterious factor like the spiritual merit generated by religious acts. So the so-called equalization of the conditions is based upon an assumption for which there is no logical warrant. The assumption of unwonted capacity or function of memory-impression for the realization of an uncognized fact which is delivered by a word as its meaning, could be obligatory and cogent if an easier and more natural explanation of the situation conformable to the unsophisticated delivery of commonsense were not possible. Kumārila, therefore, seeks to reinforce his contention by attempts to show that the theory of simple word-essence is not supported by psychological evidence and logical necessity.

Kumārila assails the assertion that word-essence is understood in the initial stage in an indistinct manner and is envisaged as a fully developed entity at the end. What is apprehended is the letters which are entirely different from the simple word-whole. It is not felt that a full word as a unity is apprehended either distinctly or indistinctly. Secondly, it is not at all intelligible how a simple word-entity should veil its identity and masquerade as letters. To admit

³⁵SS, pp. 129-33.

the possibility of one thing being presented and another apprehended will lead to scepticism, as there will be no guarantee for the validity of cognitions as evidence of reality. It is undeniable that a word, even if its possibility be conceded, is cognized as letters and not as an indivisible partless entity. The memory-impression that is left by the perception of letters can revive the cognition of those very letters, and it is perfectly unintelligible how these memory-impressions of letters should guarantee the cognition of a simple word with which they had no concern. So the charge of unwarranted assumption of a new power can be applied against the advocate of simple word with equal force.³⁶

It may be contended that the cognition of the word-essence as letters is a case of veritable illusion. But this is no better than an argument of despair. It is not denied that error as misperception is possible. But there is no reason for dubbing this cognition of letters in succession as an illusion. Error is always conditioned by some defect. What should then be the condition of error in the present situation? It is not the sounds, which are regarded as the condition of the perception of word. Certainly an accredited condition of the perception of an entity cannot be the condition of its misperception. If it were the condition of its misperception, it would never be the condition of its veridical perception. The consequence would be that sounds would not, as assumed by the grammarian, reveal a word, and in the absence of other conditions it would remain unrevealed for ever.³⁷

Again, even if the sounds be the cause of the illusion, there is no reason that the illusion should necessarily envisage the same contents with unvarying uniformity. It is not a fact that a piece of rope invariably gives rise to the illusion of he

³⁶Nanu śabdāntarāṇy eva varṇāḥ prāk prakāśante, na padarūpam avyaktam vyaktam vā. Na ca tad eva tirohitātmarūpaṁ śabdāntarātmanā prakāśata iti sāmpratam; katham anyaprakāśe 'nyaḥ prakāśeta, atiprasaṅgāt. Anyākāraprakāśopahitaṁ ca bhāvanābījaṁ katham anyākāraprakāśaprādurbhāvanimittaṁ syāt (SS, pp. 134-5).

³⁷Viparyāsaprakāśanam ca nimittāpekṣam; na ca tad ihā 'sti. Na nādāḥ, teṣāṁ tattva-paricchedahetutvāt; na hi yad evā 'syo 'palabdhinimittaṁ tad eva viparyāsanimittaṁ bhavitum arhati; viparyāsanimittatve vā na tatas tadrūpopalabdhir ity anabhivyakti-prasaṅgaḥ (Op. cit., pp. 135-6).

snake. Nor is it a fact that all persons have the same illusion regarding a particular datum. Thus it is found that somebody mistakes the piece of rope for a snake and somebody mistakes it for a line of water. Nor again is it a fact that the emergence of illusion occurs in an irreversible determinate order. Thus we may misperceive a piece of rope as a snake in the first instance and subsequently as a line of water, or vice versa. These are the well-known features of illusion³⁸.

Let us see whether these features are present in the illusory perception of letters. The apprehension of letters is universal. And if it be held to be an illusion, the identity of the contents apprehended by all persons and the necessity of uniformity and the irreversibility of the order, as maintained by the advocate of *sphoṭa*, are facts which go against the hypothesis. Certainly an illusion cannot claim these characteristics as a matter of unalterable necessity—characteristics which are, on the contrary, the distinctive criterion of valid cognition.

The charges of Kumārila are really formidable but not irrefutable. Of course, it is the position of the philosophers of the school who believe in indivisible word-entity that its appearance as letters is an illusion. It has been contended by Kumārila that letters or sounds are admittedly the medium through which the simple word is apprehended and as such they cannot be the conditions of illusion. Besides, it is unthinkable that one thing is presented and another thing is apprehended. If simple word-entity be a fact and also an object of cognition, it is inexplicable how it should appear as a plurality of letters. But this contention is based upon imperfect knowledge of the cases of illusion. It is a commonplace that a cluster of trees observed from a distance is apprehended as an elephant or the like. It is again found that a man who enters a dark room from outside, where there is much light, mistakes a piece of rope for a snake. In all these cases the misperception is due to the fact that the actual data are not perceived in the full perspective. It cannot be maintained that the data are not presented or remain unperceived because the sense is in

³⁸Iha tu niyatabhāvi niyatakramo niyatarūpaś ca viparyāsa iti kim atra kāraṇam (SS, p. 138).

contact with them. If the sense were out of contact, the data would not be the condition of the misperception. So the first contention that the possibility of one thing being presented and another apprehended in lieu of it is unwarranted, is found on examination to be inspired by an *a priori* prejudice.³⁹

The second charge that the memory-impression of letters cannot be instrumental to the realization of a simple word with which it has no concern, remains to be answered. We shall show that the simple word-entity is envisaged all throughout even when it appears in the initial stage as a plurality of letters. This can be brought home by a study of the cases of illusion cited before. Now the man who mistakes in the first instance a cluster of trees for an elephant comes to cognize them as a cluster of trees on closer and more careful observation at subsequent moments of time. It is apparent that each succeeding observation in the series contributes to the clarified observation of the real data. This is possible only because the succeeding observations are strengthened and reinforced by the impressions left by the preceding ones. This is exactly the case with the cognition of word-entities.⁴⁰

It cannot be urged that the impressions of preceding cognitions have no bearing upon the eventual perception. Were it so, the first observation would give us the full glimpse of the thing.⁴¹ Nor can it be urged that the non-emergence of a distinct perception is due to the distance of the object, since the same person standing on the same spot comes to acquire the full perception of the object after a number of attentive observations.⁴² Nor can the failure to perceive properly in the first instance be attributed to a defect in the sense-organ, because the person concerned has normal vision

³⁹Na ca teṣāṃ na prathanam iti sāmpratam, indriyasya tatsannikarṣāt; na hy anyasan-nikarṣo 'nyajñānāhetuḥ; asannikarṣajātve vā tadapekṣā na syāt (SS, p. 140).

⁴⁰Tasmāt pūrvadarśanāny eva yathottarotkarṣeṇa saṃskāram ādadhati vyakta-vṛkṣādipratipattinimittam bhavanti (Loc. cit.).

⁴¹Anyathā prathamadarśane 'pi syāt (Op. cit., p. 141).

⁴²Taddeśavasthitānām eva ca prañidhānābhyāsakrameṇa bhāvān na dūratvād alab-dhajanmā sāmīpyād udeti 'ti yuktam (Op. cit., 141-2).

and correct perception of other things.⁴³ It must, therefore, be conceded that the progressive clarification of the data in the series of cognitions eventuating in the ultimate correct apprehension is due to contributions made by the preceding cognitions. We do not care to dispute the contention of Prabhākara that the correct perception of the presented datum is present from the very beginning and the cognition of the unrepresented datum is a case of recollection occasioned by resemblance.⁴⁴ Be that as it may, the cognition of division and plurality is possible even though the datum is a simple unity. It is also a fact that the cognition of division and plurality serves to obscure the real datum, viz, the unity. Whether it be a positive error or negative non-distinction, there is no inherent impossibility that the simple word-entity should be felt as a plurality of letters.

The third charge of Kumārila is that the illusion is occasioned by an external condition and the accredited condition of the cognition of a thing cannot be the condition of its misperception. This charge is also based upon inadequate study of the matter. It is true that sounds are the conditions of the revelation of the word-entity and these sounds are generated by definite efforts involved in the exercise of the vocal organs. But different words are found to be revealed by sets of sounds which though different do sometimes overlap and appear to be similar. It is for this reason that one intended word is mistaken for another. For example, 'horseman' is a different word with a meaning different from that of 'horse' or 'man'. But the similarity of sounds may induce one to regard the component parts as different words. It is the realization of syntactical incongruity that leads one to correct the mistake. So there is no substance in the contention that what is the condition of valid cognition cannot be the condition of error. Besides, wrong cognition is also a kind of cognition. It is natural that the usual conditions

⁴³Prakṛtiśhendriyā api bahir vastvāntaradarśanād anyathā pratipadya yathāvad upalabhante (SS, p. 142).

⁴⁴Svarūpamātrakhyātau indriyādhīnāyām vṛkṣādiṣu sādṛśyanimittān mānaśaṁ smaraṇam iti cet śābdāntareṣv api bhāgābhimateṣu tathā 'stu (Loc. cit.).

of cognition should be at work in both the cases, though there may be an additional factor to account for the aberration regarding the present data. It is never the fact that illusion is produced by the negation of the usual conditions. Thus, when a distant tree is mistaken for an elephant, it is not a fact that the sense-organ is not in contact with it. And this very sense-object-contact, when aided by close attention and meticulous exercise of the sense-organ, leads to veridical cognition. To say that sense-object-contact would not be the condition of valid cognition if it were also the condition of error, is to make a sophistical observation which is falsified by facts.⁴⁵

Let us now consider the objection that the unvarying uniformity of the contents and unfailing regularity and universality of its occurrence are incompatible with illusion. The objection creates a strong presumption against the possibility of the cognition being erroneous. But if it can be established that simple word-entities are the real vehicle of meaning and the felt unity cannot be accounted for by the plurality of letters, we shall have no alternative to the dismissal of the plurality as illusion. The reason of this uniformity lies in the fact that the condition of the intuition of simple word is supplied by this plurality and nothing else. Because it is the condition, the apprehension of it is the necessary antecedent. Hence all persons have to spell out the simple words by means of the plurality of letters.⁴⁶ The regularity of the causal sequence is also due to this very fact that regular succession of letters is the condition of the manifestation of a simple word-entity.⁴⁷ There is no reason why a uniform case of error should not have a uniform set of conditions. To cite an example, we may refer to the

⁴⁵Dhvanayas sadṛśātmāno viparyāsasya hetavaḥ /

Upalambhakam eve 'ṣṭaṁ viparyāsasya kāraṇam (SS, 20).

Also: Upalabdhinibandhanam eva ca viparyāsasya nimittaṁ, hetvantarānavasandhānāt; viparyāsasyā 'py upalabdhirūpatvād anupalabdhyupayogi katham tatro 'payujyate. Yathā vidūravartivanaspatāv indriyasannikarṣa eva viparyāsasya nimittam; upalabdher api sa eva praṇidhānābhyāsaprasūtavāsanākrameṇa... (Op. cit., pp. 147-49).

⁴⁶Ata eva ca tulyarūpas sarvapratiṭṭhānāṁ viparyāsaḥ, tannimittasya samānatvāt (Op. cit., pp. 151-2).

⁴⁷Kramaniyamaś ca niyatakramatvāt (Op. cit., p. 152).

cognition of numbers. Now numbers from one to n are each one of them distinct and different. Thus one is not two, two is not three, and so on. Moreover, number is a subjective determination and the cognition of each number is bound to be numerically different. But the higher number is known through the lower; particularly, the big figures are always spelled out by and through smaller units. Certainly, it is an illusion to suppose that the smaller number forms a part of the bigger number. Each number serves to measure out a definite quantum. Yet it is this illusion which makes for the apprehension of higher numbers. The case with words is exactly analogous. A neophyte finds it difficult to apprehend a big word at one sweep and invariably arrives at it by the laborious spelling out of parts. The regularity of the order of the letters is exactly on a par with the regularity of the conditions of a natural event, say, a sprout or a confection.⁴⁸

The plurality of letters is the condition of the apprehension of a word-entity with regard to the persons who have not the spiritual and intellectual equipment for immediate access to the word-whole. They require to be taught by other persons, and the means and procedure adopted by the instructor invariably assume the form of the plurality. There is nothing to wonder at if the plurality of the condition affects the result. The simple word is naturally apt to be confounded with the plurality of the letters which is the cause of its manifestation. Now this ought not to cause any difficulty to philosophers. Those who believe that pure consciousness is the ultimate reality, have yet to admit that empirically a cognition without a content or an objective reference is not possible. Such is the case with word. It is by itself bereft of all sequence. In the empirical plane it appears to be composed of a plurality. Even the Mīmāṃsist, who believes in the eternal existence of letters, cannot deny the empirical differences of the

⁴⁸Yathā cā 'vidyamānātmabhūtasamkhyāntarajñānaṁ samkhyāntarapratipattau nimittaṁ tadupāyāt, tathe 'hā 'pi śabdāntaraparichedaḥ. Na hi kvacit kriyāyām hi nirjñāāsitasamkhyeṣu śatādisamkhyāparicchinneṣu vastuṣu pūrvasamkhyāsambhavaḥ, samkhyāyāḥ paricchedarūpatvāt, tasya ca tatrā 'sambhavāt. Yathai 'va co 'tpattau kṣīra-bījādikāryāṇāṁ ānupūrvīnyamas tatho 'palabdihāḥ api. Tasmāt paropadarśitaśabda-tattvagrāhīṇāṁ ananyopāyatayā viparyāsaniyamaḥ (SS, pp. 152-4).

letters which are pronounced with different accents and different procedural length. What⁴⁹ are called diphthongs are equally simple letters, yet grammatically they are treated as composed of two or more vowels. The differences are accounted for by the differences of the manner of utterance. A similar explanation is also offered by the advocate of *sphoṭa*. The fundamental truth that one word is felt and nothing but a whole-word can deliver the meanings is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the invisible word. It cannot be denied that we perceive one word by means of a plurality of letters. The unity and plurality cannot both be predicated of the reality. The plurality is only apparent and the unity is attested by undisputable recognition. Thus when a particular lesson, Vedic or profane, is heard as recited by a number of students with different intonations and modulations of voice an educated man finds no difficulty in recognizing the identity of the text. This ought to prove that the plurality is only accidental and the unity is the reality.⁵⁰

But the opponent may ask why the procedure adopted for the establishment of simple word should not be applied directly to the realization of the meaning. Well, the establishment of simple word-entity is not undertaken for its own sake but for the explanation of the communication of the meaning. If all the steps involved in the proof of the word-entity be found to be the condition of the communication of the meaning, that will result in a positive gain. The thesis that letters or sounds reveal a word-entity and the latter in its turn delivers the meaning, involves a roundabout procedure. The opponent only insists on the conditions of the manifestation of *sphoṭa* as self-sufficient for the communication of the meaning and thus dispenses with the intermediary without any hitch.

⁴⁹Yathā ca jñānasyā 'sadgrāhyākārānukāraviparyāsopaplavo niyatas tathā vāgātmano 'pi sadṛśavyaṇjakadhvanibhedānukārāt kramabhāvi viparyāsopaplavaḥ. Tathā hi, yeṣāṃ api varṇalakṣaṇaṃ vāktattvam avidyamānabhāgavacchedam ity abhyupagamaḥ, te 'pi bhāgakramasānsargalakṣaṇam anyam co 'dāttadīrghatvādirūpam upaplavaṃ niyataṃ na tasyā 'vajānate (SS, pp. 159-61).

⁵⁰Tathā dīrghādibhedānugame 'pi varṇātmā pratyaviijñābalena vidhūtabheda eko 'vagamyate, tathā padam api svapratyayāvagamya mānaikasvabhāvaṃ kiñcidbhedaparāmarśe 'py abhinnaṃ niścīyate (Op. cit., p. 167).

In reply the advocate of *sphoṭa* asserts that if logical economy irrespective of the evidence of accredited instruments of knowledge were the only criterion in ascertaining the proof, the opponent's position would commend itself for universal acceptance. But unfortunately or fortunately the seeker of truth has to take into consideration all the light that comes from the different quarters bearing on the problem. The fact is that the theory of *sphoṭa* accords with the evidence of psychology. Sometimes, we have a faint intuition and sometimes again, we have a clear intuition of word. Now the alternating faint and distinct presentation of word is a pointer to the existence of an entity which is the object of perception. Only perception can deliver its content as distinct or indistinct.⁵¹ If sounds or letters were alone sufficient for the communication of the meaning, there would be no qualitative variation as distinct or indistinct regarding the content. It is this fact which compels the recognition of a simple word-entity as a condition of the understanding of the meaning.

Now the simple word is an object of intuition and hence it is perceived sometimes distinctly and sometimes indistinctly. That we intuit a simple word by means of the sounds does not admit of doubt. Certainly the cognition that the word 'cow' yields the meaning cannot be dismissed as unfounded. This cognition must have a content. The different letters cannot be the content in question because it is felt as one and not many. This one entity intuited is different from the manifold letters and hence is a separate entity which the grammarian designates as word.

Now Kumāṛila has advanced serious objections against this position. He maintains that the so-called word 'cow', for instance, is not a simple entity. It is a composite fact having the different letters as its components. If it were different from the letters, it would be felt as a distinct entity without reference to the letters. But what is felt is letters and not anything which is foreign to them. There is only this

⁵¹Pratyakṣajñānaniyatā vyaktāvyaktābhāsītā (SS, p. 169).

difference that whereas each preceding cognition takes note of a single letter, the final cognition takes note of all of them together. But this difference does not justify the belief that the significant word is a numerically and qualitatively different entity. However much the advocate of *sphoṭa* may argue, he has to take cognizance of the fact that the so-called *sphoṭa* is not cognized independently of the different letters. So this significant word is a multiple entity. Of course, the cognition of this manifold is a single fact but the content is not. The singularity of the cognition is responsible for the illusion of the identity of the content. The content, though a manifold of letters, is felt as one entity, because it is apprehended by one indivisible cognition. This illusion is natural in the case of small words, but the difference of the content is distinctly felt in a long word. The unity of the content is thus a case of hasty transference of the character of the cognition to the content.⁵²

Maṇḍana in reply asserts that the opponent suffers from the illusion that the perceived multiplicity of letters is incompatible with the unity of the word. Certainly the word is felt with the multiplicity of letters and not disentangled from them. It is the drawback of finite intelligence that it cannot take stock of the indivisible word apart from and independently of the letters. But this does not annul the intuition of the unity. The fact that it is not apprehended in isolation and is mixed up with the apprehension of multiplicity does not prove that the unity is an illusion. Thus the universal is never cognized in isolation but only as associated with the individual. The whole is never perceived apart from the parts. Again, the multiple colour of a canvas with parts of diverse colours is not capable of being identified with the diverse colours, as in that case the whole would not have any colour of its own and thus be visually imperceptible. But the multiple colour, though it is not felt in isolation from the multiple colours, must of necessity be considered as a self-identical entity different from the diverse colours. Besides,

⁵²Jñeye tu tadgrāhyatayai 'kārthakāritayā vai 'katvabhramah, ekatvopacāro vā vanādivat (SS, p. 175).

the visual perception of an object is always conditioned by the perception of light, but that does not argue that the pen or the jar, as the case may be, is not anything different from the light. It has been contended that the distinctive perception of the object under consideration apart from its associates compels us to recognize their independent existence. But this is also the case with word which is felt as one singular fact, and so the compelling consideration is also present here.⁵³

The contention that the felt unity of the word is only a case of vicarious transference due to its being apprehended by a single cognition, is a suicidal argument. It would make the knowledge of unity absolutely precarious and undependable. Well, the whole may be dismissed as a case of false identity on the ground of the identity of the cognition. If the process be pursued to the farthest point, nothing but an atom can be regarded as a single entity. But even that will not be possible because the unity of the atom can likewise be accounted for by the unity of its cognition. Even the unity of the cognition will not afford a case of unassailable identity because the felt identity of the cognition may be doubted as being due to the identity of the object. Thus there will be no certitude of unity anywhere. And this means scepticism *in excelsis*.

Moreover, as the following consideration will show, there can be no cognition of a meaning unless it is preceded by the cognition of a word. One word may be susceptible of division into several words. Take, for instance, the word 'fortune'. If we split it up into 'fort' and 'une', the first word gives a different sense. Again, let the word be *kumāra*. Well, the word *ku* means bad and *māra* means Cupid. But the whole word means 'a young boy'. So the understanding of the meaning is dependent upon the fixity of the word. The multiplicity of letters by themselves cannot have any relation with the meaning. If the unity of the word were determined by that of the meaning, it would be a case of circular argument. The meaning is capable of being ascertained by means of the unitary word,

⁵³Anyānuvidhabodhe 'pi nā 'nyatvam uparudhyate /
Ekarūpaparicchede katham anyāprakāśanam (SS, 24).

and if the word be ascertained by means of the meaning there would be a deadlock.⁵⁴

The unity of the word is thus an indisputable datum. If there were no real unity but only a multitude of letters, then the difference of words and meanings, when the constituent letters are the same, would not be capable of an explanation. For instance, take the Sanskrit words, *nadī* (river), *dīna* (poor), *jarā* (old age), *rāja*(n) (king) and the like. Now these are certainly different words having different meanings. If the words were nothing but the multitude of letters, the difference would be unaccountable since the constituent letters in each pair are the same. The difference of order does not make any difference to the multitude. Thus, for instance, if the word were a whole composed of parts, the difference of the order would not make any difference to our understanding of it. Thus, for instance, a textile, which is composed of different yarns, is understood as such whether it is perceived from one end or the other. A forest is cognized as such whether it is cognized from one extreme or the opposite. The multitude or the composite whole is thus an aggregate of units, and the order of their arrangement does not add to or detract from its character as a multitude, however the perspective may be varied. If words were like such multitudes, the identity of the constituent letters would be the only important thing and the difference of order of arrangement would be immaterial. But we see that the words in question are different entities irrespective of the identity of the letters. This proves that the unity of the word in spite of the multiplicity of letters is a fact which is directly perceived and cannot be repudiated without absurd consequences.⁵⁵

Besides, it is impossible to determine the numerical identity or difference of words and sentences if there be no knowledge of them as distinct entities as an antecedent condition. It has been shown how different letters fail to

⁵⁴Arthasyā 'dhigamo nar 'te padarūpāvadhāraṇāt /
Tadarthabodhād yadi ca vyaktam anyonyasamśrayaḥ (SS, 26).

⁵⁵Bhinnakrame 'pi vijñāne samūhiṣu na bhedaṁ /
Samūhaḥ padarūpaṁ tu spaṣṭabhedam pratiyate (Op. cit., 27).

account for the felt unity of a word. It has also been shown how the same or similar letters are found to evolve numerically different words. This failure of the letters, diverse or similar, to account for the unity or diversity of words, is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the independent existence of words as unanalyzable entities. The objection that the unity is not felt apart from the multiplicity of letters or sounds has been shown to be pointless, as different entities are bound to be cognized together if the cognition of the one is the condition of that of the other. Several instances like light or colour have been found to falsify the validity of the rule. The advocate of *sphoṭa* does not assert that the word or sentence is a composite entity, and so the objections based upon the supposed logical impossibility of the relation of part and whole do not affect the position in the least. It has been made abundantly clear that there is no logical difficulty in the revelation of a word on a graduated scale. Moreover, those who hold that letters are uttered and liable to perish immediately may be justified in asserting their numerical difference. But if the letters were different from one another as uttered by different persons, then how could the meaning be understood from them? As a matter of fact, similar letters pronounced by different persons are found to deliver one identical meaning. So it must be admitted that the letters are significant only in their aspect of similarity: to be explicit, when the letters are felt to be the same. But what can make the different letters same or similar? If the presence of one universal in each letter be held to vest them with identity, that may explain the relation of a word and its meaning, in those cases where they are the factors of one word. But the identity of the universal will make the letters appear as identical, and as the words are supposed to be composed of these letters, it will be impossible to account for the multiplicity of words and meanings. All the different words have no reality outside and independently of the letters, and all the diverse letters are *ex hypothesi* felt as identical on account of the identical universal. Such being the case, there would be no difference between one letter and another and so between one word and another. The order and

adjustment of the letters may be regarded as the differentiating condition, but we have shown the futility of the hypothesis. It has been shown that the variation of the order does not import any difference into the being of the letters and how the same succession of letters pronounced by different persons fails to yield a meaning.

The order and adjustment of letters has been sought to be explained by the Buddhists as the occurrence of the different ideas in the mind of the speaker. A letter, say the Buddhists, is nothing but an idea which is produced by an antecedent idea, and the different ideas have different causes. Hence the difference between the words, *sarah* (lake) and *rasah* (taste), because though the letters as ideas may be regarded as similar or identical, the difference of their causes due to difference in the time-order cannot make the combinations identical. Apart from the objections against the possibility of combination of evanescent entities, the hypothesis is open to grave objections. The difference of words is sought to be explained by the difference of the cause or their temporal difference. If it be so, the difference of the words can be felt only if the difference of the causes can be apprehended. If, again, the difference of the causes be the condition of the understanding of the different meanings, this difference must be apprehended before, which is impossible. The difference of the mental states of another person is not susceptible of being directly cognized. It can be inferred by the realization of the unity of the word. But the unity of the word cannot be realized if it be made contingent on the unity of the speaker. It has been shown before how there can be no realization of the unity of the speaker when hidden by a screen or when he is a member of a crowd shouting slogans together. All these considerations compel the recognition of a simple word-entity as the vehicle of meaning. The fact that it is eternal follows from the consideration that it delivers the meaning in all cases irrespective of the difference of time or place or speaker. If the word were perishable and hence numerically different at each occurrence, the relation of word and meaning would not be capable of realization.

The merit of the *sphoṭa* theory lies in the fact that it does not seek to twist the verdict of commonsense. It is not liable to dispute that we all feel that the word conveys a meaning and is one and the same in spite of its different incidence. This felt unity, unless it be dubbed an illusion, presupposes the unity of the object. The grammarian-philosopher justifiably lays stress upon this fundamental character of our knowledge. He shows that the philosophers of other schools have failed to account for the felt unity of the word and that their philosophical exercises are not calculated to carry conviction to an unsophisticated and unbiassed student of philosophy in spite of the wealth of ingenuity displayed by them. Our task has been to give a faithful representation of the philosophy of Bhartṛhari and his followers. And this has made it unavoidable to discuss and evaluate the theories of the rival schools and their arguments. A modern student will have ample materials and data before him to form his own estimate.

CHAPTER SEVEN

IMPORT OF WORDS

It has been made abundantly clear that though the grammarian firmly believes in the indivisibility of a sentence as an expression of thought, he still recognizes the pragmatic value of a word signifying a certain sense or import. And before the theory of the grammarian on the nature of the import of a word is reviewed, it will prove quite an interesting study to survey the views of the different schools of Indian philosophers on the subject. Kumārila in his *Tantravārttika* informs us that there are innumerable theories which seek to explain the denotation of a word.¹ We propose to examine the more important amongst them.

ĀKṚTIVĀDA

At the outset mention may be made of the Ākṛtivādin who points out that the import of a word is ascertained only when it is known how the word is used and how again it is understood. To be explicit, the denoted sense of any particular word is determined by what the speaker wants to convey and what is understood by the addressee when he hears it. That being so, it is never difficult to make out the sense of a word. The word 'cow' is never found to be used to mean animals possessing manes, sharp claws and teeth and such other physical features; on the contrary, it implies beasts having dewlap, horns and the like. This fact alone enables us to understand the import of the word 'cow'. It is the configuration (*ākṛti*) which is, therefore, held to be the import of a word.

It has been pointed out by the Ākṛtivādin that what is cognized by perception is configuration, and that if words are used to imply objects forming the content of our perceptual knowledge, it is only reasonable to regard configuration as the import of a word. Indeed, what differentiates a cow from

¹TV, p. 293.

a buffalo is the conjunction of the component parts of the animal, and the truth of it is attested by perception.²

The fact that the different schools of thinkers have not taken any serious notice of the theory of the Ākṛtivādin bears ample testimony to its inherent weakness. The whole problem relating to configuration is after all based on a more or less superficial view of the nature of reality. The question, however, may have some pertinency in the case of specific kinds of the animal and the botanic kingdom, but even with reference to material things which do not possess definite structure or morphological characteristic, the point is absolutely out of order; more so, with regard to abstract ideas.³ Moreover, figure, being an organization of parts, must differ in each case as the parts and consequently their conjunction are bound to be numerically different. So a figure is as particularistic as the individual and hence cannot be the meaning of a word which must be something common to all members of a class.

VYAKTIVĀDA AND JĀTIVĀDA

Let us next study the two theories of the Individualist (*Vyaktivādin*) and the Universalist (*Jātivādin*), according to which the individual (*vyakti*) and the universal (*jāti*) are respectively held to be the denoted sense of a word. It is an admitted fact that for all practical purposes reference is invariably made to the individual and never to the universal. That the individual alone is endowed with the intelligent activity, that it is capable of doing a work and desisting from it and also that it alone serves a practical purpose, is a fact the truth of which requires no corroboration. Let us take an illustration. When we are asked to bring a cow, it is only obvious that what is required to be brought is an individual and not a universal existing in the entire class of cows, past, present and future—cows that we see around us and such as

²Ataḥ pratyakṣaviṣaye padaṁ pravartamānam ākṛtāv eva vartitum arhati / (NM, I. p. 291)

³Anākṛtivyāṅgaṁ jātau mṛt suvarṇaṁ rajatam ity evamādiṣu ākṛtir nivartate jahāti padārthatvam iti (NBH, on NS, II. ii. 68)

are far removed. The Individualist further avers that it is the individual and not the absolute abstract universal which forms the content of perceptual knowledge, and as there is a consensus of opinion in the matter that a word expresses or denotes what is cognized by perception, it is certainly legitimate to regard the individual as the import of a word.⁴ Furthermore, it is pointed out by the Individualist that the Universalist holding the absolute universal as the import of a word, is constrained to admit that in many cases the import of a word includes within its scope the individual as well. That being so, the Individualist insists on recognizing the individual as the import of a word.

The Universalist, however, severely criticizes the view of his opponent by pointing out that there are millions of cows in this world and in other worlds as well and that these cows as individuals vary widely amongst themselves in respect of age, configuration, colour and the like. And if the word 'cow' would mean any individual cow, say, for instance, 'the cow that I saw at Banaras', it could no longer be used to imply any other particular cow, say, for instance, 'the cow that I saw at Delhi'. The two cows differ from each other in many respects. It is indeed a fact that no two objects are exactly identical. That being so, if the word 'cow' means any particular cow, it is required to find a second word to give us the knowledge of another cow which looks so differently from the first one. But the suggestion that a different word is to be coined to imply every individual cow cannot be entertained on account of practical inconvenience. It is for this reason that Jaimini and his followers do not lend countenance to the theory of the Individualist. The young boy is told that the animal standing before him is a horse. Subsequently he chances to see another horse and he calls it a horse. What leads the boy to say so? Were the particular horse that he saw first the import of the word 'horse', he would have little justification to designate the second animal

⁴Pratyakṣaviśaye vṛttiḥ padasye 'ṣṭā padair api /

Niṣkr̥ṣṭaṁ na ca sāmānyamātraṁ pratyakṣagocaraḥ //

Vyakter eva padārthatvaṁ tasmād abhyupagamyatām / (NM, I, p. 292).

in like manner. Yet it cannot be denied that what he has said is quite correct. But how are we to account for this ? The Universalist would answer that there is some community amongst the numerous horses that enables us to apply the term 'horse' to each one of them. This community, which is otherwise called the universal (*jāti* or *sāmānya*), is, in the opinion of the Universalist, the import of a word. It may be pointed out in passing that the Individualist has sought to remodel his theory in the light of criticisms advanced by his opponent, and he admits that the import of a word suggests the universal. But he believes that though the universal is suggested by a word, it does not enter into its import. Just as the determinant of the nature of a cause (*kāraṇatāvaccchedaka*) is not regarded as the cause proper, so the universal which is suggested by a word need not be viewed as the import of word. Thus, according to the Individualist, the universal is the determinant of the import of a word which is nothing more than the individual. This explains how the word 'cow' does not mean an animal known as horse or buffalo.

We have summarized the views of the Individualist and now propose to present the theory of the Universalist. The Universalist asks : Is it any and every individual that constitutes the import of a word or any particular individual ? Obviously, the former alternative is not acceptable. The word 'cow', for instance, does not mean a horse or a lion. The latter alternative, however, on a careful analysis would be found to convey that a word does not denote any absolute individual but a determined individual—an individual determined by a universal. The Universalist contends that it is desirable to hold that the universal is the import of a word and not the individual as determined by the universal in pursuance of the laws of logical parsimony. Thus the Universalist enquires : Is it necessary that the universal which is posited as the determinant of the individual should be cognized or not ?⁵ If it is held that the universal is required to be known, the source from which the knowledge proceeds

⁵Gotvam eva niyāmakam iti ced āyusman sādhu budhyase kiṃtu tad gotvam avagatam anavagataṃ ve 'ti (NM, I, p. 292).

ought to be investigated. Is it the word itself that gives us the knowledge of the universal or is it obtained through any other instrument of knowledge? As no other instrument of cognition is at work in the context it must be accepted that the knowledge of the universal is due to the word and word alone. It remains to be ascertained now which of the two cognitions—that of the universal and that of the individual—is prior? It is held by the Individualist that the individual as the import of a word is a substantive in relation to the universal which is its determinant or attribute. But it is argued by the Universalist that whereas in the case of a qualified cognition the knowledge of the attribute precedes that of the qualified substantive, it follows that in the present case the cognition of the individual cannot be obtained prior to that of the universal itself.⁶ And it is urged by the Universalist that it is only in the fitness of things to hold that it is the universal which is the import of a word. The contention of the Individualist that syntactical construction of cases with verbs is intelligible with reference to individuals is not denied. But what the Universalist maintains is that this does not necessitate the hypothesis that the individual is the primary meaning. The primary import is the universal, and the idea of the individual which is necessary for syntactical construction is obtained by logical implication or as a secondary meaning.⁷ Nor can it be contended—‘Let the individual be the primary import and the universal be known by implication’, for as has been pointed out, the universal must have priority in cognition over the individual according to the rule that the adjective must be known before the substantive as the cognition of the former is the condition of that of the latter.

⁶Śabdāc cet tarhi śabdaḥ prathamatarāṃ gotve vartitum arhati nā ’grhitaviśeṣaṇā viśiṣṭe buddhir iti niyamāt (NM, I, p. 292).

✓ It may be mentioned that the rule that the attribute is required to be known prior to the substantive qualified by it is not a creation of the Universalist alone; for Kaṇāda and his followers have recognized this truth when they say that the perception of a white object is conditioned by the perception of whiteness (VS, VIII. i. 9).

⁷Viśeṣye vartamāno viśeṣaṇe pramāṇāntaram apekṣate, viśeṣaṇe tu vartamānas tadavagamāya viśeṣyam ākṣipatī ’ti na kaścid doṣaḥ (NM, I, p. 293).

JĀTYĀKRTIVYAKTIVĀDA

It is interesting to know that Gotama, the founder of Indian logic, thinks that none of the theories mentioned above gives the whole truth. He boldly points out that any one of the three entities, configuration, individual and universal, cannot constitute the import of a word by itself, and he is of opinion that all the three conjointly form the import of a word and not separately. Gotama proves that the individual itself cannot become the import of a word on the ground that individuals are many and vary amongst one another and that there is no knowing which particular individual is expressed by a word to the exclusion of all others. It is further pointed out that configuration alone cannot also be the import of a word. For, he says, the configuration of cow, for instance, is also discernible in a cow made of clay and if configuration is held to be the import of a word, the clay model also would be denoted by the word 'cow'. But we know that the clay model is never the import of the word. Nor can the universal by itself, Gotama further maintains, be the denoted sense of a word. In his opinion the absolute universal is something that baffles all our attempts at understanding it. It is only with reference to the individual and configuration that we can have a cognition of the universal.

In the circumstances, he avers, it is necessary to admit configuration, individual and universal—all the three conjointly, to be the import of a word. Vācaspati in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* says that the word 'cow' being uttered, any person who is aware of its denotative power will understand an individual cow, the cowhood and the configuration of the animal simultaneously.

JĀTIVĪŚIṢṬAVYAKTIVĀDA

The Neo-logician, however, has his own contributions to make on the subject. He contends that it is hardly reasonable to assume the universal alone as the import of a word. It is pointed out that a word or a term consists of two elements, viz, a base, nominal or verbal, and a suffix. According to the Naiyāyika the import of the suffix is case, gender and number.

He, therefore, points out that if the universal be regarded as the import of the stem as the Universalist holds it to be, it is in no wise possible to construe its import with that of the suffix. For, it is only the individual which is capable of being qualified by number and gender, and it is the individual to which we can ascribe agenthood (*kartrtva*), objectivity (*karmatva*) and the like. We can never conceive a universal functioning as a case or as related to gender and number. It is, therefore, quite in the fitness of things to hold that the individual is the import of a word. But, as there is no limit to the number of individuals, it is required that the particular individuals that would be denoted by a word should be restricted or determined and the restriction or determination can only be achieved through a reference to the universal which underlies all these individuals. The Naiyāyika would, therefore, suggest that the individual as determined by the universal constitutes the import of a word.

APOHAVĀDA

The Buddhist has chalked out a new mode of approach to the problem. The Buddhist regards the universal as an intellectual fiction and as such it cannot be held to be the import of a word. The individual is self-contained and has nothing to do with any other individual, similar or dissimilar, and cannot on that account be the subject of verbal convention. But what is it that a word denotes ? It can hardly be denied that a word expresses an import and has an objective external reference as well. Now if a word signifies a subjective idea only existing in the mind, how are we to explain the objective reference associated with it ? The Buddhist answers the question by positing that the import of a word is neither a subjective idea nor an objective reality but a fiction. The speaker thinks that he is presenting an objective fact to the hearer while the hearer is deluded into thinking that the import is an objective reality. So the import of a word is a mental construction which is hypostatized as an objective reality existing in its own right independently of the thinking mind. And this mental construction is unique, being

distinguishable from such other mental images. It contains a negative implication which is believed to be an objective universal. The word 'cow', for instance, implies the negation of not-cow. The objective cow is different from a horse, a buffalo or anything which is not cow. The negation of the opposite is the common element in the meaning of the word, and this is falsely interpreted and hypostatized as a positive universal. This is made possible by a transcendental illusion which cannot be avoided, but can be made harmless by criticism. The Buddhist does not deny that the meaning of a word is felt as a positive reality, which is at bottom negation of negation and a concept without an objective basis. The Realists have severely criticized this doctrine. The controversy seems to be endless. And we must avoid it as we are not concerned to establish or repudiate the Buddhist theory here.

THE GRAMMARIAN'S VIEW

The contributions of the grammarian to the study of the subject are highly significant. Jñānendra Sarasvatī, the author of the *Tattvabodhinī*, thinks that the import of a word, according to Patañjali, includes as many as five constituents, viz, universal (*svārtha*), individual (*dravya*), gender (*liṅga*), number (*saṁkhyā*) and case-relation (*kāraka*).⁸ The theory that the universal is the denoted sense of a word seems to have been propounded by the sage, Vājapyāyana, who, as Patañjali informs us, believes that the universal is one and that it is expressed by a word by means of its power of denotation.⁹ When we utter the word 'cow', for instance, what is meant is not a red cow or a black cow, neither the cow that belongs to us nor the one belonging to our neighbours, but any individual cow. The fact that the same word is used to imply the multitudinous cows suggests that there is one common nature in all the individuals included in a group which is called 'universal'.¹⁰ It may be argued, however, that the assumption of oneness in respect of the universal may be justified but that

⁸TB, p. 127.

⁹*Ekā ākṛtiḥ, sā cā 'bhidhīyate* (MB, II, p. 90).

does not imply that the meaning of the word is the universal and nothing else.¹¹ In fact, the case-relation is construed with the individual and has no competency to be syntactically related to the universal.¹² To this it is replied that the individual cannot be supposed to be the denotation of the word. In the first place, the number of individuals is practically infinite and it is not possible that the word would denote all of them.¹³ Secondly, if a word denoted a particular individual, other individuals would never be meant, and this would make the postulation of an infinite number of words as per individuals necessary, which would be absurd.¹⁴ Thirdly, a word never denotes an individual with all its peculiarities. An individual with its full individuality is known only through intuition, and a word only gives a blurred scheme which fits all the individuals, though it is not a copy of any. The Universalist points out with convincing logic that when a boy is first taught that the word 'cow' means an animal standing in front of him, he finds no difficulty in designating by the same word another cow at another place and time irrespective of difference of age, stature, features, etc.¹⁵ Had the particular cow been the denotation of the word, he would not have used the word to denote any other individual of the class.

The Universalist thus seems to gain an advantage over his opponent, but the latter would not yield ground so easily. The Individualist argues that the universal, in the opinion of his opponent, is one, and as such, we are not justified in maintaining that it resides simultaneously in more than one

¹⁰Gaur ity etena śabdeno 'kte pratyāyite sāmānyalakṣaṇe 'rthe viśeṣānavadharaṇād aikyaṁ sāmānyasyā 'vasīyate (MBP, Vol. II, pp. 90-1).

¹¹Yady api prakhyāviśeṣād jñāyate—Ekā ākṛtir iti, kutas tv etat—Sā 'bhidhīyate iti (MB, Vol. II, p. 91).

¹²Bhavatu sāmānyam ekaṁ tasya tu vāhadohādikāyām arthakriyāyām ayogyatvād, dravyasyai 'va yogyatvād abhidhānam nyāyām iti matvā praśnaḥ (MBPU, Vol. II, p. 91).

¹³Vyaktīnām tv ānanyāt tāsu na śaktigrahaḥ, nā 'pi śuddhānām tāsām bodhas tāsām viśeṣarūpatvena viśeṣāvatiprasaṅgāt (Loc. cit.).

¹⁴Jātyupalakṣitasya dravyasya śabdenā 'bhidhāne saty abhidheyānkatvenā 'neka-śabdatvaprasaṅgāt (MBP, Vol. II, p. 93).

¹⁵Gaur aya kadācid upadiṣṭo bhavati. Sa tam anyasmin deśe 'nyasmin kāle 'nyasyām ca vayovasthāyām dṛṣṭvā jñāti ayaṁ gaur iti (MB, Vol. II, p. 91).

substratum, we mean, the individual. It passes our comprehension how a man can stay in two different places at the same moment of time. The objection, of course, may be met if we can only show that one and the same thing is actually related to many others at one and the same time.¹⁶ The whole is related to each one of the parts that go to build it. Likewise, the universal bears a relationship to all the individuals comprised by it. This analogy, however, has not been drawn by Patañjali probably under the impression that the Nominalist would not accept any such concept as the whole (*avayavin*) separately comprehended from the parts (*avayava*).¹⁷ He, therefore, suggests that, as the sun shining above is at once perceived at different places, the universal in like manner is cognized in the various individuals that embody it.¹⁸ Critics, however, have found fault with this analogical reasoning. The case which has been cited above does not prove that one and the same cognizer perceives the sun in different places. But the Universalist maintains that the universal is cognized in the different individuals by one and the same person. Patañjali, in all probability, was conscious of this difficulty, and it is for this reason that he tries to explain the point by means of a different illustration. Indra, King of gods, is invoked in different sacrifices at one and the same hour and he attends all of them simultaneously. Similarly, the universal is at once related to all the individuals.¹⁹ Patañjali further observes that if the relation of one entity with a number of individuals were deemed impossible, then one word could not express different individuals. But, as a matter of fact, one word left over in what is known as *ekaśeṣa* does denote a number of individuals.²⁰ Patañjali again points out that if a definite individual were the denotation of a

¹⁶Asti cai 'kam anekādhikaraṇasthaṁ yugapat (MB, Vol. II, p. 92).

¹⁷Avayavi yady apy anekāvayavasthas tathā 'pi tadbhāve vivādān nā 'sau dr̥ṣṭān-tatveno 'pāttaḥ (MBP, Vol II, p. 92).

¹⁸Tad yathā eka ādityo 'nekādhikaraṇastho yugapat upalabhyate (MB, Vol. II, p. 92).

¹⁹Tad yathā eka Indro 'nekasmin kratuśāte āhūto yugapat sarvatra bhavati. Evam ākr̥tir yugapat sarvatra bhaviṣyati (Loc. cit.).

²⁰Yo hi manyate—'Nai 'kam anekādhikaraṇasthaṁ yugapat upalabhyata' iti. Ekaśeṣe tasya doṣas syāt (Loc. cit.).

word, it would be difficult to account for the uncircumscribed and unrestricted reference of words. The meaning of a word is not necessarily restricted to a particular individual. Particularly in such scriptural injunctions as "A Brahmin must not be killed" or "A horse is to be sacrificed", the meaning of the word 'Brahmin' or 'Horse' cannot be a determinate particular. Were it so, one could kill many other Brahmins with impunity if one particular Brahmin was spared. In the case of sacrifice, one could sacrifice a particular horse meant by the proposition and not another at a second sacrifice. Not only this. The sacrifice of any other horse by any other man would not be efficacious, if the word 'horse' meant a particular chosen horse. The words in all these sentences must, therefore, be conceded to have a wider meaning which includes one and all the individuals of the class.²¹ The position of the Individualist, on the contrary, would reduce all common names to the status of singular and proper names, and this would involve preposterous consequences as stated above. When we are told 'A Brahmin must not be killed', we understand not a particular Brahmin but any Brahmin ; in other words, all the Brahmins that form the class are understood as the subject of the proposition. Similarly, any and every horse, that is to say, all the individual horses, fall within the sweep of the meaning of the proposition, 'A horse is to be sacrificed'. But the opponent urges that the positing of the universal as the connotation of a word does not make the understanding of verbal import free from difficulties. If the meaning were a universal intended to include all the possible individuals of a class, then the fulfilment of the positive injunction, 'A horse is to be sacrificed', would be possible, if all horses that were and are and will be only, were sacrificed, which is humanly impossible. The reason is that the universal resides in each and every individual falling within its sweep, and, therefore, anything that is predicated

²¹Evam ca kṛtvā dharmasāstraṁ pravṛttaṁ "Brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ" "Surā na peye" 'ti, brāhmaṇamātraṁ ca na hanyate, surāmātraṁ ca na piyate. Yadi dravyaṁ padārthaḥ syāt, ekam brāhmaṇam ahatvā ekam ca surām apitvā 'nyatra kāmācāras syāt (MB, II, p. 92).

of the universal cannot be fully comprehended unless all the individuals typifying it are taken into consideration. Patañjali meets the objection as follows. The universal no doubt is related to each and every individual in which it occurs, but the relation that subsists between a particular individual on the one hand and the universal on the other is the same as in other individuals. It is, therefore, the case that the relationship subsisting between the universal and the different individuals included therein is at once understood in all its bearings if the relationship between any particular individual and the universal underlying it is precisely determined. The meaning of a word, therefore, is a universal as related to any individual. It is not necessary that the infinite number of individuals should be understood as the substrates of the universal. In fact, a universal is neither a summation of individuals nor collectively inherent in the latter. It is a fact that a universal occurs in individuals and, when understood as a meaning, it includes an individual as a substratum of it. The incidence of the universal is independent and self-contained in each individual. So it is not necessary that all the individuals should be understood in order to understand the incidence of the universal. Thus when a man is asked to bring a cow he need not bring all cows; what he is to do is to bring any individual cow.²²

The difficulties do not entirely end here and Patañjali delivers a long discourse on the merits and shortcomings of the two theories. We have briefly explained the position of Vājapyāyana and now proceed to study the theory propounded by another ancient teacher named Vyāḍi, who may be looked upon as the prince of Individualists.

Patañjali argues that the position of Vyāḍi may be justified on more grounds than one. Thus, in the first place, the ideas of gender and number agree only with the individual, which, therefore, should be regarded as the meaning of a word.²³

²²Sarvābhir vyaktibhis sambandhasya tulyatvāt sarvatrai 'vā 'bhinnabuddhyutpādanāt pratyekaṁ parisamāptatvād ekasminn api dravye tat karma kriyamāṇaṁ jātau kṛtam eva bhavati (MBP, Vol. II, p. 93).

²³Evaṁ ca kṛtvā līṅgavacanāni siddhāni bhavanti (MB, Vol. II, pp. 94-95).

(ii) Secondly, actions invariably bear a natural and intrinsic connexion only with the individual.²⁴ Thirdly, there is no instance known to us in which one entity is perceived in different media at one and the same time.²⁵ Were it so, we could posit a self-identical universal existing in different individuals. Moreover, such propositions as 'A dog is dead' or 'A cow is born' cannot be true or intelligible if the universal, that is to say, the infinite number of individuals in which it occurs, be supposed to be the meaning of the word 'dog' or 'cow'. The proposition 'A dog is dead' would then mean that all dogs are dead. Similarly, 'A cow is born' would imply that all cows are born. This, of course, cannot be true. We find that one dog is dead and another is alive; one cow is born, others exist, and some others die. This is intelligible only if one individual, and not all the individuals which are the implication of a universal, be the meaning of a word.²⁶

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa has carefully elucidated the logical basis of the theory of Vyāḍi. The relation of the universal to the individuals is the crux of the problem. The universal is supposed to inhere in each and every individual. Does it inhere in an individual in its entirety or collectively in all the individuals taken together? If the universal be entirely manifested in one individual, it will not inhere in others, and this would amount to extreme individualism as none but a single individual would be the meaning of a word. As for the second alternative, it will be found on examination to involve absurd consequences. If the universal were collectively inherent in all the individuals, it could be known only if all the individuals which embody it were antecedently known. To put it the other way about, the knowledge of the universal in one individual would involve the knowledge of all the individuals. But our actual knowledge is entirely different and the hypothesis cannot be sound. Again, to make

²⁴Codanāsu ca tasyā 'rambhān manyāmahe dravyam abhidhiyata iti (MB, II, pp. 94-95).

²⁵Na khalv apy ekam anekādhikarāṇasthaṁ yugapat upalabhyate. Na hy eko Devadatto yugapat Srughne bhavati Mathurāyām ca (Loc. cit.).

²⁶'Śvā mṛtaḥ' iti śvā nāma loke na pracaret. 'Gaur jāta' itī sarvaṁ gobhūtam anavakāśaṁ syāt (Loc. cit.).

it collectively inherent is to court extremely preposterous consequences. Take the numbers from 'two' to 'n'. Twoness is a quality which exists not distributively but collectively in two individuals, the non-cognition of one of which would make the cognition of the number 'two' impossible. Similarly, the destruction of one would involve the destruction of the number 'two'. If the universal were to behave like the numbers, its perception would presuppose that of the infinite number of individuals as has been shown before, and the destruction of one individual member constituting a part of its extension would involve the destruction of the universal or the lapse of it if the latter be supposed to be eternal.²⁷

Moreover, there is diversity between one individual and another. Thus one cow may be horned and another hornless. If one universal were the meaning and it were supposed to cover all the individuals, then it would have to be conceded that the universal in one being inherent in another would be both identical and different, as the relation of the universal to the individual cannot be other than identity with its different loci. It is absurd that one and the same thing can be identical and also different.²⁸ Even when an expression, e.g., *gāvau*, is used for denoting two individual cows and the meaning be supposed to be identical by virtue of a unitary universal uniting both, the statement of its meaning as one cow and another cow would not be logically justifiable. The two words, 'cow' and 'cow', certainly mean two different entities. If the meaning of both were one self-identical entity, then the use of one word would suffice.

Furthermore, it may be pointed out that one advantage of the admission of one universal as the meaning of a word was that the rule formulated by Pāṇini for the elimination of a number of self-same words could be dispensed with. Thus, for instance, in the proposition, 'The Brahmin must not be killed', the word 'Brahmin', though numerically one, denoted

²⁷Jātir na tāvad dravyeṣu vyāsajyavṛttiḥ, ekāśrayanāśe 'pratityāpatteḥ. Kiṃ ca gām ālabhete 'tyādinodanāsu sarvadravyālabhāpattiḥ. Pratyekasamāptau tu dravyāntare tadanāpattis tatrā 'pi sattve ekā 'kṛtir iti pratijñāhānir ity arthaḥ (MBPU, Vol. II, p. 94).

²⁸Na hy ekasya bhedābhedau viruddhau upapadyete (MBP, Vol. II, p. 96).

an indefinite number, and Pāṇini by propounding a definite rule implies that though according to natural law one word should imply one individual, the repetition of phonetically self-same words is not necessary for denoting a plurality of individuals. Of course, this rule would be uncalled for if a word implied a universal and, by inherent logical necessity, the indefinite plurality of individuals in which it inheres. The Universalist thinks that the rejection of this rule would be an advantage. Vyāḍi thinks that this device not only involves disloyalty to Pāṇini but also breaks down in cases where one word denotes a number of heterogeneous individuals. Thus, for instance, the word 'akṣa' denotes 'dice', 'sense-organ', 'axle' and so on. Certainly, no one would commit the absurdity of supposing one universal in these diverse entities. The theory of one universal as the meaning of a word may have plausibility in cases where the number of individuals denoted are homogeneous and as such falling under one class. But in the case cited above it hopelessly breaks down.²⁹ The theory of the Individualist is immune from all these difficulties because the meaning in each case is an individual. The elimination of the repetition of phonetically similar words even when the meaning is a plurality of individuals, is not sanctioned by logic but by convention. And so Pāṇini formulates a rule to make this usage immune from the charge of absurdity.

Such are the objections of Vyāḍi against Vājapyāyana who holds that the universal is the meaning of a word. His first objection is that difference of number and gender is incompatible with a universal. But this objection proceeds from a misconception of the relation of the universal with the individual. The universal is manifested in individuals and the number and gender of the individuals are predicated of it because of association. But the association varies and accordingly the number and gender also are found to vary. The relation of the universal with number and gender is not direct but hinges on the existence of a third term, viz, the individual entity in which the universal and these

²⁹Yadartha ākr̥tipakṣaparigrahas tad eva na sidhyati, na hi śakaṭākṣadevanākṣādiṣv ekākṛtisadbhāvaḥ (MBP, Vol. II, p. 96).

attributes inhere together. In one word, the relation is one of co-existence in one substratum.³⁰

It has been contended that this theory of vicarious transference may hold good so far as the construction of gender is concerned. But the construction of number cannot be explained in this way. It is the position of the Universalist that the universal is one self-identical principle, and hence the predication of dual and plural number regarding it will be downright nonsense, whatever might be the explanation of the relation. To make it consistent the postulation of a unitary universal has to be given up, and to make it susceptible to plurality is tantamount to endorsement of the position of the Individualist. The advantage of the elimination of repetition without recourse to *ekaśeṣa* rule would thus transpire to be illusory. Examined more closely, the predication of different genders will also be found to be unaccountable. The association of different genders was sought to be accounted for by the variability of gender in different individuals. But the difference of sex and sexual determination is constant and not variable. So the association of the self-same universal with different genders in different verbal forms, though the objective reality meant by them is one self-identical thing, becomes absolutely unaccountable.³¹

The Universalist in reply maintains that the difference of gender is not based upon the objective difference of sex. At any rate, the objective basis is not the ordinary difference of sexual characteristics but something deeper. The difference of gender in words is, of course, not entirely arbitrary or conventional without an objective basis. Certainly the spirit has no sexual difference and no gender. These differences are based on the differences of the physical organism. In the philosophy of grammar the diminution of sensible qualities,

³⁰Guṇās cā 'tra dvitvastrītvādayo vivakṣitāḥ. Taiś cā 'kṛter ekārthasamavāyalaṅkāṣaṇas sambandha ity ākṛtāv api padārthe līṅgasamkhyādisiddhir ity arthaḥ (MBP, Vol. II, p. 96).

³¹Bhavel līṅgaparihāra upapannaḥ, vacanaparihāras tu no 'papadyate. Yadi hi kadācid ākṛtir ekatvena yujyate kadācid dvitvena kadācid bahutvena, ekā ākṛtir iti ca pratijñā hiyeta. Yac cā 'sya pakṣasyo 'pādāne prayojanam uktam 'Ekaśeṣo na vaktavyaḥ' iti, sa ca idānīm vaktavyo bhavati (MB, Vol. II, p. 97).

such as sound, touch, taste, colour and odour, is the basis of the feminine gender and the augmentation of the same is that of the masculine gender. Everything is materially subject to change—it either registers increase or decrease. In fact, the two processes of increase and decrease, of growth and decay, of development and diminution, are concurrent. Though the spirit taken by itself is not liable to decay or growth, its empirical identification with the body makes it amenable to the difference of gender. But a question may be asked: If decay and growth are concurrent, what is the criterion of the difference of gender? The answer is that the difference is due to the difference of the interest and the inclination of the speaker to emphasize one aspect in preference to the other. Thus if the element of diminution is emphasized, it is an occasion for the use of the feminine gender; and the masculine is used for emphasizing the aspect of growth and development; and the neuter is used when there is no emphasis on either.³²

As for the difference of number, it is capable of the same solution as is offered by the Individualist. Now the Individualist maintains that the meaning of one word is one individual. In the case of dual and plural numbers he would have to say that the singular number is used when one individual is meant, the dual when two are meant and the plural when there are more than two. Certainly the sanction of dual and plural numbers is derived from the rule of Pāṇini and not from the natural capacity of words. Moreover, there are words used in Sanskrit which mean one individual but are used in the dual or the plural. In these cases the use of the dual and the plural number can be justified only by usage and the rules of Pāṇini are based on this usage. These latter cases are rather exceptional in character.

As regards the use of number based upon the number of individuals meant, the Universalist will also offer the same explanation. When the universal is associated with one individual the singular number is used; the dual and the plural numbers are used when the universal is associated with

³²Saṁstīyānavivakṣāyām strī, prasavavivakṣāyām pumān, ubhayor apy avivakṣāyām napuṁsakam (MB, Vol. II, p. 98).

two or more individuals respectively. It cannot be urged that the Universalist cannot take cognizance of the difference of individuals on the ground that the meaning of a word, according to him, is a universal, pure and simple, with which the dual and plural numbers have no consistency. The position of the Universalist has been either misunderstood or distorted by his opponent. When the Universalist maintains that the universal is the meaning, he does not imply that the individual is entirely left out of cognizance. Similarly, when the Individualist maintains that a word denotes an individual, he cannot fail to take cognizance of the universal also. There is no difference between the two schools so far as the two elements are concerned as factors of the meaning. The meaning of a word is complex and not simple as the omission of either element would expose it to the objections advanced by both the parties alternately against each other. The difference lies in emphasis. According to the Universalist the universal is the principal meaning and the individual is only an adjectival adjunct. The Individualist makes the individual the principal meaning and the universal the adjectival appendage.³³

The Universalist has also offered an alternative solution of the problem of difference of number and gender. The difference of number and gender of words denoting qualities follows those of the substances which they qualify. Thus, for instance, such usages as '*śuklā paṭī*' (white textile), '*śuklaṁ vastram*' (white cloth), '*dve śukle kambale*' (two white blankets), are not taken exception to. Likewise, the universal also can legitimately take on the number and gender of the substance in which it inheres. If the situation is sought to be logically explained by the postulation of the relation of identity between a substance and a quality, the relation between the universal and the individual also can be regarded as one of identity likewise, the cases being entirely analogous. If, on

³³Na hy ākṛtipadārthakasya dravyaṁ na padārthaḥ, dravyapadārthakasya vā 'kṛtir na padārthaḥ. Ubhaya ubhayaṁ padārthaḥ. Kasyacit kiñcid pradhānabhūtaṁ kiñcid guṇabhūtam. Ākṛtipadārthakasya ākṛtiḥ pradhānabhūtā, dravyaṁ guṇabhūtam. Dravyapadārthakasya dravyaṁ pradhānabhūtam ākṛtir guṇabhūtā (MB, Vol. II, pp. 98-99).

the other hand, a rule of linguistic usage is propounded that the adjectival expressions will have the gender and the number of the substantives qualified by them, a similar rule may be propounded that the universal will take on the number and the gender of the substance in which it inheres.³⁴

As regards the incompatibility of actions with universals, it is easily met by the consideration that the actions have necessary reference to the individuals with which the universal is associated. It follows from the logical implication of the verbal propositions. Kaiyaṭa explains this position by an apposite example. Thus when a person is ordered to fetch fire, he fetches it in a vessel. So also when an action is enjoined regarding a universal, it must have a reference to the individual also with which it is associated by force of logical implication alone.³⁵

As regards the objection that an entity cannot exist in more than one substratum, the examples of the sun and god Indra have been cited by Patañjali to show the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of one in many. The implication of Patañjali's statement has been explained by Kaiyaṭa with convincing logic. Certainly universals have no spatial and temporal limitations and as such they are ubiquitous and eternal. But that does not give rise to confusion of concepts. Thus, for instance, though the cow-universal exists in the individual cows along with other universals, there is no possibility of mistaking the cow for a horse and the like. Things have got unfathomable powers that cannot be known *a priori*. Thus, it is the individual cow which can manifest the cow-universal and not others. To put it the other way about, it is the cow-universal which has effective relation with the individual cow. The other universals, it can be asserted, are not related

³⁴Yad asau dravyaṁ śrito bhavati guṇas tasya yal liṅgaṁ vacanaṁ ca tad guṇasyā 'pi bhavati. Evaṁ ihā 'pi yad asau dravyaṁ śritā ākṛtis tasya yal liṅgaṁ vacanaṁ ca tad ākṛter api bhaviṣyati (MB, Vol. II, p. 99).

³⁵Yathā 'gnir āṇiyatām ity ukte kevalasyā 'gner ānayanāsambhavān nāntariyakatvād acoditam api pātram āṇiyate, etad evā 'gner ānayanam yat pātrasthasya, tathā ākṛtāv ārambhaṇādini codyamānāni sāmartyāt sāhacaryād dravyam abhiniviśante (MBP, Vol. II, p. 99).

to the cow-individual. The origination and destruction of the individual do not entail the corresponding events in the case of the universal inherent in it, because the universal is not dependent on the individual for its existence. The universal is not identical with the individual in reality, though in our empirical knowledge the two appear to be mixed up.³⁶

As regards the charge of diversity and the like accruing to the universal being the meaning of a word, it can be easily dismissed by the line of argument adopted before. The diversity belongs to the individuals, and so far as the universal is concerned, it appears to put on this vesture of diversity since as, we have shown, the relation of the universal with the individual is one of apparent identity.

As regards the last charge of Vyāḍi that there can be no one universal possible in a number of heterogeneous individuals, Patañjali shows on behalf of the Universalist that in such cases also the existence of one universal is not impossible of being discerned. Thus, though the word 'akṣa' means many diverse entities belonging to diverse classes, there is one common element in it in that the act of 'pervasion', which is the meaning of the √as from which all these words are derived, is common to all the different meanings. Likewise, in the case of polynoms, the different senses have got a common derivative meaning which renders unnecessary the repetition of more than one such word to denote various meanings.³⁷

We have elaborately discussed Patañjali's treatment of the views of Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi who hold the universal and the individual respectively as the denotation of a word. It is worthy of notice that according to orthodox traditions Patañjali is supposed to believe that not only universal and individual but gender, number and case-relation as well form the constituents of the denoted sense of a word. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa goes so far as to suggest that the view of Patañjali is decidedly

³⁶Sarvagatatve 'pi padārthānām vicitraśaktiyogāt kaścit padārthaḥ kāñcid eva 'kṛtim abhivyanakti na tu sarvām sarvaḥ (MBP, Vol. II, p. 96).

Also: Dravyavināśe ākṛter avināśaḥ. Kutah ? Anāśritā ākṛtir dravyam (MB, Vol. II, p. 100).

³⁷Vibhinnārtheṣu ca sāmānyāt siddham. Sarvatra aśnoter akṣaḥ, padyateḥ pādaḥ, mimiteḥ māśaḥ. Tatra kriyāsāmānyāt siddham (Op. cit., p. 101).

the best of all the current theories on the subject.³⁸ We have weighed the claims of the universal and the individual as the meaning of the word. We now propose to study the question of gender.

Gender in Sanskrit is not absolutely natural but determined by the accident of usage which pays scant regard to the reality meant. Thus, though the word 'man' (*puruṣa*) is masculine and woman (*strī*) feminine, Sanskrit grammarians conceive the word 'bank' (*taṭa*) as masculine (*taṭaḥ*), feminine (*taṭi*) and neuter (*taṭam*). In like manner, the word 'kalatra' (wife) is said to be neuter while the word 'vyakti' (person) is looked upon as feminine. To come to the point, we may say without fear of contradiction that Pāṇini does not think that the gender is included in the denotation; for had the idea of gender been expressed by the denotative power of the word, he would not have used the word 'gender' specifically in the aphorism II. iii. 46. Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita explains the term *prātipadikārtha* (import of the base) as what is invariably presented by the power of denotation and thus avoids the issue whether the idea of gender is expressed by a word through its denotative power. But, while explaining the aphorism IV. i. 4, Bhaṭṭoji expressly states that the idea of gender is denoted by a word; and the suffixes, masculine, feminine and neuter, only serve to suggest it (*dyotaka*). Nāgeśa also opines that the idea of gender is not denoted by the suffix but by the base. The grammarian admits that the relationship subsisting between the sense of the base and that of the suffix is one of an attribute and its substantive. That being so, the idea of gender cannot be regarded as being expressed by the suffix in view of the fact that it would in that case appear as a substantive which it is not. Further, the suffix cannot be said to be denotative of the gender when we find that a word conveys the idea of a particular gender without the necessary suffix added to it. Thus, for instance, the word '*vāc*' is feminine but there is no feminine suffix to convey the idea of the particular gender. Moreover, the aphorisms of Pāṇini testify to the fact that the

³⁸Tatra pañcakam prātipadikārtha ity eva jyāyaḥ (VSLM, pp. 1150-51).

idea of gender is really associated with the base and not the suffix. Then, again, if it is held that the masculine gender in the term '*ghaṭaḥ*' (jar) is expressed by the suffix '*-su*' (nominative singular), we can no longer explain how the same gender is denoted by the term '*ghaṭena*'. And for the sake of economy, if not for any other reason, we cannot postulate that each case-ending expresses the idea of gender. The arguments that are advanced in support of the belief that the denotation comprehends the idea of gender may be likewise mentioned if the ideas of number and case-relation are sought to be included in the denotation.³⁹

A correct appraisal of the attitude of the grammarian towards the denotation of word may be made from a study of the observations of Bhaṭṭoji on the subject. Like all other thinkers Bhaṭṭoji at the very outset enters into the dialectics of the problem and weighs the merits of the different theories in the balance. He says that the Universalists can claim the credit of logical economy while the Individualists rely more on the testimony of experience. Leaving aside a very few instances where the suffix '*-tva*' (indicative of the character of an object) is added, we cannot conceive of any particular case in which the universal appears as a substantive in the content of the meaning of a word. He points out that the Individualists need not include the universal as a constituent of the meaning for the universal will be unavoidably associated with the individual as its determinant. The determinant need not be a part of the meaning, because it cannot but be associated with it by the necessity of factual relationship. The case under consideration is analogous to causal relation. The effect of fire is smoke, which on analysis is found to consist of two elements the smoke-universal and the individual entity. The universal being an eternal verity cannot be an effect. The effect is the individual and, though the universal cannot be sundered from it, it cannot enter into the causal relation. It is plain that the determinant of a positive effect, being an eternal universal, is not part of the effect, and likewise the determinant of the

³⁹VSLM, p. 1150.

denoted meaning is not a part of the meaning, though its relationship with the individual is a matter of ontological necessity.

Having said so much Bhaṭṭoji turns round to point out that the two theories, though opposed in principle, have been accepted by the grammarian, and he explains the possibility of harmonizing them in the following way. Both the theories should be looked upon as the means that enable us to understand and explain our usages. They are like the various paths leading to one and the same goal and their pragmatic utility can hardly be denied. The paths are different but none the less they enable us to secure the vision of the goal. Bhaṭṭoji, therefore, affirms that the grammarian has no objection to accepting both the universal and the individual as the denoted sense of the word.⁴⁰ Bhaṭṭoji supports his statements by pointing out that Pāṇini's aphorism I. i. 68 would not have been enunciated if it were a fact that the universal alone happened to be the denoted meaning, and that, if the individual were the only content of the denoted meaning, the aphorism I.ii.64 would have been totally meaningless.⁴¹

Some special contribution to this problem of denoted meaning has been made by Koṇḍabhaṭṭa in his *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇasāra*. He has fully developed the thesis of his previous masters and his contributions are really of outstanding merit. Drawing his inspiration from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, he suggests that the formative elements of the denoted meaning are not five only but one more. As we have noticed elsewhere, word as the material cause persists in all its different manifestations or transformations in the shape of various objects. And what is, therefore, denoted by a word contains two elements, viz, a sense-element and a word-element. For grammatical operations the word-element is regarded as the substantive to which the sense-element is subordinate; while in other cases it is the sense-element that plays the leading

⁴⁰Yady api jātivyaktipakṣayor anyatarasya nyāyena bādha āvaśyakas tathā 'pi śāstre samjñāparibhāṣādivaḥ lakṣyasiddhyupāyatayā ubhayāśrayaṇe kim api bādhakaṁ nā 'sti (ŚK, p. 28).

⁴¹Yadi hi vyaktir eva . . . tarhi jātyākhyāyam iti sūtram nā 'rabheta. Yadi ca jātir eva . . . tarhi sarūpasūtram nā 'rabheta (Op. cit., p. 29).

role. But both the elements constitute the denoted meaning of a word. It is pointed out by Koṇḍabhaṭṭa that when we say 'Pronounce Viṣṇu' (*Viṣṇum uccāraya*) we understand the word-element as the meaning of the word *Viṣṇu*. Koṇḍabhaṭṭa, therefore, thinks that the word-element should be included in the denotation of the word, besides the sense-element which is fivefold, viz, universal, individual, gender, number and case-relation.⁴²

BHARTṚHARI'S VIEW

It is interesting to notice that Bhartṛhari has recorded no less than a dozen theories on the import of words. He has also added his own observations on the subject—observations which throw a flood of light on his attitude towards the problem.

According to some theorists what is denoted by a word is pure and unqualified existence (*astyartha*) and not any specific determination. The word 'man', for instance, means that something exists to which the appellation 'man' is attached. The content of denotation in every case, therefore, is absolutely general in character and never determinate.⁴³ It has been pointed out in opposition that there are certain words which may be said to convey a purely existential reference but it can hardly be denied that there are numerous expressions which present definite meanings. Thus such words as heaven, merit, deity and the like do not possess any specific content, but it does not surely stand to reason if it is maintained that expressions like man, cow, horse and others do not introduce into their denotations certain specific forms. Nevertheless, these theorists would hold the view that both the two classes of words cited above are on a par with each other, the denotation in either case being a vague existential reference. Thus the words having reference to visible objects denote unqualified existence, and the ideas of specific forms which appear to be expressed by them do not actually enter into

⁴²VBS, pp. 327-28.

⁴³Astyarthas sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyyalakṣaṇam /
Apūrvadevatāsvargais samam āhur gavādiṣu (VP, II. 121).

the denotation but are understood along with the denotation, thanks to their intimate and inseparable connexion with the same. It is affirmed by these theorists that we know from our experience that the word 'cow' implies an object which has invariably a particular form, and that there is nothing unusual about it if we are led to carry the impression that the said form is included within the denotation of the word. It is, therefore, suggested that the particular form associated with the denotation of any word should not be confused with the denotation itself.⁴⁴

It must be admitted that this theory is open to grave objections. If it is held that words cannot present any definite meaning but existence, pure and simple, all our intersocial communications through the medium of words would become fruitless. For we can no longer make a distinction between the denotations of different words. But if it be conceded that they contain a reference to an objective individual or to some concrete universal, there remains hardly any justification for recognizing this theory as one different from the popular theories of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā schools. It may be contended that though the denotation of the word 'cow' is not unqualified existence as characterized by the word 'cow' or the universal of cowhood, yet since the individual characteristics are not referred to, the word denotes existence and nothing more. In fact, the cow-expression or the cow-universal circumscribes the content of denotation.⁴⁵ This interpretation, too, does not solve the difficulties pointed out above; for careful analysis will reveal that it practically restates the views of the Naiyāyika according to whom the individual as determined by the universal constitutes the denotation of a word. If it is again maintained for the sake of argument that the denotation of some words is a specific determination while that of others is pure and unqualified existence, it makes no improvement whatsoever. To admit that there is

⁴⁴Prayogadarśanābhyāsād ākārāvagrahas tu yaḥ /
Na sa śabdasya viśayas sa hi yatnāntarāśrayaḥ (VP, II. 122).

Also : Com. thereunder.

⁴⁵Asti ko 'py artho gavādisābdābhidhyeyo gotvādisāmānyasambandho ve 'ti (TSP, p. 284).

no fixed character of the denotation and that it varies in the case of different words is to be involved in unnecessary cumbrousness. It is only in the fitness of things to declare in unambiguous terms whether the denotation brings home to our understanding any determinate content or only conveys a vague existential reference. In the former case there is practically no difference between this view and that of the Naiyāyika or of the Mīmāṃsaka. In the latter case it exposes itself to obvious difficulties which have been already discussed in the last paragraph.

According to another group of theorists the denotation of words cannot be pure existence. A word denotes certain broad determinations but there are specific details which are consequential, and the latter are also regarded as the meaning, because they are necessary for fulfilling the requirements of syntactical construction. It should be noted that in the opinion of this school the denotation of a word (*vācyārtha* or *śakyārtha*) is different from the meaning of that word (*śabdārtha*). Thus the denotation of a word is held to be a universal, an individual, an attribute or an action, as the case may be, but whatever is necessary for the purpose of completing the syntactical relation should be regarded as the meaning of a word but not its denotation. To illustrate the point, the word 'cow' which is denotative of the cow-universal is found to convey the idea of a cow-individual when it is used in the sentence, 'Bring a cow'. In the particular case the idea of a cow-individual is occasioned by the word, 'cow', but this does not enter into the actual content of its denotation. But this consequential idea is also regarded as the meaning.⁴⁶

From the illustration cited above it may appear to some that the position of this second school of theorists adumbrated above runs almost parallel to that of the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas, according to whom the denotation of a word is the universal

⁴⁶Kecid bhedāḥ prakāśyante śabdais tadabhidhāyibhiḥ /

Anuṣṭupādinaḥ kāmście chabdārtha ity manyate (VP, II. 123).

Also: Kecid bhedā jātyādayaś śabdavācyāḥ kecit tatrā 'rthaprayojakā anuṣṭupādina eva tathā tāṃs ca śabdārtha ity apare manyante (Com. thereunder).

while the individual which is invariably associated with the universal is held to be implied through it whenever the necessity for effecting the syntactical relation arises. In order to remove such an impression it needs to be pointed out that according to the Mīmāṃsakas the idea of the individual is presented through such proofs of knowledge as inference (*anumāna*) and implication (*arthāpatti*) and never through word (*śabda*), while this school of thinkers opine that the same is occasioned by word. The difference between the views of the two schools rests on another important point. The Mīmāṃsakas do not admit the fourfold classification of the denotation of words posited by this school. In their opinion the denotation of a word must be a universal. This school has in all probability drawn upon the scheme of the fourfold classification which was upheld by Patañjali in his *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya*.

Bhartrhari has strongly criticized the view of this school by pointing out that it is absolutely unreasonable to hold that the individual can be the meaning of a word. A word cannot denote anything else than the universal. It cannot be denied that the actual denotation of a word is supplemented for the purpose of completing the syntactical relation, but there is hardly any justification for recognizing that supplement as the meaning of that word. The word 'cow', for instance, denotes the cow-universal. It is a fact that it is not possible to comprehend this universal without the substratum in which it occurs. But it is illogical to maintain that the individual with all its characteristics is the meaning of a word.⁴⁷ The word 'jar' does not denote the specific attributes and individual characteristics which actually belong to the thing called jar. These may become associated with the meaning owing to their factual incidence in the thing. When the particular determinations which vary from individual to individual are however perceived, they become mixed up with the verbal meaning and an uncritical person takes the whole thing

⁴⁷Jātipratyāyake śabde yā vyaktir anuṣaṅgiṇī /

Na tām vyaktigatām bhedān jātiśabdo 'valambate (VP, II. 124).

in lump to be the meaning.⁴⁸ But there is no sense in saying that the specific attributes and individual characteristics should be acknowledged as the meaning of a word though they cannot actually enter into the content of denotation. What is held to be the meaning of a word is only consequential to the denoted meaning of that word and serves to complete the syntactical relation when required, and it is no use saying that what is necessary for effecting the syntactical relation is occasioned by a word and should be called its meaning. Just as the action signified by an injunction, e.g., 'perform a sacrifice' (*yajeta*), is invariably found to be related to the different instruments of that action, so that the idea of the different instruments of that action arises in our mind as soon as the idea of the action is brought home to our understanding, in the same way the idea of the specific attributes and individual characteristics springs up in our mind when the syntactical construction is not possible with the idea of general features alone. Bhartṛhari accordingly asserts that since the individual characteristics are found to be nothing more than consequential supplements to general characteristics, they ought not to be regarded as the meaning of a word.⁴⁹

It may be noticed here in passing that this view and the first are clearly distinguishable.^a In the first place, the denotation of a word according to the first view is pure existence, while according to this view the denotation conveys a reference to some specifications.^b Secondly, it is never believed by the supporters of the first view that the supplement to the denotation which is necessary for purposes of syntactical relation is occasioned by the word itself, but the upholders of the second view maintain that though this supplement is not included in the denotation proper, still it is revealed by a word.

There is yet a class of theorists who think it to be an invidious distinction to hold that certain specifications can enter into the content of the denotation of a word while others

⁴⁸Ghaṭādināṁ na cā 'kārān pratyāyayati vācakaḥ /
Vastumātraniveśitvāt tadgatir nāntariyakī (VP, II. 125).

⁴⁹...tataś ca śabdavyāpāro 'sau na bhavati (PR, p. 133).

cannot. In the opinion of these theorists the denotation of a word should include in the fitness of things all the specifications which are objectively present in the meaning and give it its individuality.⁵⁰ It is, however, admitted that certain specifications would have a more important status than others. Thus the specifications which are directly expressed by a word stand as the principal element in the content of the denotation in relation to those that are subsequently understood in this reference as completing the syntactical relation. To be explicit, the word 'jar' denotes both the jar-universal and the individual jars. Puṇyarāja seems to think that this view is more reasonable than the previous one.⁵¹

(iv) According to another school of thinkers the denotation of a word is an aggregate having neither distributive nor collective reference.⁵² It is held by these thinkers that it is no use viewing some of the elements of the denotation as more important than the rest. On the contrary, each element claims exactly the same status which is enjoyed by another. But it should be noted that there is absolutely no emphasis on the distributive or the collective character of the elements forming the group or totality. So the meaning of a word is a group or totality without reference to the units severally or collectively. If the units were severally meant, the meaning of the word would be either an entity singular, dual or plural in number according as the number of the units abstracted from the whole may vary. If, however, the meaning were a determinate group of a determinate number of individuals each definitely comprehended as a co-equal element, then the meaning would be a definite plurality, and this would necessitate the assertion of the meaning in the plural number. To make the point clear by a concrete illustration, the word 'Brahmin' may connote such essential characteristic attributes as 'austerity, learning, birth', severally or collectively. In the former case the meaning may be a singular or a dual attribute,

⁵⁰Niyatās tu prayogā ye niyataṁ yac ca sādhanam /

Teṣāṁ śabdābhidheyatvam aparair anugamyate (VP, II. 127).

⁵¹...kiṁ tu sarvākāram evā 'bhidheyāṁ guṇapradhānabhāvena tasmāt pratītam ity ayaṁ pakṣaś śobhanaḥ (PR, p. 135).

⁵²Samudāyo 'bhidheyas syād avikalpasamuccayaḥ (VP, II. 127).

either one or two. If all the attributes were thought to constitute the connotation, then the connotation of the word 'Brahmin' would include all the three qualities, each with a co-equal status. This would make the meaning a plurality, for the expression of which the plural number would be the only appropriate form.⁵³

One more theory holds that the denotation of all words is an unreal relationship.⁵⁴ Thus it is asserted that what is denoted by the word 'jar' is the relation of an individual jar to the jar-universal, and as that relation cannot be separately perceived apart from the terms between which it subsists, viz, the individual jar and the universal inhering in all jars, it is fictitious. It may be noted in passing that these theorists, like the Vedāntin, do not admit relation such as inherence (*samavāya*) as having a separate existence beyond that of the relata between which that relation is supposed to subsist.⁵⁵

According to another school of theorists the denotation of a word is not a fiction but a reality with unreal adjuncts.⁵⁶ It is

⁵³Nanu yadi ākārasamudāyaṃ samuccitam eva pratyāyayati tarhi bahuvacanam eva tatra syāt. Atha vikalpitaṃ pratyāyayati tadā vacanavikalpas syāt (PR, p. 135).

Bharṭhari has not explained this view in greater detail and Puṇyārāja has assured us that he will be discussing this point more fully in his commentary on the *Upamāsamuddeśa*, a section in the third volume of the *Vākyapadīya*. Unfortunately for us this commentary is not available. It is, however, encouraging that this view has been referred to and elucidated in the *Pañcīkā* of Kamalaśīla, where the Buddhist scholar writes in the following manner. The word *brāhmaṇa* denotes an aggregate of attributes, such as austerity, birth, erudition and the like without any conceptual determination which is either collective or distributive. Just as the word 'forest' gives rise to an indefinite and vague conception of all trees but neither a precise idea of any individual tree nor a distinct conception of the individual trees as related together, so the word *brāhmaṇa* does not definitely denote austerity, birth and erudition distributively nor does it signify austerity, birth and erudition collectively. What is denoted, however, is the group or totality of austerity, birth and erudition only in a general way as an aggregated whole which can be differentiated from other correlatives (TSP, I. p. 284).

⁵⁴Asatyo vā 'pi saṃsargaś śabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate (VP, II. 128).

⁵⁵Samavāyābhyupagamāc ca sāmyād anavasthite (BRS, II. ii. 13).

It may be noted that Kamalaśīla explains this view in a somewhat different way. He represents the view of these theorists by saying that, as the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes all such attributes as austerity, birth, erudition and the like as a single unity like the dark hue and as the attributes are neither distributively nor collectively apprehended in their own forms, the denotation of a word which is held to be the relation of these attributes should be characterized as unreal as a whirling fire-brand (*alātacakra*).

⁵⁶Asatyopādhi yat satyaṃ tad vā śabdanibandhanam (VP, II. 128).

Also: Atha satyam evā 'satyopādhivicitritaṃ śabdavācyaṃ (PR, p. 135).

common knowledge that in our inter-social communications reference is frequently made to particular forms and not to generic forms alone. Hence there arises the necessity of including the particular form in the denotation of a word. But as the particular forms are not anything more than unreal fictions, it is held by these theorists that the denotation of a word which includes the generic form with the specific determinations as its adjunct is a reality with unreal adjuncts. Though Bhartṛhari and Puṇyarāja have not elucidated the view, we find Kamalaśīla explaining it with illustrations. Kamalaśīla represents the viewpoint of these theorists by pointing out that in their opinion a substance like gold has a generic form which permeates all the different things made of it, viz, bracelet, ring and earring. The generic or the universal form is uniform and unchanging and as such held to be real, while the individual forms that are of varying character are believed to be unreal fictions. And as both the generic and the specific forms are signified by a word, its denotation is regarded as a reality with unreal adjuncts.

Another class of theorists opines that what is denoted by a word is its own form coalescing with an objective fact.⁵⁷ Reference to an objective fact is almost invariably made through the machinery of words, and so it is held that word stands in the relation of identity with fact. This relation of identity (*adhyāsa* as it is described by Puṇyarāja)⁵⁸ is responsible for presenting an objective fact not in its own character but as though coalescent with the form of a word. And this form of a word which is, as it were, unified with an objective fact is maintained to be the denotation of a word. It is further held that though word and object as unified together becomes the denotation of a word, still it is undeniable that sometimes the emphasis is on the aspect of the word while on other occasions it is on the aspect of the objective fact. Thus our work-a-day expressions have more usually a reference to an objective fact,

⁵⁷Śabdo vā 'py abhijalpatvam āgato yāti vācyatām /
So 'yam ity abhisambandhād rūpam ekikṛtaṁ yadā /

Śabdasyā 'rthena taṁ śabdam abhijalpaṁ pracakṣate (VP, II. 129-30).

⁵⁸Abhijalpatvam adhyāsarūpatvam āgataś śabdaḥ (PR, p. 136).

while in treatises on grammar a word sometimes denotes its own form and sometimes an objective fact.⁵⁹

It may be pointed out by way of criticism that as word and fact are comprehended by different sense-organs, there is hardly any possibility for a confusion of the two. The unification of the two as conceived by these theorists becomes conceivable only if the two are regarded as subjective ideas. And in that case there is no sense in upholding the position that the form of a word is coalescent as it were with an objective reality.⁶⁰

According to two other theories, mutually opposed, it is held by the one that it is the word alone which possesses the power of expressing a fact, while the fact is impotent to express itself. The brute facts of nature cannot make themselves known without the light afforded by a word. It is maintained by the other that the so-called brute fact is not a helpless destitute as asserted in the previous theory. The objective facts supposed to be revealed by words are potent enough to express themselves in infinitely diverse ways, and the word only helps us to light upon the particular by which a real reveals itself in a particular case.⁶¹

One more theory holds that the denotation of words is an idea or a mental image which is occasioned by an external object and comes to be cognized as the external object itself by being impinged upon it. But so long as the idea is not superimposed upon the objective reality but remains as the idea only, it is not recognized as the denotation of a word. It is due to an error that the idea is apprehended as something external, and the subjective idea thus identified with the objective reality is believed to be the denotation of a word.

⁵⁹Tayor aprthagarthatve rūdher avyabhicāriṇi /

Kiñcid eva kvacid dravyam (rūpaṁ?) prādhānyenā 'vatiṣṭhate //

Loke 'rtharūpatāṁ śabdaḥ pratipannaḥ pravartate /

Śāstre tū 'bhayarūpatvaṁ pravibhaktāṁ vivakṣayā (VP, II. 131-32).

⁶⁰Tathā hi bāhyayoś śabdārthayor bhinnendriyagrāhyatvādibhyo bhedasya siddhes tayor aikyāpādanam ayuktam eva bhāvikam. Ato buddhisthayor eva śabdārthayor ekabuddhigatatvād ekikarāṇaṁ yuktam. Tathā hi upagṛhītābhidheyākāras tirobhūta-śabdasvabhāvo buddhau viparivartamānaś śabdātmā svarūpānugatam arthavibhāgenā 'ntas sanniveśayann abhijalpa ucyate. Sa ca buddher ātmagata evā 'kāro yukto na bāhyas tasyai 'kāntena parasparaṁ viviktasvabhāvatvāt (TSP, I, p. 288).

⁶¹Aśaktes sasvasakter vā śabdair eva prakalpitā /

Ekasyā 'rthasya niyatā kriyādiparikalpānā (VP, II. 133).

The reason why a purely subjective idea is not recognized as the denotation of a word is not far to seek. Subjective ideas are not actionable, and so, unless they are hypostatized as objective facts, it is hardly of any practical utility to recognize them as the denotation of words.⁶²

Neither Bhartṛhari nor Puṇyarāja has thrown any hint about the possibility of a confusion that may arise between this view and the doctrine of *apoha* as sponsored by the Buddhists. Kamalaśīla, however, has taken special pains to prove that there is substantial disagreement between the two views, though points of affinity between them are apparent to a casual observer. According to the Buddhists the denotation of a word is also a subjective idea hypostatized as an objective fact. But the Buddhists would never admit that this objective fact possesses any reality—it is a fiction, pure and simple. In the opinion of the theorists, whose view has been described above, what is denoted by a word is a reality in the form of an idea superimposed upon external objects which, too, are real. The Buddhists, however, regard the objective reference as a projection of the conscious principle, not grounded in any objective reality. According to the Buddhists the denotation is nothing more than an illusory projection, and they agree that what is presented in a verbal cognition is no doubt a subjective idea but believed to be an objective fact endowed with effective action. This objective fact, however, is not an actual reality, as an actual reality must have the characteristics of a living reality which, in the opinion of the Buddhists, is unique and self-identical. Hence the import of words is maintained by the Buddhists to be a fiction, pure and simple.

(7) There is another school of thinkers who suggest that there are some words which denote concrete objects with specific forms, while others denote an abstract idea.⁶³ Thus the word 'cow' gives us a denotation which includes certain concrete forms that leave definite impressions on the mind, whereas

⁶²Yo vā 'rtho buddhiviśayo bāhyavastunibandhanāḥ /
Sa bāhyavastv iti jñātaś śabdārthaḥ kaiscid iṣyate (VP, 134).

⁶³Ākāravantas sarivedyā vyaktasmṛtinibandhanāḥ /
Ye te pratyavabhāsante saṁvinmātraṁ tv ato 'nyathā (Op. cit., II. 135).

the word 'merit' (*apūrvā*) is denotative of a purely intellectual idea that has no corresponding counterpart in objective reality. In the circumstances, the denotation of word is not uniform in every case.

The last of the twelve theories recorded by Bhartṛhari maintains that the import of words is never fixed. It varies with the difference in impressions (*vāsanā*) rooted in different persons from different sources. Thus it is found that the same word conveys different imports to different individuals. The word 'jar', for instance, denotes a whole (*avayavin*) consisting of parts (*avayavās*) to one professing his faith in the system of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, while it presents a complex of attributes (*guṇasamāhāra*) as the meaning to one trained in the Sāṅkhya system and again a collection of atoms (*paramāṇusamuccaya*) to one affiliated to the school of Buddhistic thought. Even a person who happens to change his allegiance from one particular system of philosophy to another will give us different denotations of the same word at different times.⁶⁴

Bhartṛhari draws this section to a close with an illuminating note of his own that abundantly testifies to his sharp critical acumen. It is indeed a fact that those who have received training in different systems of philosophy and dialectics will differ from one another in holding what actually forms the denotation of words.⁶⁵ But these differences of opinion can only disappear with the vision of the ultimate truth dawning upon the soul. Those who are not blessed with the vision of the ultimate truth fail to study things in their proper perspective, and so whatever they say is hardly expected to be free from error and blemish.⁶⁶ It may, of course, be said that sages who possess enlightenment will declare to us what should be regarded as the truth and what again as untruth.⁶⁷

⁶⁴Idānīm pratiniyatavāsanāvaśenai 'va pratiniyatākāro 'rthas tattvatas tu kaścīd api niyato nā 'bhidhīyate... (PR, 138).

⁶⁵Ekasyā 'pi ca śabdasya nimittair avyavasthitaiḥ /
Ekena bahubhiś cā 'rtho bahudhā parikalpyate (VP, II. 139).

⁶⁶Tasmād adṛṣṭatattvānām sāparādhmā bahucchalam /
Darśanam vacanam cā 'pi nityam evā 'navasthitam (Op. cit., II. 140).

⁶⁷Nanu santy eva parāvarajñā munayas tadanusāreṇa sarvaṁ vyavasthāpayiṣyāmaḥ (PR, p. 139).

But Bhartṛhari says that the vision of sages is correct indeed but it must not be forgotten that it is something transcendental. And we all know that our empirical and inter-social communications cannot be conducted with the transcendental truths. The transcendental truth is of little use for the understanding of the empirical meaning of words.⁶⁸ If the transcendental fails to be of any help to us, it may be enquired if our perceptual knowledge should be trusted in the matter of explaining the inter-social communications of our everyday life. To be precise, let our perception decide what should be regarded as the denotation of words.⁶⁹ Bhartṛhari warns us against putting exaggerated reliance on the efficiency of perceptual knowledge in ascertaining the truth. Is it not a fact that we all perceive that the sky is a vault and the fire-fly is possessed of fire ?⁷⁰ Hence it is that Bhartṛhari points out the necessity for examining our perceptual experiences by the test of reasoning.⁷¹ But in the case under review we find that reasoning also has not been able to help us materially; as has been shown above, it varies with different schools of thinkers. Bhartṛhari, therefore, thinks that the discussion on the import of words should not be carried to any inordinate length. He is rather inclined to indeterminism and thinks that it is impossible to hit upon a theory which will meet with universal approval. The meaning of words is largely determined by our subjective attitude and culture, and so the denotation of a word is held to be different in different systems of thought, and we need not be surprised at the incompatibility or conflict of one theory with another.⁷²

✓⁶⁸Rṣiṇāṁ darśanaṁ yac ca tattve kiñcid avasthitam /

Na tena vyavahāro 'sti na tac chabdanibandhanam (VP, II. 141).

⁶⁹Nanu puruṣabuddhāyo vicitrā bhavantu pratyakṣeṇa khalu vyaṁ yathāvad artho dṛṣtas tathai 'va ca vyavahariṣyāmaḥ (PR, p. 140).

⁷⁰Talavad dṛśyate vyoma khadyoto havyavād iva /

Na cai 'vā 'sti talaṁ vyomni na khadyote hutāśanaḥ (VP, II. 142).

⁷¹Tasmāt pratyakṣam apy arthaṁ vidvān ikṣeta yuktitaḥ /

Na darśanasya prāmāṇyād dṛśyam arthaṁ prakalpayet (Op. cit., 143).

⁷²Yasya yathai 'va svadarśanānusāreṇa pratibhāti tathai 'va tasya sa śabdārtha ity evā 'śrayaṇīyam ity alarṇaḥ nirvastubahuvikalpapradarśanene 'ty āha :

Asamākhyeyatattvānāṁ arthānāṁ laukikair yathā /

Vyavahāre samākhyānāṁ tat prājño na vikalpayet (Op. cit., II. 144).

In his system, however, the import of a word is a fiction inasmuch as he believes in the reality of a sentence and also of its meaning as an indivisible unit. Hence word and its meaning have no more objective value to him than that of an instrument enabling us to visualize and reach the ultimate goal.

CHAPTER EIGHT

IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS

INTRODUCTION

A proposition is generally defined to be a collection of individual words which culminate in and lead to a judgment consisting of concepts brought into a relation with one another.¹ So a proposition is nothing but the different individual words put in a certain juxtaposition and competent to express meanings which by virtue of their compatibility and harmony with one another cohere into one judgment. This concept of a sentence or a verbal proposition is more or less endorsed by common sense, and it represents the views of the Mīmāṃsists and the Naiyāyikas. The philosophers of these schools are realists in their metaphysical conclusions and are, in their epistemological attitude, empiricists. Experience is interpreted in consonance with the standards of common sense by them, and they fight shy of canons of logic that tend to establish a position opposed to common sense. No wonder the philosophers of these schools have criticized the idealistic theory of the grammarians regarding the metaphysical status of words and their meanings. We have set ourselves the task of elucidating the philosophical position of the grammarians, and it may appear to be a digression if we dwell at length on the theories of the realistic schools. But the prestige and the ostensible logical consistency of the theories propounded to explain the import of propositions by the Mīmāṃsists of the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools and by the Naiyāyikas necessitate a detailed examination of their theories in order that the grammarians' position may be properly assessed and, if logic warrants it, established with all its strength. We, therefore, propose to examine the theories known as *anvitābhīdhānavāda* and *abhihitānvayavāda* sponsored by the two rival schools of Mīmāṃsā and the

¹Vākyaṃ nāmai 'kaviśiṣṭārthapratipādanaparāṇi padāny eva (NR, p. 89).

theory of the Naiyāyikas which seems to differ from them both.

I. ANVITĀBHIDHĀNAVĀDA

Prabhākara and his followers contend that it is the proposition which has real significance. A single word in isolation is never found in use. The proposition is the real unit which carries a useful meaning. Individual words are possessed of significance only in so far as they are elements of a proposition. Prabhākara does not endorse the grammarians' view that the proposition is one simple unit. The apprehension of diverse elements as parts in a whole cannot be dismissed as illusion. According to him a proposition is a unit but it is an organic whole with parts correlated through their meanings. The word apart from its position in a proposition is only an abstraction and rather a torso; yet its distinctive individuality cannot be denied without repudiating the clear verdict of understanding. In this respect he agrees with Kumārila and the Naiyāyikas. It is undeniable that a verbal proposition gives rise to a judgment and a judgment is always a related whole. Though the meanings of individual words are ascertained by analysis involved in the application of the method of agreement and difference, the meanings must not be regarded as simple unrelated facts upon which a relation is made to supervene somehow. The meanings are concepts no doubt, but these concepts are organically related with one another and also understood as such. It will be pushing the process of analysis too far to take the concepts as divorced from relation. They are understood as related and there is no reason to divest them of their character as related. Relatedness attaches to the concepts as living elements in a judgment. And though it may suit the exigencies of our understanding to abstract the element of relatedness, we must not commit the mistake of supposing the concepts to be the actual real meanings of words.

Though a word, be it a verb or a noun, is understood to be related to different words in different sentences and, accordingly, the associated concepts and the relation between them

must vary, the fact that a concept is related with another concept with which it is congruent remains intact and unassailable irrespective of the difference of individual concepts. One word may stand in relation with another particular word in a particular sentence and may figure in another sentence in relation with an altogether different word; but it is absolutely certain that it must stand in some relation. The terms of relation may vary, but they have no existence apart from the relation. Relation is thus integral to the concepts conveyed by the terms. Prabhākara accordingly holds that the individual words must convey their meanings as related though the terms may be x, y, z. To put it in a nutshell, the contention of Prabhākara is that the meaning of a sentence is a consistent individual judgment and, though it is ultimately traceable to the individual component words and the meanings of words are concepts, the latter are always understood as related concepts. A word, therefore, denotes a concept as related, and an unrelated concept is an abstraction.²

But a difficulty has been raised which is a real stumbling block. Let it be assumed that a word denotes a related meaning. But it can be understood as related only when the other term *qua* another concept is known. Is the meaning or concept with which it is understood to be related denoted by another word or by its own power? If a word is supposed to convey its meaning as related with another meaning without resort to another word, then one word will suffice and the occurrence of other words in the sentence will be absolutely redundant. If, to avoid the difficulty, it is supposed that the other concept is conveyed by another word, the contingency of redundancy will be obviated no doubt. But this supposition will give rise to a logical see-saw. Take a concrete proposition—‘Bring the cow.’ If the word ‘cow’ denotes its meaning as related with the act as denoted by the verb ‘bring’, it can do so only when the act has been denoted by the verb, and the verb too can denote its meaning as related with the meaning of ‘the cow’ only

²Yady api pratiprayogaṁ viśeṣāntaratatsaṁsargayor vyabhicārah, tathā 'pi योग्येतरान्वितया स्वार्थमात्रस्यā 'vyabhicārāt prathamāvagatayogyetarānvitasvārthābhidhānasāmarthyānusāreṇa prayogāntareṣv api tathai 'va kalpayiṣyate (TP, p. 145).

after this meaning has been delivered by the word 'cow'. This circular process is unavoidable because it has been laid down as a condition that a word must denote a meaning actually related with another meaning which is actually delivered by another word. So the element of relation, which is made integral to the meaning of a word, can be understood only when the other meaning is antecedently known. But as the first word denotes a meaning which is related to that of the second and the second delivers a meaning as related with the first and as each is equally the condition of the other, the fallacy of logical see-saw (*anyonyāśraya*) is unavoidable. If, on the other hand, it is supposed that the words denote firstly unrelated meanings and then the relation between them, then the difficulty of the vicious circle is resolved but at too great a cost—namely, by arbitrarily investing a word with a double denotative power—one for simple meanings and another for their syntactical relation. There is no excuse for this unwanted hypothesis because we have no experience of such double power and also because it flagrantly violates the accepted law that a word cannot exercise a series of functions of the same order and kind in succession.³ A word can exercise one function and thus express one meaning by virtue of that function—this function ceases when the meaning is expressed. If a continuous exercise of the same function were possible, it would render nugatory the postulation of other functions, viz, indication or secondary denotation (*lakṣaṇā*).

What after all is meant by the denotation of related meaning ? If it means that the words as members of a proposition lead to a judgment consisting of meanings related with one another, there will be no objection from any quarter. Everybody admits that the meaning of a proposition or, which is the same thing, of the words constituting the proposition is a composite of related concepts—in one word, a judgment. If, again, it is asserted that the individual words are chosen and adjusted with the intention and purport of bringing their meanings into mutual relation, that can also be endorsed by

³Sakṛtprayuktaśabdasya viramyavyāpārānupapattiḥ (NPR, p. 146).

the other schools.⁴ But if it is meant that a word or words denote the relation of meanings by their primary capacity of denotation, then the position cannot be accepted. The primary capacity of a word for the denotation of its meaning can successfully come into play if it is backed by the previous knowledge of the relation of the word with its meaning, no matter whether the relation be natural or conventional. It is for this reason that a foreign language is unintelligible. Unfamiliar words in a sentence, for the same reason, do not convey any meaning. But there is no antecedent knowledge of a relation of a word with the integrated meaning of a sentence because the sentences are new and their integrated meanings were not known before. The denotative capacity for relation is confined to an individual meaning. If it is supposed that this capacity also extends to the meaning of the proposition, i.e., the relation between the meanings of the component terms, then the meanings of words and sentences should be understood in one sweep. But this is not the case. Were it so, the verbal judgment as the meaning would occur without consideration of the logical compatibility (or otherwise) of the meanings of words.⁵

It may be supposed that the capacity operates independently and immediately in respect of the individual meanings but that it denotes the meanings of the sentence, that is, the relation between the meanings of words, with the help of the latter (the individual meanings of words). This defence has a great deal of force and seems to obviate the difficulties put forward in the previous arguments. But it amounts to the elevation of the denotative capacity to the rank of an instrumental agent (*karana*).⁶ An instrumental agent is one which accomplishes the result by exercising an intermediate opera-

⁴ Kim ce 'dam anvitābhīdhānam nāma ? Na tāvad anvitapratipādanamātram. Avivādāt. Nā 'pi svārthābhīdhāyās tatra tātparyam. Avivādāt (NK, III. pp. 72-3).

⁵ Nā 'pi saṅgatibalena tatpratipādanam vākyārthasyā 'pūrvatvāt. Nā 'pi svārthasaṅgatibalena, tasya svārtha evo 'pakṣayāt. Nā 'pi sai 'va saṅgati ubhayapratipādikā, pratītikramānupapattē. Yaugapadyābhyupagame tu yogyatvādipratisandhānaśūnyasyā 'pi padārthapratyayavad vākyārthapratyayaprasaṅgāt (Op. cit., p. 73).

⁶ Nā 'pi sai 'va saṅgatis svārthe nirapekṣā, vākyārthe tu padārthapratipādanāvāntaravyāpāre 'ti yuktam. Tasyās svayam akaraṇatvāt (Loc. cit.).

tion. Thus the axe is the instrument of severance of a tree by being operated upon it in a particular manner.⁷ In the case under consideration the denotative capacity is made first to deliver the meanings of terms and through them to express the meaning of the sentence which is a judgment. It is the word which can be such an instrument and not the capacity apart from the word. It is the position of the Naiyāyika that a word is the instrument of the knowledge of the relation of verbal meanings. But it is so because it first denotes an unrelated meaning and next its relation with another. If it be the position of Prabhākara that words express the relation of meanings by means of an antecedent knowledge of the word's denotative relation to such a relation as the meaning of the sentence, then it would be wide of the mark; for the meaning of a sentence is new and cannot be antecedently known like the meaning of an individual word. If it is thought that words give rise to and become the occasion of a verbal judgment in and through the expression of individual meanings, this would amount to an endorsement of the position of the Naiyāyika.

To these objections the followers of Prabhākara have replied as follows. 'However much one may argue, one cannot get rid of the fact that when the verbal judgment follows upon the statement of words in a sentence and this judgment is cognizant of the relation between the meanings of words, the words have the capacity of conveying such a judgment as its meaning. It is not maintained by us that the sentence as an indivisible unit or as a related whole delivers the judgment as its meaning, because the sentence being different and capable of infinite variation due to the variation of terms, the relation between a proposition and a verbal judgment cannot be known before. But it is the words which have such capacity. As we have already made it clear at the outset, it is not necessary for the comprehension of a related meaning that the meanings of other terms related to the meaning in question should be known individually and specifically as antecedent conditions. It is enough that

⁷Karaṇānām avāntaravyāpārayogaḥ (NKP, III, p. 74).

the meaning of a word should be known as related in a general way with other meanings which are competent to satisfy the logical requirement of each other. So the charge of logical see-saw is entirely baseless. It is not asserted that a word denotes in the first place unrelated meanings and their relation in the second place. So the charge of double denotation is an unfounded allegation. The objection of continuous exercise of the same function is also based upon a misconception or a deliberate misinterpretation of our position. We deny all these charges because we do not assume any one of these facts.' 'What is maintained by us,' says Prabhākara, 'is this—that the verbal judgment must have a cause and that cause cannot be other than words. And it is this logical necessity which constrains us to assert that it is the word which denotes a related concept.'

It has been maintained by the followers of Kumārila that words denote unrelated meanings and these meanings aided by mutual expectancy, compatibility and propinquity give rise to the understanding of relation of meanings. It is claimed by them that this effects a logical economy inasmuch as it makes the primary meaning of a word a simple fact. But this assertion is not warranted by objective knowledge. The meanings of words are concepts and it is not found that concepts, i.e., facts conceived, do automatically give insight into their factual relations. Suppose we see a boy and we naturally enquire who the father of the boy is. Suppose also that the father of the boy is standing by. There is knowledge of the boy and knowledge of the person who happens to be the father standing in close proximity. And there is an enquiry in our mind about their relationship, and the two persons have also competency for standing in that relation. Yet the relation is not ascertained between them by means of perception. So the knowledge of two facts does not by itself lead to the knowledge of their relation despite their proximity, compatibility and capacity for rousing an enquiry.⁸ It may be asserted that though facts observed

⁸Na hi pramāṇāntarāvagatānām padārthānām pratilabdhākāṅkṣāditrayasahāyānām api vyatiśaṅgapratipādakatvaṁ dr̥śyate. Na hi Devadattam upalabhya ko 'sya pite 'ty

or known otherwise do not make known their relation, the same as expressed by words will automatically give rise to the knowledge of relation between them. But this position on examination will transpire to be vitiated by the fallacy of logical supererogation as it involves a superfluous assumption of these capacities. First, it is assumed that words have the capacity for denoting their unrelated meanings. Secondly, that the meanings have the capacity to convey the relation between them. Thirdly, that it is the words which bequeath this capacity to the meanings because the facts meant by words are supposed to have this capacity and not facts known otherwise.⁹ The Prābhākara theory has the merit of satisfying the law of economy. It asserts that a word denotes a related meaning. If it is contended that the concept of relatedness presupposes the concept of relation and so the power of denotation is bound to be two-fold—one for the relation and another for the related, still there is economy in respect of one power.¹⁰ But in reality the denotative power of the word is numerically one and has reference only to the related meaning. The element of relation involved is understood by implication and does not require the postulation of another denotative power, just in the same way as the universal as the meaning of the word, according to Kumārila, does not necessitate the postulation of a separate capacity regarding the individual. It is asserted that the universal is naturally bound up with an individual and so the latter is understood by implication. The same logical necessity is operative here also because the concept of relatedness involves the concept of relation as its presupposition.¹¹ Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that there is equality in respect of the number of powers, yet it ought to be admitted that it is the

apekṣamāṇas sannihitam api Yajñadattam yogyam api sahasai 'vā 'dhyavasyati pitaram (NR, p. 98).

⁹Saktitrayam prakalpyam syāt padānām arthagocarā /
Arthānām anvite śaktis tadādhāyakatā pade (Loc. cit.).

¹⁰Nanv anvitagocarām śaktidvayam kalpayitavyam. Tat katham ekā śaktir ity ucyate. Satyam etat, Tathā 'pi śaktitrayakalpanāl lāghavam asty eva (NR, p. 99).

¹¹Kim ca na prthag anvaye śaktiḥ kalpanīyā. Ekai 'va tu śaktir anvitaparyantā kalpayiṣyate (Loc. cit.).

words which have the capacity for the denotation of relation being known prior to the meanings and that the intention of the speaker for the communication of the relatedness is embodied in the words employed. This has the additional advantage of giving the verbal character to the judgment to be understood from the proposition. The position of Kumārila makes the judgment independent of the verbal proposition by affiliating it to the concepts understood instead of the terms. To seek to preserve its verbal character owing to its remote extraction from the terms will be round-about procedure. Besides, the law of causality precludes the affiliation of an effect to the cause of a cause.¹²

The difficulty was raised that the relatedness of a meaning could be understood only when the other meaning was known, and if the other meaning was also known to be related the result would be a vicious circle. But the objection proceeds from a misconception. Words by virtue of their association with facts give rise to a recollection of their simple unrelated meanings. This recollected meaning is understood as related by the denotative capacity of the words. It is not asserted that the words denote simple facts in the first place and their relation in the second place. So the charge of double denotation or the continuous exercise of the self-same denotative capacity is entirely baseless.¹³

The *modus operandi* of the emergence of the verbal judgment from a proposition is this: In the first instance words occasion a recollection of unrelated simple facts which are parts of their real meanings. These simple facts are not expressed by their denotative capacity but are simply recollected on account of the close association of the recollected contents with the verbal meanings. And the denotative capacity of words immediately sets up a syntactical connexion between meanings which fulfil the conditions of syntactical construction, viz, propinquity, compatibility and mutual

¹²Yady api kathañcic chaktikalpanā samānā bhavet tathā 'pi prathamāvagatānām abhyupetatātparyāñām ca padānām evā 'nvitābhidhāyakatvaṁ yuktam evā 'ngikartum. Evaṁ ca śābdatvam api vākyārthasya samāñjasaṁ bhaviṣyati (NR, p. 99).

¹³Nanu dvir abhidhānaṁ na padajātasya sāhacaryavaśāt svārtheṣu prathamāṁ smārakāñām paścād anvitābhidhāyakatvābhyupagamāt (TP, pp. 145-46).

expectancy. It is not necessary that these unrelated meanings should be delivered by the denotative capacity. The essential condition of syntactical relation is twofold : (i) the meanings should be first understood and (ii) then they should combine in pursuance of the aforesaid laws of syntactical relation. It has been urged against this view that as Prabhākara admits a syntactical combination even with a fact which is not expressed by a word standing in proximity, he cannot make proximity a condition of verbal judgment. Thus in the Vedic proposition, *Viśvajitā yajeta* (one should perform the *Viśvajit* sacrifice), the qualification of the agent is not stated. But unless the qualified agent is understood, the verbal judgment will be incomplete. This qualified agent is inferred to be a person desirous of heavenly residence. Now Kumārila infers the word and Prabhākara infers the meaning. In the view of the former there is no difficulty as the ellipsis is made good by a word which enters into the proposition and thus makes it self-sufficient, whereas the meaning independent of the word being not in actual proximity cannot satisfy the expectancy of the verb. To this objection Prabhākara replies that the expectancy of the verb is satisfied by conceptual association of the meaning and so there cannot be any difficulty in the syntactical construction. The ellipsis in a sentence makes the judgment incomplete because the meanings stand in need of another meaning. What is necessary to make it complete is the supply of this wanted meaning competent to satisfy the expectancy felt. A judgment is always concerned with meanings or concepts and not directly with the words expressive of them. The inference of a word can satisfy the requirement only by means of the meaning delivered by it.¹⁴

Another objection has been raised against the view that meanings are recollected and then words by their denotative capacity institute a relation between them. It is urged that this supposition is only a subterfuge to avoid the charge of logical see-saw. It is maintained by Prabhākara that the

¹⁴Na ca sannidhyapekṣatve bhaved anyonyasamśrayaḥ /
Na kevalābhidhānena smṛtyā 'pi hi bhaved asau (NR, p. 99).

meaning of a word is a related fact. If it be so, it is quite natural that this meaning should be remembered as soon as the word is uttered.¹⁵ It has been asserted that words are uttered with a view to a judgment and for this purpose unrelated meanings have no utility. The meanings are understood directly from the judgment and so relatedness is an integral factor of the meaning. But the recollection of the related meaning will be possible if the other relatum is recollected. This will make it impossible for a word or for a meaning, for the matter of that, to be a member of more than one proposition or one judgment. It has been maintained that a word occasions the recollection of the meaning without reference to its relation with other meanings because the latter are inconstant and variable. It is natural that memory should attach to what is constant. But this contention is an argument of despair. The conditions of recollection have been rather exhaustively stated in the *Nyāyasūtra*, III. ii. 41. In modern psychology they are styled the laws of association which are three or four, viz, the law of similarity, the law of contiguity, the law of contrast and, according to some, the law of causality. When one thing is associated with another thing the cognition of one gives rise to the memory of the other. A word is associated with a related meaning as a matter of fact. Unrelated meaning is only an abstraction or deduction from the felt related meaning. That being so, Prabhākara cannot get rid of the difficulty by resort to recollection as the latter will be concerned with the related meaning that was apprehended before.¹⁶ It is argued by the followers of Kumārila that their theory, which maintains that words express unrelated meanings and that the latter become automatically related if the threefold condition is satisfied, should commend itself for unqualified acceptance as it avoids the charge of logical see-saw which is inevitable in the other theory.

The adherents of Prabhākara, in defence of their position,

¹⁵Sāhacaryadarśanadaśāyām anvitānām evā 'nubhūtatayā tathai 'va smaraṇasyā 'vaśyāśrayaṇīyatvāt (TP, p. 146).

¹⁶Na hi padaṁ padārthamātrapratipattaye prayujyate kiṁtu vyavahārāya sa cā 'nvita eve 'ti katham ananvitānām eva padārthānām padebhyas smṛtis syāt (Loc. cit.).

observe that this animadversion is rather inspired by the opponents' love of their theory which gets the better of their love of truth. The conditions of recollection as enunciated in the *Nyāyasūtra* are not repudiated in the least, but the insistence of the opponent upon the recollection of the integrated meaning previously felt in a verbal judgment overreaches the truth. It is an accepted law that nothing can be remembered which was not previously cognized. It is never the case that all that was cognized is recollected. It is true that we have no previous knowledge of an unrelated meaning as part of verbal judgment, and it is also true that the latter is the only source of our knowledge of the meaning of words. It is out of loyalty to such experience that we maintain that the meaning of a word must include relation. But it does not follow that though the accepted meaning of a word must be a related fact, a word cannot occasion the recollection of the meaning without relation. A related meaning is a complex of the simple fact and relation. The simple fact was cognized when it was cognized as related. So there is no logical or psychological impediment to the recollection of a simple meaning being occasioned by a word. The contention of Kumārila's followers is unrealistic and insincere. What is the nature of the cognition of the unrelated meaning of a word as maintained by Kumārila ? The position of Kumārila is this : that words denote unrelated meanings and the latter bring about the knowledge of their relation *inter se*. What is this denotation ? It must be in the last resort a case of recollection. The understanding of the meaning cannot be a case of valid cognition as the fact meant must have been known before. Knowledge of a fact known before is nothing but recollection.¹⁷ It cannot be maintained that though denotation be a case of recollection, the recollection caused by a word has a special advantage inasmuch as the meaning recollected by means of a word is alone competent for syntactical construction with another meaning. For in such a proposition as 'There is a colony of milkmen

¹⁷Tvayā 'pi padārthaviśayāḥ pratyayāḥ...smṛtaya eṣṭavyāḥ (TP, p. 147).

on the Ganges', the word 'Ganges' surrenders its primary meaning and is taken to stand for the bank because of the impossibility of the existence of human settlement on the current of the river. Here the river stands for the bank by virtue of association and does not express it by its denotative capacity, and yet the syntactical construction with the recollected fact takes place.¹⁸ It should be admitted, therefore, that words first occasion a recollection of unrelated meanings and then by the exercise of their denotative capacity bring about the knowledge of their relation. No special power of word is postulated for the recollection of the unrelated meanings. The relation, it must be remembered, is made known by the special power of the words and hence the resulting judgment is called verbal. Kumārila's contention that words are put out of office after giving expression to the meanings and these meanings by a special power of their own give rise to the verbal judgment, takes away all justification for the characterization of the judgment as verbal.

It has been contended by Kumārila that the power for syntactical combination must be supposed to belong to the denoted meanings and not the words, because in a lengthy sentence the exact verbal expressions are generally apt to be forgotten and yet the syntactical combination takes place among the meanings. Again in a situation where one sees a white blurred figure without noticing its special features and hears the sound of hoofs and a neigh, the judgment 'A horse is running' at once occurs in the mind. The combination of the different facts is governed by the laws of expectancy, competency and propinquity, though there is no word known to denote any one of these facts. This shows that meanings, which are facts meant by the words, must have the capacity to combine with one another.¹⁹ Prabhākara rejoins that the judgment in question cannot be verbal and that it is effected

¹⁸Yadi hi abhidhānena smāritam eva vākyārthopayogī tarhi tīrādipadārthānām vākyārthānvayo na syāt (NPR, p. 147).

¹⁹Nanu 'Paśyataś śvetimārūpaṁ heṣāśabdaṁ ca śṛṇvataḥ. Khuranikṣepaśabdaṁ ca śveto 'śvo dhāvati 'ti dhīr' iti nyāyād asty eva padārthānām saṁsargabodhajanakatvam iti (TP, p. 148).

either by inference or by implication.²⁰ So this does not afford any proof against the direct capacity of words for generating a judgment. Moreover, if a verbal judgment were generated by the meanings and the words are put out of office, then the meanings should be given the status of an organ of knowledge in addition to the six such organs recognized.²¹ We have already shown that Kumārila's theory is exposed to the charge of logical superfluity as it involves the postulation of three different causal capacities, whereas Prabhākara's theory is immune from the charge of assuming supererogatory powers.

To sum up :

1. Words have the primacy over the meanings. Because the meanings are denoted by the words and not otherwise known.
2. It is admitted even by Kumārila that the ultimate purport of the speaker as embodied in the words is the verbal judgment and so this verbal judgment should be regarded as their meaning. The question whether this meaning is immediate or ultimate need not detain us because words are employed not for the signification of simple meanings known before but for the hitherto unknown verbal judgment.

These considerations should clinch the issue in favour of Prabhākara.

II. ABHIHITĀNVAYAVĀDA

The advocates of the theory called *abhihitānvayavāda* who assert that the verbal judgment is effected by the meanings as opposed to words, have advanced serious objections against the theory just expounded. It is urged that the plea of direct denotation of *related meaning* as a single act is a hoax. Relatedness is intelligible only if relation is understood before or

²⁰....na. Anumānād arthāpatter vā tatra saṃsargāvagamāt. Tathāhi, eṣāṃ padārthānām ekādhihikarāṇatayā 'vagaṭānām pratyāyakatvenā 'numānānatireko viśakalitā-vagaṭānām vā 'rthāntarābhāve niścite 'rthāpattir eva pariśiṣyate, aniścite tv anadhyava-sāya eva (TP, p. 148).

²¹ Api ca śabdasaṃarthayājanyatve vākyārthapratyayasya padārthākhyam saptamam pramāṇam abhyupeyam syāt (Loc. cit.).

synchronously. In that case Prabhākara must admit a two-fold capacity of words for the denotation of the relation as well as of the fact that is related.²² The concept of relatedness implies relation as well as the fact meant to be related. In that case it is a simpler hypothesis that the meaning of a word should be the substantive element of which a relation is supposed to be the adjectival determinant. It cannot be urged that this simple meaning cannot lead to the knowledge of the relation. The meaning of a word cannot be a particular individual because a word may mean any individual. As the number of individuals is infinite, it is not humanly possible to ascertain the relation of the word with each and every one of them. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that the meaning of a word is a universal and the transition from the universal to the particular is a natural and easy process. The universal is necessarily connected with an individual and so the idea of a universal naturally involves that of an individual, with which it is connected and without which it is not conceivable. The individual is thus got by implication and there is no need to postulate any separate denotative power for the purpose.

But there is a difficulty regarding implication. Implication at most can give an indefinite individual and not the definite individual intended. Thus, when there is a verb, it can imply a substantive case, and the latter can at most imply any act and for the matter of that any verb. Thus in the sentence, 'Bring a cow', the act of bringing expects an object, and this object may be a horse and the like. And the substantive denoted by the word 'cow' requires an appropriate act which need not necessarily be an act of bringing.²³ By your theory you make the universal the import of a word, and the individual which is the actual meaning is said to be got by implication (*ākṣepa*) or secondary denotation (*lakṣaṇā*). Here

²²Anvitābhīdhāyīve hi padānām avāśyam eva viśeṣaṇabhūto 'py anvayo 'bhīdhātavyaḥ. Anyathā 'nvitapratīter utpattiyogāt. Tataś cā 'nvayānvitaviśayaśaktidvayakalpanād adṛṣṭakalpanā gurutarā syāt (NR, p. 102).

²³Yac cai 'vaṁ sati gaur ānīyatām ity atra kārakeṇa kriyayā ca kriyākāramātrākṣepān na niyamena gaur ānayanenā 'nayanam ca gavā 'nvayam labhete 'ty uktam (Loc. cit.).

the advocates of *abhihitānvayavāda* may contend that this difficulty can be raised even against the opposite theory. The follower of Prabhākara holds that a word denotes an individual as related. But in a situation where there is a horse drinking water and a man utters the sentence, 'Bring the cow', the word 'cow' may be related with the act of drinking and the act of bringing may be construed with the horse that is observed. Even in his theory the related individual which is said to be the meaning of a word cannot but be indefinite. It cannot be maintained that a substantive is related with a definite act and an act is related with a definite substantive and no other. This would make the occurrence and the consequent construction of a verb or a noun in other sentences such as 'Bring the horse' or 'Take off the cow' impossible. The solution of the problem must be identical, namely, the futility of the sentence uttered. It must then be admitted that the meaning of a word in a sentence fulfilling the threefold condition of syntactical construction cannot be construed with the meaning which is not conveyed by another word. It is this necessity of construction of verbal meanings with one another that gives the character of verbality to the resulting judgment. It is the mutual juxtaposition of words in a sentence which determines the relation of meanings, though they, being universal, are theoretically capable of construction with any other meaning (i.e., fact). It is for this reason that a significant verbal proposition is regarded as an additional organ of knowledge. If the determination of syntactical construction could be effected without appeal to the presence of words, the judgment would be inferential and the like.²⁴

What then is the difference between the two theories? In the theory of Kumārila the meaning of a word, though capable *per se* of combination with any other fact, brings itself into relation with the meaning actually expressed by another word actually occurring in the same sentence. This

²⁴Yata eva cā 'yam niyamaḥ padāntarasamadhigamyād vākyaḥ eva sidhyati na padārthasāmarthyamātrād ata eva śabdasya pramāṇāntaratvam. Anyathā 'numānaṁ syāt (NR, p. 103).

much is common between the two positions. But whereas the *Prābhākara* makes a related meaning the denotation of the word, this theory posits the meaning to be a simple unrelated fact.²⁵

It has been urged by the opponent of this theory that there is no equality with the other theory on the ground of the unity of the proposition as the determining factor of syntactical construction. The reason why a particular word does not make its meaning understood as related with a fact unexpressed by another word is that the meaning has no expectancy and occasion for such other meanings. Expectancy is the condition of the understanding of relation, and it is possible only between meanings expressed by words and not between facts known from other sources. When the expectancy is satisfied by the expressed meaning of a word, there is no occasion for any other fact.²⁶ But this attempt on the part of *Prabhākara* at making out a different case cannot succeed. There may be a case where expectancy is not wanting and yet the syntactical construction is determined by the unity of the proposition alone without regard to expectancy.²⁷ Suppose one hears a neigh and from this he infers the presence of a horse. He may naturally feel inquisitive as to the condition of the horse—whether it is moving, standing or running. Suppose, again, at that very time he hears the clattering of hoofs and this makes him infer that some animal is running. Suppose that somebody at the time utters—‘The cow is standing there’. Here the expectancy of the horse for any act and the expectancy of the act of running for an agent are present, and if mere expectancy were the determining factor, one could easily form the judgments—‘The cow is running’ and ‘The horse is standing’. It could by no means be affirmed that the judgment must be of the form—‘The cow is standing’,

²⁵Ubhayaṃ api vādinor anekasādhāraṇānvitapratipāḍakatvaśaktir ekavākyatayā mitho niyamyate ity etāvad avāśyaṃ kalpanīyam. Padasya tu bhavān viśiṣṭe śaktim kalpayati. Vayaṃ tu svarūpamātra itī mahān viśeṣaḥ (NR, p. 103)

²⁶Katham tarhy arthāntareṇā 'nvitābhīdhānaṃ na bhavati. Apekṣābhāvāt. Sā hy anvitābhīdhānopalakṣaṇam. Na ca pramāṇāntarapratītyoḥ kriyākāraḥ appekṣā vidyate. Śrutayos tv apekṣā (Loc. cit.).

²⁷Satyāṃ apy apekṣāyāṃ anvayādarśanāt (Loc. cit.).

unless the unity of the verbal proposition were a determinant of syntactical combination. An advocate of Prabhākara's theory cannot escape this preposterous issue on the plea that syntactical construction is limited to verbal meanings, because in an elliptical sentence he holds that the meanings of words are construed with any other fact without reference to a word. So the only means of escape from the dilemma lies in the appeal to the unity of the verbal proposition.²⁸

Thus there is equality between the two theories so far as the relation of the meanings of words in a sentence is understood. It is the sentence as a whole, and not words in isolation, which is responsible for the verbal judgment. Though there is thus equal need of appeal to the determining influence of a sentence, yet logical consistency requires that it is the meanings understood which directly deliver the meaning of the proposition. It will be far-fetched to affiliate the verbal judgment to the instrumentality of the words. Even the school which gives all the credit to the words for the verbal judgment has to admit that the latter becomes possible only if the unrelated meanings of words are antecedently understood. Otherwise, there could be no proximity. It makes little difference whether the unrelated meanings are expressed by the words or recollected by means of the words. There is perfect unanimity between the two schools that in between the knowledge of the verbal proposition and the occurrence of the verbal judgment there occurs the understanding of the meanings of the words, whatever may be the nature of such understanding. It is the meanings of words which are the immediate antecedents of verbal judgment. And so the causal relation must be held to subsist between these two events. It cannot be decisively proved that the recollection of words follows in the wake of the understanding of their meanings prior to the verbal judgment.²⁹

²⁸Na ca padasāmarthyam eva padāntarasmāritānvitasvārthaviṣayāvabodhanāya vyavasthāpakam iti vaktavyam. Aśābdair apy anvitābhīdhānasye 'ṣṭatvāt. Tasmān na padasāmarthyān niyamasiddhiḥ. Ata ekavākyatai 'va śaraṇam arthanīyā niyataikānvayabodhanāya padair apy anvitābhīdhāyibhiḥ (NR, p. 104).

²⁹... padārthā eva vākyārthe pramāṇaṁ yuktam aṅgikartum. Na padāni. Ānantaryavyavadhānābhyām. Anvitābhīdhānavāde 'pi hi padaiḥ padārtheṣv avagateṣu

As has been observed before, Kumārila does not lay stress upon the role of words in the emergence of the verbal judgment. In prolonged sentences the words are not bodily present to the mind. Yet the verbal judgment takes place by means of the meanings expressed. It stands to reason, therefore, that the verbal judgment should be acknowledged to be the consequence of the knowledge of the meanings. To trace the causal relation to the words will be tantamount to repudiation of the plain verdict of our understanding.³⁰ As for the plea of primacy, it is rather an argument for dismissing the claims of words because it means that they are put out of office by the ensuing understanding of the meanings of words which imposes a barrier between the words and the verbal judgment.³¹ As regards the insistence on purport as the determinant of the verbal judgment, it would suffice to observe that this intention towards the ultimate verbal judgment can fulfil itself only when the meanings of words are understood in between. The follower of Kumārila does not deny that the purport of the speaker is embodied in the words. And in the ultimate analysis it is the peculiar character and position of the words in the sentence which express this purport. So the purport as objectified in the selected words governed by the triple law of syntactical combination is directed to the materialization of the verbal judgment. The understanding of the meanings is rather the instrument through which the purport and tendency of the words are fulfilled. It ought not to be ignored that it is the meanings of the words understood that directly lead to the verbal judgment, and, that the words can be regarded as the instrument of verbal judgment only

paścād vākyārthajñānaṁ jāyate. Anyathā sannidher durlabhatvāt. Te tu tair abhihitās smāritā ve 'ty anyad etat. Sarvathā tāvat padagrahaṇānantaraṁ padārtheṣu pratīteṣu vākyārthāvagatir ity avivādam. Tataś cā 'nantarabhūtapadārthātikrameṇa vyavahitāni padāni na kathañcit vākyārthaṁ pratipādayanti 'ti yuktaṁ padārthāvagatir vākyārthāvagateḥ kāraṇaṁ bhavati 'ti kalpayitum. Na ca punaḥ padānusandhānaṁ asti 'ti kiñcana pramāṇaṁ asti (NR, p. 104).

³⁰Kiñ ca dirghatameṣu vākyeṣu aśakyam evā 'nusandhānaṁ. Asaty api ca tasmin padārthānusandhānamātreṇa vākyārthaḥ pratiyata iti sarvajanīnaṁ etat. Tena dṛṣṭānugūṇyād api padārthanimittika eva vākyārtho na padānimittāḥ (Loc. cit.).

³¹Etena yat padānām evā 'nvite sāmāthyam ity atra kāraṇaṁ uktaṁ prāthamyād iti tad viparyayasādhanam iti veditavyam (Loc. cit.).

through the medium of such meanings and not directly and immediately.³²

An objection has been raised against the theory which asserts that the verbal meanings and not the verbal expressions are the cause of verbal judgment. It is urged that the knowledge of verbal meanings cannot but be anything else than recollection.³³ The recollection of word and meaning as isolated facts cannot be supposed to make them known as related because recollection cannot give insight into an unrecognized fact. The meanings of words were cognized piecemeal and the recollection of them must be also piecemeal. To assert that recollection of isolated meanings takes note of the relation among them is to assert that one may recollect what was known before, and this is absurd. If there be an objective situation in which one fact has been observed to be related with another, there may be a recollection of relation; but facts not observed as related before are never cognized as related by the mere recollection of them.³⁴ In reply it is affirmed that the cognition of verbal meanings is not recollection but of a kind of its own. There is a difference between such cognition and recollection proper. Of course, there are statements of Kumārila which seem to lend support to the contention that the understanding of the meanings of words is of the nature of recollection. It may be true that mere recollection of isolated facts does not lead to the understanding of their relation. But even if it be conceded on the strength of such statements of Kumārila that meanings are recollected, yet it is not inherently impossible that these recollections, though unrelated *inter se*, may give rise to the understanding of the relation between them when the recollections in question are occasioned by words in a sentence reinforced by mutual expectancy, propinquity and competency

³²Atrā 'pi hi tirohiteṣv eva padeṣu padārthānusandhānānantaram avagamyamānasya vākyārthasya padārthā eva sākṣāt sādhanam padāni tu tadvāreṇai 'va sādhanam na sākṣāt (NR, p. 105).

³³Nanv evam abhidhāyakatvaṁ padānāṁ na syāt. Padārthasvarūpāvagates smaraṇād aviśiṣṭatvāt smarakatvam evā 'stu. Nā 'bhidhāyakatvam (Op. cit., p. 106).

³⁴Na ca padārthasvarūpamātraviśayasmṛtīnāṁ anyonyānvayabodhakatvam anupapannam anyatrā 'dṛṣṭatvād iti vācyam (TP, p. 149).

of the meanings. The difference of attendant circumstances is found to manifest a different power in things. Thus though a memory-impression revived by a stimulant (*udbodhaka*) leads to recollection, it is found to generate a different kind of knowledge called recognition when it is found to co-operate with a sense-organ. Recognition is caused by the memory-impression of a past experience acting in unison with a sense-organ. Here the relation of identity between a past datum and a present datum is understood; though generally a sense-organ and a memory-impression, left to themselves, have reference to unrelated facts.³⁵

Others, however, do not take these statements of Kumā-rila at their face value. Words denote facts and the denotation is not a recollection. Recollection of A takes place on the observation of B if A and B were found to be related before. No recollection is possible without such relation. But there is no relation between a word and the meaning expressed by it such as conjunction, inherence and the like.³⁶ Why should a word denote a meaning which is not related with it? The answer is that denotation is a natural power which does not depend upon an extraneous relation like recollection. A word denotes a meaning by its natural power just like the visual organ revealing a coloured shape.³⁷ But it has been urged that there is a relation between the organ and the object in the shape of conjunction or inherence or conjunction-cum-inherence and the like. And so the analogy is not quite apposite. 'Yes,' replies the advocate of natural power, 'but this relation is not the determinant of the act of revelation'. It is not denied that the visual organ reveals its object by being related with it, but this physical relation, conjunction or conjunction-cum-inherence, also exists between the

✓³⁵*Smaraṇamātrasya sāmartyābhāve 'pi samabhivyāhṛtapadakadambakasamupajanitapadārthasmṛtinām ākāṅkṣādisahakāriṇīnām sambhavaty eva tadbodhakatvaṃ saha-kāribhedopādānāt katham anyathā saṃskārendriyayor anyatra paraspara-saṅgātārthāviśayayoḥ pratyabhijñāyām pūrvāparadeśakālasaṃsrṣṭaikavastubodhakatvaṃ, parasparasahakāritayā tathātvam tu prakṛte 'pi tulyam (TP, p. 149).*

³⁶*Pratyāsattinimittam smarakatvam. Na ca padapadārthayos saṃyogasamavāyā-dilakṣaṇā pratyāsattir asti yatas smarakatvaṃ syāt (NR, p. 107).*

³⁷*Pratyāyakatvaṃ hi vācakatvam. Tac ca svabhāvaśaktyā 'pi upapannam cakṣurā-dinām iva rūpādiṣu (Loc. cit.).*

flavour of the object and the organ; yet it only reveals the colour and not the flavour. It is the special competency of the organ that determines the nature and content of the revelation effected by it. Such is precisely the case with the words and their meanings. Word has expressive power and by means of it reveals the meaning.³⁸ This act of expression cannot be a recollection because recollection is possible through the revival of the memory-impression which is effected by the cognition of a fact found to be associated with it in the past. But there is no such previous knowledge of association of word with a meaning.³⁹ The association is rather a consequence of the power and not the condition of it. Of course, it may be contended that the power of revelation is found to come into play when there is a relation between an organ which possesses the power and the object upon which the power is exercised. There is no instance of an organ operating in vacuum. The effectiveness of the power is thus dependent upon a relation, but regarding words and meanings no such relation is found in existence. So how can a word reveal a meaning?⁴⁰ If, however, it be supposed that a word denotes a meaning though not antecedently related, why should it not be supposed that the act of expression is recollection pure and simple ? The fact that there is no relation between the meaning and the word need not be a bar to the possibility of recollection just in the same way as it is not supposed by the opponent to be an obstacle to revelation, though in ordinary experience relation is found to be the *conditio sine qua non* of both. The advocate of natural power of expression must point to a distinguishing character to establish the superiority of his opinion. It is answered by Pārthasārathi that the opponent has succeeded in presenting a dilemma. It is

³⁸Nanu tatrā 'pi saṁyogasaṁyuktasamavāyatatsamavāyalakṣaṇas sambandho vidyata eva. Satyam. Sa tu rasādisādhāraṇaḥ. Śaktir eva tv asādhāraṇaṁ pratyāyakatve nimittam. Tadvac chabdasyā 'pi svābhāvikiyai 'va śaktyā pratipādakatvaṁ bhaviṣyati (NR, p. 107).

³⁹Smāarakatvaṁ tu saṁskārodbodhena. Na ca sambandhyarthāntaradarśanānā 'sāv udbodhayiturṁ śakyate. Kvacid apy adarśanāt (Loc. cit.).

⁴⁰Nanu pratyāyakatvaṁ apy asambandhino nai 'va dr̥ṣṭam. ...śabdasya tu na kaścid arthena sambandho 'sti. Tat katham asya pratyāyakatvaṁ (Loc. cit.).

admitted that there is no relation between a word and a meaning prior to the understanding of the meaning. In this case recollection and revelation seem to stand in the same position. But if we consult the verdict of psychology, it ought to be conceded that the understanding of the meaning is a case of revelation and not recollection. It is not felt as recollection because there is not the revival of the spatio-temporal background of the previous cognition. Moreover, the meaning is understood immediately upon the word being known and there is no warrant for supposing that the understanding of the meaning is preceded by a revival of the memory-image.⁴¹

It is urged by the opponent that the knowledge of the verbal meaning occurs only if the meaning were known before. A word is but a label affixed to a fact either arbitrarily by a fiat of the will or in response to the inherent nature of the object or of the verbal expression itself as maintained by the Mīmāṃsist. But nobody can understand a meaning from a word unless he were aware of the use of the word in that sense. This shows that the understanding of the meaning is the understanding of the fact known before. The knowledge of a fact antecedently known is nothing but recollection, and if the denotative function of the word is not anything more than this, there is no justification for regarding it as an additional category which the Mīmāṃsist holds it to be. It is regarded by the Naiyāyika as being just a case of memory. And the Mīmāṃsist must agree that it is so. This contention, it is asserted by Pārthasārathi, is based upon a superficial knowledge of the nature of recollection.⁴² It is true that recollection is knowledge of a fact previously known. But the converse of the proposition is not true. Knowledge of a fact known before is not necessarily and universally an act of recollection. Recollection is that species of cognition which is generated exclusively by the memory-impression left by a

⁴¹Tatra pratyāyakatvakalpanam eva jyāyāḥ. Śabdānantaram arthapratyayadarśanāt tasyai 'va tatra kāraṇatvaṃ kalpayitum yuktam. Na tu śabdāt saṃskārod bodhas tatas cā 'rthapratitiḥ iti yuktam. Praṇālyāṃ pramāṇābhāvāt (NR, p. 107).

⁴²Gṛhītagrāhivāt smaraṇam eva padajanitaṃ vijñānam iti cet, tad asat (Loc. cit).

previous cognition.⁴³ Undoubtedly, in denotation, there is knowledge of a previously known fact, but that does not relegate it to the status of recollection. In repetitive perception of an object there is repeated cognition of a known datum. But nobody mistakes it to be a case of recollection for that reason. It may not be regarded as a full-fledged case of accredited knowledge which is always the cognition of a new fact. The opponent at most can urge that the cognition of a verbal meaning is a cognition of a fact known before. Even the followers of Kumārila do not regard the cognition of a verbal meaning as a case of accredited knowledge of a new content. What they affirm is that the cognition of a verbal meaning should be put in a class apart. And so they call it denotation (*abhidhā*). The statement of Kumārila that a word does not materially differ from an occasioning condition of recollection implies that it shares in common with recollection the character of communicating of knowledge of a known fact. He does not expressly describe a word as the condition of recollection. Kumārila's statement, therefore, should be taken in a secondary sense and not literally.⁴⁴

If the contention of Prabhākara that the knowledge of relation in a verbal judgment is generated by the denotative capacity of words were true, the syntactical relation of a meaning denoted by a word with a secondary meaning indicated by another word would not be possible. But in the proposition, 'There is a cowherd's colony on the Ganges', the primary meaning of the word 'Ganges' is surrendered and it means 'the bank of the Ganges' by indication (secondary denotation). Here the syntactical relation of the secondary meaning cannot be denied. And yet it is not due to the denotative capacity of the word. The secondary meaning is known through the primary meaning and is not directly denoted by the word. A word is not capable of conveying a secondary meaning, far less its relation, by itself and without

⁴³Na gr̥hitagrāhitvaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ smaraṇasya. Kiṁ tu saṁskāramātrajanyatvam (NR, p. 107).

⁴⁴Ata evā 'cāryāṇāṁ śābda eva pratyaye smaraṇavyavahāro 'py aupacārikaḥ (NRM, p. 109).

reference to the primary meaning. So it must be admitted that the meaning of a word can be the instrument of the knowledge of its relation, though the denotative capacity of the word does not extend to it. It cannot be contended that there are other words the denotative capacity of which is not frustrated and that it is by virtue of this capacity that the syntactical relation of the secondary meaning is understood. Because there are propositions, e.g., an ironical one, in which all the words are used in a secondary sense and their relation is understood. The appeal to the denotative capacity of words in such situations is quite unavailing.⁴⁵

It has just been shown that the syntactical combination of secondary meanings takes place without reference to words and their denotative capacity. Here the meanings alone come into mutual relation. Parity of logic requires that syntactical combination should always be generated directly by the meanings, and appeal to words would be rather tortuous and uncalled-for. Prabhākara holds that word denotes a meaning which is related with an action. In the Vedic injunctions there is always an act to be performed and the factual meanings of words become significant only because they are understood as related with such acts. In sentences of a descriptive nature, where there is no reference to an action to be performed, only unrelated meanings are recollected from the words known and the syntactical combination is effected by these recollected meanings only. For instance, in such statements of fact as 'The king goes' or 'India is bounded on the north by the Himalayas', there is no reference to an action to be performed. And so the syntactical relation cannot be denoted by any word. Yet it is undeniable that the meanings of the words are related. What can make the understanding of the relation possible? Certainly it is the meanings themselves.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Kim ca yady abhidhānata evā 'nvitapratītiḥ katham tarhi Gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ityādiṣu lākṣaṇikasya tīrāder ghoṣādyanvitasya pratipattiḥ... Atho 'cyeta Gaṅgāśabdena nimittabhūte 'rthasvarūpe smārite sati tena yatsambandhāt smāritam tīrasvarūpaṁ tenā 'nvitam svārtham ghoṣaśabdo 'bhidhatte. Gaṅgāśabdas tu tīrasmarāṇamātropayogī 'ti. Yatra tarhi sarvapadānām eva lākṣaṇikārthatvaṁ in kasyacid api mukhyo 'rtho vidyate tatra katham anvitapratipattiḥ (NR, p. 107).

⁴⁶Tasmāt siddhārthasthale padārthanimittai 'vā 'nvitapratītir eṣitavyā (NRM, p. 109).

It has, however, been contended that the knowledge of the syntactical relation in such statements of fact is obtained by inference. As has been already stated Prabhākara admits that the recollection of unrelated meanings occurs first and then their relation is made known by the denotative capacity of words. In statements of fact the denotative capacity does not come into operation as there is no reference to an act to be performed. It is undeniable that the adjustment of words in such statements is effected with a view to the communication of the relation of recollected meanings. The utterance of the sentence will be absolutely abortive unless it results in the emergence of a judgment. This judgment is effected by inference. The form of the inference is as follows: The speaker of the sentence 'The king goes' is aware of the relation of the meanings of the words, because these meanings are capable of mutual combination and the speaker is a sane and trustworthy person who intends to communicate his knowledge of such a relation. So there is no necessity for the assumption of the agency or instrumentality of the meanings for the verbal judgment, since the knowledge of the syntactical relation involved in the judgment is derived by inference.⁴⁷

This contention seems to be inspired by the extreme zeal of a partisan with the scantest regard for truth. This shows the extremism to which partisan spirit can lead. Apart from sophistry the admission of this extreme possibility is bound to act as a boomerang upon the advocate of the theory. He makes a distinction between a statement of fact and a statement of act. In the latter case he admits that words communicate the idea of relation by their denotative capacity. But the tables can be turned upon him by supposing that the knowledge of the relation is secured by inference just as in the statements of fact. The adjustment of words is here also dictated by the speaker's purpose of conveying a related meaning. By inference of the purpose and the knowledge of the relation on the part of the speaker, the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence will be secured in the same

⁴⁷Atha tatrā 'numānena saṁvid anvitagocarā /
Jāyate na padair nā 'pi padārthair iti manyate (NR, p. 109).

way as in statements of fact.⁴⁸ What is more, we may dispense with the assumption made by Prabhākara of the recollection of unrelated meanings in the interval between the knowledge of the sentence and the inference of the relation of the meanings. The adjustment and order of the words ought to be directly related with the knowledge of the relation which inspires the selection of the words and not to the brute fact of relation which is the content of the knowledge, and then the process of knowledge will be more direct and simple. This would lay the axe at the root of the supposition that words denote related meanings because there will be no occasion for supposing that words have the capacity for denoting any meaning at all—still less a related meaning, because the relation of words has been understood with the knowledge and not with the meaning.⁴⁹ The accepted theory is that words denote meanings because they are related with them. If, however, words can be supposed to have direct relation with the knowledge and not the meanings, words cannot denote the meanings because of the lack of relation. This argument has been sponsored by the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas who seek to subsume verbal knowledge under inference in order to dispense with verbal proposition as an additional and distinctive source of knowledge. Prabhākara has sought to exploit this line of argument against verbal propositions having reference to a factual situation without any voluntaristic bearing. But Pārthasārathi shows that if the contention of direct relation between a proposition and a judgment be once accepted, there will be no *raison d'être* for postulating the relation of words and individual meanings. Words in a proposition would rather serve the purpose of symbols and signs just as the pricking of a goad serves to stimulate the idea of a particular activity in an animal. The relation here is between the act and the judgment or the equivalent of the latter in the case of animals. But however much one may

⁴⁸Yatrā 'pi kāryasaṁvittis tatrā 'py evaṁ prasajyate /

Padānām api sāmāthyam anvite 'to na sidhyati (NR, p. 109).

⁴⁹Kiṁ ca svarūpamātram api nā 'bhidheyam. Padaviśeṣasyai 'va vācakatvavad viśiṣṭārthaviśayeṇai 'va vijñānena vyāptigrahaṇasambhavāt (Op. cit., p. 110).

stress the relation between a judgment and a proposition taken in the lump, the judicious selection of particular words and their adjustment show that the judgment is no longer unanalyzable but consists of factors which are due to the individual words. This shows that the relation of words and their meanings is understood as the condition of the knowledge of the meaning of the proposition, i.e., the verbal judgment in every case. One cannot draw the line of demarcation between a proposition of fact and a proposition of act in the way which seeks to obliterate the parts played by the parts of speech. The admission of this possibility would lead to the absurdity of the abolition of the relation between words and meanings. Prabhākara will be the last person to endorse this, because he admits that there is a relation between a word and a meaning. The difference between the two schools of Mīmāṃsā is over the nature of the content, i.e., the meaning, as to whether it is simple or a related complex.

The advocate of Prabhākara's theory regards this animadversion as extremely unfair. He complains that the opponent has made a deliberately wrong interpretation of his position. What is intended by Prabhākara is this. It is the activity of the people inspired by language that is the ultimate source of knowledge of the meanings of words and sentences. When a senior person gives his command to a junior, 'Fetch a cow', the latter actually moves forward and fetches the cow. The child hears the command and observes the activity of the person commanded. He infers that this movement is occasioned by the sentence uttered, since the former immediately follows upon the latter. He further infers that there must be a relation between the sentence and the knowledge concerned. And this relation is nothing but that of the denoter and the denoted. Then by further permutation and combination of the individual words made possible by the knowledge of other sentences and the varying positions of the words in them he understands the meanings of individual words and the relation between the words and the meanings. Later on, finding that persons make false statements also, he comes to entertain doubt about the truth of the knowledge intended

to be communicated. This doubt is an obstacle to the knowledge of the relation. But when he finds the reasons to believe in the veracity of the speaker, he infers that his statement is conditioned by knowledge of the situation intended as the meaning. Here the meaning of the sentence and consequently of the words occurring in it is no doubt known by means of inference. But that does not annul the fact that words do denote their meanings by a natural power. It, at most, makes the verbal judgment generated by the sentence a reproduction of the inferential knowledge. The natural denotative capacity is neither superseded nor annulled.⁵⁰

According to the adherents of Kumārila this defence is vitiated by the fallacy of malobservation. The argument could be accepted as conclusive and convincing if it were true that the knowledge of the junior adult were directly occasioned by the apprehension of the sentence. It is affirmed that the doubt of the veracity of the speaker necessitates resort to inference of the true knowledge of the situation on the part of the speaker as the condition of verbal judgment. So the verbal judgment is directly occasioned by inference and not by words.⁵¹ And so no relation can be established between the verbal judgment and the individual words of the sentence. It may be supposed, however, that ordinarily indiscriminating persons regard the judgment as being caused by words and so the causal relation leads to the knowledge of the meanings of words. But this will be a mistake, and this mistake, when realized, will set aside the whole procedure as false and unfounded.⁵² The plea that inference only confirms the verbal judgment, which rather reproduces the knowledge secured by the former, is not calculated to carry conviction until and unless an independent proof of the denotative capacity of words can be put

⁵⁰Tataś ca śabdānām vāakatvaśaktis svābhāvikī paścād anumāne 'pi na hīyate (NRM, p. 113).

⁵¹Śabdānantarabhāvinī prayojyavṛddhasya vākyārthaviṣayā pratītir yadi vyutpittsunā kevalavākyajanye 'ti niścītā syāt tadā vākyasya tatra śaktim kalpayet. Na tv evam. Kirā tv anumānarūpād eva vākyāt (Op, cit., p. 115).

⁵²... tajjanyatvabhāntau nivr̥ttāyām tannimittā śaktibhāntir api nivartisyate (NR, p. 113).

forward.⁵³ The predicament can be avoided if Prabhākara waives his insistence upon inference as the condition of verbal knowledge and vests words with the capacity for denoting their meanings directly and immediately. The attempt at discrimination between sentences in the Vedas and sentences in profane speech is bound to fail as there is no difference between Vedic words and profane words so far as their denotative capacity is taken into account, and also because the same law governs the syntax of sentences both Vedic and otherwise. We have shown how the admission of inference makes the understanding of meanings from words an impossibility. And if no denotative relation can be established between a word and a meaning in the current linguistic usage, we shall have no reason for postulating such a relation in the case of Vedic words.⁵⁴

But there is no such difficulty in the theory of Kumārila. He does not draw a line of demarcation between a false and a true statement so far as the understanding of meanings is concerned. A statement directly denotes by means of the constituent words their individual meanings which in their turn give rise to a verbal judgment. There is no difference in the process of knowledge whether the statement is true or false. The falsity of the statement is detected with the help of subsequent evidence. But this does not set aside either the denotative capacity of words or the causal efficiency of the meanings for the verbal judgment.

Prabhākara cannot claim to establish the knowledge of relation by the denotative capacity of words. It is admitted on all hands that the knowledge of the meanings of words is ultimately derived from the child's study of the behaviour of elders. And we have explained the psychological process involved in the situation. But there is no warrant for Prabhākara to infer the knowledge of the related meanings of words from the capacity of the junior acting in obedience to

⁵³Nanv anumitam apy arthaṁ paścād anuvadaḥ vākyāṁ vācakāṁ śaktāṁ syāt. Tan na. Anuvāḍakatve pramāṇābhāvāt (NR, p. 113).

⁵⁴Tasmāl lokavacasām anumānatvena prāmāṇyāṅgikaraṇe padānāṁ vācakatvāyogād apratipāḍakatvenā 'prāmāṇyāṁ Vedasya syād iti tatprāmāṇyasiddhyarthāṁ loke 'pi śabdānāṁ śabdatayai 'va prāmāṇyam abhyupagantavyam (Op. cit.).

the command. Prabhākara denies the possibility of erroneous cognition which he explains as a case of two unrelated cognitions unaccompanied by the knowledge of their unrelatedness. There is omission of the knowledge of non-relation and the activity is supposed to be caused by this negative knowledge. It does not lie in the mouth of Prabhākara to assert that activity is conditioned by judgment. It might be argued against Prabhākara that the servant obeying the command of his master is actuated not by the knowledge of the relation of the meanings of words but by the knowledge of the unrelated meanings uncognized as unrelated. So the causal relation between a sentence and a verbal judgment cannot be established on the ground of the physical movement of a servant.⁵⁵ It may be argued that non-discrimination is the condition only of unsuccessful activity and that, where the activity is successful, we should infer judgment as its cause. But ~~the~~ the argument cannot be accepted as convincing because there are cases of error which lead to successful activity. The most striking example of it has been given by Dharmakīrti. When a man mistakes the light of a jewel for a jewel and the light of a lamp for a jewel there is difference in the results. The former leads to the attainment of the object while the latter causes disappointment. There is no intrinsic difference between the two cases of error notwithstanding the pragmatic satisfaction or its absence. Pārthasārathi has given another example of successful error. Imagine a situation where there is fire but no smoke, and suppose that a mass of vapour is hanging over it and the vapour is mistaken for smoke. The inference of fire therefrom leads to successful activity, but that does not make it an authentic cognition. According to Prabhākara the activity would be occasioned by non-discrimination between the perceived vapour and the smoke recollected. So success or failure of the activity cannot give warrant for supposing the knowledge of the relation as

⁵⁵Sā hi bhavanmate śūktikāyām iva rajatārthino vivekāgrahaṇād api sidhyati. Tena gām ānaye 'ty atra goprātipadikena dvitīyayā dhātunā vidhipratyayena ca caturṣv apy artheṣu svarūpamātreṇā 'bhihiteṣv agrhīte 'py anvaye tadanvayāgrahād eva pravṛttisiddher nā 'nvitapratītiḥ kalpayitum śakyate (NR, pp. 114-15).

the condition. Thus Prabhākara has left no means for inferring the causal relation between the knowledge of the sentence and the verbal judgment following upon it. And this takes away all cogency from his arguments for the denotative capacity of words for related meanings, since there is left no ground for affiliating the meaning understood to the sentence, i.e., the words constituting it.⁵⁶

Whatever might be the case, the plea of logical economy put forward by Prabhākara is a hoax. Apart from the fact that Prabhākara cannot get rid of the necessity of assuming two separate powers, one for the meaning and another for its relation, the assumption of triple power, which has been advanced as an objection against Kumārila's theory, is also necessitated in Prabhākara's theory. Thus a word whether heard or remembered first generates a recollection of its unrelated meaning; secondly, when all these words are remembered by an act of collective memory generated by the individual recollections, these words directly denote the relation among the meanings; thirdly, as the effect derives its capacity from the antecedent condition, it must be admitted that the denotative capacity is generated by the collective recollection because a word which is not a content of such a recollection is not found to have this power.⁵⁷ It may be argued that even if this contention were conceded to be logically unimpeachable, it would only result in the equalization of the two theories and thus could not give us any reason for preferring one to the other. But the case is not one of equalization of drawbacks. In the theory sponsored by Kumārila it is not asserted that the relation is understood by virtue of the denotative capacity of words. It has been shown that the verbal judgment does not materialize if any one of the meanings is forgotten. It has also been shown that there are

⁵⁶... tadā tatrā 'grahaṇanibhandhanasyā 'pi vyavahārasyā 'visamvādadarśanād anaikāntiko vyavahārāvisamvādo nā 'nvitajñānotpattiparikalpanāyām pramāṇaṁ bhavitum arhati (NR, p. 117).

⁵⁷... ekaikasya padasya śrūyamāṇasya smaryamāṇasya vā tattatpadārthasmarājananaśaktiḥ punar ekasmarāṇagocarāṇām ca teṣāṁ eva padānām anyonyānvitāpadārthābhidhānaśaktiḥ, sakalapadagocarasya smaraṇasya padeṣv anvitābhidhānaśaktyādhānaśaktiś ce 'ti śaktitrayakalpanā (TP, p. 151).

cases where the meanings directly lead to the verbal judgment without reference to words and hence their denotative capacity. It will be shown that the verbal judgment is not effected by the denotative capacity of words but by means of secondary denotation (*lakṣaṇā*).⁵⁸ Thus there will be economy in respect of one power at least. What is, however, necessary is the condition that the meanings must be expressed by the words as members of a unitary proposition. The meanings which are known from other sources are not capable of entering into relation with the meanings expressed by words. It is for this reason that the followers of Kumārila insist on the inference of verbal expressions and not their meanings in elliptical sentences. This also accounts for the character of verbality of the judgment produced by a sentence.

It might be complained by a student of philosophy that the controversy is based upon rather fine distinctions and niceties. Whatever might be the justice of such complaint, the disadvantages are too patent not to be decisive. In respect of logical economy Prabhākara's theory stands at an obvious disadvantage so far at least as synonyms are concerned. In the case of univocal words there may be an apparent equality between the two theories, because one theory (i.e., of Kumārila) posits one power of the word for the meanings and one power of the meaning for the relation. The other theory must also posit two powers for the two meanings. In the case of equivoques and homonyms Prabhākara has to admit two powers for each distinct meaning. Thus for the word 'akṣa', which means a dice, a sense-organ and *vibhītaka* (Terminalia Belerica), Prabhākara will have to admit six denotative powers. Kumārila also will have to admit three denotations and one capacity for each of these three for the verbal judgment. In these cases both will be in the same position so far as the number of postulations is concerned. But in the case of synonyms Prabhākara will have to admit two meanings

⁵⁸Na cā 'bhihitānvayavāde 'pi śaktikalpanāgauravasya tulyatvāt vinigamanābhāva āśaṅkaniyaḥ. Viśiṣṭārthapratyāyanaprayuktapadakadambasamabhivyāhārānyathānupapattyā padasmāritānām arthānām anyonyānvayasya lakṣyamānatveno 'papatteḥ (TP, p. 151).

for each word. Thus if there be three synonyms the meanings will be six. Kumārila will account for the situation by assuming three denotative powers and one common power of the common meaning for the judgment. In this way the disadvantages of the Prābhākara theory will multiply according as the number of synonyms will be found to be greater and greater. Moreover, the consideration that the verbal judgment follows immediately upon the understanding of the meanings should clinch the issue that it is only the verbal meanings which directly generate the verbal judgment.⁵⁹

We have represented fairly elaborately the controversy between the two schools of Mīmāṃsā regarding the denotative power of words. Prabhākara and his followers stick to their position that words denote related facts and the awareness of relatedness involves the awareness of relation. And so the denoted meaning is said to be a related fact or, which comes to the same thing, a fact plus relation. The followers of Kumārila on the other hand assert that words denote only isolated meanings and the relation between them is conveyed by the meanings. It is contended that relation cannot be the meaning of a word because there is no fixity and uniformity in the relations conveyed by different verbal propositions. It has been shown that the followers of Prabhākara have been constrained to admit that words occasion recollection of isolated meanings and the relation between them is understood afterwards. This relation is supposed to be communicated by the denotative capacity of words. But circumstances have compelled them to attenuate their claim to the minimum. They have admitted that the exact particular relation, which is bound to vary in different propositions, cannot be denoted by words in isolation. If they are to denote a relation at all, it will be a vague and general relation as such. The meaning of a word must stand in relation to another meaning, and so meaning and relation must go together. But to all intents and purposes the foreknowledge of relation *in abstracto* does not give any advantage in the determination of the meaning of

⁵⁹Śaktikalpanātulyatve 'pi cā 'nantaryāt padārthānām eva vākyaṛthanimitatvam yuktam na padānām ity uktam. Tasmād abhihitānvaya eva jyāyān (NR, p. 119).

a sentence. The determination of the exact relation is possible only when the meanings of the other words occurring in the sentence are associated with the meaning of a particular word. And it is these particular relations of the meanings which represent a factual situation, and we are interested in this alone. It is plain that a complex situation in which different facts are variously related and form a systematic whole cannot be communicated *a priori* by an isolated word. The followers of Kumārila accordingly contend that the meaning of a proposition which is always a related whole cannot be known through the denotative capacity of individual words. It is, therefore, affirmed that words denote meanings and these meanings convey the relation among them by an inherent natural causal efficiency of their own.

What is the nature of this causal efficiency ? The followers of Prabhākara declare that it is the primary denotative power of words whereas the followers of Kumārila assert that the power vests in the meanings, and they designate this power as secondary denotation (*lakṣaṇā*).⁶⁰ What characterizes this secondary denotation is the fact that it does not require previous knowledge of the meaning, i.e., of the sentence as a whole. The understanding of the secondary meaning follows automatically upon the understanding of the primary meaning. We have seen that the insistence on the previous knowledge of the meaning of the proposition as a related whole on the part of Prabhākara has been whittled down to that of a general abstract relatedness which is of no practical value. Both he and Kumārila have to admit that the meaning of the proposition in terms of exact relation is conveyed by the words or their meanings by means of an unknown capacity. Before embarking on the nature of secondary denotation in its role as the condition of verbal judgment, we should like to discuss the nature of primary denotation according to both schools because of its intimate relationship with the question of secondary denotation.

We have rather elaborately discussed the nature of the

⁶⁰ Ata eva vākyaṛtho lakṣaṇika iti Mīmāṃsakāḥ (NR, p. 125).

content of denotation in the last chapter. There we have shown that though it is the individual particular which satisfies the requirement and interest of the speaker and the person addressed and words are supposed to denote the particular as their meaning, we found that words are inadequate to this task. The number of individuals is infinite and they vary from one another by indeterminable shades of difference. A word cannot, therefore, deliver the knowledge of the individual substantive or adjective or action with its full-blooded individuality. What words signify are rather bloodless concepts which can fit in with an infinite number of individuals, no matter whatever their individualistic differences may be. Thus, for instance, the word 'Triangle' denotes what is neither equilateral nor scalene nor isosceles; yet a meaning which embraces them all. Both Kumārila and Prabhākara agree on the impotence of words regarding the individuals. They assert that words signify universals. But universals apart from their embodiment in particular individuals have no pragmatic value. If words were exhausted in the denotation of universals alone, they would be as bad as unmeaning nonsense, because neither the speaker nor the hearer is interested in universals exclusively for their own sake. They must be embodied in concrete individuals in order to be able to answer the requirement. How can transition from the universal to the individual take place ? This is the problem to which we now address ourselves because the meaning of the sentence is directly concerned with individuals.

Prabhākara asserts that a word denotes a universal by means of an unprecognized relationship. But as a universal is not intelligible without reference to an individual, the individual is understood together with the universal. The denotative capacity of a word is confined to the universal and, owing to the limitation of the resources of human understanding, it cannot have a direct concern with the individuals either severally or collectively as we have seen in the last chapter. But the individual is automatically made known by the universal. A word denotes a universal which by its inherent capacity makes the individual known. Prabhākara,

therefore, asserts that the individual is also the meaning of the word though for this purpose no separate capacity is required to be postulated.⁶¹

Now Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara up to a limit. He also affirms that the universal is the meaning of a word and the individual is signified by implication (*ākṣepa*) or secondary denotation (*lakṣaṇā*). He emphatically differs from Prabhākara when the latter makes the individual the content of primary denotation. He asserts that a word or its meaning signifies the individual by means of a separate power. Prabhākara admits that the natural power of words is concerned with the universal, and that the jurisdiction of a word over the individual is established by means of the universal denoted by it. The individual is meant by the universal because the universal is neither ontologically possible nor psychologically realizable without the individual as its concrete substratum. So the individual is rather a corollary and a necessary concomitant of the denoted meaning. Whatever may be the difference regarding the means and source of their knowledge, the universal and the individual are alike the content of denotation and thus both should be given the same status as contents of the meaning. The followers of Kumārila read in this interpretation of Prabhākara either a confusion of thought or a deliberate misinterpretation. To assert that the individual is the denoted meaning is tantamount to the assertion that the word has a denotative capacity regarding the individual. But Prabhākara hesitates to postulate two separate powers, one for the universal and another for the individual. He makes the latter meaning consequential to the former. So far, however, as our psychology of the understanding of the meaning is concerned, we have no criterion to distinguish the one from the other as essential and consequential respectively.⁶² The inconsistency in Prabhākara's position is further brought out by the consideration that according to

⁶¹Atha na vyaktau śabdasya śaktiḥ. Kiṁ tu jātāv eva. Sā tu śabdenai 'va pratiyamānā vastusvabhāvād vyaktyā saha pratiyate (NR, p. 121).

⁶²Yadi tasyā 'rthadvaye 'pi śaktidvayaṁ śabdasya kalpitaṁ tataḥ kena pramāṇenā 'yam avāntaravibhāgo 'vagamyate svābhāviky ākṛtau śaktir vyaktau tu tannibandhane 'ti (Loc. cit).

him the universal and the individual are two different entities.⁶³ If Kumārila had put up this claim, it might have had some plausibility. For, according to him, the relation of the individual and the universal is one of identity-cum-difference whereas Prabhākara, like the Naiyāyika, regards the relation as inherence of one ontologically different principle in another. The contention that a universal is not intelligible without a concrete individual as its medium is not free from controversy. If they be two different entities as Prabhākara asserts, it passes one's comprehension how the one is not possible or intelligible without the other. At any rate, the followers of Prabhākara cannot maintain like Dharmakīrti that the universal and the individual are numerically one undifferentiable principle. Moreover, he makes the cognition of the universal the condition of the cognition of the individual, and he further asserts that these cognitions are effected by one denotative function of the word. At any rate, he makes them the contents of the same primary denotation. And his plea of essential and consequential meanings is rather an ingenious device which does not carry conviction to an unbiassed mind. The individual must remain an unknown entity in so far as it is regarded as the meaning of the word, unless the latter be credited with the capacity for the same, to which, however, Prabhākara demurs. How can the individual be known? Certainly not by the word, because the latter has no capacity for making it known. A word denotes a universal, and the universal is supposed to carry with it the idea of the individual because a universal is asserted to be unknowable without an individual. If the universal cannot be known without reference to an individual, the former cannot be the condition of the latter. For the word cannot denote an individual for which it has no power. Nor can the universal be its meaning because the universal is unintelligible minus an individual. This amounts to saying that word cannot denote any meaning, either universal or individual.⁶⁴

The followers of Kumārila accordingly argue that the

⁶³Atyantabhedavādināḥ tava mātē tu nītarām vilakṣaṇasvabhāvā (NRN, p. 126).

⁶⁴Nanv asau na kevalā pratyeturṁ śakyate. Evaṁ tarhy asyā apratītiḥ prasajyeta.

primary meaning of a word is a universal, and that the individual is made known by means of a secondary denotation. The universal is immanent in the individual. The individual is thus the secondary meaning just as much as the bank is the secondary meaning of the word 'river' in the proposition 'There is a town on the river'.

The assertion that the individual is known by secondary denotation must lead to the conclusion that the relation among the meanings of words is also to be understood by this very function. As we have remarked before, the meaning of words in a proposition is not an abstract relation which has no theoretical or practical consequence. The relation among meanings must be a concrete and particular fact. In reality the meaning of a proposition is a systematic unified whole in which facts meant by words are found to be knitted together, and the idea of relation is rather an after-thought and a logical deduction from the concrete setting which the convenience of human understanding finds it necessary to postulate. It is doubtful whether relation abstracted from terms has any significance or reality. If the concrete individual is to be understood, it can be understood only in the actual objective setting in which it occurs. Thus if words are to signify individual facts, they must be credited with the capacity for signifying a relation as well. This capacity is designated as secondary denotation by Kumārila, which has been recognized as another capacity by all the teachers and students of linguistics. The peculiar characteristic of this capacity is unfolded in the fact that it does not presuppose an antecedent knowledge of the relation of words with the secondary meaning which is the characteristic of primary denotation. This meaning cannot be obtained through the medium of isolated words, and so no dictionary, however comprehensive it may be, can be of help in regard to this secondary meaning. A dictionary can at least give us those secondary meanings which have acquired by immemorial convention the status of primary meaning. 'England declared war against Germany',

Vyaktis tāvāt pratyāyakābhāvān na pratiyate. Tasyām cā 'pratiyamānāyām na tayā saha jātiḥ pratyeturī śakyate (NR, p. 121).

'The lawsuit is between the Crown and a citizen', 'Kaliṅga is bold', etc. are rather familiar illustrations of those secondary meanings which are virtually accorded almost the same status as the primary meaning. But the meanings of sentences—or, to be precise, of words occurring in them and satisfying the triple law—are to be discovered anew in every instance. They are not, however, arbitrary but made understood by the words indirectly and by their meanings directly by virtue of a special capacity which is not anything different from secondary denotation postulated in figurative expressions and the like.⁶⁵

But exception has been taken to this position of Kumārila. Individuals and their relations are asserted to be conveyed by secondary denotation. But secondary denotation, as we know, and, as has been defined by followers of different schools of philosophy, is resorted to only when there is logical incompatibility in syntactical construction of the meanings of words. The occasion of secondary denotation is syntactical incompatibility and the secondary meaning is necessarily one which bears a definite relation with the primary meaning. And this secondary meaning must be such as admits of expected syntactical construction.⁶⁶ But Kumārila makes the meaning of sentence as such dependent upon secondary denotation though there is not the least suggestion of incompatibility regarding the syntactical combination of primary meanings. Take for instance the sentence, 'The British have relinquished their possessions in India'. The meaning of the sentence is plain and there is no difficulty in syntactical combination of the primary meanings. Yet Kumārila would have recourse to secondary denotation for the verbal judgment. Besides, the secondary meaning is here affirmed to be the syntactical combination itself which does not admit of a further syntactical combination.⁶⁷ So the conditions of secondary

⁶⁵Ata eva vākyārtho lākṣaṇika iti Mīmāṃsakaḥ. Abhihitārthasambandhād abhigamya-mānatvāt (NR, p. 125).

⁶⁶Vācyaśā 'rthasya vākyārthe sambandhānupapattitaḥ / Tatsambandhavaśāprāp-tasyā 'nvayāl lakṣaṇo 'cyate (TP, pp. 151-52).

⁶⁷Na ca padārthair lakṣitāyāḥ padārthānām anvitāvasthāyāḥ punar anvayāntaraśā-litā tenc 'yam na lakṣaṇā (Loc. cit.).

denotation are wanting so far as the conception of secondary denotation according to Prabhākara is taken into account. Even the definition of Kumārila does not apply to the integrated meaning of sentences. According to Kumārila the condition of secondary denotation is the conflict of the primary meaning with the accredited sources of knowledge. And the secondary meaning must be bound by a necessary and inalienable relationship with the primary meaning. So the conditions of secondary denotation being absent on all accounts, the assertion that the integration of the individual meanings of words is conveyed by secondary denotation amounts to a camouflage and an escapist device to avoid a difficulty.⁶⁸

In reply to this charge it has been asserted by the followers of Kumārila that the definition of secondary denotation as occasioned by a logical conflict is not to be taken at its face value, because that would make it too narrow to cover many a recognized instance. Thus, for instance, there is no logical conflict of the primary meanings in the sentence, 'Protect the food from crows'. There arises no logical incompatibility if we construe the words in their literal primary meanings. Yet this is a recognized case of secondary denotation. For the meaning intended by the speaker remains unrealized if we prevent the crow only and not cats, dogs, etc. Here 'crow' stands for all obnoxious animals that will prey upon the food, and this is not the primary but the secondary meaning. So the conflict of the primary meaning is not the universal condition of secondary meaning. Even in Vedic literature we meet with cases of secondary denotation where there is no conflict of the primary meaning with other sources of knowledge. Thus in the instance, 'One should perform *Agnihotra* for a month after having performed *Upasads*', the word 'Agnihotra' does not stand for the obligatory sacrifice to be performed everyday but a different Vedic rite which is called by that name on account of similarity of observances. It cannot be the well-known *Agnihotra* sacrifice because the

⁶⁸Mānāntaravīrodhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe / Mukhyārthenā 'vinābhūte pratītir lakṣaṇo 'cyate (TP, p. 152).

rites called *Upasads* have no place in it. It is a case of secondary denotation though there is no logical conflict occasioned by the primary meaning with other sources of knowledge, since the content of a Vedic sentence is not accessible to them.⁶⁹ We may add another instance, 'One must recite the hymns if one sees the stars in the firmament'. The conditional clause about seeing stars is not to be taken literally because that would make the performance of the evening prayer by a Brahmin contingent upon fair weather and not compulsory which it is meant to be. So the meaning is, 'the fall of dusk'—which is secondary. In order to make the definition of secondary denotation, comprehensive of all occurrences it should be formulated as follows : Secondary denotation is resorted to when the validity of a verbal proposition cannot be established on the basis of primary meanings.⁷⁰ In every case of secondary denotation, irrespective of the compatibility or incompatibility of the primary meaning, the acceptance of the primary meanings inevitably makes a verbal judgment invalid.

Let us see whether this definition extends to the integrated meaning of a sentence. If the words in a sentence were to stop short after denoting their primary meanings which are necessarily universals, there could not occur any verbal judgment at all and so the employment of the sentence would be quite uncalled-for and purposeless. The primary meanings cannot make a consistent judgment. The words in a sentence are chosen with a purpose, viz, to give expression to a related integrated meaning, and of this primary meanings are absolutely incapable. As regards the other condition, viz, the relationship between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning, that is endorsed to be the essential factor. And this is not wanting in the meaning of the sentence. The meaning of the sentence is the integration of the meanings of words in which primary meanings are out of place. The meaning of a sentence is undoubtedly individuals and their relation, and the

⁶⁹'Upasadbhiś caritvā māsam agnihotraṁ juhvatī' 'ti śrūyamāṇatvāt prasiddhāgnihotre co 'pasadām abhāvāt karmāntare 'gnihotraśabdaḥ prasiddhāgnihotrasādharmyāl lakṣaṇayā vartate (TP, p. 152).

⁷⁰Tasmāt padānām padārthasvarūpamātraparatve vākyaprāmāṇyānupapattir eva lakṣaṇākṣepike 'ti tad eva lakṣaṇam lakṣaṇāyāḥ (Op. cit., p. 153).

primary meanings are universals. But the universal is embodied in the individual and the relation understood does not supersede or annul the primary meanings—the universals. There is no difficulty from Kumārila's point of view in particular, because the relation between the universal and a particular is one of identity-in-difference. And so the relation of individuals, which is the meaning of the sentence, automatically involves the relation of universals. Thus there is every justification for regarding the meaning of the sentence as secondary meaning.⁷¹

In the *Nyāyaratnamālā* Pārthasārathi concludes his dissertation on the meaning of the verbal proposition by asserting that neither the sentence nor the individual words directly generate the understanding of the meaning of the proposition. It is the meanings of the words which by means of secondary denotation convey the meaning of the proposition. This is quite in conformity with the position of Kumārila who affirms that the meaning conveyed by a sentence is not of course derived from the agency of words and, in this sense, cannot be regarded as verbal. But the meanings of words being directly derived from words are verbal, and since the meaning of the proposition is derived through the agency of these verbal meanings, the verbal character cannot be unduly affirmed of it.⁷² We had an occasion before to remark that though words primarily denote universals as their proper meaning, yet, in the ultimate stage of a verbal judgment which eventuates from the meanings of individual words, the particular individuals embodying the universals are understood with the help of the accompanying words occurring in the sentence. This dependence upon the component words in a particular juxtaposition furnishes the reason for word being regarded as a separate independent source of knowledge which cannot be accounted for by inference and the like.⁷³ The interpretation

⁷¹Bhaṭṭapādaś ca vākyārthasya sarvatra lākṣaṇikatvasvikārāt (TP, p. 155).

⁷²Nanv evam avasitavyāpāreṣu padeṣu paścāt padārthebhyo gamyamāno vākyārtho 'śābdas syād ata āha...satī teṣāṁ śābdatvena dvāreṇā 'sti vākyārthasyā 'pi śābdapratipādyatvam (NRT, p. 909).

⁷³... Samabhivyāhṛtapadadakadambakasmāritapadārthānām | parasparānvayapratyayo lākṣaṇikaś śābdas ce 'ti sarvam avadātam (TP, p. 154).

of the verbal character of the judgment eventuating from the meanings of words has apparently the sanction of Kumārila's plain texts.

But this justification does not exhibit the whole picture that Kumārila has in mind. The text of Śabarāsvāmin's commentary on this point seems, however, to suggest that this is the only possible interpretation and explanation of the process of verbal judgment. We have given an exposition of this side of the problem in the beginning of our study of Kumārila's position. Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* has fastened on this interpretation as the final view of the advocates of *abhihitānvayavāda*, and his criticism of the theory derives all its cogency and relevancy from the fact that the relation between words and verbal judgment is made rather indirect and far-fetched in the theory.⁷⁴ In the *Nyāyaratnamālā* Pārthasārathi observes that it is the meanings of words which directly lead to the meaning of the sentence and that the individual words can be looked upon as having only a remote bearing upon the latter through the medium of the verbal meanings. Words cannot have any direct relation to the verbal judgment.⁷⁵

Jayanta in his criticism of the exposition of this theory by the adherents of Kumārila points to certain texts of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* which seem to give a more cogent and convincing interpretation of the universally accepted verbal character of the meaning of the sentence.⁷⁶ Pārthasārathi in his interpretation of these texts also gives the same explanation as has been put upon them by Jayanta. Curiously, Jayanta holds that this interpretation is not the

⁷⁴ Aśābdatvaṃ ca vākyaṛthapratīter ittham āpatet /

Vyavadhānam ayuktaṃ ca sāksāc chābdatvasambhave (NM, I., p. 367).

⁷⁵ Atrā 'pi hi tirohiteṣu eva padeṣu padārthānusandhānāntaram avagamyamānasya vākyaṛthasya padārthā eva sāksāt sādhanam padāni tu taddvāreṇai 'va sādhanam na sāksāt (NR, p. 105).

⁷⁶ Na vimuñcanti sāmānyam vākyaṛtheṣu padāni na /

Tanmātrāvasīteṣu eṣu padārthebhyas sa gamyate (ŚV, vii. 229).

Also : Sāksād yady api kurvanti padārthapratipādanam /

Varṇās tathā 'pi nai 'tasmin paryavasyanti niṣphale / /

Vākyaṛthamitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntariyakam /

Pāke jvāle 'va kṣāṭhānām padārthapratipādanam (Op. cit., 342-3).

orthodox exposition of the *abhihitānvayavāda*. It seems that there is sufficient justification for calling in question the orthodoxy of the interpretation sponsored by Jayanta and also Pārthasārathi in their comments on these texts.

Kumārila has fought a battle with the grammarians who hold that the sentence is an indivisible unit and its meaning is directly derived from this unitary principle. He also opposes the Naiyāyikas who hold that though the sentence is a composite whole in which the individual words have definite important parts to play, the meaning of the sentence is delivered by the sentence and not by the words or their meanings. Kumārila refutes the grammarians on the ground that the meaning of a sentence is not materially different from the meanings of words which are understood in succession. He gainsays the Naiyāyikas by asserting the superfluity of the admission of the sentence as an independent entity distinct from the component words. Kumārila maintains that the words have the power to convey the verbal judgment and that, had they abdicated their power, the sentence might have had a chance of playing its part. As a matter of fact, the words as parts of speech do not denote the meaning of the sentence, yet they have got a definite capacity for this. The meaning of the sentence is conveyed by secondary denotation which undoubtedly vests in the meaning. But the very choice of the words and the order of their adjustment definitely point to the drift and purport of the words namely, that their function is not exhausted until and unless the meaning of the sentence is made known. In point of fact there would be no purpose served if the words had to culminate in the communication of the individual meanings alone. Such meanings are all known facts. And it would be outright superfluity if facts which are already known were expressed by a sentence. In order to save words *qua* parts of speech from the charge of futility and superfluity, it must be admitted that they have a deeper purpose to serve, i.e., that they must culminate in the verbal judgment. Of course, the capacity of primary denotation is not equal to the task. It fulfils itself by conveying the individual unrelated meanings. The relational meaning is

communicated by words under the influence of another power which has been called the intention or purportive tendency (*tātparya*). This squarely accounts for the understanding of the meaning of the sentence and justifies the verbal character of it. Unfortunately, we notice an attitude of vacillation on the part of Kumārila and his commentators. The question of loyalty to Śabarasvāmin's plain texts is, perhaps, responsible for it. Śabarasvāmin has laid emphasis upon the fact that the primary denotation stops with the communication of the primary meaning and that the verbal judgment follows upon the latter.⁷⁷ There is not the faintest trace or suggestion that another influence (*tātparya*) is at work. The orthodox followers of Śabara sought to account for this novel operation by an appeal to secondary denotation which has its seat in the meanings directly and in the words by a remote extraction. We have already spoken of the defence of the nomenclature as given by Citsukha and Pārthasārathi.

It seems to be confusing that the capacity for the verbal judgment should in one place be vested in the meanings and called secondary denotation and in other places called *tātparya* having its seat in the words. Let us attempt a solution by reconciling these apparently conflicting assertions. The words of a sentence have the drift and nisus towards the judgment, and this is fulfilled when the judgment is understood. We may account for this verbal judgment by an appeal to this novel function and power of the words, or we may fall back upon secondary denotation which is an acknowledged function of words as the instrument for the fulfilment of this intention. The discussion of the relevancy of the nomenclature has revealed the fact that it is the ultimate meaning intended to be conveyed by the whole sentence which is the essential factor in calling secondary denotation into operation. We may, therefore, assert with every plausibility that words have a tendency to the verbal judgment and that this tendency is satisfied by means of secondary denotation when it conveys the verbal judgment. This suggested interpretation may derive

⁷⁷Padāni hi svaṁ svaṁ padārtham abhidhāya nirṇṭtavyāpārāṇi. Athe 'dānīm padārthā avagatās santo vākyārtham gamayanti (ŚB, p. 96).

some support from the fact that in subsequent developments of *abhihitānvayavāda* secondary denotation has been described as occasioned by the failure of the realization of the intended meaning as opposed to primary meaning. It is reassuring to notice that Citsukha has adopted this line of interpretation in reconciling the claims of secondary denotation (*lakṣaṇā*) and propositional intention (*tātparya*). He asserts that the words in a sentence as parts of speech denote their respective meanings and that, as these meanings do not serve the purpose of communicating a judgment which is the intended meaning of the sentence, the meanings of the parts of speech or the parts of speech with the help of their meanings do convey the related meaning through secondary denotation. The primary meanings are rather the means and medium through which the parts of speech fulfil the intention of the proposition. It is worthy of notice that Citsukha makes the secondary denotation the function of the parts of speech and not of the primary meanings.⁷⁸ This seems to be the only solution of the tangle presented by the postulation of apparently two powers for one and the same thing, viz, the verbal judgment. Intention or purport should not be regarded as a separate function either of the words or of the meanings, as primary denotation and secondary denotation are. It should be rather looked upon as the condition and occasion for calling into play another function of the word different from the primary denotation which has fulfilled itself by denoting the primary meaning. This additional function has been called secondary denotation and we have shown that this nomenclature is not an unwarranted extension of an accepted category. Our line of interpretation receives additional support and reinforcement from Vardhamāna's presentation of the Bhāṭṭa position which he, as an adherent to the Nyāya school, quite naturally condemned from the Nyāya point of view. Vardhamāna states the Bhāṭṭa position in the following terms: "The purport and intention of words is directed to the syntactical construction of the denoted meanings. But as this purport

⁷⁸...padāni lakṣaṇayā padārthhānām anyonyānvayapratipattiparāṇi (TP, p. 154).

cannot fulfil itself either by its own unaided agency or by virtue of the primary denotative capacity, it can be brought to fulfilment by means of a (co-ordinate) verbal function. This function is secondary denotation which conveys the syntactical relation of the verbal meanings. As the primary and secondary meanings are related, the condition of secondary denotation is satisfied. Nor is there a conflict between the two functions, viz, primary denotation and secondary denotation, because the primary meanings attach themselves as the adjectival determinations to the relation conveyed by the secondary denotation."⁷⁹ The idea is that the contents of the two verbal functions are quite different and distinct. Primary denotation gives the primary meanings which constitute the terms of the relation which is conveyed by the secondary denotation. There is absolutely not the faintest suggestion of conflict as the first function furnishes the raw materials and the second makes finished articles of them by employing them as the necessary factors of the verbal judgment. In fact, it is verbal judgment which alone possesses the status of valid knowledge, being a novel and unprecognized contribution. The primary meanings, being precognized facts, cannot lay any claim to this status, the essential condition of which according to Kumārila's school is novelty.

Pārthasārathi in his comment on ŚV, vii. 230, also endorses this argument. But he speaks of *tātparyā* as a function (*vyāpāra*).⁸⁰ It seems to us to be an unfortunate looseness of expression to designate purport (*tātparyā*) as function (*vyāpāra*) in contrast with the function of denotation. If we were to take the *ipse dixit* of Pārthasārathi at its face value and accord purport the rank of a verbal function co-ordinate with primary denotation, we would commit ourselves to a hopeless confusion. We have shown on the strength of the remarks of Kumārila and Pārthasārathi that the syntactical relation of the primary meanings is communicated by secondary

⁷⁹Nanv anvaye padānāṁ tātparyāṁ tannirvāhikā ca vṛttiḥ. Na ca svārthasambandhīni svānvaye tātparyāl lakṣaṇā, anvaya-viśeṣaṇatayā padārthopasthiteśu ca na vṛttidvaya-virodha iti vācyaṁ (NKP, III., p. 76).

⁸⁰Ato yady apy abhidhāvyāpāraḥ padārtheṣv eva paryavasitas tathā 'pi tātparyavyāpṛter aparyavasitāyāḥ... (NRT, p. 909).

denotation. To posit two functions for one and the same result is bound to create unwelcome confusion. We cannot make out the respective quota of contribution made by purport and secondary denotation to the realization of the verbal judgment for which they have been called into request. We, therefore, suggest, in the interest of clarity of expression and thought, that purport is not understood as a verbal function like primary or secondary denotation. On the contrary, it should be regarded as the condition of the psychological urge and motive-force of the selection of the parts of speech aiming at the verbal judgment, i.e., of the syntactical relation of the primary meanings. And this urge is bound to remain impotent until it is fulfilled by an independent verbal function which Kumārila and his followers including Pārthasārathi have characterized as secondary denotation. We shall presently show in our treatment of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that purport is not a verbal function in the Bhāṭṭa theory, which position has been given to it by Jayantabhaṭṭa as the representative of the ancient Nyāya school.

It is a pity that even writers of established reputation and authority in later times did not care to make a firsthand study of Kumārila's works, and their appraisal of this respectable theory is based upon hearsay and guesswork. The *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa is, of course, immune from this charge of misinterpretation as his love of brevity does not allow him to make any statement which is in conflict with the fundamental position of Kumārila. He calls the meaning of the proposition *tātparyārtha* (intended meaning).⁸¹ He, indeed, observes that this meaning, i.e. the verbal judgment, is not denoted by the parts of speech.⁸² But unfortunately his language is so cryptic that it does not throw any light on the intricacies of the theory. He is silent about the operation of secondary denotation (*lakṣaṇā*). His knowledge of the theory of *abhihitānvayavāda* is most probably derived from Abhinavagupta who has represented the theory in a manner which is consistent with the theory of Jayantabhaṭṭa. It is absolutely

⁸¹...tātparyārthaḥ...vākyaārthaḥ...(KP, p. 24).

⁸²...apadārtho 'pi vākyaārthaḥ...(Loc. cit.).

certain that Mammaṭa has misrepresented the theory of Kumārila which is called *abhihitānvayavāda*. Unfortunately he calls what is really the Nyāya theory by the name of the theory of *abhihitānvayavāda*. This error has persisted in all the subsequent writings of the Ālaṅkārikas. It is painful to remark that this celebrated authority on poetics did not have direct access to the work of Kumārila. According to Kumārila words denote universals and convey the individuals by secondary denotation. This position is endorsed by Mukulabhaṭṭa.⁸³ But Mammaṭa repudiates it. He observes that the individual is necessarily related with the universal and so, though a word denotes a universal, the individual is understood by logical implication (*ākṣepa*) and not by secondary denotation.⁸⁴ There is no incompatibility in this view because Mammaṭa is not bound to follow Kumārila. But what strikes us as strange is that Mammaṭa missed the point in his representation of the theory called *abhihitānvayavāda* sponsored by Kumārila by failing to notice that intention (*tātparya*) and secondary denotation go hand in hand. The extreme brevity of his texts saves him from the commission of a serious blunder. But his commentators have made inaccurate and misleading observations. Thus Govinda Ṭhakkura, the astute commentator on the *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, observes that the doctrine of *abhihitānvayavāda* is advocated in Nyāya and other systems.⁸⁵ Nāgeśa in his commentary remarks that 'other systems' stand for the followers of Kumārila.⁸⁶ We shall show in our representation of the Nyāya theory that the doctrine of *abhihitānvayavāda* is purely a creation of Kumārila and his school and that it is repudiated by both the older and the latter-day Naiyāyikas. This confusion on the part of very respectable and authoritative writers on poetics has created a legacy of error which is found to persist uncorrected and unchallenged even to the present day. Hopeless confusion has

⁸³Jātiś tu vyaktim antareṇa yāgasāadhanabhāvaṃ na pratipadyata iti śabdapratyāyī-tajātiśāmarthyād atra jāter āśrayabhūta vyaktir ākṣipyate. Tenā 'sau lākṣaṇiki (AVM, p. 4.)

⁸⁴...jātyā vyaktir ākṣipyate na tu śabdeno 'cyate (KP, p. 44).

⁸⁵Keśucin nyāyādinayeṣu (Op. cit., p. 24).

⁸⁶Ādinā Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakaḥ (KPU, p. 24).

been created by Viśvanātha. Viśvanātha observes that another function of the word called *tātparya* is posited by the sponsors of *abhihitānvayavāda* as being necessary for the communication of the meaning of the sentence. He further remarks that the seat of this function is the sentence as a whole.⁸⁷ We shall see that this is the position of Jayanta who records his dissent from Kumārila's view. If Viśvanātha had not directly affiliated this theory to the followers of Kumārila, it would have been absolutely unexceptionable. The confusion became almost traditional. The Nyāya view and Kumārila's view were mixed up in hopeless confusion. We propose to conclude our treatment of the theory of *abhihitānvaya* by calling attention to the fact that Kumārila does not accord any independent status to the sentence as distinct from the parts of speech and that he emphatically repudiates the view that the sentence is the vehicle of a new power called *tātparya* (intention). If *tātparya* be a separate power and function, it vests in the parts of speech *per se* and not in the sentence as a distinct entity.

III. THE NYĀYA VIEW

Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* has elaborately treated of the theory of Kumārila and that of Prabhākara which are respectively called *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhanavāda*. As is characteristic of Jayanta, though he criticises these theories in the end, he represents the theories with such clarity, vehemence, verve and gusto that an abler exposition could not possibly be expected from even a loyal and orthodox adherent of the schools. He agrees substantially with Kumārila's followers regarding the drawbacks and hurdles met with in Prabhākara's theory. We, therefore, do not embark upon a fresh criticism of Prabhākara's theory from Jayanta's point of view as this will necessarily entail a dupli-

⁸⁷Tātparyākhyāṁ vṛttim āhuḥ padārthānvayabodhane /

Tātparyārthaṁ tadarthaṁ ca vākyam tadbodhakaṁ pare //

...tātparyam nāma vṛttis tadarthaṁ ca tātparyārthaṁ tadbodhakaṁ ca vākyam ity abhihitānvayavādināṁ matam (SD, p. 73).

cation of what we have said before. About Prabhākara Jayanta remarks that he is absolutely correct in saying that words do not convey isolated meanings because that would stultify the use of language. Certainly words do not occur in a free state and their meanings are not found to be understood in sacred aloofness and privacy except in grammar and lexicons. In actual living language words are found to be combined with one another and their meanings are interrelated. So words must have the capacity for communicating relation. Jayanta observes that when Prabhākara is constrained to concede that the relation conveyed by parts of speech is only abstract and universal in character which can fit in with any and every possible meaning whose number is bound to be far more than a legion, he virtually admits that relation is of no pragmatic consequence on which, however, he lays stress in propounding his peculiar theory. Thus, for instance, the word 'cow' is supposed to be related with some quality and action, but this 'some quality or action' is so vague or rather so sweepingly comprehensive that it can include all possible qualities or actions. The possibility of relation with all qualities or actions, though known, does not give us any advantage. The knowledge of all here is tantamount to total ignorance or uncertainty. The sea is of no use to the thirsty man in spite of its unlimited fund of water and so is as good as a desert to him. Exactly analogous is the position of Prabhākara who pins his faith to knowledge of possible relation which is absolutely indeterminate and even embraces any and every meaning or concept.⁸⁸

Jayanta has the charity and fairness to admit that Prabhākara has laid his finger upon the vital point when he emphasizes that syntactical relation is derived directly from the words *qua* parts of speech. It is true, as Prabhākara points out, that parts of speech have no isolated status and that their meanings are necessarily interlocked with one another in the verbal judgment ensuing from it. But Prabhākara's

⁸⁸Na hi rasavidāṁ pūrṇo 'py abdhir meror atiricyate salilākāryāṇiṣpatteḥ, niyāta-guṇakriyānuraktasvārthapratipādane tu gośabdasya na hetum utpaśyāmaḥ (NM, I., p. 365).

empiricism ought to save him from committing the excess of the idealist Bhartṛhari (so says Jayanta) who denies all reality to the parts of speech and makes the sentence the indivisible unit. Prabhākara cannot lose sight of the individual contributions made by the parts of speech to the meaning of the whole sentence. Prabhākara has contended that the individual meanings are not repudiated by him. But as they are understood together with relation, a meaning should be understood as related with another meaning which is expected, fit and proximate to it. Jayanta observes that Prabhākara is here misled by his observation of the co-operation of the meanings in a proposition. But he ought to apply the joint method of agreement and difference in determining the constant from the variable elements. Relation is bound to vary with the terms, but the meanings of the terms are constant in spite of the variation of the relation. To take a concrete instance. The formal relation is one and the same in the two propositions—‘Tether the cow’ and ‘Tether the horse’. But the material meaning is different because of the difference of the terms ‘cow’ and ‘horse’. This shows that the meanings, though always bound by relation, have an independent status. The constant meanings are conveyed by the power of denotation. As regards the concrete relational framework, we have seen the inability of the parts of speech. And the plea of a relation *in abstracto* is entirely irrelevant and useless. But it is true that without relation the meanings are a dead torso. So there must be some power either in the meaning or in the word which can deliver knowledge of the relation. Kumārila finds this power in the meanings which we (says Jayanta) shall presently show to be incompatible with the verdict of experience and the admission of Kumārila himself, perhaps in an unguarded moment. Jayanta agrees with Prabhākara that this capacity must be affiliated to the parts of speech. But as the power of denotation is always confined to the data previously known and the relational meaning of a proposition is always an unprecedented instance of knowledge, we must postulate some other power distinct from the denotative capacity. Jayanta chooses to call this power by the name of *tātparyasakti*—the motive power.

According to Jayanta, Prabhākara fails to distinguish between these two powers which work simultaneously.⁸⁹

Jayanta differs from Kumārila in that he does not endorse the apprehension of isolated meanings as the sole condition precedent to the verbal judgment irrespective of the role of parts of speech. He also differs from Prabhākara in that he refuses to believe that words can convey a verbal judgment by their denotative capacity. He gives his own verdict after summing up the position of the two theories. He asserts that all the parts of speech in a sentence co-operate to produce the verbal judgment in which invariably one meaning enjoys primacy over others which are related with the former as adjectival determinants. This ought not to be confounded with the position of Prabhākara. Words co-operate to produce a verbal judgment and do not communicate it like their usually accepted meanings. By virtue of the denotative capacity the parts of speech denote the meanings which are invariably associated with them. But by another power, viz, *tātparyāśakti*, they give rise to the related meaning. This power works in unison with the denotative power and does not cease until a complete self-sufficient verbal judgment is produced.

As regards Kumārila's position that the power for syntactical relation belongs to the meaning which is set to activity after the words have gone out of office, Jayanta affirms that this would make the meaning an independent instrument of knowledge and the resulting judgment would be anything but verbal. Kumārila himself has observed that words have a necessary drift and impulsion to the meaning of the sentence and that the individual verbal meanings are rather the intermediate stage between the words and the verbal judgment. This plainly gives out that the communication of individual meanings is rather a necessary function of words which finds satisfaction and fulfilment in the verbal judgment which ought to be regarded as the ultimate and real meaning. This

⁸⁹Nā 'bhīdhātṛī śaktir anvitaviṣayā kiṃ tv anvayavyatirekāvagatanīṣkrṣṭasvārthaviṣayai 'va, tātparyāśaktis tu teṣāṃ anvitāvagamaparyantā saha vyāpārād vyāpārasya ca tādīyasya nīrākāṅkṣapratyayotpādanaparyantatvāt (NM, I., p. 371).

is exactly the position in the Nyāya system, viz, that the words are the instruments, the apprehension of the verbal meanings is the intermediate function, and the verbal judgment is the ultimate result achieved by them in unison.

As regards the contention of Śabarasvāmin that words denote their accepted meanings and go out of office, he and his followers, says Jayanta, have failed to notice that though the denotative function is exhausted after the delivery of the verbal meanings, the parts of speech are still active regarding the final import of the sentence which justifies the employment of the verbal proposition. It is the continuation of the exercise of this extra-denotative function, which has been called the motive power (*tātparyaśakti*) of words, that gives the resultant judgment the character of verbality. The meaning of the proposition is invariably a judgment which has an individuality of its own unshared by the judgments produced by other sources of knowledge, inference and the like. If there is justification for characterizing the conclusion of the inference as inferential judgment, there is the same justification for calling the knowledge of the propositional meaning a verbal judgment. Now this felt characterization can be justified only if the judgment owes its existence to the good offices of the words as parts of speech. Kumārila's contention that this characterization is justified by its remote affiliation to words is a case of special pleading. If its remote derivation from words can account for its verbal character, it may with equal plausibility be supposed to bequeath to the judgment the character of audibility also, because words ultimately represent audible sounds. If the verbal meanings are given the status of an organ of verbal judgment, this would amount to the admission of an additional organ of knowledge different from word, perception, inference and the like. But Kumārila and his followers are not prepared to face this predicament.⁹⁰

As for the contention of Śabarasvāmin, endorsed by Kumārila, that in a prolonged sentence the verbal expressions

⁹⁰Tad idam saptamam pramāṇam avatarati padārthā nāme 'ti (NM, I., p. 359).

are lost sight of and the meaning of the proposition is understood through the verbal meanings, the Naiyāyika only finds in it the zeal of a partisan and not any disinterested pursuit of truth. Śābarasvāmin draws the conclusion from this supposed fact that words have no direct influence upon the verbal judgment. The Naiyāyika maintains that even in this case the operation of words does not entirely cease. It is true that in a lengthy sentence the individual words are not articulately felt right through. But this holds good also of the individual verbal meanings. The proposition and its meaning are synthetic facts in which the preceding members, the verbal expressions and verbal meanings respectively, are somewhat held together when the last syllable is uttered and the last verbal meaning is understood. The denial of the respective quotas contributed by the individual meanings or words would rather lead to the position of the idealist grammarian who holds the sentence and the apprehension of its meaning to be indivisible unitary entities. Śābarasvāmin as much as the Naiyāyikas believe that both the sentence and its meaning are composite synthetic wholes made possible by the contributions of the individual members.⁹¹

Again, Śābarasvāmin has seriously urged the consideration that if the meaning of a word escapes notice owing to the diversion of the attention of the hearer the meaning is not understood. He uses the point in support of his position that the understanding of the propositional meaning or verbal judgment is occasioned by the verbal meanings alone without reference to the parts of speech from which they are derived. Here the Naiyāyika finds only emphasis upon a truism. Certainly the verbal judgment cannot occur if any verbal meaning is lost sight of, because the verbal judgment consists in the realization of the relation of such meanings. How can there be the knowledge of the relation without the knowledge of the relata? This is a fact too obvious, but has no bearing on his main contention that verbal meanings are the only

⁹¹Yad api ciratirohitavarṇanaprabandhānusandhānam durghaṭam iti kathitam tad api na cāru, kayācit kalpanayā varṇānām iva padabuddhau padānām api vākyabuddhau upārohasambhavāt (NM, I., p. 358).

things that matter irrespective of the verbal expressions. It cannot be a proof against the role of verbal expressions in the generation of the verbal judgment. The rule of concomitance in agreement and difference between the verbal meanings and the verbal judgment as emphasised by Śabarasvāmin, is endorsed by the logician. But he points out that it is also in operation between the verbal expression and the judgment. Thus when the hearer's attention is diverted to something else, he requests the speaker to repeat his words. He says that he did not catch his words as his mind was diverted to some other thought and so he could not understand the meaning of the sentence uttered by him. This shows that the knowledge of the verbal expressions is as essential and material as the verbal meaning. Were it the case that the hearer remembered the words and the meanings did not occur to him, he would not ask for the reproduction of the sentence but apprehend the meanings on second thought. If, however, there were strange words, he would ask for the elucidation of their meanings. So both words and meanings must be present in the mind of the hearer in order that the verbal judgment may be realized. But Śabarasvāmin, either by oversight or by partiality for his theory, ignores one set of conditions and lays stress on the other.⁹²

Śabarasvāmin and Kumārila have made capital of some situations in which a judgment follows upon the presentation of the concepts independently of the antecedent occurrence of verbal expressions. The instance of the running horse has already been explained by us in the exposition of the theory of the Bhāṭṭa school. Here the judgment, 'The white horse is running', is shown to follow the perceptual cognition of the white horse, clatter of hoofs and the peculiar sound—the neighing of the horse. They have made enormous capital of

⁹²Yad apy uktam anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ padārthanimitakatvaṃ vākyārthasyā 'vagamyate iti tatra padārthasamśargasvabhāvatvād vākyārthasya satyam tat-pūrvakatvaṃ iṣyate eva, vākyārthapratipattis tu na tajjanyatvaṃ śabdavyāpārānu-paramāt. Mānase cā 'pacāre sati padānāṃ api grahaṇaṃ nā 'sty eva yataḥ kṣaṇāntare samāhitacetās sa vakti 'Nā 'ham etad aśrauṣaṃ anyatra me mano 'bhūt punar brūhi' iti. Itarathā hi padāni smṛtvā tadarthaṃ evā 'vagacchen na punaḥ pṛcchet. Tasmāt padārthānāṃ grahaṇaṃ eva tatra vākyārthāvagame nimittam (NM, I, p. 359).

this. They could as well multiply instances from the occurrences of judgments from other sources, inference and the like. Whatever it may be, it ought to suffice to say that nobody is guilty of thinking judgment to be verbal judgment alone. The peculiar instance of the running horse is a straightforward case of inference. This has been pointed out by the adherents of Prabhākara's theory and the Naiyāyika agrees with their finding.⁹³

Udayana, in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, observes that it is not denied that concepts are apt to combine into a judgment whether they be derived from words or other sources. But this does not prove that verbal concepts are the instruments of verbal judgment independent of the verbal expressions. Verbal concepts, when they refer to future or past events, do not possess causal efficiency because the past is defunct and the future is not yet in existence. But the meanings of words as concepts are not necessarily confined to present data. When they refer to past or future occurrences they also lead to the verbal judgment. But these concepts cannot be the operative cause of the verbal judgment simply because no causal efficiency can be predicated of non-existent facts. How can the Mimāṃsist give them the status of an organ of knowledge which is necessarily a specialized instance of causal efficiency (*kāraṇatva*) ? The Mimāṃsist cannot point to a single instance in which pure concepts combine into a judgment without the kind offices of a recognized organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) where the judgment is a case of valid knowledge. In the case of invalid knowledge or knowledge of dubious validity, the presence of other factors over and above the concepts cannot be ruled out ; so the judgment is not the result of concepts alone. In the case of the running horse the judgment is due to inference. In the case of poetical compositions the assertions may not be purveyors of material concrete truth. But the ideas are

⁹³Yad api paśyataś śvetimārūpam iti tad api na kiñcit kiṃ pratyakṣeṇa śuklo gaur gacchan na dṛśyate sa kiṃ śuklo gaur gacchati 'ti vākyasyā 'rtho na bhavati, pratyakṣapratibhāsāt tu pratyakṣārtha evā 'sau na vākyārtha ity ucyate. Evaṃ śveto 'śvo dhāvati 'ty ānumāniko 'yaṃ pratyayaḥ parvate 'gnir itivād vākyaśravaṇāt tu vinā na vākyārtho bhavitum arhati 'ty alaṃ prasaṅgena (NM, I., p. 359).

conjured up by imagination and the judgment is formed by the mind aided by poetic fancy. Here also an accredited instrument of knowledge, viz, the mind, is at work. This shows that concepts by themselves cannot form a judgment, valid or invalid, without the help of a cognitive organ, and this shows that verbal meanings cannot lay any claim to the status of an independent organ of knowledge. The verbal judgment must then be set down as the effect of words, which are accorded that status by most of the philosophers.⁹⁴

Furthermore, the verbal meaning does not possess the essential character of an organ of knowledge. The cognitive organ is the instrumental cause of cognition. An instrumental cause is a cause which produces the effect by means of intermediate operation. To be explicit, it produces the eventual effect by producing the operation which immediately leads to the eventuation of the effect. The axe is the instrumental cause of the cutting down of a tree, but it becomes so only when it is informed with an activity ; in plain language, when it is used by the tree-cutter against the tree. The axe lying idle and inactive cannot produce this effect. So an instrumental cause is always an entity which exercises an activity or effects an operation as the penultimate condition. In the case of verbal judgment, it is immediately preceded by the apprehension of the meanings and there is no operation between them. If the definition of instrumental cause be adhered to, verbal meanings cannot be regarded as the instrumental cause of the verbal judgment. In terms of that definition this status can be accorded to words only. Words are the instrumental cause of verbal judgment because they denote the verbal meanings, which act leads to the judgment. In other words, words are the instrumental cause because they are responsible for the intermediate operation in the shape of the denotation of meanings and produce the verbal judgment by its means. To say that the immediate antece-

⁹⁴Tasmāt prakārāntareṇa saṁsargapratyayo bhavatu mā vā, padārthānām ākāṅkṣādimattve sati abhihitānām avāśyam anvaya iti kuto 'tiprasaṅgaḥ. Na cai 'vaṁ sati padārthā eva karaṇaṁ, teṣāṁ anāgatādirūpatayā kārakatvānupapattau tadviśeṣasya karaṇatvasyā 'yogāt. Tatsaṁsarge pramāṇāntarāsaṅkirṇodāharaṇābhāvāc ca (NK, III., p. 77).

dent is the instrumental cause of verbal judgment amounts to the relinquishment of the accepted meaning of the term. It cannot be contended that the operation acts as a barrier between the cause and the effect and thus deprives the former of its causal character. The operation is the necessary mode in which a cause can produce an effect. The operation is inherent in the cause as an integral part of its being and thus cannot be regarded as spelling the interposition of a barrier.⁹⁵

Moreover, in the initial stage of learning a language the utterance of a sentence is seen to be followed by activity on the part of a junior, and this activity makes the inference of the knowledge of the propositional meaning possible. Now this knowledge of the propositional meaning is preceded by the knowledge of the sentence and of the meanings of words. If there be a doubt about the causal efficiency being exercised either by words or by their meanings, it ought to be resolved by the consideration of the primacy of words which should thus be regarded as the cause of the verbal judgment. The matter can be clinched by the further consideration that it is the particular juxtaposition of words in a sentence which alone can produce the verbal judgment by means of the denotations of the verbal meanings. If the verbal meanings alone were potent enough to produce the verbal judgment, they could do so without regard for the necessary juxtaposition. Thus in an inflexional language where the nouns and the verbs undergo morphological changes in order to be able to denote the changed status of meanings, the mere statement of the meanings does not lead to the verbal judgment. To take an illustration, 'John commanded me' is a verbal proposition the meanings of the members of which may be stated as follows : John in the nominative case, the act of commanding in the past tense, the pronoun I in the objective case. All the meanings are expressed by words but the verbal judgment does not materialize. This shows that the meanings alone are not responsible for the verbal judgment. It is only when they are expressed by words in a particular order and juxtaposition

⁹⁵Padānām tu pūrvabhāvanīyamena padārthasmaranāvāntaravyāpāravattayā tadupapattēḥ, vyāpāryā 'vyavadhāyakatvāt (NK, III., p. 77).

that this judgment can materialize. If it is said that this arrangement is necessary for expressing the mutual expectancy and connexion of the meanings, then also the efficiency of the words regarding the verbal judgment must be acknowledged as a contributory factor. The Naiyāyika regards this as clinching the issue, though he does not ignore the part played by the verbal meanings or the words employed in the sentence. This view has the merit of dealing adequately with the problem of the verbal character of the judgment which the Bhāṭṭa theory seeks to explain away by a jugglery of words.⁹⁶

Finally, the Naiyāyika takes exception to the hypothesis of secondary denotation as the cause of verbal judgment. The considerations that have been urged in support of the fairness and propriety of nomenclature of secondary denotation by the adherents to the Bhāṭṭa school, the Naiyāyika does not care to refute or endorse. The arguments are regarded as more ingenious than convincing and calculated to succeed only if all the essential characteristics of secondary denotation were present. Now, the secondary denotation is only an extension of the primary denotation, and they share the same character in so far as their logical value is taken into account. Both the capacities, primary and secondary, are operative with regard to facts which are known antecedently from other sources. They are, therefore, communicative in character and have no creative function. The verbal meanings do not give any new information and therefore do not add to the stock of human knowledge. To take any instance of secondary denotation, say, 'There is a town on the river', the secondary meaning is 'the bank of the river', which is already known. If a person is ignorant of what a bank is, he would not understand the secondary meaning. But the

⁹⁶Api ca vyutpattikāle prayojakavṛddhavākyaśravaṇānantaraṁ prayojyavyāpāra-darśanād anvitajñānopapattiyartham anvitabodhakatvaṁ śabdasya gṛhyate. Tad atra tannirvāhārtham arthopasthitir api sahakāriṇī kalpyate iti na tayā śabdasyā 'nyathāsid-dhir iti śabdatadarthayor upasthitayor anvayabodhāt kutrā 'nvayajñānaśaktatvam iti saṁśaye prāthamāc chabdhānām eva kāraṇatvam avadhārayati. Kim cā 'gniḥ karaṇam odanaḥ karmatā pākaḥ kṛtir iṣṭasādhanaṁ iti jñāne 'py agninau 'danam pacete 'ty atre 'va kuto nā 'nvayabodhaḥ. Tāvat padārthopasthiter aviśeṣāt (NK, III., p. 80).

meaning of a proposition is always found to furnish a new judgment. To be logically valid the verbal judgment must be a real judgment. To put it the other way about, the verbal proposition to be logically valid must be a real proposition. Of course, neither the Naiyāyika nor the Bhāṭṭa rules out the possibility of analytical judgments and analytical propositions, but their logical value is only derivative and secondhand. Now, leaving aside analytic propositions, the knowledge yielded by real propositions is always new and unprecedented. The question is : Can primary or secondary denotation function in regard to such unknown meaning? We have found that primary or secondary denotation is always communicative in character and that again of facts known before. The Naiyāyika, therefore, demurs to the hypothesis of the Bhāṭṭa in spite of its simplicity and logical economy. To make secondary denotation a creative function, i.e., a purveyor of a meaning not known before, and thus, to all intents and purposes, to vest it with the character of an instrument of valid knowledge is tantamount to using a verbal expression in a sense which is not universally accepted. And if the Bhāṭṭa would still insist upon calling the propositional import a secondary meaning, he is liable to be accused of giving a new meaning to a well-known term. Virtually he gains nothing except a symbolic economy and that again at the cost of great confusion. He is aware of the material difference between a propositional import and a verbal secondary meaning. But he chooses to ignore this essential difference out of spite for the philosophers of the Prābhākara school, who have sought to make words *qua* parts of speech responsible for the propositional import. Of course, the Prābhākaras have committed the excess of making primary denotation capable of denoting an unknown meaning. Kumārila only vests this power in the secondary meaning. Both of them are guilty of subverting established logical notions, because primary and secondary meanings are bound to be representative of facts known independently and antecedently from other sources. It is ignored that the secondary meaning is always the primary meaning of some other expression while

propositional import is incapable of becoming the meaning of a word—much less primary meaning.

Vardhamāna, therefore, concludes that a word must possess a capacity for giving rise to verbal judgment, and that this capacity is not capable of being discovered before the judgment is known. The relation between such verbal capacity and the meaning cannot be anticipated *a priori*. It can be a deduction from the verbal judgment produced by the proposition. It ought to be regarded as a power separate from primary and secondary denotation, if not for anything else, at any rate for the consideration that the meaning or the knowledge of it are facts unknown before. This capacity is rather creative than communicative. Jayanta calls it *tātpar-yaśakti* whereas the logicians of the new school call it the cognitive instrument of syntactical relation (*saṁsargamaryādā*). In other words, it is a capacity which is entirely different from the capacity of primary denotation and that of secondary denotation. All these capacities are vested in the words and not in the meanings.

To sum up : The differences of these three theories from one another, when subjected to critical examination, transpire to be very subtle distinctions, which may appear to a dispassionate critic as differences of emphasis. Prabhākara holds that words must have the capacity for producing a verbal judgment since the latter follows upon the former. This fact together with the consideration that words are significant only when they are members of a sentence induces him to affiliate the related meanings to the words. And he makes the words capable of this meaning by means of the primary denotative capacity which is admitted on all hands. But, in spite of his insistence on the capacity of words for the related meanings, he is constrained by circumstances to admit that the relation denoted is of a widely generic nature which is determined and specified by the accompanying words. The specific relations in which the meanings are actually understood could by no means be ascertained independently of the incidence of the words in the sentence. To this extent he is obliged to admit that the actual meanings of words as mem-

bers of a sentence are new facts. So his plea that primary denotation satisfies all the requirements cannot stand the test. Moreover, the admission that pure unrelated meanings are recollected in between the knowledge of the sentence and verbal judgment amounts to a virtual surrender to the position of the Bhāṭṭas. The theory of Prabhākara boils down to these assertions. Words denote related meanings *a priori*. But the relation is too general and unspecifiable to be of any practical value. The specified relation is understood only from the sentence as a whole. In between the knowledge of the sentence and verbal judgment words give rise to recollection of pure unrelated meanings. The position of the Bhāṭṭas is that words denote unrelated meanings and these meanings by an unpredictable power, so far as the latter's contents are concerned, give rise to the relational verbal judgment. The denotation of simple meanings as posited by Kumārila and the recollection of the same as affirmed by the exponents of Prabhākara do not appear to be materially different. The difference between the two theories lies in their conception of the medium of syntactical relation. Prabhākara makes words and Kumārila makes verbal meanings the medium. Prabhākara's theory seems to accord with our psychological persuasion that the judgment produced by a verbal proposition is verbal. Kumārila's interpretation makes the verbal character of the judgment vicarious and derivative. The Naiyāyika is in agreement with Prabhākara so far as the capacity for relational meaning is thought to be vested directly in the words. But the former differs from the latter by refusing to regard it as the capacity of denotation. He makes the denotative capacity yield unrelated meanings, which is also the position of Kumārila. But there is a vital difference between these two schools again. The Naiyāyika postulates a different capacity of words for relational meaning whereas Kumārila seeks to gain logical economy by the good offices of secondary denotation. The logical economy consists in the admission of two capacities, viz, primary denotation and secondary denotation; whereas the Naiyāyika has to admit over and above these two capacities

a third one for the relational meaning. This capacity differs from the two recognized functions in that the relation between it and the relevant meaning cannot be previously known. We have seen that the meaning of a proposition is always a situation which cannot be known before. And so Prabhākara's primary denotation and Kumārila's secondary denotation requisitioned for the relational meaning are bound to transpire as previously unknowable capacities. And they have both been compelled by circumstances to admit this fact. So the difference between Prabhākara and the Naiyāyika appears to be one of emphasis and nomenclature. Prabhākara calls it denotation (*abhidhā*) but makes it responsible for the unknown relational meaning. The function of denotation as admitted by Kumārila and the Naiyāyika is sought to be fulfilled by means of recollection; yet in any event it is certain that Prabhākara's denotation does not materially differ from the capacity for relational meaning posited by the Naiyāyika. It is given different meanings by the two groups—the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas on the one hand and the school of Prabhākara on the other.

The difference between the Naiyāyika and Prabhākara on the one hand and the Bhāṭṭas on the other centres round the role of secondary denotation. The secondary denotation in the usual acceptance of the term comes into play after the expected syntactical relation is disrupted by a logical conflict presented by the primary meaning. In other words, it is resorted to only when the primary meaning fails to lead to the expected verbal judgment. But though this is the usual case, we have found in our exposition of the Bhāṭṭa theory that the concept of the primary meaning has to be widened in its scope to include the meaning which is intended by the speaker. Hence in later developments the occasion of the logical conflict is said to arise when the acceptance of the primary meaning fails to answer to the intention of the speaker, i.e., the conflict consists in the failure of the intended meaning, i.e., verbal judgment, arising from the acceptance of the primary meaning.

This deadlock apparently arises when the primary mean-

ing cannot be construed with the primary meaning of another accompanying word as is seen in the proposition, 'There is a town on the river'. But if we look closely, we cannot but notice that the conflict is always present even in the propositions in which there is no incongruence between the primary meanings of the constituent words. If all verbal activity were to stop after the communication of the primary meanings, the proposition would be absolutely infructuous because that would only make known facts which were known before. The intention of the speaker is to communicate a judgment, but the primary meanings taken by themselves would not yield this intended judgment. So though there be no conflict among the primary meanings *inter se*, there is conflict between the primary meanings on the one hand and the intended judgment on the other. This conflict is bound to persist until the verbal judgment is realized. The failure of the intended judgment through conflict with the primary meanings presents a deadlock in the same way as the conflict of one primary meaning with another in the notorious examples of secondary denotation. This latter conflict is admittedly resolved by secondary denotation. It must not be overlooked, however, that the conflict does not occur so far as the primary meaning is concerned but only when the latter is sought to be brought into syntactical relation with another primary meaning. So the conflict centres round the intended construction which the primary meaning cannot yield. Hence the occasion of resort to secondary denotation is always found to be furnished by the deadlock arising from the failure of syntactical construction. We have shown that if we were to rest content with the primary meanings there would be the same failure of syntactical construction. Secondary denotation has been found to resolve the deadlock in other cases, and there seems to be no ground for objection if the Bhāṭṭas appeal to this denotation as the solvent of the deadlock in every verbal secondary proposition.

The Naiyāyikas have postulated another power for syntactical construction. The followers of Prabhākara make denotative capacity answer the purpose. But the consideration

which compels the assumption of an additional power is the recognition of the incapacity of the primary meanings for leading to the knowledge of the syntactical construction without the aid of another power. This additional power is called *tātparyaśakti* by the older Naiyāyikas or *samsargamaryādā* by the latter-day logicians. The Bhāṭṭas have shown how secondary denotation fulfils the part that is supposed to be played by the new power assumed by the Naiyāyikas. If a separate capacity for syntactical relation is postulated, the following procedure will have to be assumed in the notorious instances of secondary denotations. In the first place, the individual words denote their primary meanings piecemeal. In the second place, the power of syntactical construction comes into operation. In the third place, the logical conflict presented by the meanings by reason of their mutual incompatibility and incongruence frustrates the expected syntactical operation and is resolved by the substitution of a congruent meaning by means of secondary denotation. In the fourth place, the syntactical capacity vested in the parts of speech yields the expected verbal judgment. Now, if it be the self-identical capacity that operates in the second and the fourth stage, it would mean the double employment of the same verbal function, which is repugnant to all canons of linguistic laws. If, however, it is contended that the syntactical capacity of words does not and cannot function owing to the logical conflict, then of course this charge of double employment can be obviated. But the logical conflict arises only when any attempt is made to bring the two incompatible meanings into a relation. The primary meanings by themselves do not cause any logical difficulty, which is always bound up with a judgment. So it has to be admitted either that the syntactical construction is thwarted and held in check and operates only after the logical incompatibility is removed by the good offices of secondary denotation, or that the syntactical construction takes place despite the logical incompatibility and the secondary denotation comes into play in order to remove the logical invalidity caused by the realization of logical inconsistency. The first supposi-

tion makes the operation of syntactical capacity take place in the third stage, the primary meaning constituting the first, the secondary meaning the second and the syntactical construction the third stage. Abhinavagupta, however, thinks that the syntactical operation takes place in the second stage and the secondary denotation functions in the third.⁹⁷ He is, however, silent on the issue how the ultimate verbal judgment comes into being. He does not make any observation as to whether the original syntactical capacity is resuscitated or a fresh syntactical capacity is brought into request. In either case, the charge of double employment of the syntactical capacity becomes unanswerable. The Naiyāyika, however, would not admit that syntactical power functions antecedently to secondary denotation. But he will be constrained to admit that there are three stages to be traversed in the cases where secondary denotation is called into request. The followers of Kumārila who make secondary denotation the solvent of logical deadlock as well as the instrument of syntactical construction, will easily dispense with the third stage entailed by the opposite theory.

In brief, an adherent of Kumārila may now argue that secondary denotation is held in request in order to obviate the obstacle to the syntactical construction which is realized as soon as secondary denotation comes into the arena. It ought to be admitted in all fairness that the syntactical construction and the consequent verbal judgment are effected by the intervention of secondary denotation. To say that secondary denotation only removes the obstacle by substituting a logically congruent meaning for the incongruent primary meaning and that the syntactical construction is made effective by the intentional capacity of words, serves to introduce an unnecessary complication. We have shown that secondary denotation is occasioned by the intentional capacity, and the latter cannot be evoked twice according to the dictum that one verbal function cannot operate

⁹⁷ 'Simho māṇavakaḥ' ity atra dvitīyakakṣāniviṣṭatātparyāśaktisamarpitānvaya-bādhakollāsanānantaram abhidhātātparyāśaktidvayavyatirikṭā tāvat tṛtīyai 'va śaktis tadbādhakaśaktividhurikaraṇanipuṇā lakṣaṇābhidhānā samullāsati (DL, p. 17).

more than once. The Bhāṭṭas can argue with a good deal of plausibility that secondary denotation alone accounts for the syntactical construction in cases of logical conflict and deadlock. But the deadlock is only an occasion and does not make any contribution to the realization of the syntactical construction. It is secondary denotation alone which effects this. If so, it appears appropriate in the interest of the uniformity of the law of causation that secondary denotation should be the instrument of syntactical construction in all cases. As regards the deadlock, it is always present in the primary stage and persists until the syntactical construction is realized. When secondary denotation has been found to resolve the deadlock in well-known cases, it is quite fit and appropriate that it should do the same duty in every case of intended syntactical construction. The Bhāṭṭas, therefore, do not seem to commit an outrage on reason and common sense when they make secondary denotation responsible for syntactical construction and consider it unnecessary to appeal to any other power.

In the foregoing paragraphs we have shown the points of strength in the theory of Kumārila. By making secondary denotation the medium and purveyor of syntactical construction, the exponents of the theory have effected tremendous economy in the logical procedure. But this has been made possible by attempting a revolution in the nature and function of secondary denotation and also in the antecedent conditions which warrant in the generality of cases a recourse to the departure involved in the surrender of the primary meaning. Now, as regards the conditions, generally the occasion is one of logical conflict. By making resort to secondary denotation the universal medium and channel of relational integration the followers of Kumārila have virtually repudiated the distinction of primary and secondary denotation. It is true that the logical conflict is occasioned only when an attempt is made to connect syntactically the primary meanings of the terms in the proposition. The incompatibility of the primary meaning of the term 'river' in the proposition, 'There is a town on the river', with the meaning of the

term 'town' and also the consideration that the assertor of the proposition really intends a relation between the two terms impel us to give up the primary meaning and substitute an allied meaning in its place. The secondary meaning is always one which stands in a recognizable relation with the primary meaning. If the resolution of the logical incompatibility were the only criterion, it could be effected by substituting any convenient meaning for the import of any one of the terms. For instance, we could escape the deadlock by proposing a change in the meaning of 'town'. The town might be regarded as standing for 'fish' or 'boat', but this is not warranted because the two meanings are not bound by a recognizable relation. Thus the scope of choice of secondary meaning is logically restricted. This shows that the secondary meaning is only a case of extension of the primary meaning. This is recognized to be the case with a type of secondary denotation which makes the primary meaning an integral part of the secondary meaning. For instance, in the propositions, 'The pen is mightier than the sword', 'Opposition has come from the platform and the pulpit', 'England has declared war against Germany', the primary meanings are incompatible. But the secondary meanings, 'the wielder of the pen and of the sword', 'speakers on the platform and clergymen on the pulpit' or 'people of England and of Germany' are obvious extensions of the primary meaning. This is also the case in all cases of secondary denotation. It matters little whether the primary meaning is felt as an integral part of the secondary meaning or not. It is a matter of psychology. But, logically speaking, the primary meaning has a determinate bearing upon the secondary meaning.

Moreover, the secondary meaning is also a fact antecedently known to be connected with the primary meaning. The followers of Kumārila make the verbal judgment the secondary meaning which is, however, necessarily one which was not known by any other instrument of knowledge. To make secondary denotation, therefore, capable of communicating a meaning previously unknown and unknowable amounts to vesting it with a creative efficiency. This spells a

departure from the accepted convention. The Bhāṭṭas must admit that secondary denotation as purveyor of an unknown fact must be different from the secondary denotation which delivers a meaning previously known as related with the primary meaning. It is not fair and appropriate to call these two functions by one identical name, when their contents are radically different.

Secondly, the Bhāṭṭas make secondary denotation the function of the primary meaning and not of the part of speech. It is true that the secondary meaning is resorted to after the primary meaning is understood to be incompatible. But that does not warrant its affiliation to the primary meaning. The influence of the verbal expression cannot be set aside. The plea that it becomes a *functus officio* is not sanctioned by human psychology. Jayanta has proved with great force of logic that the knowledge of words is the precondition of the knowledge of the propositional import. Bhartṛhari has emphasized the truth that meanings cannot be sundered from words and this holds good *a fortiori* of verbal judgments also.

Thirdly, the charge stands that the acceptance of the role of verbal meanings irrespective of words in the emergence of the verbal judgment makes the characterization of the judgment as verbal unwarranted and unaccountable. Consequently, the acceptance of a word or a verbal proposition as an independent instrument of knowledge is rendered an unjustifiable procedure. The explanation of this distinctive characteristic by remote abstraction from the proposition seems to be an ingenious device.

If we are to account for the verbal character of the judgment in a straightforward fashion, we must admit without reservation the bearing of the parts of speech upon it. Again, when it has been found that secondary denotation as the instrument of verbal judgment is qualitatively a different function from the recognized cases of secondary denotation, and is to all intents and purposes a novel function altogether, the gain is only verbal and not material. It is quite appropriate to call it by a different name. If verbal economy be the sufficient consideration, the postulation of the primary

meaning alone would be justifiable. We could suppose that the secondary meaning is also an instance of primary meaning. Indeed, such a view has been sponsored by a class of thinkers who hold that the function of words is a protracted process like the action of an arrow.

We have dealt with all these issues in the discussion of the Naiyāyika's position. Suffice it to say that this position accords with our common sense unsophisticated by considerations of logical economy, which by itself cannot be regarded as a decisive factor without the backing of independent proof. The Naiyāyika's position is rather an improvement upon Prabhākara's theory which makes primary denotation the purveyor of verbal judgment. Prabhākara has been constrained, as we have seen, to admit that the relation among verbal meanings is variable and as such cannot be known antecedently to the verbal judgment. He has been compelled to concede that words *qua* parts of speech do possess the power for communicating this antecedently unknown relation. By calling this capacity primary denotation he exposes himself to the charge of subverting the established convention. We have also seen that the followers of Prabhākara have been forced by *reductio ad absurdum* to posit the knowledge of isolated meanings of words as an antecedent condition of verbal judgment. Of course, he designates this antecedent knowledge as recollection. But recollection is made possible here by virtue of factual relationship between words and meanings. The Naiyāyika derives this knowledge of verbal meanings directly from the agency of words which he calls primary denotation. Again, the capacity of words for the communication of an unforeseen relation is named primary denotation by Prabhākara whereas the Naiyāyika gives it the name of intentional capacity (*tātparya*) or, simply, capacity for syntactical relation (*sam-sargamaryādā*). The difference thus turns out to be more a question of nomenclature than of material truth.

As regards the charge of logical complexity, it seems to be inspired by a scholastic prejudice. The so-called logical economy is gained by a sophistication of common sense. The Naiyāyika admits the three stadia in the evolution of the

verbal judgment. In the first place, the cognition of words. Secondly, that of individual meanings. Thirdly, the relation of these meanings in the verbal judgment. Words as parts of speech possess two distinctive capacities, one for the primary meanings and another for the relational integration. The first capacity comes into play if backed by a previous knowledge of convention, i.e., it functions as a *causa cognoscendi*. The second capacity functions as a *causa essendi*. The Naiyāyika has abjured the effort for lumping these two capacities into one which Prabhākara is supposed to make. He also differs from the Bhāṭṭas who repudiate the bearing of parts of speech upon the verbal judgment and seek to effect logical economy by subsuming the capacity for syntactical construction under secondary denotation. Against this attempt the Naiyāyika has conscientious objections and in this he seems to enlist on his behalf the sanction of unsophisticated common sense.

IV. PRATIBHĀ

We have discussed in detail the theories of the two rival schools of Mīmāṃsā philosophy and also the theory of the Naiyāyika which seeks to hold the scales even between them. The importance, prestige and cogency of the theories concerned compelled us to give them due weight and consideration. The grammarian was fully acquainted with these theories and also other theories which are rather the outcome of permutation and combination of the elements embodied therein. It will be a risky venture to surmise chronological priority or posteriority of any one of these theories in relation to the rest. Bhartṛhari is certainly chronologically prior to Kumārila and Prabhākara and also to the exponents of the Nyāya system with whose works we are familiar today. But we find them all anticipated by Bhartṛhari, and we shall be safe in deducing from this curious phenomenon the conclusion that these theories existed side by side though the works of the older exponents are no longer extant.

Bhartṛhari remains unconvinced by the arguments of his opponents who have attempted to explain the verbal judgment by the dual process of analysis and synthesis. Bhartṛhari

does not deny that the individual words have their individual meanings, and that at the end the verbal proposition somehow brings these diverse meanings as so many fragments into a unitary whole. This is the apparent procedure no doubt. But in all these theories, however much they may differ from one another regarding the organ of synthesis, be it the parts of speech or their meanings or their combination in a particular order, there is perfect agreement that the isolated meanings of the component words are somehow brought into a synthesis. Bhartrhari would call in question the feasibility and intelligibility of this procedure which seems nothing short of a miracle.

Now it is supposed that relation unifies the different concepts and their corresponding objective counterparts and the substances in which the latter inhere. This could be intelligible if relation were itself a unity and a real entity. But relation is also understood to obtain between fictions also. For instance, the concepts of 'a barren woman's son', 'a mare's nest' and 'a sky-flower' are complexes of two ideas and have no objective counterparts. There is an internal relation inside the very concepts and also an external one when these concepts are made subjects and predicates in a judgment. 'There are eggs in the mare's nest' is thus a formally legitimate judgment. But the relation is unreal because the relata are obvious fictions. Relation as such has, therefore, no intrinsic claim to reality. But it may be urged that though relation between fictions be unreal, relation between real relata must be accounted as real. But this contention, too, has no cogency. A relation is supposed to be a fact which subsists in more than one entity. Now a self-identical entity cannot exist in more than one substratum. It is common knowledge that what exists in two different substrata is not one entity but as many as the substrata. Thus each apple existing in two or three plates is different from the apple in the other plates. The apples are numerically different like the plates in which they exist. Relation in the strict sense of the term must subsist in two terms and as such must be numerically different. The concept of unity and that of synchronous existence in a

plurality of substrata are mutually incompatible. So the unity of relation is only a figment of the imagination, and as such it can have no bearing upon the felt unity of judgment or the proposition or the real situation. It is a hypostatized fiction of thought which passes muster with unreflective persons. Of course, common sense and the general consensus of opinion have tended to invest this fiction with solid reality. And the theories of the Mimāṃsists and the logicians, which we have reviewed in the preceding sections, derive all their apparent cogency and prestige from the common sense estimate of things. But common sense, if contradicted by logical criteria, ought not to cut ice with philosophers.

Relation has been shown by both Indian and European thinkers to entail a *regressus ad infinitum* if regarded as a third entity besides the terms which it is supposed to connect. The two terms are brought into connexion by relation which is virtually a third term and as such can be connected with the terms by another relation. But the second relation also is in the same predicament and as such will necessitate another relation. This inevitably leads to a vicious infinite series. If, on the other hand, relation is supposed to be identical with the terms which it connects, then its identity would be split up into as many fragments as there are terms. If, however, relation be supposed to belong to each of the terms in an invariant manner and be integral to the terms, then the perception of one term would entail the perception of the relation. Not only this. The perception of the relation as integral to one term would also entail the perception of other terms, because the relation is supposed to be an identical fact with an identical nature. Relation is supposed to exist in virtue of its nature in several terms. The nature of the relation being identical as belonging to a self-identical fact (i.e., relation), the nature of its existence in the different terms must be identical. Such being the case, the perception of relation in one term would entail the perception of all other terms to which it belongs in the same manner and mode of being. But this is never the case. So the perception of relation in one term and its non-perception in other terms, being

mutually incompatible in one entity, knock down the plea of its unity.⁹⁸

Another consideration also can be brought forward against the validity of relational thought. Let the relation belong to different terms as supposed by the commonsense Realist. But does the relation exist part by part in the different terms or in its entirety in each term? A relation is *ex hypothesi* an impartite whole and so its sectional existence is out of the question. The admission of parts would, on the contrary, involve infinite regress. The conception of part as infinitely divisible would involve an infinite number of parts. Again, a medium-sized part would be a whole and as such it can exist in the different parts of the term by so many parts of its own. And those parts, if they are complexes of parts, would also be confronted with the same problem. If the ultimate parts be atomic, that also would involve logical difficulties. The conjunction of one atomic part of the relation with one atomic part of the term is not intelligible, for conjunction is always possible in respect of parts which atoms are not supposed to possess. If to avoid this difficulty the incidence of relation in its entirety is admitted, then the relation would be exhausted in a single term and cannot possibly exist in other terms. Relation is thus an impossible fiction, because of the antinomies involved in its concept.⁹⁹

All the previous theories presuppose and hinge upon the possibility of relation. The exposure of contradiction in the concept of relation takes away all the logical glamour of these theories. What is then the explanation of the emergence of the verbal judgment? How can the grammarian who is sceptical of the relational mode of thought explain the integrity of the import of verbal propositions? The grammarian-philosopher, however, has no difficulty with relation which he does not and cannot posit as the content of verbal judgment. The felt

⁹⁸Athai 'kasminn eva saṃsargiṇi gr̥hyamāṇe tadgatas saṃsargo 'pi gr̥hyeta, tenai 'va svabhāvena saṃsargyantaṛeṣv apy asti 'ti tāny api grahitavyāni. Na ca tāni gr̥hyante, iti saṃsargo 'pi na gr̥hyeta...(NKN, p. 287).

⁹⁹Tathā nāṇasaṃsargiṣu vartamānas saṃsargo bhāgaśo vartate, kārtsnyena vā? Na tāvad bhāgaśo nirbhāgatvāt. Sabbhāgatve vā 'navasthāpātāt, Nā 'pi kārtsnyena, saṃsargyantaṛe tadabhāvaprasaṅgāt (Loc. cit.).

unity of the verbal judgment cannot be gainsaid. But relation cannot account for it. The only reality according to Bhartrhari is Word. And if verbal judgment is to have the slightest pretension to validity, it must be grounded upon this reality. The unity can be accounted for by any one of these hypotheses : by the superimposition of the unitary word upon the plurality of meanings, or by regarding the plurality as evolutions or as appearances of Word-essence.¹⁰⁰ The hypothesis of superimposition is based upon well-known cases of experience. A white vase appears red if it is coloured by a solution of a red substance or if red flowers are put inside. The redness of the vase is not genuine, but it appears red only by the reflexion of redness in it. Likewise, the different word-meanings are made to disguise their numerical and qualitative differences when word is superimposed upon them. The unity of the meanings is only a reflexion of the unity of word (*sphoṭa*) which is superimposed upon them. The differences are obliterated for all practical purposes, and though word is reflected in them the meaning of the proposition is not felt as identical with word just as the glass vase is not felt as identical with the flowers. The superimposition only transfers the quality of the entity superimposed to the substratum. The unity of the propositional import is thus a reflexion of the unity of the Word-essence which transfers its character by itself eluding the notice of the knowing subject. One cannot complain that this theory makes the same thing the meaning and its denoter, because there is no warrant for the postulation of a dual entity. All that exists is Word-essence and the meaning is only its reflexion. The different word-meanings are rather the occasioning conditions of the manifestation of the Word-reality. But the Word-reality is not understood as such and that is due to the inherent nescience which contaminates all empirical thought. We can notice the analogy between the grammarian's theory and that of the Vedāntic Monist. The phenomenal world is but an appearance of the *Brahman* whose

¹⁰⁰Na hy avastuṣu saṃsargasamūhātīyāntāsādādiṣu saṃsargiṣu vā nānātmasv ekavastupratibhāsa sambhāvati. Vinai 'kasya śabdātmānaḥ pratyāsāt pariṇāmād vivartād ve 'ti (VV, pp. 286-87).

nature consists of existence, consciousness and bliss. These three concepts are identical in their objective reality. Though the phenomenal world has no independent existence of its own but is rather a reflexion of the Absolute upon which the phenomena are superimposed and which again is reflected through them, yet the phenomena are not felt as the self-identical Absolute. It is only the aspect of existence which is felt as the common character of all phenomena. Exactly in the same way the propositional import, though it has no independent existence of its own apart from the Word-essence which is the exact counterpart of the Vedāntic Absolute, appears not as identical with the Word-essence but as a unit. The unity is rather a borrowed attribute derived from the Word-essence which alone can be characterized by it. The unity of the judgment is thus a unity superimposed upon the concepts.

(ii) The second hypothesis regards the phenomenal order as an evolution of the Word-essence which is the Ultimate Reality and the prius of everything that exists. The fundamental difference between this hypothesis and the former lies in the fact that according to it the world has objective reality of its own, standing as it does in the relation of identity-cum-difference to the Absolute as its prius. Real evolution always entails the reality of the evolutes and makes the admission of the relation of identity-cum-difference an inevitable consequence.

(iii) The third hypothesis of appearance is to be understood in the same way as in the theory of Monistic Vedānta. Word-essence is the only reality which appears as the multiplicity of phenomena just as one single face appears in different shapes and colours in different media, e.g., a mirror, a jewel, water, oil and so on. But it may be legitimately urged that the difference of appearances is possible because there is a difference of the media. But Word-essence being the only reality, how can there be the difference of its appearances when no real medium can be posited? The question, however, misses the point. A medium is necessary but it does not follow that it must be real in the same sense as the Absolute is. Though

Word-essence is the Ultimate Reality and there is no second reality parallel to it, yet there is a pseudo-reality—the beginningless nescience which as an objective principle is co-eval with it so far as the beginning of its career is concerned. The nescience is the negative principle which serves to make one appear as many. Of course, nescience, though it has to be admitted as a second entity always in association with the Absolute, has not the ultimacy which belongs to the Absolute. It disappears like darkness before the sun's light as soon as the perfect knowledge of the Absolute emerges into being. The whole position comes to this : it is Word-essence that appears as diversified meanings, both subjective and objective. The meanings, it is needless to add, are unreal appearances. The difference of denoter and denoted is thus a conceptual thought which is determined and generated by an original nescience.

This gives the metaphysical explanation of the problem. It now remains for an exponent of this philosophy to substantiate the validity of its contentions by psychological and logical considerations. Even in the case of empirical propositions which are numerically different from one another in their import, the grammarian posits that the meaning in each case is a self-identical fact which he calls *pratibhā*—an immediate intuitive illumination.

Now, according to the grammarian-philosopher, the Ultimate Reality is Word and Word is Consciousness. Consciousness minus Word is an absurdity. The identity of Consciousness and Word has been proved by weighty arguments which we have set forth in preceding chapters. Now consciousness is an indivisible and unanalyzable simple entity. It appears to be many owing to association with diverse contents. The contents are identified with consciousness and consequently they superpose their diversity upon the basic unity of consciousness which holds them together. The unity of judgmental thought is an inalienable fact, and this has proved to be a crux to the believer in pluralism. Can the plurality be converted into a unity ? The analytical tendency of empirical thought, which takes the surface appearance of thought-contents to be the ultimate data, seeks to deduce unity from plurality by

a sort of chemical process which the Realist fails to explain. The believer in phenomenal pluralism has floundered on this problem. In his haste to find out a plausible and easy explanation he affirms the unity of thought with diverse contents as a post-dated event which emerges in a miraculous fashion. This attempt to distil unity from plurality shows slipshod thinking. Plurality is in the ultimate analysis nothing but a sum of unities. It is unity in the plural number. But the plural number is irreconcilably incompatible with unity. It is as false and meaningless as the plural number of I. How can a *unity* be *many*? Even if it be taken for granted that there can be many units and the many units form the plurality, it cannot be overlooked that unity is the foundation and starting point of plurality. Unity is antecedent to plurality. If we are confronted with this problem of incompatibility of unity with plurality and if we are constrained to discard one of the two incompatibles, we have to do away with plurality and accept unity as a matter of logical necessity. For plurality is inconceivable without unity as we have seen that plurality is nothing but unity in the plural number.

The grammarian posits word as consciousness. The two terms are, to all intents and purposes, synonymous. And consciousness is an indivisible entity. It is matter that is divisible, and it is the indivisibility of consciousness which distinguishes it as a spiritual fact from matter. Now, the proof of matter and of the plurality which infects it is furnished by our awareness of it. The Materialist who seeks to distil consciousness from matter simply puts the cart before the horse. How can we posit matter unless we are aware of it? So awareness is the fundamental datum and it would be suicidal to jettison it under a pluralistic bias. Apart from the consideration whether matter and its consequential plurality have ultimate validity or not, a cool consideration of the logical implication of thought-activity is bound to drive home the conclusion that unity of consciousness is the presupposition of discursive thought. It is the form which lends unity to the contents which are strung together upon it. This unity is an immediate, unanalyzable, unbroken and simple

illumination which the grammarian designates as *pratibhā*. It is this that makes discursive thought and pragmatic activity possible of realization.

The ultimate meaning of a verbal proposition is also affirmed to be an unbroken intuition which is called *pratibhā*. We have seen at the outset that word is consciousness and consciousness is immediate, self-luminous and intuitional in its intrinsic nature. So word and intuition (*pratibhā*) are one and the same thing. To affirm, therefore, that the meaning of a word or a proposition is intuition (*pratibhā*) amounts to affirming the meaning of a word as word. This seems to be a case of hopeless tautology. A word and, for the matter of that, a proposition is felt to be denotative of a meaning, and this meaning is a fact which necessarily transcends the verbal form. To say that a word denotes itself is tantamount to the assertion that a word is an unmeaning piece of nonsense. Even if the equation of word with consciousness be accepted as a correct appraisal of reality and truth, the essential character of self-transcendence of verbal assertion and of the conceptual thought which is adumbrated by it cannot be brushed aside unless the objective reference, i.e., reference to some alien situation, be deliberately ignored.

This objection is so obvious and based upon such plain common sense that it will be absurd to repudiate it. It would be idle to suppose that this simple fact did not occur to the grammarian. The grammarian does not deny that a verbal proposition has got a meaning, i.e., a reference to an objective fact which is different from it. Obviously the proposition is the *form* and the meaning is the *matter*, and the two are felt to be ontologically different entities. So the attempt to refute the grammarian on the ground of his repudiation of the obvious understanding and psychological evidence simply amounts to an onslaught upon a castle built in the air. The opponent only demonstrates a fact which the grammarian never pretends to dispute. It is not denied that psychologically a word has an extra-subjective reference. But the problem is not so simple and plain as the opponent assumes it to be. Consciousness is supposed on the strength of empirical thought to be

impossible without a foreign content. Our empirical thoughts are always thoughts about some object and the latter is an alien fact which somehow coalesces with them. But as a philosopher who wants to understand the true character of things, the grammarian raises questions about the ontological nature and status of the content in relation to consciousness. This relation which seems to be so plain and patent a fact transpires on examination to be a pleasant makeshift and convenient device which does not admit of a logical explanation. How can a fact, by itself an unconscious and unthinking brute entity, be integrated with consciousness? Certainly, the relation is neither one of identity nor of difference because both the alternatives make relation impossible. Besides, consciousness is an internal entity and a foreign material object is an external fact; the two are by their nature autonomous and independent of each other. There is a gulf between them and we cannot understand how it can be bridged. The Realist admits the autonomy of the two realms of existence and yet he assumes that somehow they are forced into a wedlock. Psychologically speaking he is perfectly justified in asserting the obviousness of the relation. But when the logic of this felt integration is sought to be understood and the Realist is asked to throw light upon it, he simply rules out this honest query by denying the problem altogether. Certainly, the opponent's assertion of the problem as the explanation of it is not a philosophically satisfactory procedure, though the sincerity of his belief may not be called in question.

The grammarian does not deny the obvious fact which is plain to the meanest understanding that words in a proposition denote their meanings piecemeal—a fact which is made the cornerstone of their theories by the Mīmāṃsist and the Naiyāyika. The individual meanings, no doubt, are the initial data and the starting point and they are the inevitable conditions of verbal judgment. But what the grammarian emphasizes and seeks to drive home to the opponent is the incalculable and unpremeditated consciousness of unity which holds together the different concepts. The logician, no doubt, correctly lays emphasis upon the mutual compatibility

of the concepts and thinks that this is the secret of their being welded by a unity-bond. But the so-called compatibility, expectancy and propinquity are rather the conditions, and they cannot throw any intelligible light upon the unity-bond. It is sheer intellectual inertia and laziness which induce the logician to think that no further explanation is necessary. It is on this vital point that Bhartṛhari joins issue with his opponents who pin their faith to analytical thinking as the competent instrument of synthetic knowledge. The logical difficulty involved in the conception of many diverse elements being strung together by a unity-bond is insurmountable.

The Naiyāyika logician is a believer in the metaphysic of atomism. He asserts that atoms are ultimate reals which by their mutual combination and permutation produce the world of matter. It is the same atomistic bias of thought which is responsible for the formulation of their analytic-cum-synthetic theories of verbal judgment and, for that matter, all judgments. What escapes the atomist and also what he refuses to face is the problem—how autonomous atoms can merge together in a gross magnitude without shedding their atomicity. If atoms are recalcitrant entities and cannot be induced to abandon their autonomy and atomic constitution, no amount of adjustment can give rise to a massive whole. In the massive whole the status of the minuter parts is not discernible. We can appreciate the position of the Buddhist who denies the existence of a unitary whole. The Buddhist asserts the whole to be a plurality of parts at bottom and the idea of unity to be an illusion. The logician wants to have the benefits of both the worlds when he believes in the unanalyzable constitution of atoms and at the same time admits the actual merger of them in a whole. The incongruities of the atomic theory have been laid bare by Vasubandhu and the philosophers of the Idealistic schools, and they are too well-known to require any restatement here. The same fallacy is seen to be at work in their conception of the relation of words to propositions and of concepts to judgments. They think that the many units preserve their individualities and yet somehow are merged in a greater unity.

With regard to verbal judgment also they affirm complacently that the different meanings are somehow brought into a synthetic whole. They make the unity a consequent effect of the plurality. Bhartṛhari is not deceived by this show of logic. He has a keener intuition than the Realist. He affirms that the unity is not a posterior event. It is there from the very beginning and discovered in the end. The culmination of the thought-activity, which seems to move by a halting process, is undeniably the grasping of a unity and a flash of intuitive illumination. This is not the result of a halting movement but an entirely different fact.¹⁰¹ It simply springs like a flame of fire, and the analytical process of thought, though it leads up to the vision of it, has nothing in common with it.¹⁰² It is immediate and distinct and unique¹⁰³. It is an illumination and not intellectual judgment. The different concepts are rather shot through by this unitary revelation and they simply float on as pendants and appanages. This illumination is not a deliberate thought-process as the logician seems to make out. The meaning of the proposition, therefore, is in the last resort this intuitive flash of illumination which is felt to assume diverse forms due to its association with diverse verbal meanings. It is not an unaccountable mystery or miracle¹⁰⁴ but the result of funded experiences of the past. This illumination is directly generated by word, if bodily present, and if absent, by the unconscious impressions left by it.¹⁰⁵

As we have said before, word is consciousness and consciousness is word. In empirical thought, however, this

¹⁰¹Vicchedagrahaṇe 'rthānām pratibhā 'nyaiva jāyate (VP, II. 145).

¹⁰²Upaśleṣam ivā 'rthānām sā karoty avicāritā /

Sārvarūpyam ivā 'pannam viṣayatvena vartate (Op. cit., II. 147).

¹⁰³Also: Vicchinna-pratipattinām api ca padārthānām kiṁ katham anusandhiyeta, vicāravikalpā 'pratyavamṛṣṭapūrvaśaktis samāviṣṭapūrvaśaktipratibhāse 'va... (VV, p. 249).

¹⁰⁴Vicchinna-pratipattinām tāpahradatoyādīnām sahaso 'paśleṣam vidadhāti (NKN, p. 252).

¹⁰⁵Na ce 'yam ākasmikī na vā 'pramāṇabhūtā... (Loc. cit.).

Also: Sākṣā chabdena janitā bhāvanānugamena vā /

Itikartavyatāyām tām na kaścid ativartate (VP, II. 148).

Also: Kiṁ punar asyā nimittam ? Śabdaḥ. Tatra vyutpannānām sākṣād bhāvanā-mukhena vā 'prasiddhaśabdanibandhanavyavahārānām bālādīnām anādiśabdabhāvanā (VV, p. 248).

word-consciousness is defined and limited by categories of understanding as Kant has set forth and also by empirical concepts. It is this limitation of Absolute Consciousness to definite contexts and situations that makes empirical and pragmatic judgments possible. It must, however, be borne in mind that neither these concepts nor the judgments have ultimate validity so far as their objective reference is concerned. They are the creations of an original nescience, which has diverse forms and derivatives, and appear to be founded upon real objective data. The division of reality into objective and subjective realms is also due to this primal nescience. In reality, however, neither the subject nor the object has any metaphysical validity, though their pragmatic value is not impugned. This conclusion, though based upon metaphysical considerations, is verified even by the analysis of so-called pragmatic empirical judgments. The true meaning of a proposition is, as we have found, an intuitive illumination, and the judgment that is provisionally generated by it is only the necessary expedient and stepping-stone to an unanalyzable simple intuition. It has been contended by the Realist that this conclusion is tantamount to the assertion that thought has no object but itself. And this is a preposterous position. The grammarian-philosopher will plead guilty to the charge; it is based upon a hasty, superficial and slipshod understanding of the import of propositions. The Realist is misled by the surface appearance of things and thoughts, and he does not care to probe the implication of the so-called objective reference to its depth. The truth and justice of the grammarian's position will be apparent from the scrutiny of the import of even commonplace work-a-day assertions.

Let us first take up for consideration a pragmatic proposition which purports to call upon a person to execute an act as a duty. Let us select the Vedic injunction—'One should perform *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice to secure residence in heaven.' What is the meaning of it save an intuition of an act which is undoubtedly circumscribed by reference to a result and to the expedient to be employed for the achievement of the result?

This intuition is the true meaning of the proposition which has no real object as its content. It is at bottom a contentless intuition. It may be supposed that this intuition has reference to an act and this act is its content. But this assumption is hopelessly untenable. An act, if real, must have reference to a time-division. An act may be present, past or future. But the act referred to in the Vedic injunction under consideration is not a present, past or future operation. The auxiliary particle 'should' cannot be construed with a present, past or future act. The form of the verb is different in each case. It would have been expressed as 'performs', 'performed' or 'will perform', had the time-division been intended. Thus no temporal reference can be made out from the expression 'should perform'. The act, if at all signified by it, would be a timeless deed, which is absurd. A non-temporal act is a fiction, and so if this be affirmed to be the content of the proposition, it would be as good as to say that the proposition has no real content at all.¹⁰⁶

It may be urged that a contentless assertion and an injunction to an unreal act cannot have any logical validity. But this is no objection, because the grammarian does not put forward any claim for the logical validity of verbal assertions and so-called logical judgments. But how can it lead to volitional activity when it has no logical validity of its own? The question proceeds from a total misunderstanding of the nature of the sources of activity. Logical validity is entirely irrelevant to the problem of volitional activity. It is doubt and error that have no pragmatic value. Doubt creates deadlock by suspending volition, and error leads to miscarriage of volitional effort by leading to disappointment. But the intuitive illumination which is asserted to be the meaning of a proposition is neither of the nature of doubt nor of error. It is not doubt, because it is an unwavering grasp of a definite fact. It is not error, because it is not contradicted by a subsequent activity; it is on the contrary the universal condition of activity. As we shall presently show, activity follows intuition

¹⁰⁶Niyatāsādhanaṁ vacchinnakriyāpratipattyānukūlaṁ prajñā pratibhā. Kriyāviśayaṁ hi kriyāpratītiḥ syāt (VV, pp. 246-47).

as a matter of psychological necessity. But, though not classifiable either under the head of error or of doubt, it cannot lay any pretension to logical validity, because the objective reference it contains has no ontological foundation.¹⁰⁷

The contention of Bhartṛhari that all activity is the direct outcome of immediate intuition and that judgmental thought is only effective because it leads to intuitive grasp of an objective situation in one sweep, is bound to shock our common sense. We are apt to affiliate activity to deliberation and consideration of pros and cons. Bhartṛhari does not deny that judgment precedes intuition in such cases. But neither intuition nor activity is the immediate result of this slow intellectual movement which is involved in the consideration of evidence for and against a particular line of action. The intellectual process is comparable to a situation in which we fumble and hesitate and by a stroke of happy insight light upon the fact. It is sudden discovery—a spontaneous illumination that seems to occur. It is this sudden, unexpected and undeliberated decision that makes activity possible. Bhartṛhari accordingly asserts that nobody succeeds in hitting upon a course of activity without this illumination. And whether one has clear consciousness of it or not, everybody follows the lead it vouchsafes, and so practically it is the cause of activity and awareness of it. However much one may deliberate, the know-how or do-how is not a consciously worked out process. It is spontaneous, sudden and abrupt. It may be the result of a long course of thought and habit in the past and this seems to be endorsed by Bhartṛhari himself. But the preparation is not evident to our present consciousness, and the eventual intuition cannot by any stretch of imagination and ratiocination be affiliated to the intellectual process, which happens to precede it as a matter of fact, by the relation of cause and effect.¹⁰⁸

The contention that activity follows as a consequence

¹⁰⁷Sā ca pravṛttihetuḥ. Apramāṇaṁ na vyavahārāṅgam. Saṁśayaviparyayau hi tathā. Na hi 'dam ittham anena kartavyam iti anupajātapratibhābhedaḥ pravartate pratyakṣādyavagate 'py arthe (VV, p. 247).

¹⁰⁸...vicāravikalā 'pratyavamaṣṭapūrvaśaktis samāviṣṭapūrvaśaktipratibhāse 'vo 'diyamānā...(Op. cit, p. 249).

upon an intuitive grasp of the relevant situation and is not the result of an elaborate ratiocination, is reinforced by what is called reflex action and instinctive reaction. Now, the first movement of the vocal organ or the propulsion of the vital air through the nostrils and its impact upon the vocal chords are certainly not the result of an elaborate intellectual process. It is no solution to dismiss these activities as unconscious and automatic. After all, these activities occur in conscious agents whose movements and motor-activities ought to be distinguished from the movements of unconscious machines. These activities are not and cannot be unconscious simply because they occur in conscious beings and exhibit a definite teleology. The purposive movement of an automaton is caused by the prevision of an intelligent being who has devised the mechanism suitably to his plan and purpose. But the teleological motif of the so-called reflex actions and instinctive behaviour cannot be accounted for by reference to the design of a foreign agent. The reason of the teleology must be immanent in the living organism and traced to the mental apparatus working inside it. The scientist's explanation that the design is inherited from ancestral habits enforced by the need for adaptation to changing environment, is based upon a bad metaphysics. At best it is a hypothesis which need not be accepted as the last word or the only solution. It is bad metaphysics to explain an event by a cause which is separated from it by a long distance of time and space and variation of location. The cause and effect must be co-existent in the same substratum. Even admitting that the activities under consideration are more somatic than psychical, the purposive nature of these activities requires an explanation which would be more consonant with its conscient character.

The explanation of the primal activities of an intelligent agent by reference to the purpose of remote ancestors does not give the whole answer to a difficult problem. The birth of a child in a particular species and family ought not to be regarded as an accident. If it is an accident at all, it is a matter of momentous consequence to the child and is responsible for the primary direction of its career. To say that the

father's sins are visited upon the child is a loose statement and cannot be taken seriously. The supposition lays the axe at the very root of ethical responsibility. It is metaphysically more satisfactory to hold that the child reaps the consequences of its past deeds, and will be held responsible for its future wisdom or folly. Furthermore, the demarcation of conscious life as distributed in human beings from that embodied in brutes and birds as based upon a difference of kind, seems to be inspired more by prejudice than by a dispassionate consideration. It is true that intellectual development is found to register a high-water-mark in human beings who are regarded as rational animals. Intellectual development is manifested in conceptual thinking and elaborate processes of ratiocination and of this capacity we have no unmistakable evidence in sub-human species of life. But consciousness and intellectual activity need not be conterminous, far less synonymous. It is true that man has produced poetry, metaphysics, science and religion. Consciousness of higher values is a prerogative of mankind. It will be sheer dogmatism to seek the seats of these higher powers, intellectual, aesthetic and moral, in lower animals. But it would be equally extravagant to deny the minimal modicum of consciousness to the lower species and ignore the common ground among all living animals. Certainly man cannot be regarded as the exemplar of intellectual or moral perfection. The sense of 'beyond' and an unachieved stratum is too patent. Both Indian and European philosophers have confessed the grievous incapacity of man for pure and simple intuition of higher reality. Our philosophy still culminates in inconsequence and uncertainty, if not doubt and scepticism. Kant has pointed out that human understanding is incapable of insight into the essence of the self which is beyond the categories of thought. Our empirical knowledge about our own selves is hazy, confused and misleading. At any rate, the nature of the self as declared by mystics and set forth in the authoritative religious scriptures such as the Upaniṣads is bound to remain unrealized by the vast majority of human beings. Moreover, intellectual and spiritual development is found to

vary in respect of magnitude and subtlety and clarity from one individual to another. The man of genius is immeasurably superior to his fellow beings. But notwithstanding the baffling magnitude of the difference of intellectual, aesthetic and moral powers, the fundamental unity of the human mind and the community of human nature are not open to doubt or denial. The difference must be regarded as one of degree rather than of kind.

If we apply this criterion to enlarge our vision and disabuse our minds of inherited prejudices and self-complacent preconceptions, we need not be surprised if we find a common modicum of sentience in the whole gamut of animal life from the lowest to the highest. It is not surprising that primitive instinct and highest intuition exhibit a family likeness. A man of genius has immediate insight into a problem which taxes an average man to the utmost. What an average intellect succeeds in understanding after a good deal of plodding is understood by a man of genius as if by a flash of intuition. The elaborate process and preparation lying behind this intellectual insight are not patent to the man of genius. But so far as the ultimate result, viz, the grasp of the truth, is concerned, there does not seem to be any difference at all. The culmination is an intuitive grasp, though the process of the working of the understanding is in one instance one of prolonged course of toil and in the other seems to be simply *nōn est*.

Bhartrhari lays stress upon the final result of our intellectual thought. He rather seems to hold that the grasp and the insight and the intuition of a truth which is the invariable culmination and fulfilment of all such activity, is neither causally related nor ontologically consubstantial with the antecedent process of thought. The latter is a means to the former but the two are intrinsically different. The bird easily flies in the air and civilized man does the same in an aeroplane—the result is the same thing though the antecedent processes may not be identical. In his elucidation of the concept of *pratibhā* as an act of sudden illumination he does not care to attach importance to the preparatory

drilling which preceded it. He, therefore, does not find it inconsistent or *infra dignitatem* to compare the so-called instinctive activities of the lower animals with the intuitive illumination which results from an elaborate course of thought. Like Bergson he compares intuition with instinct. What seems to differentiate Bhartṛhari's position from that of Bergson is his unqualified assertion that instinctive activity is exponent of a conscious grasp of a situation. There may be difference of view regarding this point, but Bhartṛhari is unambiguous and unequivocal and we explain him in his words.

It may be a pure coincidence that poetic vision in Indian aesthetics has been designated by the same term as Bhartṛhari employs for the resultant cognition of conceptual thought. The poet's vision is called *pratibhā*, which has been described by Jagannātha as the spontaneous, immediate and unpremeditated presentation of appropriate thought and diction which give the utterances of the poet the distinctive stamp of aesthetic pre-eminence.¹⁰⁹ He does not enter into the metaphysical question as to whether it is a super-normal capacity or a heightened form of ordinary intuition. He seeks to interpret it in terms of the result. A man of lesser genius may also succeed in creating good poetry after a good deal of laborious toil involved in experiments by trial and error and correction. Jagannātha is not interested so much in the preparatory stage as in the final result. The poet must light upon the proper and appropriate thought and word, and it is not a matter of great consequence whether he arrives at this happy end with or without conscious plodding and racking of the brain. Of course, the poet's calling is different from and highly superior to that of the average man. But the point of resemblance lies in the finding of the ultimate meaning. This finding is, at any rate in its ultimate stage, an act of intuitive grasp which does not lend itself to logical analysis.

It furnishes a clear proof of the community of the human

¹⁰⁹Sā ca kāvyaghaṭanānūkūlaś śabdārthopasthitiḥ (RG, p. 9).

mind that Croce also calls the vision of the poet and, for that matter, of the artist, intuition. The artistic genius is characterized as the faculty of intuition. This is, we have found, the view of Indian writers on poetics. We have also found that this faculty of intuitive knowledge, taken by itself, is held by Bhartṛhari to be conterminous with conscious life. It is called *pratibhā* which is the condition and the upshot of all activity, theoretical and practical. Bhartṛhari does not discriminate between the animal's intuition and man's intuition and regards them both as consubstantial in nature. Croce, though he does not expressly include the animal's activity within the purview of intuition, refuses to believe that the poet's genius is something qualitatively different from the average man's intuition. He regards the difference to be merely quantitative and not qualitative. We quote the words of Croce in support of our position :

"Nor can we admit that the word *genius* or artistic genius, as distinct from the non-genius of the ordinary man, possesses more than a quantitative signification. Great artists are said to reveal us to ourselves. But how could this be possible, unless there were identity of nature between their imagination and ours, and unless the difference were only one of quantity? The cult of the genius with all its attendant superstitions has arisen from this quantitative difference having been taken as a difference of quality. It has been forgotten that genius is not something that has fallen from the heaven, but humanity itself. The man of genius who poses or is represented as remote from humanity finds his punishment in becoming or appearing somewhat ridiculous".¹¹⁰

It is also refreshing to observe that both Bhartṛhari and Croce are in perfect agreement that intuitive genius is always conscious. The *pratibhā* of Bhartṛhari and the intuition of Croce are conscious grasp of fact and not blind mechanism.¹¹¹

We feel called upon to advert to another point. *Pratibhā* in its highest manifestation has been identified with *paśyanti*,

¹¹⁰Aesthetic, p. 14

¹¹¹Op. cit., p. 15

the divine intuition of the Absolute. But Bhartṛhari does not hesitate to equate it with the lowest intuition of brutes and birds. Of course, he does not allude to the poet's genius called *pratibhā* but there is no logical difficulty in finding the kinship of artistic genius with the intuitive knowledge of average human beings. Mahimabhaṭṭa, who believes *pratibhā* to be the divine organ of intuition like the followers of the Pratyabhijñā school of philosophy, expressly states that the poet's genius is akin to it. The poet's vision of the Truth is direct intuition. It, therefore, visualizes reality with all its individuality and gives rise to such an intuitive knowledge in the mind of his reader. It thus differs from the pale conceptual knowledge which a verbal exposition in a scientific or a philosophical work produces in us.¹¹²

V. THE VEDĀNTIST'S VIEW

Our treatment of the grammarian's view of the propositional import in contrast with the views of the other schools of philosophy cannot be regarded as complete unless we consider in this connexion the Vedāntist's theory of the import of a class of propositions as revelation of a simple identity. The two theories have a very close affinity with each other regarding the ultimate meaning, though the approach is not the same. Both of them are remarkable for their striking originality and their bold departure from the conventional appraisal of the logical value of verbal judgments. The Vedāntist asserts with conspicuous courage of conviction, which has its parallel only in the grammarian's view which we have just passed under review, that the import of a formal proposition need not necessarily be judgmental in character. The equation of the value of a proposition with judgment is a time-honoured convention and any deviation from it is bound to shock the self-complacence of philosophers, and it is no wonder that academic philosophers have been ruthless in their attacks upon this theory. Fortunately, we are immune from the schoolmen's pledge of loyalty to tradition and are thus in

¹¹²VV, pp. 390-91

a position to take a detached view of the point at issue and give a calm and dispassionate consideration to the theory. We have endeavoured to bring to light the implications of the grammarian's theory which has been more maligned than understood. We now address ourselves to the evaluation of the Vedāntist's theory.

The Vedāntist of the Monistic school of Śaṅkara believes that the true knowledge of *Brahman*, the Absolute, is vouchsafed by the Upaniṣadic texts which define it. But the Absolute is a simple unanalyzable identity which is bereft of all characteristics, internal or external. A definition is but a verbal proposition in which an attribute is predicated of a subject, and the Upaniṣadic definitions cannot be exempted from the limitations imposed by the subject-predicate form of assertions. If the definitions of the Absolute were regarded as tentative and provisional pointers and the full glimpse of its true nature were beyond their scope, and if other sources of knowledge independent of the aid of words were to be called upon for the attainment of this illumination, the problem of the capacity of language for deliverance of insight into a simple identity would not have a *raison d'être*. But though this is the line of least resistance, the Vedāntists of the Vivaraṇa school have avoided this prospect of easy success. They assert that the intuition of the ultimate truth can be vouchsafed only by the Upaniṣadic texts and that it is this intuition which constitutes ultimate import. The philosophers of rival schools regard this assertion as an exaggerated expression of loyalty to the letter of the text, and they have challenged the capacity of word for such imports. The Vedāntists have taken up this challenge and they maintain that the scepticism of the opponent proceeds from imperfect assessment of the competency of language. The capacity for simple import is not confined to sacred language but is also exhibited by profane texts, particularly the propositions which set forth the definition.

But the opponent asks: What is the nature of simple identity or indivisible unity which is supposed to be the import of a verbal proposition (*akhaṇḍārthaparakatvam*) ? It can

be neither defined nor proved by means of an accredited organ of knowledge. Let it be supposed that simple identity stands for an entity without a differentiating characteristic (*nirviśeṣavastuaparatvam*). The supposition can be tested by this dilemma. Do the words signify this uncharacterized entity by primary denotation or by secondary denotation? The first alternative is out of the question because an uncharacterized entity is an unknown and unknowable fact, if it exists at all, and so the conventional relation of word with such a meaning is not capable of being apprehended.¹¹³ The second alternative is also equally untenable because secondary denotation presupposes relation of the primary meaning to the secondary as its condition. When the primary meaning is an impossible fiction, its relation with another fact is equally unintelligible.¹¹⁴ It may be contended that relation of the primary meaning is not the universal condition of secondary denotation. The logical incompatibility of the *prima facie* import of the sentence with the objective situation or funded knowledge of mankind makes resort to secondary denotation inevitable, though there be no recognizable relation between primary and secondary meanings. The contention may be valid, but this does not prove that an illogical fiction can be the secondary meaning. Whatever may be the case, the primary or secondary meaning must be a fact which is uncontradicted by experience and logical canons. The contention that secondary denotation can give intuition of an uncharacterized entity is, therefore, an argument of despair.

Let it be further supposed that simple identity stands for undifferenced entity (*nirbhedavastu*). But what is connoted by undifferencedness? If it means absence of difference, does it mean that absence of difference qualifies the substantive as an integral adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*) or as an unattached external determination (*upalakṣaṇa*). In both the cases, the substantive will be understood not as a simple entity but

¹¹³Tasyā 'tyantam aprasiddhatayā sambandhāgrahaṇena padānām tatparyavasāyit-vāsambhavana lakṣaṇasyā 'sambhavitvaprasaṅgāt (TP, p. 106).

¹¹⁴Aprasiddhatvād evā 'bhidheyāvinābhāvasa lakṣaṇāhetor asambhavana prācinā-doṣānuṣaṅgaprasaṅgāt (Loc. cit.).

as determined by an attribute. Now absence of a fact is as much a determination as its presence, and so the import of the proposition will be a substantive determined by an adjective. It has been contended that absence of difference is an unattached determination which is only a means to the apprehension of simple identity. Even if this be granted, that will not make the substantive understood as a simple entity. The unattached attribute is as much a determination as an attached one. The substantive in question, if understood as distinguished from others, is no longer an unqualified simple entity. If, on the other hand, the determination does not distinguish the substantive, it will be an useless appendage.¹¹⁵ Thus absence of difference cannot be made the ground of apprehension of simple identity, even if its possibility be taken for granted. Besides, how can a sentence consisting of different words which are not synonymous signify one identical meaning? It may be supposed that in a definition, though the different words are capable of yielding different meanings, the meanings are so constituted that they all merge in the meaning of one particular word, and that the single meaning of this single word constitutes the meaning of the whole proposition. This culmination in one meaning, that is to say, one isolated fact, is called import of identity. It is a simple identity in the sense that it is not qualified by the meanings of other words which have merged their identity in the former. But if one word be supposed to be significant in a definition, the employment of the other words would have no use and thus there would be no definition at all. It has been urged in defence that the different words have their meanings no doubt, but these meanings are purely negative in implication because they serve to negative the opposite connotation. But this plea of negative implication is not intelligible unless the implied negation is supposed to determine the meaning of the substantive term. If the negation of the opposite concept be conceded to play the rôle of an adjective, the meaning of the substantive would be a qualified fact and not a simple

¹¹⁵Upalakṣyamāṇasya svetarebhyo vyāvṛttatvena pratitāv akhaṇḍārthatvāsambhāvāt (TP, p. 106).

identity.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, it is only a supposition that the verbal definition ends in the communication of the meaning of one word and that this meaning is nothing but the identity of the fact meant. But this supposition cannot intelligibly evade the charge that this would involve the redundancy of the other words in the proposition. Lastly, it has been maintained that identity as the meaning of a proposition is nothing but the communication of a simple fact unqualified by another fact; in other words, the meaning is an unrelated entity. But an unrelated entity is a fiction of which we have no possible cognition.

It has, however, been argued that the definition is intended to give us knowledge of the fact defined and not of anything else. It is necessitated by a question about fact. 'Which is the moon among the different luminaries in the sky?'—so asks the child. It is said in answer—'That which has the greatest magnitude of light is the moon.' The object of the query is the moon—the fact by itself and not anything else, neither its quality nor its relation. The adjective employed is intended to distinguish it from the other luminaries and helps the child to spot it out. So here the meaning of the definition of the moon is a simple fact and thus the assertion that there are identity-propositions is not wide of the mark. This defence seems more ingenious than convincing, because the moon defined is understood as distinguished from the rest of the luminaries. This is the case with all other definitions. So simple identity cannot be put forward as the meaning of any proposition. Thus we see that the Vedāntist does not succeed in formulating a definition of an identity-proposition nor can he adduce any proof in support.¹¹⁷

To this the Vedāntist replies as follows: The charge of

¹¹⁶ Vyavacchedyabhedād avaiarthyaṃ iti cen na. Tadanirukteḥ. Tathā hi kiṃ vyavacchedyānāṃ vyāvṛttayaḥ padaiḥ pratipādyante, athavā tadviśiṣṭam, āhosvid upalakṣitaṃ svārūpamātram vā. Tatra na prathamadvitīyau. Tathā sati saṃsr̥ṣṭārthatvenā 'khaṇḍārthatvānupapātteḥ (TP, p. 107).

¹¹⁷ Nānu prakṛṣṭaparakāśaś candra ityādilakṣaṇavākyeṣu dṛṣṭam saṃsargāgocarapramitījanakatvam iti cen mai 'vam. Lakṣaṇavākyair api lakṣyasya sajātīyavijātiyebhyo vyāvṛttatvena pratipādanāt tacchabdair vyavahartavyatvena pratipādanād vā lakṣaṇavākyānām api saṃsr̥ṣṭārthatvānativr̥tteḥ (Loc. cit.).

lack of definition of identity-propositions is not based upon a correct appraisal of the situation. An identity-proposition (that is to say, a proposition which has simple identity as its import) can be defined as a proposition which is the cause of authentic apprehension of a fact which is bereft of a relation. It may also be defined as a proposition having the import of one single word as its ultimate meaning, though there are other words connected with it in the proposition and though they are not synonyms. Definitions, as a rule, answer to this description. The contention of the opponent that a definition serves to state a fact as distinguished from similar and dissimilar things is guilty of the fallacy of putting the cart before the horse. The confusion can be cleared by the dilemma: Does the proposition directly assert the distinction of the fact defined or indirectly by logical implication? As regards the first horn of the dilemma, it will suffice to remark that there is no occasion for direct assertion of distinction, simply because the definition makes a positive statement of what a fact is. Thus, for instance, in the definition—'The luminary possessed of the greatest bulk of light is the moon', there is no such word as states the distinction of the moon from what it is not. It is a universally admitted rule that a verbal proposition can convey only the meanings of the words bodily present and not a meaning which is not expressed by a word. In conformity with this law it must be admitted that distinction or negation of an opposite fact cannot be the direct meaning of a definition. A definition, as we have said, is the statement of a positive fact as to what it is and not what it is not. If it be maintained that negation follows by logical implication, we shall not dispute the point. But it suffices to say that implication is not the meaning of a proposition. Were it not so, the proposition, 'Fetch a cow', could be construed to convey as its import the negation of horse and the like. Of course, the statement of one fact implies the negation of its opposite, but implication is a logical function and as such cannot be the meaning of a verbal expression. In this connexion we should remember the dictum of Śabarasyāmin—"The meaning of a word is what is

not known by other cognitive instruments and the meaning of a meaning is not the meaning of the word." The logical implication of negation is the meaning of the meaning of the proposition and as such cannot be its direct import.¹¹⁸

Thus when negation of the opposite cannot be the direct meaning of a proposition or of a word occurring in it, the contention that the definition as a proposition expresses a fact as qualified by its distinction from the opposite, proceeds from a slipshod and hasty appraisal of the value of a proposition. But the opponent may contend:

Let us drop the question of negation of the opposite as the meaning of a definition. But definitions certainly serve to give us an idea of the thing defined, and this idea enables us to employ it as a subject or a predicate. Thus, for instance, the definition of the moon makes us aware of the luminary as being moon. That this is the meaning of the definition can be brought home by a regular syllogistic argument. "That luminary in particular is to be understood as moon, because it is possessed of the greatest bulk of light. Whatever is not moon is not possessed of such an attribute. But the luminary concerned is not like the tiny stars bereft of this attribute. Therefore, it is not other than moon." The import of the proposition is, therefore, a judgment in which the subject is the luminary and the predicate is the quality of being understood as the moon. So the plea of simple identity as the meaning of a definition falls to pieces.¹¹⁹

The contention seems to be plausible enough, but it is based upon confusion. What is the meaning of the predicate in question—'to be understood as moon'? Does it mean that the subject should be understood as an objective fact which is the meaning of the moon, or that it should be designated by the word moon? The first alternative is not capable of being

¹¹⁸Kim prakṛṣṭaparakāśādivākyaṃ sāksād anyato vyāvṛttiṃ pratipādayati, kim vā svarūpapatipādanenā 'rthāt. Nā 'dyaḥ. Vyāvṛttipratipādakaśabdābhāvāt. Nā 'pi dvītiyaḥ. Nāntariyakatayā sidhyato 'rthasya śabdārthatvābhāvāt (TP, p. 109).

¹¹⁹Nanv ayaṃ candra itī vyavahartavyaḥ prakṛṣṭatve sati prakāśatvāt, yaṃ nai 'vaṃ na tad evaṃ, yathā nakṣatrādi, na tathā cā 'yaṃ, tasmān na tathe 'ti kevalavyatirekī-tayā lakṣaṇavākyaṃ paryavasyati tathā ca katham akhaṇḍārthatā (Loc. cit.)

maintained, simply because it begs the question—which is the moon ? The construction put upon it by the opponent presupposes the knowledge of the moon as an objective fact on the part of the interrogator. The question, however, implies that the interrogator is not aware of what a moon is. The answer alone would be appropriate which will make the interrogator aware of the moon. He does not enquire about the quality of the moon but about the identity of it. The question of quality would arise only after he is given to understand what the moon is as a fact and not before. Besides, the opponent makes the definition serve as a case of inference having for its predicate the moon as an objective fact. But inference is possible if there is previous knowledge of the predicate as the concomitant of the *probans*. Were the predicate known before, the inference would be altogether uncalled-for and redundant, because it would only make known a fact which was known before. It may, however, be argued that the question presupposes only a general sort of knowledge that the idea of the moon has got an object of its own attended by ignorance of its specific character. And the inference is intended to give this specific information. But this contention of general knowledge has no bearing upon the question at issue. The fact that the idea has got an objective fact for its meaning does not give any advantage unless the fact is known. Without the knowledge of the objective fact the idea may be affiliated to anything as its meaning. And if the meaning were previously known, the question would have no purpose and *raison d'être*.¹²⁰ If the opponent insists that the definition gives knowledge of the fact and also of the quality possessed by it, we should say that he is guilty of exaggeration. The definition must give knowledge of the fact which is the object of interrogation, and this can be given as the predicate. And if any other fact is to be predicated of it as an attribute, it can be given in another proposition. It is improbable that one proposition should yield knowledge of two independent predicates. The interrogator's question is about the identity

¹²⁰TP, p. 109.

of the moon, and the answer becomes complete by giving out this identity. Any further information is simply otiose and irrelevant and, apart from its relevancy, it cannot be vouchsafed by the self-same proposition. The definition of the moon as the largest luminary is set forth in answer to the query of a child who does not know the meaning of the word 'moon'. What the child wants to know is the fact that is called by the name of the moon, and the definition helps him to identify the luminary so called. The meaning of the proposition is the fact itself, which is the object of the question. 'You ask about the moon? Well, this is the moon.' The answer is complete. If further information is volunteered, such as 'this is the moon and it is circular in shape and is bright, etc.', it will be in excess. Moreover, the compound proposition is the aggregate of two propositions, each having a different predicate of its own. It consists of two propositions—(i) Such and such is the moon and (ii) the moon is circular and bright. The second proposition is redundant and also irrelevant as an answer to the query. If, however, the second proposition is offered as the meaning of the definition, it will be unintelligible to the person who does not know the meaning of the word moon. So the opponent must admit either of the two alternatives: that the definition has got a meaning or is downright nonsense. The answer and question must refer to an identical fact. It is no answer to point to a cow when asked about a horse.

It was contended that the meaning of the definition of the moon was that the largest luminary was *to be understood as the moon*. We have tried to bring out the implication of the predicate, 'to be understood as the moon', and we have found that the word 'moon' cannot mean the objective fact to the person who does not know the meaning of the word. The position will not improve if it be supposed that the predicate, 'to be understood as the moon', means 'to be signified by the word moon.' For in that case the purpose of the definition would be to make known to the hearer the relation of the word to an objective fact. But a definition is hardly required for that purpose. We do not stand in need of a definition for

understanding the meaning of a word.¹²¹ Moreover, what the child, in asking the question, wants to know is not that 'there is a thing which is called the moon' or that 'a thing is to be understood as designated by that term', but simply the meaning of the term, i.e., the objective fact itself. He already knows that there is an entity which is designated by the term 'moon'. But this does not advance his knowledge even by an iota unless he knows what the thing is. He is interested in the entity itself, and if the proposition helps him to detect the entity, it will be significant enough. The child will be satisfied when he knows what the moon is. The further fact that the entity is designated by such and such a word will be a consequential deduction which may be meaningful only after the subject is understood. It must, therefore, be admitted that a definition serves to give us knowledge of an entity as an identity and the subject-object form involved in the constitution of the proposition is only a necessary expedient for the discovery of such an identity. It is not gainsaid that the definition *qua* a verbal proposition expresses a subject, a predicate and a relation between them. But the verbal judgment yielded by it does not by itself satisfy the curiosity of the interrogator unless it enables him to spot out the entity which is sought to be defined. Once that entity is known, the interrogator is satisfied and any further information would be in excess. That this is the case follows from the consideration that the predicate, 'is designated by the word moon', is affirmed of the thing called the moon and not any other thing. So the definition can become significant only if the subject is known, and if the definition in question makes the subject known, that alone should be regarded as its meaning. The knowledge of the fact that it is designated by the word 'moon' or that it is distinct from other luminaries of lesser magnitude is rather consequential upon the knowledge of the identity. It may be contended that the moon as an individual luminary and also as possessed of a character was already perceived by the person asking the question—What

¹²¹Lakṣaṇam vinā 'pi gavādīśabdānām iva vṛddhavyavahārād eva vācyavācakaśaṁ-bandhagrahopapatteḥ (TP, p. 110).

is the moon ? The answer that such and such a luminary is the moon would not give knowledge of an unknown fact if the identity were the meaning. It would become significant only if it is conceded that the proposition makes known the relation of the word with the object. But the contention ignores the crucial point that though the moon was known as a luminary, it was not known in its character as moon. The child asking the question does not want to know the relation of the word and its meaning but the fact itself, viz, the moon as moon. This was not known antecedently to the knowledge yielded by the definition. So it must be conceded that a definition gives knowledge of the fact in its specific character, e.g., of the moon in its character of moon and not of a luminary. It is knowledge not merely of a word-meaning but of a fact in respect of a character which was not known as such. To put an additional meaning would amount to giving a twist to the plain deliverance of a proposition and would amount to confusion of an earlier event with a later one.

It must, therefore, be admitted that a definition purports to give knowledge of a substantive fact as it is in itself, and that the different qualifying clauses only help the hearer to eliminate other unwanted entities and light upon the identity of the entity which is defined by the proposition. The fact that the meaning of the substantive is understood in itself unqualified by the meanings of the other words occurring in the proposition and undetermined by any relation to the meanings of the accompanying words, is emphasized by the Vedāntist as the unrelated meaning of the proposition. The definition as a verbal proposition gives this knowledge of simple identity precisely in the same way and manner in which other verbal propositions deliver their meanings. The fact that a definition, in so far as it states a peculiar characteristic of the subject, acts as the ground of inference of its difference from similar and dissimilar facts, is a corollary from the verbal meaning of simple identity and, as such, can neither precede nor synchronize with the import of the proposition.

That all definitions have this characteristic import is not open to doubt. However much the subject of the definition,

i.e., the thing sought to be defined, may vary, there is no departure from the truth that the meaning of the substantive is understood as a simple fact unqualified by the meanings of the adjectival words standing in syntactical relation with it. The meaning of all definitions is an unrelated fact. There is no exception to this rule even when the substantive to be defined is *relation* itself. Thus, for example, the definition of conjunction, which is a relation, as 'the contact of two things which were separate from each other' or that of inherence as 'an uncaused relation', are not exceptions even though their contents are relations.¹²² When it is asserted that the meaning of a definition is a non-relational concept, the meaning of this assertion is that the meaning of the substantive is not qualified by a relation with the meanings of the remaining words. If the fact to be defined happens to be a relation in and by itself, that does not make the 'relation' understood as qualified by its relation with other facts. The meaning of the term defined is a self-contained fact, which is independent of reference to anything else that stands outside. Relation when defined stands by itself and has no reference to any further relation, and it is this unrelatedness of the fact understood as its meaning which is characterized as the import of simple identity. The meaning of other propositions is not a simple fact but one that is hedged round by a network of relations. So these propositions are excluded from the category of identity-propositions.

The identity-proposition may be further defined as a 'proposition which, though consisting of several words having different meanings, culminates in the communication of the meaning of one substantive word alone.'¹²³ Now all definitions will be found to answer to this description. A definition seeks to convey definitive knowledge of one fact, and so the word which stands for this substantive fact is the only significant expression the meaning of which we

¹²²Nanv evam api nai 'tal lakṣaṇam aprāptayoḥ prāptis saṁyogo nityas saṁbandhas samavāya ity evamādisaṁbandhapatipādakalakṣaṇavākyeṣv avyāpteh (TP, p. 110).

¹²³Aparyāyaśabdānām ekapratipadikārthamātraparyavasāyitvam akhaṇḍārthatā (Op. cit., p. 111).

endeavour to know. Though the definition is necessarily a proposition consisting of several words related as subject and predicate, its purpose and objective is to state the meaning of the word which denotes this fact. Let us examine the definition of a triangle, for instance. The definition is propounded in response to a question implied or expressed on the part of a student who wants to know what a triangle is. Thus the definition, 'A triangle is a figure enclosed by three straight lines', is a formal proposition. What the definition aims at is nothing but the communication of the meaning of a triangle. In it 'triangle' is the only significant word and the rest only state the meaning of this word. So the whole proposition becomes significant only in so far as it succeeds in setting forth the meaning of one particular word. It is called an identity-proposition because it gives one identical and self-contained meaning of one identical word without reference to the meanings of other words or to the relation in which these meanings stand to the substantive meaning. It is no valid objection to urge that the other words will be redundant and purposeless. They have got their meanings, and these meanings play a necessary part because they contribute to the comprehension of the meaning of the substantive word. These meanings are rather conditions of and means to the realization of the meaning of the substantive word, i.e., of the fact sought to be defined and elucidated. Thus, for instance, the constituent words of the definition of a triangle, viz, a figure enclosed by three straight lines, are each and all significant, because without the understanding of their meanings severally and jointly the meaning of a triangle would not be understood. But the significance of these words lies in the elimination of the opposite concepts.¹²⁴ Thus the word 'figure' implies that it is not a not-figure, 'three' implies that it is not any other number, 'straight lines' signify that they are not oblique curves. Each one of these meanings is necessary to the emergence of the concept of a triangle. But the meanings of the individual words are

¹²⁴Na cai 'vaṁ padāntaravaiyartham. Vyāvartyabhedād arthavattvopapattēḥ (TP. p. 111.).

rather provisional and apparent. The meaning of a triangle is the real and ultimate meaning. The different meanings are intended to be conveyed not for their own sake but for the realization of the meaning of the triangle as it is in itself. The provisional meanings serve to eliminate the false ideas which would divert the attention from the real meaning. They serve to focus the attention upon the real meaning which is a simple identity, and they have their significance because each of them eliminates the opposite idea.

This is also the truth in the case of definitions found in the Upaniṣads. *Brahman* is defined as truth, consciousness, infinity, bliss and self. Now these different terms serve to eliminate the opposite concepts. Truth rebuts falsity, consciousness negates inconscience, infinity excludes finitude, self negates not-self, and bliss excludes the concept of pain. It is only by the implied negation of these opposite concepts that the words culminate in giving the definitive unambiguous concept of *Brahman*. Though the meanings of the different words are different, the meaning of *Brahman* is not affected by this plurality. The different meanings which are provisionally understood as antecedent conditions serve only to rebut the illusory ideas of falsity and the like. But when they culminate in the elucidation of the meaning of *Brahman*, which is the ultimate objective, the provisional meanings are left behind and we get only a simple fact. It will be a travesty of truth if the provisional meanings are regarded as ultimate, because what the text seeks to make us understand is only the meaning of the Absolute Reality, viz, *Brahman*. We are not interested in the different meanings, positive and negative, on their own account. But if the text gave us knowledge of any other thing it would be useless and misleading, simply because a statement becomes significant only when it gives us knowledge of the thing which the enquirer after truth wants to understand. What we want to know is *Brahman*, the Absolute Truth. And this statement is intended to give us knowledge of it. The fact is that language, be it divine or human, sacred or profane, is subject to the limitations of the human intellect and has to accommodate

itself to these limitations in order to make itself intelligible to our finite intellect. A simple truth cannot be made intelligible by means of a simple word. This truth can be reached only by the negation of the false ideas, and the necessity of negation makes the employment of several words an inescapable procedure. But the different concepts, positive and negative, drop out when the real meaning is understood. What is sought to be known is a simple fact, and were the different concepts, which are the stepping stones to the realization of this ultimate meaning, to be associated with this latter meaning, the result would be suicidal. The simple meaning would not be understood in its simplicity and thus the whole procedure would stultify itself.¹²⁵

It may be legitimately claimed, we hope, that the Vedāntist has succeeded in making out a strong case in support of his position that a definition *qua* proposition aims at giving the knowledge of a simple fact as it is in itself. The import of a fact of self-identity unqualified by other facts, attributes and relations, makes these propositions distinct and different from other propositions which affirm or deny a predicate of a subject. The verbal form of subject-predicate relation is not necessarily indicative of a judgment proper. The objections raised by the opponent against the possibility of a simple identity in the sense of an uncharacterized or undifferentenced entity are based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of identity-propositions. That a self-identical fact is the meaning of a proposition does not necessarily imply that the fact has no character or that it is not a fact distinct from others in point of reality. What is stressed by the Vedāntist is the truth that here a fact is understood as the meaning of the proposition without reference to its relation with other facts meant by the other words occurring in the proposition. If, on the contrary, the substantive fact conveyed by a definition were thought to be qualified by the characteristics signified by the accompanying words, that would make a definition

¹²⁵Evam ca tattacchabdajanyavijñānānām tattadbhinnākārasamarpiṇām nāntarīyakatayā tattadvirodhyākāranivartakatvād vākyasyā 'khaṇḍārthatvasiddhiḥ (TP, p. 111).

either a false assertion or just a piece of nonsense. Nāgārjuna in his *Mādhyamikakārikā* draws attention to the problem involved in the ordinarily current conception of a definition.¹²⁶ A definition states certain characteristics which are peculiar to the subject, i.e., of the object to be defined. Now, the characteristics predicated may stand in the relation of identity or otherness to the subject supposed to be defined. If the characteristic attributes were identical with the subject, the subject would be left undefined by a characteristic. If, on the other hand, they were different from the subject quite as attributes not belonging to it are different, then they would not characterize the subject and would leave the latter undefined. Thus a definition becomes an unmeaning assertion and, what is worse, gives the false impression of defining a thing without actually doing so. This dilemma ought not to be dismissed as a mere play upon words. It focuses our attention upon the dubious character of a definition, though to an uncritical and unreflective mind it seems quite legitimate and significant. To abuse one's rival is not a philosophically sound argument. The Vedāntist correctly apprehended the difficulty, but found it to be the consequence of a linguistic convention taken at its face value. If the import of a definition were a judgment in the strict sense of the term, the difficulty alleged by Nāgārjuna would be insurmountable. But as the import is not a judgment involving subject-predicate relation but a simple identity, the problem does not arise at all. The problem of relation between the subject and the predicate, the defined substantive and the defining adjective, is to be solved by those who think that definition is the assertion of a predicate in respect of a subject. The Vedāntist lays stress upon the fact that the import of a proposition is a self-identical substantive fact which is independent of relational concepts. So the problem is simply *non est* from his point of view.

The Vedāntist again lays emphasis upon the fact that the meaning of a definition is the substantive unqualified by the

¹²⁶ II, 1,

meaning of any other word. Whether the substantive has a character of its own integrated with it does not affect the stand he has taken. This depends upon the nature of the substantive which is defined. Even if the substantive fact be possessed of a character, it is understood as a simple, self-contained entity unfettered by any attribute standing outside. But the definitions given in the Upaniṣadic texts regarding the Absolute give the knowledge of an entity which is a simple identity in the strict sense of the term, because the Absolute is unambiguously undetermined and undefined by any characteristic which is numerically other than and outside of the Infinite Reality which the Absolute is understood to be.

But a problem has been raised. How can there be a definition regarding the Absolute unless we have knowledge of it? An unknown thing cannot be defined and a thing known does not need definition. Certainly we mortals cannot pretend to have knowledge of the Infinite Reality which comprehends the whole of existence within its orbit. So a definition of such an entity, even if its ontological possibility be not denied, will be perfectly abortive because it will be quite unintelligible. To this question the Vedāntist gives the answer that a definition does not presuppose a full and thorough knowledge of the thing defined. It becomes effective and useful by making the knowledge, which we already possessed in a confused manner of the thing defined, precise and specific. The objection would invalidate the utility of all definitions if full knowledge of the object of definition were an antecedent condition of the knowledge of the definition. As regards the Absolute Brahman of which there are numerous definitions and descriptions in the Upaniṣads, it ought to suffice to know that it is not altogether alien to our being. Our self-consciousness, i.e., the consciousness of the self, is witness to the Absolute which presents itself as the individual self. The individual self has no reality outside the Absolute, and by knowing our inner being we know the Absolute though our knowledge is imperfect and inadequate. The self in us is identical with the Absolute though the infinite expanse of its being is not realized. The definition only serves

to give us knowledge of the self unfettered by the limitations imposed by ignorance of our own nature. A definition, therefore, gives us knowledge wider and more comprehensive and makes the previous conception free from doubt and confusion.¹²⁷

We have already discussed the implication of definition and also its *prima facie* import, and have considered the reasons which lead the Vedāntist to adjudge it as an identity-proposition. But definitions are not the only case of verbal propositions which have the import of identity. The propositions which assert the numerical identity of a past datum with a present one or of two different concepts should also be interpreted as identity-propositions, i.e., as propositions which give out identity as the ultimate meaning. Let us consider the proposition, 'Certainly this is the very man whom I saw before at Patna' or 'Certainly this man is Mr. So and So who delivered a lecture in the Town Hall two years ago.' Now, what is the import of these propositions? They certainly express on the part of the speaker his recognition of a person, and recognition is always a cognition of identity. The propositions assert also this knowledge of identity. Now, the question is: what sort of identity is intended to be asserted? Is the past man asserted to be identical with the present? In other words, is the man qualified by his relation to a previous particular spatio-temporal context asserted to be identical with the man who is seen in a present spatio-temporal context? Now, the two spatio-temporal settings are numerically different. The past spatio-temporal determination is no longer present. And when one recognizes the identity of such a man in a present spatio-temporal setting, the previous spatio-temporal determination drops out from the focus of his attention. If the past determination were felt as an adjective of the person, that would make the cognition of identity impossible. So the past determination must be admitted to be left out of account when the identity of the

¹²⁷Na cā' prasiddhatvād Brahmaṇo lakṣyatvāsambhavaḥ, pratyagātmatayā svatasāmānyena prasiddhatvāt. Na ca tathātve lakṣaṇavaiyarthyaṁ, lakṣaṇasya viśeṣākāra-samarpaṇārthatvāt (TP, p. 112).

person is asserted. But is the present spatio-temporal determination felt as an integral adjective? The answer must be that the present spatio-temporal determination is also ignored. The assertion of identity does not imply the identity of the person actually perceived in the past with the person felt as determined by a different spatio-temporal context actually perceived in the present. The present spatio-temporal context is being perceived and so cannot be an object of doubt or enquiry for the rebuttal of which the assertion may be called into request. But the very assertion implies that the identity is realized not without some deliberation. But there can be no doubt regarding the present time and place in which the person is observed. So it should be admitted that the identity of the man is felt and asserted regardless of the spatio-temporal situations. These spatio-temporal determinations are rather accidental to the history of the person and have no relevancy to his personal identity.¹²⁸

But it may be argued that the identity of the person can be established even if the man perceived in the past is felt as actually living in the present. The identity of the person with the person felt as existing in the present is stressed, though the past spatio-temporal determination is not felt as a qualifying adjective of him. The man felt without reference to the past context is felt merely as a man, pure and simple, and there is no incompatibility in this man taking on a new spatio-temporal determination. The advantage of this interpretation lies in the consideration that in the proposition, 'That man is this man', we have to surrender the meaning of the pronominal adjective 'that' only. In other words, though the subject loses a part of its meaning, the predicate retains its meaning intact. The alternative interpretation is that the simple identity of the man is asserted without reference to the temporal determinations connoted by the pronominal adjectives, 'that' and 'this'. But this is open to the objection that the meanings of both the subject and the predicate are mutilated. What is intended to be asserted is

¹²⁸Devadattasvarūpamātrasyai 'va bubhutsitatvāt (TP, p. 113).

the identity of the man, and when this can be settled with the modification of the subject alone, the modification of both the subject and the predicate is an unwarrantable procedure. Of course, the meaning will be the identity with the present man of the past man felt simply as man. The other interpretation seeks to assert the identity of the past man with the present man as of man with man. In other words, it is contended that it is an assertion of a man's identity, simple and unqualified.

The Vedāntist endorses the latter interpretation, not because it reinforces his theory of identity-proposition, but because it is forced by an inescapable logical necessity. The obviously felt assertion of identity has compelled the opponent to take the subject, 'that man', in the sense of a man, pure and simple, without reference to the past spatio-temporal setting. The subject understood as a man *qua* man, i.e., without a temporal determination, cannot be regarded as identical with a man qualified by another temporal determination. If, in fact, the past man is the present man, the present man may be regarded as having been in the past. But the past and the present are incompatible and so the assertion of identity cannot have reference to the temporal determinations.¹²⁹ Besides, the assertion, 'The past lives in the present', can have significance only if the sameness of the man is implied. But the implication of the sameness of the man can be significant only if the temporal determinations are left out of account as irrelevant accidents. The opponent is compelled to make simple identity the logical implication, though he hesitates to regard it as the direct import of the proposition. But the Vedāntist regards this roundabout interpretation as the outcome of timidity. The opponent is deterred by the prospect of surrender of the primary meanings of both the subject and the predicate, though he endorses this consequence in the logical interpretation of the assertion of identity.¹³⁰ The resort to secondary meanings

¹²⁹Viśiṣṭāviśiṣṭasvarūpayor abhedāsambhavāt. Tathā sati vartamānakālavīṣiṣṭasya pūrvam api sadbhāvaprasaṅgāt (TP, p. 113).

¹³⁰Ubhayapadalakṣaṇāśrayaṇe kalpanāgauravāt...(TP, p. 113).

both in the subject and in the predicate is advocated by the Vedāntist because this is a means to the assertion of identity. This leads to the admission of identity as the only meaning, which ought to be preferred to the admission of two different meanings, one direct and another indirect, viz, of the subject as qualified and of the same as unqualified by a temporal determination.¹³¹

Now let us consider the assertion of identity between two different facts having incompatible connotations, e.g., of the identity of the individual self with the Super Self, i.e., the *Brahman*, in the Upaniṣads, 'Thou art That.' 'Thou' here stands for the individual self with all its limitations and 'That' stands for the Omniscient and Omnipotent Soul. Obviously the assertion of the individual soul, subject to ignorance and limitation of power, as being identical with the All-powerful and All-knowing perfect Soul would have been dismissed as downright nonsense had it not occurred in the Vedic text in which the father instructs his son about the ultimate mystery. The assertion of identity again would have been an instance of unmitigated absurdity had there not been a core of identity in their substance. Both the individual and the Super Soul agree in respect of the element of consciousness. Now, consciousness cannot be numerically or qualitatively different if taken by itself. The difference of consciousness appears only when there is difference of contents or of the psycho-physical organism in which it manifests itself. The self is pure consciousness. If there were any element alien to consciousness, that would make it equivalent to unconscious matter. The Upaniṣad asserts that the self is consciousness compact and indivisible, and that there is no difference between one soul and another so far as its essential character as consciousness is taken into account. When the individual self is affirmed to be the same thing as the Super Self, the assertion of sameness has a reference only to consciousness and nothing else. The fact that the Super Self is Omniscient and Omnipotent and the individual self

¹³¹Bubhutsitārthapratipādanaprayojanatāyā gauravasyai 'vo 'citatvāt (Op. cit., p 114).

is an entity of limited knowledge and power, is not lost sight of. But the attributes of power and also of being knower are neither absolute characteristics nor integral features of consciousness. The concept of knower is relative to the quantity and magnitude of the content. The limited knower implies that the content of knowledge is limited, and the opposite concept of the unlimited knower implies unlimited magnitude of the content. The self as pure consciousness, however, has no reference to the content. The content is rather a foreign matter which comes to be associated with it. The difference between the individual self as the limited knower and the Super Self as the unlimited knower is relative to the difference in the magnitude of the content. So the concepts of knowledge and knower and known are relative and so cannot be the correct representation of consciousness. When, however, the identity between these two apparently opposite principles is asserted in the Vedic texts, it can have significance only if the accidental character of knowerhood is left out of account and the emphasis is laid upon the fundamental integrity of consciousness which does not admit of any intrinsic difference. And the two souls are, therefore, asserted to be identical only because their entire being consists in pure consciousness and the determinations of knowerhood and the like are rather accidental adjuncts.

The Upaniṣadic proposition compelled us to enter into the metaphysical discussion of the nature of the self. We have here followed the interpretation proposed by the philosophers of the Monistic school. The question with which we are dealing, however, is a logical one. The metaphysical issues introduced may give the impression that the logical evaluation of the proposition has been predetermined by a metaphysical bias. So we propose to give an ordinary example to prove that the implication of identity is purely logical in character, e.g., 'The King is the Supreme Head of the armed forces.' In this proposition the identity of the person holding the two offices is affirmed. The office of the King and that of the Supreme Head of armed forces are numerically and qualitatively different. To assert, therefore, that the

Supreme Head of the armed forces is the King would be false and misleading if the official positions involved real distinction. But even an ordinary man, perfectly innocent of logical discipline, does not find any difficulty in understanding the meaning of the assertion. Where can, therefore, the identity exist ? Certainly it is not between two officers but only in the personality of the man who holds the two offices. The occupation of the two offices is rather an accidental event and does not involve numerical or qualitative difference in the person concerned. The identity asserted between the two officials is, therefore, to be understood in respect of the person taken as an integer which is left entirely unaffected by the accidents of office. The import of the proposition, therefore, is this identity of the person considered by itself without reference to the official determinations which are external to the personal identity. We have deliberately chosen this commonplace assertion in order to avoid controversial issues. The Upaniṣadic proposition stands on a par with this commonplace assertion. So logically considered both the propositions are to be regarded as identity-propositions as defined by us. The question whether there can be ontological identity between the individual self and the Super Self is a question of metaphysics. We have given a short account of the metaphysical considerations which have led the Vedāntist to accept the logical import at its face value. The import of the proposition is characterized by us as logical, not because it gives the logical justification of the import derived from the proposition, but because the import is necessitated by logical consideration of the incompatibility of the primary meanings. The assertion of identity of the individual soul with the Super Soul is bound to be absurd if the primary meanings are taken into account. This absurdity necessitates resort to the secondary meanings. This is everywhere the case in all propositions having a secondary import. The logical considerations entail the surrender of the primary meanings and the adoption of secondary meanings. But the import of the proposition is direct and verbal in character irrespective of the consideration whether the meanings of the

individual words are primary or secondary. We have used the term logical meaning in the present context only in view of the antecedent logical considerations. It must on no account be confounded with the logical implication of the meaning of a proposition. The logical implication of the meaning of a proposition is rather the meaning of the meaning. But the identity import is the direct meaning of the proposition and is not derived by implication from the meaning. The contention of the Vedāntist that the different kinds of proposition under review are identity-propositions is supported by weighty arguments.

We have tried our best to represent the Vedāntist theory of identity-propositions with all its logical strength and to make it intelligible to a modern student of philosophy. There is no doubt that the adjudication of the logical issues will have a momentous bearing upon the metaphysical problems. But the present problem should be approached and adjudged from the logical point of view, and it will not be conducive to the appreciation of the problem and its solution if metaphysical considerations are allowed to prejudge the logical issue. In fact, the philosophers of the other schools of Vedānta have tried to give a different interpretation of these propositions in consonance with their metaphysical position. But it must be said to their credit that they have not repudiated the direct import of identity. They have tried to interpret this deliverance of identity in a different light from a consideration of the implications of the *prima facie* import. The difference is in the meaning which they derive from the meaning of the proposition. We are not concerned with the metaphysical issues. Our concern is with the direct propositional import, and if the import of identity is accepted as the direct deliverance of the proposition, our task is fulfilled. What we have sought to prove is that the subject-predicate relation is not the meaning of all propositions. And this should be regarded as an original contribution of the Vedāntist to the philosophy of word and meaning.

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